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The idea for this thesis was born in an elevator.  That was in 2001, and I was interning at the 
UN headquarters in New York, thanks to an arrangement overseen by Dr Marco Martiniello.  
I got stuck one day in an elevator with a man I had never met, who happened to be H.E. 
Enele Sopoaga, the freshly-appointed ambassador of Tuvalu to the United Nations.  Prior to 
that moment, I had never heard of Tuvalu; if I had, I might have imagined it was one of those 
exotic micro-states that seemed designed for honeymooners. 
 
Being stuck in an elevator has many drawbacks, but the one positive thing is that you get to 
talk with people you might not have had a chance to talk to otherwise.  Naturally, I asked my 
elevator-fellow about his country.  And while we were waiting for the operators to fix the 
elevator, he started telling a story that I found almost incredible: the story of a country so 
small and so flat that it was at risk of being washed away by rising sea-levels.  I told him I 
found the story compelling.  He replied that telling it to as many people as possible was his 
raison d’être in New York.  The elevator started working again, and we parted.   
 
Back at the Belgian mission, I told my supervisor, Jean-Paul Charlier, about my encounter in 
the elevator.  And he brought up the topic of ‘environmental refugees’: the massive 
population displacements that were to happen in the future, the lack of legal status, climate 
justice, … All subjects that are now familiar, but which sounded like terrae incognitae back then.  
Our conversation was an eye-opener; and so when Marco Martiniello, himself a specialist of 
migration, suggested I embark on a PhD a few years later, it seemed only natural for me to 
choose this topic.  The subject was still very marginal at that time, and Tuvalu appeared more 
a unique case than representative of a wider phenomenon.  Marco Martiniello, however, 
believed the topic was promising, and Dr Catherine de Wenden, another migration specialist 
whom I had contacted to act as joint supervisor, shared the same opinion.  Over the years, I 
have been struck by the growing importance of the topic in public and scholarly debates, and 
the overwhelming number of studies, reports, recommendations, proposals and press articles 




1. Goal o f  the Thes i s  
 
What then might be my contribution in this emerging field of study? A few scholars had 
written on the topic already – Richard Black was one of them – but overall it was a largely 
under-researched area, so there were plenty of avenues to explore.  Most of the literature that 
existed on the topic in 2004-2005 touched upon two distinct aspects: 
 
- A first group of works aimed to conceptualise the topic: how does the environment 
impact migration? How do people react to environmental stressors? Does 
environmental migration exist? How can it be defined? How many people will move? 
These were some of the questions posed, and most of them have not yet been fully 
answered, to a large extent because of the lack of empirical research. 
 
- A second body of literature was concerned with the protection of people uprooted by 
environmental changes: it stressed that ‘environmental refugees’ were actually not 
considered refugees and were not protected by any international convention, and that 




These two clusters of works reflected, on the whole, the classic ambivalence between 
fundamental research and policy-oriented research.  I thought that it would be interesting to 
see whether both approaches could be combined, and could inform each other.  It seemed 
that one was the consequence of the other, and that there was a one-way relationship: 
appropriate policy instruments could be developed only when environmental migration was 
defined, estimated and identified.  Fundamental research would orient policy-making, and 
more research was needed.   The other side of the relationship, however, seemed less 
explored: could policies also inform concepts, as concepts inform policies? 
 
I was struck, in particular, by the debates surrounding the use of the term ‘refugee’: though the 
term had a legal as well as a sociological meaning (Suhrke 1994), it seemed that the fact that 
the term was legally defined was preventing any further use in another context, as if the 
Geneva Convention had pre-empted all other possible definitions (Castles 2004).  Refugees, as 
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a sociological category, had been defined by the instrument that was designed to protect them.  
This definition is a classic example of the performative function of law: given its status as an 
international agreement ratified by Western powers, the Geneva Convention created refugees 
as a social category at the same time as it defined them legally.  This Convention, however, 
was the product of a specific political context, an outcome of conflicting interests and 
strategies.  Hence the conceptualisation of ‘refugee’, as a sociological category, was determined 
by a specific normative framework.   
 
 Could the same be true for environmental migration? How was the conceptualisation of the 
term influenced by normative frameworks of, and policy responses to, this social 
phenomenon? How was the term constructed as a category? Could it correspond to a 
categorical void in norms and policies? I was interested in the construction of the concept: 
this is what this work is about. 
 
It could be argued that a discussion of policies is premature, as the debate on the very nature 
of environmental migration is still ongoing.  I contend that discussion of both should go hand 
in hand, and mutually influence each other.  My central argument in this research is that 
policies play a key role in determining whether displacements occur, and which form they 
take.  As Zolberg has argued with regard to international migration, that ‘it is state actions (…) 
that determine whether any international migration will take place at all’, and ‘it is the policies 
of the receivers which determine whether movement can take place, and of what kind’ 
(Zolberg 1989: 405-406).  Waddington makes a similar argument for internal migration 
(Waddington 2003).  In the next section, I will develop one of the main hypotheses of this 
research concerning the central role of the state in determining patterns of environmental 
migration: I argue that these patterns are, to a large extent, determined by the policies 
implemented to address these migrations rather than by the environmental change per se. 
 
This research does not aim to map environmental migration or discuss the linkages that exist 
between environmental change and migration1, but will rather focus on the policy responses, 
normative frameworks and institutional arrangements that aim to address these migrations 
and protect migrants.   
 
                                                
1 The main components of this debate will be presented in the next chapter. 
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Ultimately, my question relates to the long-debated relationship between research and policy, 
and their mutual influence. But which policies to choose? From which level of analysis to 
depart? It seemed that environmental migration was most influenced by environmental and 
migration policies.  Both were understood as broad concepts that encompassed a wide range 
of interventions: from disaster management to climate policy on the one hand, and from 
asylum to governance of migration on the other hand.  But each of the two fields were 
concerned by an overarching concept: the changes in the environment in the case of 
environmental studies, and the movement of people in the case of migration studies.  Both 
concepts were absolutely central to environmental migration, which was born out of the 
coincidence of these concepts.   
 
My goal is therefore to examine the norms and policies that relate to movements of people 
triggered by environmental changes, and how they inform the debates on environmental 
migration and shape its conceptualisation.   
 
How should I proceed to conduct this review? From a methodological point of view, a great 
source of inspiration has been the work conducted by Dr Francis Deng.  In 1992, the UN 
Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, appointed Deng as his special representative for 
internally-displaced persons (IDPs).  By the early 1990s, the number of IDPs worldwide had 
surged, and their situation was widely perceived as a major humanitarian crisis, which required 
the development of new frameworks of protection.  Francis Deng was therefore entrusted 
with the task of creating an ‘appropriate framework’ for addressing the plight of IDPs, and he 
enjoyed great latitude regarding the possible formats of this framework (Kälin 2001).  Deng’s 
first act was to set up a team of researchers at the Brookings Institution to review all 
international norms that might apply to IDPs.  The researchers focused their investigations on 
human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law: they identified protection gaps and key 
areas, inferences of some rights from certain provisions, and areas where the law should be 
restated, complemented, or transposed.  Overall, they concluded that although neither 
humanitarian law, nor refugee, nor human rights law alone could provide adequate protection 
to IDPs, the combination of the three bodies of law had the potential to do so.  Their 
conclusions, summarised in a document entitled ‘Internally Displaced Persons: Compilation 
and Analysis of Legal Norms’ (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 1998), showed the complementarities between the different bodies of law, and 
established the basis for the development of Guiding Principles on Internal Displacements, a 
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series of key principles aimed at safeguarding human rights in situations of internal 
displacement, which were adopted in 1998.  One of the factors that made the Guiding 
Principles a successful instrument of protection on the ground was that they were firmly 
rooted in international law: they did not create any new law, but rather combined norms and 
principles that already existed but were scattered in different agreements and conventions, 
uniquely bridging separate, but connected, branches of law. 
 
The intention of this thesis is certainly not to draft a framework for the protection of 
environmentally displaced people.  A number of such attempts have been made: in recent 
years, an impressive and proliferating number of initiatives have successfully portrayed 
environmentally displaced people as ‘forgotten migrants’, ‘legal gypsies’ (Conisbee and Simms 
2003), those unprotected by any norm of international law.  A number of studies, workshops, 
declarations and projects – some of a legislative nature – have called for the development of 
new policy instruments and international agreements to address the plight of ‘environmental 
refugees’. Very recently, a group of legal scholars from the University of Limoges (France) 
drafted a ‘convention on the international status of environmentally-displaced persons’, which 
aimed to combine key principles from both environmental law and refugee law, an endeavour 
that had not previously been undertaken (Prieur et al. 2008). 
 
Hence my approach is inspired by the seminal work of the team set up by Francis Deng – at a 
more modest level, it goes without saying – but is different in nature: this work is not a legal 
analysis, and has no pretensions to that field.  My aim is different: I have chosen to examine 
how social categories and concepts are shaped by law, which itself is the outcome of interactions between political 
values and interests. This research revolves around this central question. Thus my goal is not to 
discuss normative frameworks as such, but rather how these frameworks are political 
constructs and inform the concept of environmental migration.  The process, rather than the 
outcome, is the fundamental unit of analysis.   
 
There are however, two significant conceptual differences between environmental migration 
and internal displacement, which ought to be mentioned at this stage.  Firstly, internal 
displacement is more easily conceptualised than environmental migration.  Although there is 
some debate on the definition of the causes of internal displacement,2 two elements are 
                                                
2 In particular on the inclusion or not of natural disasters as a root cause of internal displacement (Phuong 2004: 
30) 
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decisive in the conceptualisation of displacement: the absence of crossing an international 
border, and the coercive character of the movement.  Such elements do not appear as clearly 
in the case of environmental migration, hence no common definition has yet been agreed 
upon: environmental migration encompasses both internal and international movement, and 
forced as well as voluntary migration.  Secondly, in the definition above, internal displacement 
is conceived exclusively as the result of forced migration: therefore, the frameworks that 
address these displacements are primarily concerned with protection and assistance.  
Environmental migration, in addition to coerced displacements, also encompasses some 
voluntary movements, where ‘pull’ factors play an important role.  Relevant norms and 
policies are therefore more complex and varied, as they must also address migration 
management and governance, in addition to protection and assistance.  The former, however, 
are much more developed on the international level, whereas the latter remain confined 
mostly to domestic policies (Badie et al. 2008; Martiniello 2001).  My analysis will therefore 
primarily focus on frameworks of protection and assistance, as will be explained below.  These 
differences aside, the principal defining feature of my endeavour is the focus on the policy 
process.   
 
The policy process is examined through the lens of the advocacy coalition framework, an 
innovative method of policy analysis that considers policy outcomes as products of policy 
subsystems organised around competing advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1988).  These coalitions 
revolve around a core system of policy beliefs, and gather a wide range of policy actors: 
institutions, NGOs, the media, but also university scholars.  A core objective of my work is to 
show the role played by these actors in the policy-making process: I argue that academic 
research or media reports are not neutral in this process, but underpinned by a series of core 
values and interests.  Thus the model of the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) seemed 
pertinent, as it allowed the development of the two objectives of this work:  
 
- To show the political construction of the norms and policies that addressed – or not – 
environmental migration; 
- To highlight the relationships between research and policy in this field, and in 
particular how policy impacted upon research, rather than the other way around. 
 
In particular, I was seeking to explain how different value systems could explain the emergence of different 
policy outcomes.  I argue that these outcomes are contingent upon the value system at play in the 
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policy-making process. My hypothesis was that the policy subsystem of environmental 
migration was dominated by two advocacy coalitions, led by scholars of migration studies and 
environmental studies respectively, which I called the sceptical and alarmist coalitions.  With 
regard to policy, the major preoccupation of migration scholars – the sceptical coalition – was 
to uphold the rights of migrants, whereas environmental scholars – the alarmist coalition – 
were primarily concerned with raising awareness and prompting action on environmental 
change, and global warming in particular.  Both values were sensible and commendable policy 
beliefs as such, but I made the hypothesis that they could compete with each other when it 
came to environmental migration. 
 
I chose to conduct my research in two distinct fields of norms and policy processes: 
environmental and migrational.  What I hope is a major originality of this work is also one of 
its major limitations, amongst many others:  although it aims to highlight the 
complementarities and parallel developments of environmental and migration policies, only 
these two fields are considered.  Why not consider humanitarian, development and security 
policies, to name just a few other policy areas that would have been relevant? Though 
expanding the research into these areas would have been extremely useful, I chose not to 
enter into these areas (or to do so only marginally), and thus limited the scope and ambition of 
this thesis.  There were several reasons for this limitation.  Firstly, I was constrained by time 
and financial resources.   Secondly, I did not have the appropriate training to conduct an 
investigation in those policy areas.  My educational background is in political science, with an 
emphasis on public law and public administration.  A Master’s degree in Environmental 
Studies from the University of Louvain provided me with valuable insights in this policy area; 
my working environment at CEDEM, as well as an exchange study year spent at New York 
University, helped familiarise me with migration studies.  Finally, a Master’s of Research from 
the London School of Economics allowed me to train in research methods, especially with 
regard to policy analysis.  Thus I could find my way in environmental and migration studies, 
equipped with the tools to analyse relevant policies, but I was not sufficiently confident to 
engage with policy areas in which I had received no formal training, even though this imposed 
a considerable limitation onto my work.  Thirdly, I felt that environmental and migration 
policies related most directly to the two fundamental components of environmental migration: 
environmental changes, and the movements of people.  Other areas touched upon these 
components more marginally, without capturing their essence.  Finally, I assumed that it 
would be more fruitful to analyse the policy areas that environmental and migration scholars – 
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the key actors within advocacy coalitions – were most likely to influence, and to assess how 
their competing values and interests translated into “their” policy fields.   
 
I had fixed upon my subject of study and intended methodology; however the level of analysis 
still remained to be decided.  The Advocacy Coalition Framework takes the most useful unit 
of analysis to apprehend the policy process to be the policy subsystem, rather than a specific 
organisation or programme (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 119). The policy subsystem 
encompasses different levels of policy-making and their interactions, as well as all actors 
concerned with a policy issue. Hence I will investigate the different policy areas in which 
environmental migration is addressed, considered as part of the same policy subsystem. 
International mechanisms play an important role in this subsystem, as most of the extant 
literature addresses environmental migration as a global issue, which needs to be addressed 
globally.  However, the analysis will not be restricted to the international level, but will 
examine how these international mechanisms are informed by regional, national and local 
actors through a bottom-up approach, and how they find concrete applications on the micro-
level. 
 
Analysis at the macro-level will be complemented by the study of two cases at the micro-level: 
the cases of Tuvalu and Katrina.  These cases will serve as illustrations of how actual 
migration has been addressed – or not – by the policy process, and how processes and 
interactions identified at the international level can also reflect at the local level.  
 
These illustrations deal with migration flows associated with sea-level rise in Tuvalu, and with 
hurricane Katrina in New Orleans.  Although both migration flows have been labelled 
‘environmental migration’, they represent very different patterns of migration in different 
institutional settings, resulting in different policies.  One is a proactive, international migration 
flow triggered by slow-onset environmental change, whereas the other is a brutal, reactive 
displacement induced by a sudden event.  Moreover, the migrations happened in places in the 
world that could hardly be further apart.  These cases, which are apparently very dissimilar, 
will be used to illustrate the local dimension of the policy subsystem, and how this local 





Overall, the thesis hopes to make an original contribution in three ways: 
 
1. In demonstrating how environmental migration, as a social category, is a political 
construct.  In doing so, I do not seek to deny or diminish the reality and (growing) 
importance of environmental factors as migration drivers, but rather to show that the 
establishment of environmental migration as a specific type of migration is the result 
of a political process, involving coalitions pursuing different and conflicting interests. 
 
2. In connecting research and policy in an innovative fashion.  In contrast to the 
common assumption that research informs policy-making, I argue that policy-making 
also informs research, and shapes the conceptualisation of environmental migration.  I 
shall examine in particular two areas of policy-making: migration and environmental 
policies.   Although both areas have been considered separately with regard to 
environmental migration, they have not yet been considered together, in their potential 
complementarities and discrepancies. 
 
3. In highlighting the role played by scholars in the policy-making process.  I argue that 
scholars are not neutral, policy-independent agents, but rather policy entrepreneurs, 
whose perception of their topic is shaped by a series of policy objectives and 
fundamental values.  The model of the advocacy coalition framework is used in my 
analysis, through the identification of two funding coalitions, led by environmental 
and migration scholars respectively.  After a thorough review of the literature of both 
coalitions, the subsequent chapters aim to demonstrate how their policy beliefs have 
translated into actual norms and policies.   
 
 
2. Thes i s  Out l ine  
 
 
The thesis is divided into four parts: Part 1 lays the conceptual foundation of the research and 
details its methodology.  Part 2 discusses the components of the environment-migration 
nexus. Part 3 reviews environmental norms and policies, and their relevance to environmental 
migration, while Part 4 conducts a similar exercise for migration policies.   
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The thesis does not use a typical concatenationist format, but rather follows a sequential 
three-step approach: Parts 3 and 4 can be read irrespective of their order.  
 
Chapter 1 presents the theoretical scaffolding for my research.  It shows where and how this 
thesis contributes to existing literature on the subject, and how it relates other works in the 
field.  The relevance of the constructivist approach is explained, as well as the main objectives 
of the thesis.  A subsequent section is devoted to a discussion of the principal theoretical 
models that will be used in the thesis.  Those drawn from environmental studies include the 
principles of environmental economics, as well as theories on climate change and 
vulnerability.  Concerning migration studies, the section seeks to show how classical theories 
of migration can address environmental migration, and what their insufficiencies are.  Chapter 
2 is methodological, and discusses the investigative techniques and methods used in the 
research.  The model of the advocacy coalition framework, the main method of analysis, 
makes up most of this section, but the relevance and methodology of the case studies are also 
addressed.   
 
Chapter 3 opens with an extensive review of the literature on environmental migration, from 
early texts in the field to current policy proposals, and aims to show the origin and evolution 
of the opposition between a sceptical and an alarmist perspective.  Chapter 4 addresses 
different aspects of the environment-migration nexus, which include the issues of definition, 
estimates and predictions, as well as the different drivers and patterns of migration.  A final 
section attempts to propose a three-dimensional theory of environmental migration, and 
clarifies the terms and concepts that will be used in the remaining chapters. 
 
Part 3 is devoted to environmental policies. Chapter 5 begins with an examination of 
international normative frameworks in the fields of disaster management, and some of their 
policy applications. It examines how states and the international community have responded 
to disasters, from early responses in the seventeenth century – with the Great Fire of London 
and the Lisbon Earthquake – to the recent internationalisation and institutionalisation of 
disaster responses.  Chapter 6 looks at the different principles developed in environmental law 
to address environmental changes, and how these principles might apply to environmental 
migration.  It describes how climate change became a matter of international concern, and the 
initiatives that have been taken thus far to address its impact, particularly through adaptation 
strategies.   
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Part 4 conducts a similar exercise for migration, and two areas are considered: the 
international refugee regime and asylum & mobility policies. Chapter 7 reflects on different 
instantiations of the protection of refugees, including the role of the UNHCR, and aims to 
highlight the reasons why environmental factors have never really been considered as a root 
cause of refugee movements.  Chapter 8 examines the different applications of refugee law in 
Europe, as well as the frameworks for protection of the internally-displaced people.  
 
 
* * * 
 
 
I met Enele Sopoaga again in July 2007, fewer than six years after our first encounter in a 
Manhattan elevator.  This time we were both in Funafuti, the small capital atoll of Tuvalu.  I 
was there to conduct fieldwork on his country, and he was returning home after six years 
spent at the United Nations as a plenipotentiary ambassador.  I was standing next to the 
runway when the small Air Chathams’ Convair 580 that was bringing him home landed.  I 
joined the group of friends greeting him and his family upon their arrival in the tiny, packed 
airport.   
 
A few days later, we spent a delightful evening at his home, talking about sea-level rise and 
drinking terrible tea.  His teenage children were speaking flawless English, with a strong 
American accent.  He told me that he remembered me and our conversation in the elevator 
perfectly.  I didn’t dare to ask him whether this was a white lie or not.  He was now a career 




















“My view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no such thing as a logical method 









Many theories and models have struggled to describe and explain environmental changes and 
migration flows over the years. When dealing with environmental migration, an immediate 
temptation is to consider environmental change as the independent variable, and migration as 
the dependent variable. In the analysis of the policy process I plan to conduct, however, I 
intend to consider both variables as social constructs, constituted by the policies created to 
address them.  
 
In Part 1 of the thesis I present the principal theories and methods used in this research.  
Chapter 1 addresses the design of the research, outlining the theories it relies on, the approach 
it will use, and the scholarly contribution it hopes to make. 
 
In the first section, I show the relevance of my research to existing literature, and outline the 
contribution it intends to make to the field on the conceptual level.  The second framework 
outlines the theoretical framework in which the thesis is constructed. I describe and justify the 
constructivist perspective underpinning this work, and explain how the concept of 
environmental migration can be considered as a social construct, and the implications this 
holds for my research methodology. The third section turns to address the main theories and 
models, both from environmental and migration studies, which constitute the theoretical basis 
of my reflections. Although the research deals with a policy-driven conceptualisation of the 
environment-migration nexus, it seemed important, as a first step, to show how both 
components of the nexus were conceptualised separately in the literature. In particular, 
following Piguet (2008), I try to demonstrate how environmental factors have been neglected 
in mainstream migration theories, and the importance of vulnerabilities to discussion of the 
impacts of environmental changes. Finally, in this section I also discuss the linkages between 
research and policy, and the mutual interactions that exist between scientists and policy-
makers. 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the different methods used to conduct my work, and in particular the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework, which is the key model for my analysis of the policy process. 
Although different scholars have used the model for analysing environmental policies, in 
particular forestry policies and pollution control (Burnett and Davis 1999; Grant 1995; Sewell 
 31 
1999), I am not aware of any attempt to apply the model to migration policies, let alone the 
combination of environmental and migration policies. 
 
After a brief description of different theories of the policy process, I turn to the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF) and explain the reasons for my choice of this model. 
Furthermore, the key methods and data used to conduct this research, including its fieldwork 










“One of the major problems the world is going to face in future years is what you  
might call ecological refugees.  It’s a question of national security for the U.S.” 
 
E.  Curtis Bohlen,  






This chapter aims to delineate the main theoretical underpinnings of this research.  Section 1.1 
situates the research within the extant literature on environmental migration, and attempts to 
show the contributions it makes to academic and policy debates.  Section 1.2 discusses the 
nature of these contributions, and outlines the main goals of this work.  The conceptual 
framework is detailed in Section 1.3.  The implications of the constructivist approach as a 
conceptual choice are explained and discussed.  The next cluster of the section discusses the 
mode of selection of the theoretical framework of the research: which theories, which models 
are to be used in order to develop the analysis? This research lies at the crossroads of 
environmental and migration studies: models and theories germane to both fields are 
discussed, and the choices that have been made are justified.  Finally, the linkages between 
research and policy are discussed in a final segment.  
 
                                                
3 Interview with E. Diringer, The Road from Rio Looks More Promising, published in the San Francisco Chronicle, 15 
June 1992, p. A1. 
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1. Relevance of the Topic 
 
As suggested in the Introduction, the existing literature on the linkages between environment 
and migration has mostly concentrated on a central debate between an alarmist, or maximalist 
(Suhrke 1993), perspective, and a more sceptical approach, espoused by many migration 
scholars (Kibreab 1997; Black 2001; Castles 2002).  This debate considers the environmental 
causes and impacts of migration, and their two-way relationship.  Many authors address both 
clusters of the environment-migration nexus (Suhrke 1993; Hugo 1996; Kibreab 1997; Black 
1998; Kliot 2004).  Fewer authors address the environmental impacts of migration specifically 
(Homer-Dixon 1991; Locke et al. 2000b), and the debate has now shifted to focus on the 
causal relationship between environmental change and migration, and in particular forced 
migration.  The increased attention given to climate change and its impacts on populations 
played a major role in this shift.  In a similar fashion, literature and debates on climate change 
have also increasingly devoted more space to the issues of adaptation to the impacts of climate 
change, and not only to the mitigation of the latter (Adger et al. 2006b).  This evolution will be 
discussed in the section devoted to climate change (Chapter 3). 
 
As the shift towards a focus on environmental migration became more marked, the 
controversy between alarmists and sceptics slowly faded.  I argue that the fundamental causes 
of this controversy were twofold: firstly, the lack of comprehensive research – particularly on 
the empirical side – was fertile soil for the development of different research agendas;  
secondly, the disciplinary divide between migration and environment scholars paved the way 
for studies evolving in different directions.  In recent years, various initiatives have attempted 
to bridge this divide – for example, environmental and migration specialists have been 
brought together in numerous workshops and conferences4  – and as the first impacts of 
climate change became manifest viewpoints have become more aligned.  It is noteworthy that 
recently published work has largely been collective work, often a product of researchers from 
different disciplines (Kniveton et al. 2008; Boano et al. 2007; Renaud et al. 2007). 
 
                                                
4 For instance, the Research Workshop on Migration and the Environment held in Munich on 16-18 April 2008 
by UNU-EHS and IOM, the workshop on Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Migration: 
Preparing for the Future, held in New York on 8-9 May 2008 by UNITAR, or the expert seminar on 
Environment and Migration held in Bangkok on 22-23 February 2007 by IOM, to name but a few. 
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The gradual disappearance of this controversy can also be linked to climate change and an 
increased number of disasters, which have shed new light on the relationship between 
environmental change and migration flows.  There is today a wide consensus that 
environmental drivers play an important and increasing role in the migration decision of a 
growing number of migrants (Renaud et al. 2007; Brown 2008; Boncour 2008).  
Conceptualisation of the environment–migration nexus remains, however, the subject of 
ongoing debates and discussions: many scholars insist that migration is only one possible 
response to environmental change (Kniveton et al. 2008), and argue that there is no single 
direct causality between the two, but rather a combination of economic, social, cultural and 
environmental factors  (Kliot 2004; Hugo 1996; Boano et al. 2007). 
 
The view that environmental changes, and climate change in particular, are increasingly 
important migration drivers is now shared by growing numbers of migration scholars and 
environmental scholars alike, but also by international organisations (IPCC 2007; Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2006).  In an interview with The Guardian on 
17 June 2008, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, stressed the 
importance of climate change as a driver of forced migration, and also the multi-causality of 
such displacements: ‘Climate change is today one of the main drivers of forced migration, 
both directly through impact on environment – not allowing people to live any more in the 
areas where they were traditionally living – and as a trigger of extreme poverty and conflict’ 
(Borger 2008).  This perspective also dominates much of the media and political discourses. 
Some authors, however, warned that this linkage between environmental change and 
migration was yet to be empirically proven, and that empirical research thus far had yielded 
mixed results: in some cases, environmental changes such as droughts resulted in a decline, 
and not an increase, of migration movements (Black 2001; Van Der Geest 2009). 
 
The lack of empirical data is certainly one of the major impediments to the current research 
stream on environmental migrations.  Many seminars and workshops in recent years have 
called for more empirical research, repeating the call formulated in 1996 in a report on the 
fifth meeting of the International Research and Advisory Panel for Forced Migration (Koser 
1996: 357).  The lack of empirical research has fuelled the debate on the conceptualisation of 
environmental migration, and particularly on the definition and numerical estimation of such 
migrants.  Thus far, no unanimous definition of environmental migration has emerged, while 
predictions of the number of environmental migrants range from a few millions to a billion 
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people by 2050 (Christian Aid 2007).  These two issues are closely related, of course, since 
‘broad categorizations invite large numbers’, as noted by Suhrke (1993: 6).  Though recent 
progress has been with some proposals and models for the improvement of methodologies to 
estimate flows of environmental migrants (Kniveton et al. 2008; Afifi and Warner 2007), 
debates remain fierce regarding the definitional issue, and even the very point of such a 
definition. These issues and developments shall be discussed in further details in Chapter 3. 
 
Some initiatives have recently been taken to address the lack of empirical research.  The most 
significant is undoubtedly the EACH-FOR project5, funded by the European Commission 
over the period 2007-2009.  The project aims to examine the impacts of environmental 
changes on migration patterns in 23 case studies throughout the world.  It is the first project 
of its kind to study these impacts on a global scale, in a comparative and empirical perspective.  
Its preliminary results hint at a close connection between environmental change, environment 
and migration, or at least temporary relocation.  They also stress the difficulty of disentangling 
environmental factors from other factors influencing migration decisions, such as poverty, 
land tenure, or government planning.  It appears that the form of migration movement most 
commonly linked with environmental factors is internal flows, except when patterns of 
international migration pre-exist between two countries (Entzinger 2008).  The project should 
be pursued further, however, in order to yield more comprehensive results. 
 
This thesis does not seek to weigh the evidence of the linkages between environmental 
disruptions and migration, nor to provide new empirical evidence. Such a task would have 
required extensive fieldwork in multiple locations, or a statistical analysis of data that were not 
readily available. More fundamentally perhaps, any discussion based on such empirical 
evidence(s) is presented with several major obstacles: 
 
- Firstly, much of the discussion dealing with environmental migration is directly 
contingent upon the effects of climate change. Although the global impacts of climate 
change are well-known, thanks to the work of the IPCC, their future unfolding on a 
regional level continues to be uncertainties. As of the current state of science, it is 
difficult to forecast precisely how a given area will be affected. 
 
                                                
5 The acronym stands for ‘Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios’. More information on the 
project can be obtained from http://www.each-for.eu . 
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- The implications of these impacts at a social level are difficult to predict. How people 
respond to environmental stressors depends on many variables, which include their 
livelihoods, adaptive capacities, social networks, etc. As will be shown in Part 2, Chapter 
3, the multi-causality of migration makes it difficult to identify empirical cases of 
environmental migration, let alone to predict new flows. 
 
- Finally, any empirical evidence would not be generalisable. How environmental stress 
impacts upon migration is contingent upon national, regional and local contexts: 
adaptive capacities, levels of resilience and policies vary, hence migration patterns 
observed in one case cannot be transposed as such to another case. 
 
For these reasons, my research will not seek to discuss the empirical linkages underpinning the 
environment-migration nexus, but rather its policy connections. I argue that these policy 
connections are fuelled by discursive and ideational linkages that have emerged in recent years. 
These linkages reflect and serve a wide range of strategies and interests, which will be called 
‘policy beliefs’ in the Advocacy Coalition Framework. My goal is therefore to show how these 
interests shape the connection between environment and migration on the policy level, and 
how the emergence of this connection, in turn, shapes the conceptualisation of environmental 
migration. Zetter has flagged the risk that ‘evidence-based policy making’ might be replaced by 
‘policy-based evidence making’ (Hietanen 2009): from my perspective therefore it seemed 
important to study policy developments in the field, their emergence and interactions, as well 
as the factors and interests driving the policy connections between environment and 
migration. 
 
Despite the lack of material evidence, many authors have stressed the need for the 
development of protection mechanisms and normative frameworks for those uprooted by 
environmental changes, in diverse and sometimes conflicting directions.  Brown notes that 
‘forced climate migrants fall through the cracks of international refugee and immigration 
policy’ and sees a ‘collective, and rather successful, attempt to ignore the scale of the problem’ 
(Brown 2008: 36).  Already in 1995, Dacyl advocated a new protection system in Europe for 
the ‘refugees’ who were not recognised by the 1951 Geneva Convention, and stressed that 
most asylum-seekers in Europe were ‘fleeing various forms of so-called generalised violence 
(…), massive and persistent patterns of human rights violation, economic emergency, and 
environmental deprivation; or they are forced from their places of origin by natural 
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catastrophes or man-made disasters’ (Dacyl 1995: 580).  Since then, many authors have 
pointed to a policy gap  in the matter of environmental migration, especially for those 
displaced abroad (Zetter 2008; Conisbee and Simms 2003; Boncour 2008; Suhrke 1994; Hugo 
1996).  In a recent academic conference held at the European Parliament, participants called 
for ‘legal protection for the victims of climate disruption and of possible displaced persons 
(current or future) who do not benefit today from any recognition’ ("Declaration on climate 
migrations"  2008).   
 
Several attempts have been made to fill in this gap, most of them in the field of legal 
protection and status.  In 1999, Magniny examined the legal possibilities of granting refugee 
status to those uprooted by environmental disasters, in what she called ‘a legal hypothesis to 
address an ecological threat’ (Magniny 1999).  Other notable works in this area include those 
of Cournil and Mazzega, (2007, 2006), Chemillier-Gendreau (2006) and Falstrom (2001).  
Following  Magniny, Cournil and Mazegga also reflect on the prospect of legal protection of 
‘ecological refugees’, Chemillier-Gendreau concluded that an international legal status was a 
necessity, while Falstrom proposed the creation of a new convention, built on the model of 
the UN Convention Against Torture. In March 2009, a group of environmental law scholars 
from the University of Limoges presented a draft convention on the status of 
‘environmentally-displaced persons’, which they hope to promote at the international level 
(Prieur et al. 2008). 
 
Fewer works have addressed issues of governance.  Biermann and Boas outlined a blueprint 
‘for a global governance architecture for the protection and voluntary resettlement of climate 
refugees’ (2007: ii).  They argued for a new legal instrument under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and a dedicated funding mechanism.  
King (2006) also makes the case for a new policy instrument, and proposes the creation of an 
International Coordination Mechanism for Environmental Displacement (ICMED).  Overall, 
most works addressing the governance aspects of the debate do so within the framework of 
climate change as a security issue.  Recent research conducted by the German Advisory 
Council on Climate Change advocates a multilateral umbrella convention on environmentally 
induced migration, which is considered a possible conflict trigger (2008: 187).   
 
This attention to policy responses is recent: most research on these aspects has been 
conducted only in recent years, and has been geared primarily towards future flows of 
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migrants induced by the impacts of climate change.  Therefore, these works are anchored in a 
prospective framework, and look at the development of future mechanisms and legal 
instruments, rather than at current policies and regulations.  This tendency is rooted in the 
expectation that movements triggered by environmental change will be more important in the 
future than they are now, and that new policies and instruments should therefore be 
developed to deal with these future displacements.  Little research has been conducted on 
current policies and instruments that exist already to deal with contemporary displacements 
associated with environmental changes.  Only Bell discussed the current situation from a 
philosophical stance, concluding that neither John Rawls’ ‘Law of Peoples’ approach of 
justice6 nor Charles Beitz’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ approach were appropriate (Bell 2004), and that 
a new ethics was needed to deal with the issue. 
  
It is crucial to examine the different instruments used by states and by the international 
community to deal with current displacements associated with environmental changes, since 
these may lay the basis for the development of future instruments, or, on the contrary, reveal 
that the development of such instruments is not needed. As said above, I argue that these 
instruments and policies inform the debate on the conceptualisation of environmental 
migration, and thus the way the issue will be addressed. 
 
The aim of this research is to describe these instruments and examine the interests that fuelled 
their development, as well as their interactions with each other.  In other words, I will look at 
how the growing ideational linkage between environment and migration is reflected in policy 
developments, and how these developments, in turn, fuel the conceptual debate. 
 
The approach of this work will thus be descriptive and analytical rather than prescriptive, 
however that is not to say that it will ignore population displacements that may arise in the 
future: on the contrary, it is hoped that the analysis of current mechanisms can lay the basis 
for the development of adequate responses to address future migration flows, both on the 
conceptual and policy levels. 
 
                                                
6 Though Bell does not discuss this, the inadequacy of Rawls’ theory might be explained by the fact that it was 
not conceived to apply in an international setting (Rawls 1993). 
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2. Intended contribution 
 
The primary contribution this thesis intends to make is to be found on the theoretical level. 
Until now, the linkages between environment and migration have not been studied as a policy 
process, but rather as a material one. Furthermore, most discussion on policies is geared 
towards the development of new mechanisms and protection instruments, rather than of 
actual normative frameworks.  This thesis aspires to fill this double gap in the literature. 
 
In order to do so, it will examine how migration and environment have been linked in two 
areas of policy-making: environmental and migration policies. The analysis will focus primarily 
on international normative frameworks, but will also incorporate some relevant elements of 
national policies, considered as part of a single policy subsystem. The analysis will be 
complemented by empirical illustrations from Katrina and Tuvalu. Results and findings from 
both sets of fieldwork will serve to illustrate different applications of these frameworks and 
policies in different settings. It is hoped that a key originality of the work lies in the 
combination of these two bodies of policy-making, and their interactions with each other at 
different levels of government. 
 
The analysis, however, will not be conducted from a legal point of view, but from a political 
one. It will seek to analyse the emergence of the ideational linkage between environment and 
migration in the policy process, as well as the interests, values and strategies that drove this 
development. Hence the object of the analysis is the policy process and the different actors 
that govern it. These actors are not limited to policy-makers stricto sensu, but include members 
of civil society: journalists, researchers and NGOs. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first such analysis of its kind.  I argue that the policy 
process is driven by interests that weigh on the conceptualisation of environmental migration, 
and therefore on the empirical evidence labelled as ‘environmental migration’. Although most 
works so far have assumed the existence of empirical evidence to call for the development of 
new instruments, this thesis aims to study existing instruments in order to question the 
discursive connection established between environment and migration. 
 
In subsequent chapters, I endeavour to show how policy responses to environmental 
migration contribute to shaping the concept of environmental migration.  I will not discuss 
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the impacts of environmental degradation and climate change on population movements: 
these impacts are at the same time increasingly obvious and heavily discussed.  As explained in 
the first section of this chapter, this discussion is driven, to a large extent, by the lack of 
empirical research.  Discussing these impacts would have involved a great deal of comparative 
empirical research, and my resources were limited.  Furthermore, this work is conducted in 
political science, not in geography or social anthropology, and I shall therefore focus on the 
way different policy-makers responded to those displacements.  My point is not to deny an 
essential reality to environmental migration, but to look at it from a perspective that I call 
‘political constructivism’.  In other words, I intend to describe how environmental migration, 
as a political and social event, is constituted by the political response it triggers, and is not an 
obvious and inevitable consequence of environmental changes.  The point is not to deny the 
impact of these changes on population, but to show how the concept of environmental 
migration is also a political construct: in other words, to add a constructivist perspective to a 
field that has until now been characterised by an essentialist position. 
 
Although empirical observations from fieldwork will be used to illustrate the applications of 
the policy process, I do not aim to provide additional empirical evidence, nor to test the 
validity of the concept of ‘environmental migration’. My contribution is limited to showing the 
interests and processes shaping the linkages at play in the environment-migration nexus. 
 
On a more practical level, it is hoped that the thesis will contribute to both academic and 
policy debates: 
 
- On the academic level, I hope that the analysis of the policy process can inform the 
logic of the conceptualisation of environmental migration, since I argue that this 
conceptualisation is dependent, to a large extent, upon the responses, discourses and 
attitudes of those who are supposed to address these flows, i.e. states7, 
intergovernmental agencies and organisations, and non-governmental organisations. 
 
- On the policy level, I believe that a discussion of existing mechanisms can inform the 
debate on future, new instruments.  Environmental migration is largely perceived as a 
                                                
7 The receiving states appear to be the first respondents, but sending states will also be considered. 
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‘new’ phenomenon8, and many argue that new policy and legal instruments are called for 
(Boncour 2008; Brown 2008; Biermann and Boas 2007; Cournil and Mazzega 2006).  I 
propose to review the current instruments and assess how they reflect and address the 




3. Conceptual Framework 
 
 
This section aims to provide an overview of the main theories and models that form the 
conceptual framework of this research.  This research deals with a phenomenon that bears on 
environmental change and migratory movements.  Therefore, it touches upon theories of 
environmental disruption, climate change, and social vulnerability, but also upon theories of 
migration choice and internal displacement.   Before examining these theories, which shape 
the objects of the policy-process, I will develop the constructivist approach underpinning this 
research, according to which the policy object is considered as a social construct. Finally, a 
final section will be devoted to the relationships between science and policy (and between 
scientists and policy-makers). In this section I explain how I intend to consider researchers as 
part of the policy-process.  
 
 
3.1. A Construct i vi st  Approach 
 
 
This research is built on a heavily constructivist posture, which postulates that environmental 
migration, as a social phenomenon, develops in a specific political context.  In contrast, many 
works on the topic are rooted in an essentialist or deterministic perspective that assumes that 
population movements are a logical by-product of environmental change.  This approach has 
been championed by Myers, who contends that the growing number of people who can no 
                                                
8 The source of this perception is to be found in climate change and an increased number of disasters. What is 
new, in reality, is not the phenomenon itself, but its extent and the important human responsibility of its origin.  
This point will be developed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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longer gain secure livelihoods in the their homelands because of environmental problems feel 
that ‘they [had] no alternative but to seek sanctuary elsewhere, however hazardous the 
attempt’, further asserting that there were ‘at least 25 million environmental refugees today’ 
(Myers 1997: 167).  This approach has been followed by many other scholars, including 
Westing (1992),  Hermsmeyer (2005), Brown – who claims that ‘climate change will cause 
population movements by making certain parts of the world much less viable places to live’ 
(Brown 2008: 16) –, Byravan and Rajan, who assert that ‘several million people living in 
coastal areas and small islands will inevitably be displaced by the middle of the century’ 
(Byravan and Rajan 2006: 247).   
 
Though many scholars have stressed that the term ‘environmental refugees’ is misleading 
(Hugo 1996), fewer have addressed the very notion of environmental migration as an artificial 
construct.  Among the latter, the most frequently cited include Black, Castles and Kibreab.  
Black notes that the ‘conceptualisation (of environmental factors) as a primary cause of forced 
displacement is unhelpful and unsound intellectually, and unnecessary in practical terms’ 
(Black 2001: 2); Castles acknowledges that ‘environmental and disaster displacees’ are a 
category of forced migrants, but also that ‘the emphasis on environmental factors is a 
distraction from central issues of development, inequality, and conflict resolution’ (Castles 
2004); whereas Kibreab cautions that ‘the term “environmental refugee” was… invented at 
least in part to depoliticise the cause of displacement’ (Kibreab 1997: 21).  Such views 
represent a minority of academic works on the topic, but have had a profound impact on the 
burgeoning field of research: most of the available literature now recognises and emphasises 
the multi-causality of displacements. 
 
To a great extent, the opposition between those who insist on the inevitability of displacement 
and those who insist that environmental migration is a social and political construct – the 
opposition between ‘alarmists’ and ‘sceptics’ outlined in the introduction – matches the 
opposition between an essentialist and constructivist approach to the issue.  
 
Although constructivism is typically associated with epistemology or psychology, its influence 
in social sciences has also been significant.  The breakthrough of constructivism in social 
sciences is usually credited to Antonio Gramsci.  In his famous theory of hegemony, Gramsci 
suggested that capitalism maintained its domination over society through ideological and 
cultural hegemony, more so than violence and economic domination.  This process allowed 
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bourgeoisie to inculcate its values - normalised as common sense – to the working classes.  
The capitalist state was therefore a social construct that allowed the bourgeoisie to maintain 
social order and prevent revolt (Gramsci 1971).  Wendt later applied constructivist theory to 
international relations, and showed that many of its core aspects were socially constructed, 
rather than imposed by a supposed international order (Wendt 1992). 
 
The influence of social constructivism in environmental science and disaster studies is less 
widespread, but will be used as the starting point of my reflection.  An abundant body of 
research on natural disasters has shown how natural hazards, such as earthquakes or 
hurricanes, become disasters when they meet certain social patterns and structures that put 
populations at risk.  This approach is exemplified by the seminal book aptly entitled 
Catastrophe and Culture by Oliver-Smith and Hoffman, which demonstrates that natural 
disasters are not natural phenomena, but by-products of human decisions (Oliver-Smith and 
Hoffman 2002).  The importance of social structures has been emphasised since the early days 
of natural hazard research in the 1940s (White 1974), and has since developed constantly.  The 
social, economic and political forces that mediate the impact of a natural hazard upon a 
population have been categorised as social vulnerability, a concept that has been explored by 
different fields of the social sciences.  Bolin and Stanford have defined it as the ‘unequal 
exposure to risk coupled with unequal access to resources’ (Bolin and Stanford 1998: 3), while 
Cutter has characterised it as the ‘conditions that reduce the ability of people and places to 
respond to environmental threats’ (Cutter 2003: 6).  Laska and Morrow add that ‘social 
vulnerability factors are not mutually exclusive, but tend to be clustered in patterns of 
vulnerability that place some communities and households at particular high risk’ (Laska and 
Morrow 2006: 7). 
 
The perspective taken by the social sciences on natural disasters is, by nature, deeply 
constructivist.  Blaikie et al. assert that beginning an analysis of disasters from the starting 
point of natural hazards produces environmental determinism: the disaster is assumed to be 
caused solely by external forces, external to society, and therefore the sole responsibility for 
the disaster is also borne by nature.  Yet only social and political factors can explain why the 
number of ‘natural disasters’ has grown constantly during the twentieth century, while the 
number of natural hazards has remained constant (Bolin and Stanford 1998: 2).  Likewise, 
only social and political factors can explain why the number of casualties resulting from 
cyclone Nargis, which hit Burma on May 2, 2008, was fifteen times higher than the number of 
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victims of cyclone Sidr, which hit neighbouring Bangladesh six months earlier, on November 
15, 20079.  As expressed by Oliver-Smith, ‘a disaster is an unfolding process, beginning with 
socially constructed conditions of vulnerability in which a community lives’ (2001: 111). 
 
Furthermore, the environment itself is a social construct.  In ‘The Construction of Social 
Reality’, Searle stressed the importance of ‘collective intentionality’ in the construction of 
institutional facts, which he distinguished from crude facts (Searle 1995).  A similar distinction 
is usually made between nature and environment, and Larrère and Larrère also argue that 
environmental problems are, by their very nature, social constructs, thus environmental 
knowledge is itself a social product.  Furthermore, they add that the legitimisation process of 
these problems in the public sphere also interferes with economic, social and political contexts 
(Larrère and Larrère 1997: 224).  As in the case of natural disasters, environmental changes 
and risks are social constructs, and need to be distinguished from environmental hazards or 
events.   
 
I intend to apply this constructivist perspective to the process of environmental migration.  
Social science research has shown how natural disasters and environmental risks are the 
results of social, economic and political factors and structures.  I argue that this argument can 
also be applied to environmental changes at large, and their impacts, which include population 
displacements.  I intend to focus on the political responses addressing these impacts, with the 
belief that such an analysis can help to better understand the process leading to the 
displacements of people, and the patterns of these displacements.  Domenach and Picouet 
have rightly noted that the concept of environmental migration remained highly controversial, 
not only because of the ongoing academic debates, but also because of its political and 
ideological implications (Domenach and Picouët 1995).  It is precisely these implications that I 






                                                
9 Cyclone Sidr claimed an estimated 5,000 – 10,000 victims, while cyclone Nargis resulted in 130,000 victims at a 
minimum; despite the fact that Sidr was slightly stronger than Nargis, and both caused landfalls in neighbouring 
and highly populated countries. 
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3.2. Theori e s  o f  Environmental Change  
 
Current theories of the environment descend from a long tradition of academic debates on 
the relationship between man and nature.  Since Antiquity, essentialist nature, natura naturans, 
has been described in opposition opposed to the nature created by man: natura naturata 
(Larrère and Larrère 1997).  In the modern era, a philosophical tradition beginning with Kant 
has described nature as a human artefact (Kant 2004 (1786)), and evolutionary thinkers 
beginning with Darwin posited a long-standing opposition between a nature that would exist 
by itself and have an intrinsic value, where the frontier between humans and animals would be 
blurred (Rolston III 1975). 
 
This opposition translated into different philosophical perspectives: a naturalist, or biocentric, 
perspective envisioned nature as an external entity, while a sociocentric perspective considered 
nature to be embedded in society.  This perspective, in a way, presupposes the end of nature 
and its replacement by the environment – nature considered in its relationships with human 
beings (Larrère and Larrère 1997).  Later, these conflicting perspectives also induced different 
policy options, as will be shown later. 
 
The perspective of this research is sociocentric, as it deals with the impacts of environmental 
change on human societies.  Environment is thus considered to be an independent variable in 
its relationship with migration flows and the induced policy responses.  More precisely, I shall 
focus here on environmental changes, including climate change and natural disasters, and the 
vulnerabilities of populations to these changes. 
 
 
3.2.1. Environmental Economics 
 
There are diverse theories to describe and explain environmental changes. A distinction is 
made here between environmental changes with natural and those with human causes.  Many 
theories provide explanatory frameworks for environmental changes occasioned by natural 
causes: earthquakes and landslides can be explained by tectonics, volcano eruptions by 
theories of volcanic activity, etc.  Such theoretical frameworks are drawn from geology, 
meteorology or oceanography, and are beyond the scope of a work in the social sciences.  
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Instead, I focus on theories that explain the impacts of these changes on populations and 
societies, which will be developed in the section 3.2.3. 
 
Environmental changes with human causes require different explanatory frameworks.  These 
frameworks are to be found in environmental economics, the subfield of economic theory 
concerned with environmental problems.  Environmental economics is organised and 
structured around the concept of market failure (Cornes and Sandler 1996).  The fundamental 
assumption is that human-induced environmental changes result from a failure of the market 
to allocate resources efficiently, in order to protect the environment and its resources.  The 
most common forms of market failure include the impossibility of barring an individual from 
using a common resource (non-excludability), the fact that the consumption of a good by an 
individual does not affect the consumption of the same good by other individuals (non-
rivalry), and externalities, or external costs (or benefits) of an economic decision that are not 
accounted for in the market price. 
 
I shall describe here the application of these market failures to environmental problems, and 
elaborate upon three major concepts of environmental economics related to these failures: 
global commons, public goods and externalities. 
 
3.2.1.1. Global Commons 
 
 
In a famous, concise essay published in 1968, Garrett Hardin developed the ‘Tragedy of the 
Commons’ theory (Hardin 1968), which has been widely used since to characterise many 
environmental changes induced by inappropriate or excessive use of a common resource.  To 
introduce the theory, Hardin uses the example of a common pasture used by local herders.  
Access to the pastures is unrestricted and free, and each herder is assumed to seek to 
maximise his gains and thus ‘keep as many cattle as possible on the commons’.  The utility of 
each additional animal, however, has a positive and a negative component: 
 
The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal.  Since the herdsman receives all 
the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1. 
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The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal.  Since, 
however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular 
decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of 1.  (1968: 1244) 
 
As one can easily see, the fundamental problem of the Tragedy of the Commons lies in 
unequal distribution of benefits and costs: the benefits are individual, the costs are collective.  
Hardin describes the herder as a rational individual, whose logical behaviour would be to keep 
adding extra animals to the commons.  He sees them as ‘locked into a system that compel[s 
them] to increase [their] herd[s] without limit – in a world that is limited’, and concludes that 
‘freedom in a commons brings ruin to all’.  He sees this as a tragedy, in the sense of a 
‘remorseless working of things’ (1968: ibid.).   
 
Hardin’s example was inspired by Malthus’ Principle of Population, which predicted population 
crisis on the basis that demographic growth was exponential whereas the amount of available 
resources could only grow arithmetically (Malthus 1999 (1798)).  Malthus’ principle soon 
became an explanatory framework to explain how common resources could be destroyed by 
excessive, unrestricted use. 
 
Theories and models about the commons were not new10, but Hardin was the first to 
formalise the concept and to develop the notion of the ‘tragedy’.  His model had a significant 
impact on policy design, most notably in resource management11, but also received important 
criticism, prompting Hardin himself to conduct six revisions of his paper (Hardin 1998).  It 
was argued that his analysis was too vague, did not consider herding costs, institutional 
arrangements or cultural factors (Feeny et al. 1990; Wijkmans 1982).  Fundamentally, Hardin’s 
theory was widely seen as a case for state control and surveillance (what Hardin calls 
‘bigbrotherism’), while various alternative management arrangements could indeed result in 
sustainable use of the commons, rather than the tragedy predicted by Hardin (Wijkmans 
1982). 
 
Despite these criticisms, the Tragedy of the Commons saw multiple applications as an 
explanatory framework for environmental changes: for example, deforestation, the depletion 
of fish stocks, or the degradation of the ozone layer.  It also led to the development of many 
                                                
10 The concept was already present in the work of Thucydides and Aristotle.  
11 The best known example of such an application is in fishing stock management (Wijkmans 1982: 512). 
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environmental policies, and directly inspired the conception of sustainable development as a 
‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’, as coined by the United Nations (World Commission 
on Environment and Development 1987: chapter 10). 
 
Hardin’s model can also serve as an explanatory theory for environmental change leading to 
migration.  A typical example can be found in the programme launched by the Chinese 
government in 2001 aimed to relocate approximately 700,000 herders from the provinces of 
Inner Mongolia, Xinjang and Tibet.  The goal of the programme is to restore natural 
ecosystems in fragile areas of Inner Mongolia (Rogers and Wang 2006).  Over the years, the 
grasslands of Inner Mongolia have slowly deteriorated into arid and areas and desert, and this 
transformation is, to a large extent, the result of overgrazing.  Consequently, the Chinese 
government has initiated a policy to close the grasslands and relocate the herders to towns and 
cities, in order to stop desertification and restore the original environment.  Even though 
social and political factors also count in the decision to displace the nomadic herders, the 
grasslands can certainly be considered as commons where a ‘tragedy’ of excessive and 
inappropriate use (overgrazing in this case) occurred.   
 
 
3.2.1.2. Public Goods 
 
 
Hardin’s model also laid the ground for the development of revised theories of public goods, 
espoused in an important book edited by Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (Kaul et al. 1999b).  
Classical, liberal economists such as Adam Smith and David Hume recognised the need for 
state intervention in order to provide some types of goods that could not be provided by the 
market: public goods.  Samuelson performed a systematic and rigorous analysis of these 
goods, which have since been defined by their two essential properties: non-excludability and 
non-rivalry.  In the words of Samuelson, these were ‘goods that all enjoy in common in the 
sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtractions from any 
other individual's consumption of that good’ (1954: 387).   
 
Since it was widely acknowledged that these goods could not be produced by the market, the 
question of the provision of these goods naturally arose.   Olson (1965), as well as Buchanan  
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and Kafoglis (1963), developed models of collective action for the provision of such goods, 
usually based on the intervention of the state, sometimes with some exclusion mechanisms 
(the goods were therefore no longer pure public goods, but club goods).  Without a mechanism 
of collective action, these goods were at risk of being underproduced, thus undermining their 
collective benefits (Kaul et al. 1999a: xx). 
 
Hardin’s model had demonstrated the problems caused by the exploitation of open access and 
common property resources: the study of this problem has a very similar structure to the 
problem of the provision of public goods (Cornes and Sandler 1996).   Environmental goods 
based on open access and common property, such as the pasture described in the Theory of 
the Commons, are considered to be quintessential public goods (Heal 1999).  Kaul et al.  have 
rightly observed that global public goods, such as the ozone layer or a stable climate, whose 
benefits reach across borders and generations, ‘tend to suffer from underprovision’ (Kaul et 
al. 1999a: xxi).  A root cause of environmental changes is therefore the underprovision of 
global public goods.  This theory applies particularly well to climate change: the atmosphere is 
a classic example of global commons, and the current amount of greenhouse gas emissions 
represents an excessive use of it.  In order to avoid dangerous climate change, a global public 
good has to be provided: the protection of climate, through massive reductions of greenhouse 
gas emissions.  Many environmental problems, such as climate change or pollution, are the 
consequence of an insufficient provision of global public goods, which can be likened to 
insufficient management of the commons, leading to Hardin’s tragedy. 
 
What is the reason for such a gross underproduction of global public goods, and 
environmental goods in particular? Kaul et al. point to the role of externalities, whose 
importance is increased by globalisation: ‘at the international level, this collective action 
problem is compounded by the gap between externalities that are becoming more and more 
international in reach, and the fact that the main policy-making unit remains the nation-state’ 
(1999a: ibid.).  I shall elaborate in a moment upon the concept of externalities.  For now, let us 
assume that externalities are the effects of an economic decision that are not borne by the 
decision-maker – negative effects in this case.  In this case, we are confronted with a typical 
problem of multi-level governance, impeding the production of environmental goods: while 
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pollution or climate change affect all countries, the decision to pollute is still largely self-
interested12 – hence the tragedy of the commons. 
 
The accumulation and internationalisation of environmental problems in recent years has 
prompted important debates upon the provision of environmental (public) goods.  In the 
traditional model, public goods are produced by the public sector: the state or international 
organisations.  Since the impacts of decision-making at the national level (the externalities) 
were increasingly felt across borders, however, some authors stressed that states were no 
longer the right agents for the production of environmental goods, and that these ought to be 
increasingly produced by the private sector.  Using the example of climate change and 
greenhouse gas emissions, Heal argued that the emissions were the result of ‘billions of 
decentralized and independent decisions by private households […] and by corporations […], 
all outside the government’s sphere’ (1999: 222-223).  Therefore, emission reductions 
(considered as a global public good) had to provided by a large spectrum of agents, and not 
only by the state, since this situation had led to an underprovision of the good. 
 
Theories of public goods and global commons have had a deep impact upon environmental 
policies, as I will show in Chapter 2.  However, I shall first describe the problem of 






Dominant theories of human-induced environmental change explain these changes as failures 
of the market to provide environmental goods, or ‘manage the commons’.  Therefore, they 
call for public policies to address these failures.  Among the diverse theories of market 
failures, the most pertinent for environmental changes is certainly the theory of externalities.  
At this point, I wish to stress that externalities and global commons are not conflicting 
theories: the latter derives from the former.  The problem of the provision of public goods is 
a particular, prominent case of the problem of externalities, which provide a broader 
explanatory framework.  In the word of Cornes and Sander: 
                                                
12 These decisions are, to a large extent, taken at the national level, and international relations theories generally 
assume that states are self-interested. 
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Externalities and public goods are helpfully viewed as incentive structures, rather than being inherently 
associated with certain activities […], and […] public goods can be thought of as special cases of 
externalities – special cases that lend themselves easily to analysis.  Viewed in this light, externalities 
represent not simply a further source of market failure, but a much broader family of market failures 
of which public goods constitute a member.  (1996: 6) 
 
In the previous section, I have argued that the internationalisation of externalities has 
undermined the provision of externalities.  Defining externalities, however, is not an easy task: 
it is a source of controversy in economic theory, and many authors have tried to define 
externalities in terms of what they do, instead of what they are.  In the previous section, I have 
summarised defined externalities as the effects of an economic decision that were not borne 
by the decision-maker.  This definition is a simplification of the definition proposed by Meade 
and Hjertonsson, which remains that most commonly used today: ‘an external economy 
(diseconomy) is an event which confers an appreciable benefit (inflicts an appreciable damage) 
on some person or persons who were not fully consenting parties in reaching the decision or 
decisions which led directly or indirectly to the event in question’ (1973: 15).  This definition, 
however, is very broad, and encompasses a wide variety of situations that have different 
implications, both for theory and policy responses.  Indeed, such a definition can apply to 
externalities as diverse as smoking, pollution, urban noise, or traffic congestion. 
 
Following the pioneering work of Ronald Coase (1960), economists started to distinguish 
between different types of externalities.  Two principal distinctions emerged: the first one 
between private and public externalities, which Baumol and Oates call depletable and 
undepletable externalities (1975: 19); the second one between technological and pecuniary 
externalities.   
 
Two examples can help us distinguish between public and private externalities.  If the air in a 
city is polluted, all residents of the city are affected, not just a few individuals.  This externality 
is undepletable: the air breathed by one resident leaves the quantity and quality of the air 
available to others unaffected, and the externality is thus public.  Air pollution is clearly a 
public ‘bad’.  Examples of depletable externalities are more difficult to find, but here is one: it 
is common for a private wireless internet network to be unprotected, simply because the 
owner of the 
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password.  If an internet user is in the vicinity of the network, he may therefore be able to 
connect to the internet for free.  However, if too many users connect at the same time, the 
network will be slowed down, which may prompt its owner to restrict access to the network.  
This externality is depletable, since the ‘consumption’ of the network by an additional user 
reduces the availability of the network for other users: unprotected wireless networks are 
private externalities.   Baumol and Oates argue that ‘in the case of public externalities, taxation 
of those who generate externalities with neither compensation nor taxation of the victims 
(beneficiaries) is necessary for optimal resource allocation, but for private externalities, 
taxation of the generators and compensation of the victims […] is normally required’ (1975: 
15). 
 
A further distinction is made between technological – or real – externalities, and pecuniary 
externalities.  Pecuniary externalities are often described as ‘fake’ externalities, since they refer 
to a situation in which the activity of one individual affects the financial circumstances of 
other individuals.  This type of externality operates through prices, and not through real shifts 
in the allocation of resources.  For example, a sharp increase in the demand for biofuels might 
raise the price of corn or sugar cane, and thus affect the price of food, hitting the welfare of 
consumers worldwide.  Most economists, however, consider that such externalities are driven 
by other market mechanisms, and are not real, technological externalities. 
 
Finally, even though this might seem obvious, a distinction also needs to be made between 
positive and negative externalities.  Negative externalities result in social costs, while positive 
externalities result in social benefits.  Hence the ideal equilibrium of the market will vary 
accordingly, as shown in Fig.  1.  In both cases, if the equilibrium of the market takes 
externalities into account, prices will rise (PS1 and PS2), but quantities will decrease in the case 






Fig.  1 – A model for supply and demand with externalities 
 
 
In the case of environmental changes that induce migration, I shall focus on negative, public 
and real externalities.  I have shown the relevance of the theory of public goods and global 
commons to the analysis of human-induced environmental changes, as a prominent case of 
public externality.  The changes considered are real, and not related to price fluctuations.  
Finally, these environmental changes, most of the time, impact communities and livelihoods 
adversely13. 
 
The range of policy options that can address such externalities is wide open.  These can 
include prohibition, government supply, or compensations and taxes (called pigouvian taxes, 
after economist Arthur Cecil Pigou).  In his famous theorem, Coase showed that externalities 
do not necessarily require state action, and can instead be solved through the market, provided 
that property rights are well-defined, people act rationally and transaction costs are minimal 
(Coase 1960).  The flexible mechanism of the carbon market under the Kyoto Protocol is an 
                                                
13 If we consider the cases where environmental changes are a ‘pull’ factor for migration, we will naturally 
consider positive externalities; nonetheless, the structure of the analysis remains the same, even though responses 
might differ. 
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illustration of the theorem.  Overall, as shown in the previous section, market mechanisms 
bear an increasing importance in the provision of environmental public goods. 
 
 
3.2.2. Climate Change 
 
 
The scientific basis for anthropogenic climate change is now well-established, largely thanks to 
the comprehensive assessment reports generated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC).  These findings, well popularised by the media, remain disputed by a small 
number of researchers, often dubbed ‘climate sceptics’.  At the other end of the scientific 
spectrum, a larger number of researchers, point out that IPCC findings, though highly 
authoritative, are also very conservative, since they are designed to be ‘internationally 
palatable’ (Spicer 2008).  Indeed, IPCC reports are the outcome of a compromise between 
more than 2,000 scientists, and the short versions of the reports (or summaries for policy-
makers) are edited by government representatives in negotiation sessions.  Furthermore, it is 
widely acknowledged that research on climate change is still impeded by uncertainties, 
especially about the regional impacts (Webster et al. 2003; Stainforth et al. 2005).  One of the 
core tasks of the IPCC is to delimit these uncertainties and define ranges of probabilities for 
the possible impacts of climate change. 
 
In spite of these limitations (or perhaps because of them), IPCC reports are widely regarded as 
the most authoritative scientific works on climate change, and are also the most widely 
distributed.  The  Fourth Assessment Report (4AR), issued in 2007, asserts that ‘warming of 
the climate system is unequivocal’ and ‘many natural systems are being affected by regional 
climate changes’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007d: 2).  The causes of this 
warming are very likely14 to be found in the ‘observed increase in greenhouse gas 
concentrations’: ‘global greenhouse gas emissions due to human activities have grown since 
pre-industrial times, with an increase of 70 per cent between 1970 and 2004’ (2007d: 5).  For 
the purposes of this research, both the reality of climate change and its anthropogenic origin 
are considered scientific facts, as evinced by the findings of the IPCC. 
 
                                                
14 In IPCC reports, the expression ‘very likely’ denotes a probability of the occurrence above 90 per cent. 
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Climate change is expected to encompass a wide range of environmental changes, ranging 
from droughts to sea-level rise.  As will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, the IPCC also sheds a 
new light on the relationship between environment and migration, and was largely 
instrumental in setting the agenda for environmental migration, which received only marginal 
attention before worldwide attention was focused on global warming.  It is therefore 
important to review the scientific basis for climate change, as underlined by the IPCC, before 
relating the phenomenon to the concepts delineated above. 
 
 
3.2.2.1. The Scientific Basis of Climate Change 
 
 
Climate change, as such, does not represent a single environmental change within ecosystems, 
but rather a wide variety of impacts that interact with people and their livelihoods.  ‘People 
and society are not and never will be affected by climate change; rather their lives and 
livelihoods are impacted by manifestations of the climate system, such as a lack of rain or a 
heat wave’ (Kniveton et al. 2008: 11).  Climate change is not environmental change per se, but a 
driver of wide-ranging environmental changes.  The nature of climate change induced hazards 
are no different from other environmental changes, and therefore the framework of analysis 
developed above remains valid for the analysis of climate change, as I will demonstrate. 
 
Climate change is an extremely complex phenomenon, involving many uncertainties, whose 
causes can include solar variations, volcanic eruptions, El-Niño oscillations, and high 
concentrations of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere (Hansen et al. 2006).  It is not, however, 
a new phenomenon: climate changes occurred in prehistoric times, and even led to mass 
population displacements.  Approximately 25,000 years BC, at the peak of the last ice age, a 
major wave of migration occurred: the climate of the Northern hemisphere became extreme, 
and populations moved southwards, circumventing the ice-caps (Beniston 2004).  The 
beginning of the Holocene period, around 11,000 years BC, was marked by the melting of the 
large continental glaciers, resulting in a sea-level rise of about 100 metres.  Many parts of the 
globe were completely flooded, and populations started to settle and became sedentary, 
developing new agricultural and farming techniques (Beniston 2004: 7).  A comprehensive 
collection of papers edited by Scott, Alekseev and Zaitseva (2004) details the impact of 
environment on human migration in the Eurasian steppe belt during that period.  One paper 
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in particular concludes that the massive displacements that led to the colonisation of Northern 
Eurasia were ‘triggered by environmental stress, and coincided with the coldest stages of the 
Last Ice Age, when the conditions for livelihood were less severe in Eastern Europe and 
Siberia’ (Dolukhanov 2004: 225).  Many studies show that population settlements and 
migration have been highly influenced by climatic changes in pre-historical times.  Tyson et al.  
(2002) have shown this to be the case in Southern Africa, while Smit and Cai (1996) have 
explained that long-term patterns of population movements in China, especially by herdsmen, 
were related  to climatic changes.   
 
The present day period corresponds to an exceptionally cool period of the earth’s history, if 
we compare the current temperatures to the temperatures of the last 500 million years (Spicer 
2008).  In this way, the current global warming is only returning the Earth to its usual 
condition – but human society has never experienced this usual condition, which occurred 
well before human life appeared on Earth.  Contemporary climate change is different from 
previous climate changes for at least two key reasons: 
- It is occurring at an unprecedented pace, leaving very little time for biological and 
societal adaptation; 
- It is human-induced, resulting from a higher-than-usual greenhouse gas concentration 
in the atmosphere, due to unprecedented levels of carbon emissions. 
  
Thus the current climate change is fundamentally different from other climate changes that 
occurred during other periods of history, because of its exceptionally rapid pace, and its 
anthropogenic origins.   
 
Most of the current warming is the result of human activities: the atmospheric concentration 
of carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas (GHG) has risen sharply from 280 
parts per million (ppm) in 1850 – a figure that has been relatively stable for the last 700,000 
years – to 380 ppm currently.  This rise is mostly caused by the burning of fossil fuels, and a 
smaller contribution (of about one fifth of the total concentration) is induced by 
deforestation.  As a result, global surface temperature has increased at a rate of approximately 
0.2°C per decade over the last 30 years (Hansen et al. 2006).   
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Building upon these observations, the IPCC has developed different predictive models and 
scenarios for the evolution of climate in the coming years.  These scenarios are classified into 
four groups: 
 
- The A1 scenarios describe a future world of very rapid economic growth, a global 
population that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, and the rapid 
introduction of new and more efficient technologies.  The major theme of these 
scenarios is the convergence amongst regions, towards a more homogeneous world. 
- The A2 scenarios rely on a very heterogeneous world, where self-reliance and 
preservation of local identities prevail.  The scenarios are also marked by a continuous 
population growth, and a regionally-oriented economic development. 
- The B1 scenarios are based on a convergent world, with many similar patterns to A1 
scenarios.  The main differences are in patterns of economic growth, based on a shift 
towards a service and information economy and the introduction of clean and 
resource efficient technologies. 
- Finally, the B2 scenarios assume an economy based on local solutions to economic, 
social and environmental sustainability.   
 
These scenarios allow IPCC to construct models of temperature and related sea-level 
variation.  Without entering into details of the way these models are designed, it is important 
to keep in mind the latest estimates contained in IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007a):  
 
- Over the course of a century, global average temperatures will rise by 1.8° C in a ‘best-
case scenario’, and by 4.0° C in a ‘worst-case scenario’.  For the next two decades, the 
rise is estimated at 0.2°C per decade. 
 
- For the same period, sea levels are expected to rise between 18 and 38 cm in the ‘best-
case scenario’, and between 26 and 59 cm in the ‘worst-case scenario’.  It should be 
noted, however, that these predictions are based solely on the thermic expansion of 
the ocean (thought to be responsible of about 75 per cent of sea-level rise), and do not 
include the impacts of the melting of glaciers and ice caps. If these impacts are 
included, it is estimated that sea-levels could rise by approximately one metre by the 
end of the century. Some authors, such as Hansen, argue that ‘scientific reticence’ is 
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inhibiting the communication of this figure, as well as of the threat of potentially 
larger sea-level rises (Hansen 2007). 
 
These changes will translate into different impacts, identified by the Working Group II of the 
IPCC15:  
- Warmer and fewer cold days and nights, and warmer and more frequent hot days and 
nights; 
- Warm spells and heat waves over most areas; 
- Heavy precipitation events; 
- Droughts; 
- Intense tropical cyclone activity; 
- Extremely high sea levels. 
 
For these last three types of impacts, the IPCC foresees a potential for large population 
displacements.  Furthermore, some authors also distinguish between climate events and 
climate processes (Brown 2008): climate processes are slow-onset  changes, such as sea-level 
rise, while climate events are sudden, brutal hazards such as hurricanes and droughts.  Even 
though this distinction has not yet reached a scientific consensus, it is clear that not all impacts 
of climate change produce similar migration patterns.   
 
3.2.2.2. An Economic Model for Climate Change 
 
 
From an economic point of view, climate change poses a major problem of resource 
allocation: though industrialised countries emit most of the emissions (both per capita and in 
total) and thus bear most of the current and historical responsibility for climate change, the 
countries that will be most affected by the impacts of climate change are developing countries, 
with the least responsibility. Furthermore, although these countries can have high adaptive 
capacities, they often lack the financial resources to develop ambitious adaptation strategies.  
If the increase of carbon emissions continues at the same pace, it is widely acknowledged that 
climate will reach a tipping point, resulting in catastrophic impacts – hence the problem of 
                                                
15 The IPCC is made up of three Working Groups: Working Group I studies the scientific evidence of climate 
change, Working Group II is concerned with the impacts and adaptation strategies, and Working Group III 
investigates the different mitigation mechanisms. 
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resource allocation.  In this section, I shall delineate how this problem unfolds, using the three 
key concepts of environmental economics. 
 
The climate system represents a particular type of public good.  Most public goods – such as 
national defence or poverty reduction – are produced through state intervention.  The 
production of such goods has a cost, usually shared by all beneficiaries or supported by an 
external entity.  The problem of the production of these goods lies in a fair allocation of the 
costs, and the deterrence to free-riders.  The climate system, though it obviously shares the 
properties of non-rivalry and non-excludability, is different from other public goods: it existed 
prior to human intervention, but can be degraded by individual human actions.  Climate 
change is thus a global public bad, affecting all countries and future generations: greenhouse 
gases mix easily, remain in the atmosphere for several decades after emission, and their 
concentration is quite uniform throughout the world.  As said earlier, these emissions are the 
results of zillions of individual decisions, hence there is a very strong incentive to free-ride 
when it comes to emission reductions.   
 
Because people depend on the climate system for their physical wellbeing, Baer has qualified 
the climate system as a ‘life-support commons’ (2006: 134), which he describes as a global 
commons with a different moral structure.  In this case, the climate system is a commons 
where the right not to be harmed is prime.  Even though the economic structure of the resource 
allocation problem is similar to other public goods, ethics and law also need to be considered 
in solving the problem, and not purely economic considerations.  This is the approach I adopt 
when dealing with climate change and climate responsibility: the right not to be harmed is 
pertinent when one considers the possible population displacements induced by climate 
change. 
 
Climate change, as stated above, is a by-product of human activities since the industrial 
revolution.  Externalities are therefore relevant to the issue, since carbon emissions bear a 
social cost not included in the market production cost.  Climate change, as a global public bad, 
is an extreme case of negative externalities.  These externalities are global, even though they 
are unequally shared, and market mechanisms are unable to provide a fair level of allocation 
for the carbon emissions.  Given their global impact, adjustment by national policies or 
domestic markets is unable to achieve a significant level of reduction, and international 
cooperation mechanisms are needed.  For global public goods (or bads), there’s no market 
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mechanism or government system that allows for an efficient solution of the provision 
problem (Nordhaus 1999).   
 
Climate change has long been identified as a market failure, because of the externalities 
involved, but it was not until 2006 that a comprehensive assessment of its economic impacts 
was conducted, through a study commissioned by the UK Treasury, placed under the 
responsibility of economist Nicholas Stern (Stern 2007).  The study evaluates and compares 
the costs of mitigation of and adaptation to climate change, and concludes that the cost of 
inaction is much bigger than the cost of an immediate action, estimated at around 1 per cent 
of the world’s global GDP.  The study, however, does not include the costs of migration in 
the assessment, though massive displacements are presented as an unavoidable consequence 
of climate change: the estimate of 200 millions permanent displacees by 2050 is mentioned, 
but not further discussed (Stern 2007: 56).  In this thesis, I argue that the costs of migration 
associated with climate change should be included in this assessment, and be can considered 
through the lens of externalities.  Only a few authors include the costs of displacements in 
their economic analysis of climate change16 (Cline 1992; Fankhauser 1994; Tol 1995), though 
these are widely presented as a consequence of climate change.  These costs are estimated 
between 0.5 and 1 billion US$ for a doubling of carbon dioxide concentration, relative to 1990 
levels.  The right not to be harmed, in a life-support commons, certainly includes the right to 
retain in one’s livelihood.  Externalities associated with climate change generally include 
consequences such as reduced agricultural yields or infrastructure damage: I argue that 
migration movements are also part of these externalities, as are the problems faced by those 
who cannot leave. 
 
Some authors have made the case for preventive migration strategies as adaptive mechanisms 
to climate change (McLeman and Smit 2006).  Such strategic displacements could alleviate the 
environmental burden, and reduce adaptation costs: in these cases, migration would result in 
positive externalities.  These externalities would include a reduced pressure on resources, such 
as decreased demand for water, a reduction in associated diseases, and more sustainable 
livelihoods overall.   
 
                                                
16 For a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations, relative to 1990 levels, Cline estimates these costs at 0.5 
billion US$, Fankhauser at 0.6 billion US$ and Tol at 1 billion US$ (Fankhauser and Tol 1997: 390). 
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When analysing the normative frameworks that address climate change, I consider 
displacements to be an indirect externality of carbon emissions. Acknowledging this posture is 
important, since it bears important meanings for the debates on adaptation to climate change, 
and particularly for the issues of fairness and responsibility, which will be developed later.  Yet 
I argue against the idea that forced displacements are an automatic and unavoidable 
consequence of climate change.  In order to understand the relationship between 
environmental change (including the impacts of climate change) and migration, the variable of 






Even though this research deals with environmental policies, I am not interested in 
environmental changes per se, but in their impacts on populations.  In my examination of the 
policies implemented to deal with climate change, I shall focus not on policies aimed at 
mitigating climate change, but rather on policies aimed at adapting to it.   
 
The link between environment and people is often predicated upon vulnerability.  It was 
typically assumed that natural hazards necessarily provoked natural disasters.  It is now widely 
acknowledged that natural hazards only result in disasters when they meet patterns of 
vulnerability (Blaikie et al. 1994), as will be exemplified in the case of hurricane Katrina 
(Chapter 6).  Similar hazards, at different locations or different times, will not result in the 
same damages, as in the abovementioned examples of cyclones Nargis and Sidr.  The natural 
hazard plays the role of a trigger for the natural disaster, but the causes of the latter lie in 
people’s vulnerability. 
 
Vulnerability has often been confused with poverty.  Though poverty is certainly an important 
component of vulnerability, other economic, social and political processes have to be factored 
in.  Most definitions describe vulnerability as the potential to experience loss or harm from a 
natural hazard, induced by unequal exposure to and inability to cope with the hazard (Kelly 
and Adger 2000; Ribot 1995; Tol et al. 1998).  The core of vulnerability lies in inequality, 
driven by both socio-economic and biophysical processes (Fraser et al. 2003).  The concept of 
vulnerability is made up of two different aspects: an external aspect, related to the exposure to 
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risk; and an internal aspect, related to poverty and concerned with the ability to cope with the 
hazard and recover from the damage.  Both aspects are reflected in the model of vulnerability 
proposed by McLeman and Smit (2006: 34): 
 
Vslit = ƒ (E slit , AC slit ) 
 
Where V = vulnerability, E = exposure to risk, AC = adaptive capacity, s = a given system or 
community, l = a given location, i = a given environmental stimulus, and t = a given period of 
time.  The model shows that vulnerabilities are specific to certain communities, environmental 
changes, times and locations.  It also incorporates both the external and internal dimensions 
of vulnerability: the exposure to risk (external aspect) and the adaptive capacity, which is the 
ability to cope and recover (internal aspect).  Logically, vulnerability is positively related to 
exposure, but negatively related to adaptive capacity: it increases with the exposure to risk, but 
decreases when adaptive capacity improves.  External variables also have to be factored in: 
disaster assistance varies greatly according to the types of different disasters, and the regions 
of the world where they happen (Guha-Sapir et al. 2004).   
 
The theorisation of vulnerability has evolved historically from attempts to explain the 
occurrence of famines (Watts and Bohle 1993), to a more comprehensive framework linking 
environmental changes with their impacts upon populations.  This thesis will rely primarily on 
Adger’s contribution to this stream. 
 
Sen’s entitlement approach (1987) was designed to explain the occurrence of famine and 
hunger, but proved very influential in research on vulnerability. Sen argued that famines were 
caused by a failure of coordination of food supplies, rather than by food shortage itself.  Sen 
contended that the crucial determinant in vulnerability was a person’s entitlement, defined as a 
set of commodity bundles (including food items in case of famines).  Entitlement to a safe 
livelihood, according to Sen, is acquired a combination of endowments: those of production, 
exchanges, and assets.  Sen’s explanatory theory for famines can easily be transposed to 
adaptive strategies to environmental changes: vulnerability arises when people face a high risk 
of entitlement deprivation.  Sen’s initial theory of entitlements was criticised for placing too 
much emphasis on entitlement shifts, and not enough on structural, historical patterns of 
entitlement.  These flaws have since been corrected by a new stream of research inspired by 
the entitlement approach (Swift 1989).   
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Adger’s contribution (1999) is empirically rooted, arising from a vulnerability assessment in 
coastal Vietnam.  His most significant contribution to the theorisation of vulnerability is the 
distinction between collective and individual vulnerability.  Individual vulnerability depends on 
‘access to resources and the diversity of income sources, as well as (the) social status of 
individuals or households within a community’, while collective vulnerability is determined by 
institutional and market structures, such as the prevalence of informal and formal social 
security and insurance, and by infrastructure and income’ (Adger 1999: 251).  This distinction 
echoes the abovementioned dual dimensions of vulnerability, whereby collective vulnerability 
corresponds to the external dimension of vulnerability, and individual vulnerability relates to 
its internal dimension. 
 
In sum, what is the importance of vulnerability to a study on the protection and management 
mechanisms of environmental migration? Numerous studies have shown that migratory 
responses (forced or not) to environmental change are heavily dependent upon vulnerability 
patterns and adaptive capacities (Locke et al. 2000a; McLeman and Smit 2006; Renaud et al. 
2007; Gonin and Lassailly-Jacob 2002; Boano et al. 2007).  Environmental policies aimed at 
preventing forced migration should therefore focus on reducing vulnerability, as will be shown 
in Chapter 3.  Furthermore, migration can also be an adaptive strategy, aimed at reducing 
vulnerability.  Interactions between vulnerability and migration are central to debates on 
environmental policies, and are also a major component of migration theories – these are 




3.3. Theori e s  o f  Migrat ion  
 
 
In the previous sections, I have attempted to delineate the main theoretical concepts that are 
used in explanatory frameworks for environmental changes, climate change included, and their 
impacts on societies.  This section will focus on the other side of the problem: What are the 
main theories that explain migration movements worldwide? Chapters 3 and 4 will focus on 
the specific interactions between environment and migration.  For now, this section aims to 
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review diverse theories of migratory movements, and to assess their relevance for our 
discussion.  A subsequent section will deal with migration policies. 
 
The first attempt to theorise migration is usually attributed to Ernest Ravenstein, who 
developed ‘Laws of Migration’ in 1885.  The laws outlined by Ravenstein put a heavy 
emphasis on the ‘push-pull’ process, by which unfavourable conditions ‘pushed’ people out of 
a place, while more favourable conditions ‘pulled’ them into another one.  Ravenstein also 
concluded that the primary cause of migration was better economic opportunities, that 
migration decreased as distance increased, that migration occurred in different stages and was 
bilateral, and, finally, that social factors and differences influenced a person’s mobility 
(Ravenstein 1885).  These laws had a great influence on future theoretical debates, and remain 
a central focal point in many explanatory frameworks. 
 
Migration theories have proliferated and diversified since the late nineteenth century, as a 
reflection of increasingly complex migration movements worldwide.  In a review of migration 
theories published in 1993, Massey et al. noted that migration theories did not share a 
common paradigm, but rather offered a variety of viewpoints across disciplines and regions.  
Brettell and Hollifield also note that migration studies are often spread across disciplines, and 
do not necessarily relate to each other (2000: 3).  Castles and Miller argue that the reason for 
this variety of theoretical approaches is that ‘the study of migration cannot be confined to a 
single social-scientific domain’ (2003: 19).  Furthermore, they insist upon the difference 
between approaches aiming at generalisations and more collectivist and institutional 
approaches.  However, it seems possible to extrapolate some key patterns across theories and 
disciplines:   
 
- Globalisation of migration: an increasing number of countries and regions, both as 
origins and destinations, are affected by migration. However, the vast majority of 
migrants are internal migrants, moving within their own country (World Bank 2008). 
 
- A small majority of the world’s migrants are refugees (less than 10%). Furthermore, 
the majority of people displaced by conflicts and persecutions are internally-displaced 
people (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2006). 
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- Differentiation of migration: different types of migration co-exist in the same place. In 
particular, the routes and itineraries used by forced migrants are increasingly the same 
as those used by voluntary migrants (Crisp 2007), hence the line between the two 
categories of migrants becomes blurred. 
 
- Women now represent about half of the world’s international migrants (International 
Organization for Migration 2008) . 
 
Migration theories have also evolved from an ‘individual relocation’ perspective to a more 
collective one, that involves a multiplicity of actors (Zolberg 1989).  When trying to apply 
migration theories to the field of environmental migration, however, one is confronted to a 
triple difficulty:  
 
- The dominant theories are mostly Western-centred, focusing on migration from South 
to North, or East to West, from developing countries to developed countries, while 
most environmental migration happens in developing countries, and over relatively 
small distances; 
 
- Most theories focus on international migration, while environmental migration 
involves a border crossing as an exception, not a rule; 
 
- Forced migration as an area of migration has been less studied than voluntary 
migration: in fact, most migration theories tend to focus on economic migration, 
though displacement has been addressed by some authors from a theoretical point of 
view (Zolberg et al. 1989; Richmond 1994).  Hence there is a smaller set of 
explanatory theories for forced migration.  Yet literature on environmental migration 
has a tendency to portray environmental migration mostly as a forced displacement. 
 
The first part of this section will review the main migration theories, and assess their relevance 
to environmental migration.  In particular, I shall examine whether and how they account for 
environmental drivers. That said, one must keep in mind that these theories mostly focus on 
Europe and the United States as destinations, and apply primarily to international and 
voluntary movements.  This is the reason why two subsequent parts will discuss theories that 
specifically address forced and internal migration.   
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3.3.1. Dominant Theories of Migration 
 
 
Traditionally, models of migration have been predicated on economic disparities between 
countries and most of them stress the economic motives of migrants, paying little attention to 
environmental factors.  Traditional models assume that migration is driven by wage and 
employment differentials: migrants move because they expect a net gain of income, and 
migration is supposed to result in a wage rise in the departure area and a wage fall in the 
destination area.  These model, however, did not fit real outcomes: on numerous occasions, 
migration ceased before wages  equalised, and economic disparities were not sufficient to 
account for migration behaviour (Massey et al. 1998: 9-10).  The classic Push-Pull model, in 
which the drivers termed push and pull factors are mostly economic, is an offspring of this 
model.  The model was first developed by Ravenstein (1885), and later refined by Lee (1966), 
who insisted on the importance of ‘push’ factors, as well as on the obstacles that could impede 
or prevent migration, such as distance or restrictive migration policies.  Lee also noted that a 
person’s response to push-pull factors was highly dependent upon her age, class, gender, and 
education or family ties abroad.  Overall, the assumption of the model was that migration 
would help achieve an equilibrium between push and pull factors.   
 
Such models, however, grossly underestimated the importance of migration policies in the 
regulation of migratory flows (Zolberg 1989).  The barriers and constraints imposed by states 
are now widely acknowledged as a crucial determinant of migration flows, and new theoretical 
perspectives have attempted to account for this new reality, usually by putting a greater 
emphasis on the role of migrants as individual decision-makers.  Among these new theoretical 
models, those that pertain to environmental migration are briefly summarised here. 
 
3.3.1.1. Neoclassical Economic Theories 
 
When applied to migration studies, neoclassical economics aims to use rational choice models 
to explain migration behaviours.  These models have been developed both at the macro- and 
micro-levels, and are rooted in labour market analysis. 
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At the macro-level, neoclassical economic theories focus on rural to urban migration and are 
an ‘extension of the simple-wage differential approach commonly found in the literature’ 
(Todaro 1969: 138).  They contend that migration flows are related to the supply and demand 
of labour markets: these are considered the main drivers of the movement of people, and thus 
the best way for governments to manage migration is to regulate labour markets. 
 
At the micro-level, neoclassical economic theories argue that migration behaviour is 
determined by the need – or the desire – to increase one’s economic capital.  Migrants are 
considered rational agents who migrate after a review of the cost-benefits of doing so.  
Sjaastad (1962) conceptualises migration as a form of investment in human capital, where 
monetary return is usually expected.  Borjas (1989) explains that such a theory assumes that 
each individual seeks to maximise her/his well-being by selecting the country of her/his 
choice, given financial constraints and barriers imposed by states.  The model emphasises the 
importance of each migrant’s individual characteristics, which explains why different 
individuals in the same situation may adopt very different migration behaviours.  This aspect 
of the model bears some relevance for environmental migration: as will be shown in Chapter 
4, people faced with environmental change will show different proclivities to migrate. 
 
3.3.1.2. New Economics of Migration Theory 
 
This migration model was expounded by Stark (1991), who argued that migration decisions 
were not only influenced by the income expectations of the migrants, but also by the 
willingness of the household to minimise the exposure to risks.  Stark’s theory puts greater 
emphasis on the collective dimension of migration: families, households or communities are 
the decision-makers, instead of the sole migrant.  Decision-making is a collective process, and 
the variety of expected incomes is considered an insurance against risks (Massey et al. 1998): 
the goal is to diversify the sources of income, rather than simply to maximise it.  The theory 
highlights the importance of remittances, and sheds new light on the migration-development 
nexus.  The model also accounts for long-term migration and transnational links, which play a 
fundamental role in the perpetuation of migration (Castles and Miller 2003: 21).   
 
Adger, in his assessment of social vulnerabilities to environmental change in Vietnam, found 
many examples of applications of the above model, and showed that remittances sent by 
environmental migrants were a key asset to increase the resilience of their families to floods 
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and sea-level rise (Adger 1999).  Poncelet et al.  (2008) document the presence of similar 
practices in Bangladesh, especially for families faced with riverbank erosion, and McLeman 
and Smit present similar findings for western Sudan and northern Ethiopia  (2006).  Because it 
considers migration a risk-reduction and coping strategy, the new economics of migration 
model can prove a very pertinent model for environmental migration, and will be the 
dominant model used throughout this research to account for voluntary environmental 
migration, as will be shown in the findings from the Tuvalu fieldwork. 
 
3.3.1.3. Structural Theory 
 
Other approaches suggest that migration is triggered by structural economic, political and 
societal forces within a community.  This argument holds that migration is structurally 
constrained, and therefore that migrants cannot really choose when and where they go.  
Zolberg (1989, 1990) contends that restrictive immigration policies are the main determinant 
of contemporary migration flows, and that Western states seek to protect their domestic 
markets and attract cheap labour at the same time.  The model has been expanded specifically 
to apply to forced migration theory, and this aspect is described below. 
 
This thesis argues, from a constructivist perspective, that the concept of environmental 
migration is shaped by normative frameworks and policy responses: therefore, a model 
seeking to explain migration flows by structural constraints is also relevant, and many 
references will be made to this model in addition to the new economics of migration model. 
 
3.3.1.4. World Systems Theory 
 
World systems theory was first developed by Emmanuel Wallerstein (1974), who sought to 
describe and analyse the expansion of capitalism from the sixteenth century onwards: he 
classified countries into between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ nations, the latter being dependent 
upon the former.  The model was not concerned with international migration at first, and it 
was only after the migration crisis of the 1970s that world systems theory was transposed to 
international migration (Portes and Walton 1981). According to this theory, migration is not 
considered a decision taken by individuals or households, but rather as a by-product of market 
expansion.  Applied to international migration, the theory argues that the penetration of 
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capitalism into non-capitalist economies (‘peripheral countries’) creates a mobile population, 
with a high propensity to emigrate.  This penetration was first induced by colonialism, and 
later by globalisation.  Sassen’s theory of global cities (1991), which considers migration a by-
product of capitalism, is an application of the world system theory. 
 
Other theoretical approaches have been inspired by world systems theory, most notably the 
theory of migration systems.  This theory is based on the idea that migration flows occur within 
clusters of countries, organised in a migration system in which different countries, which do 
not need to be geographically close, exchange migrants with each other, following the 
structures outlined in the previous paragraph.  These countries form a dynamic system, whose 
variables are economic and political, but also cultural.  Migration systems explain the 
development of transnational spaces, where people, and also goods and communications are 
exchanged through social networks (Faist 1998).  A migration system usually includes different 
sending countries (‘peripheral countries’), and one core receiving country.  The theory has 
been generalised to apply to different migration systems by Kritz et al.  (1992).   
 
These models have a high explanatory value, since they not only account for economic 
migration but also for political migration.  The question is, can they also apply to 
environmental migration? I shall discuss in Chapter 4 how environmental migration drivers 
are intertwined with economic and political migration drivers, and how unequal vulnerabilities 




These theories and models, despite their significant differences, commonly address 
international labour migration to western countries.  They are rooted in western, Euro- and 
US-centric concerns for migration flows, which hardly reflect the totality of global migration.   
Theories of neoclassical economics and the new economics of migration argue that migration 
is determined by individual or household decisions, whereas structural and world systems 
theories contend that movements are structurally determined.  While the latter position better 
fit this research’s constructivist posture, the former accounts for internal migration as well, an 
aspect not tackled by structural theories.  Overall, it appears that environmental drivers are 
insufficiently addressed by classical migration theories.  Accordingly, this thesis will borrow 
from different models for its theoretical underpinnings. 
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Overall, migration theories mostly address patterns of economic migration to developed 
countries, and do not capture two essential aspects of environmental migration flows: internal 
migration and forced migration.  I shall now try to identify some specificities of these flows in 
contrast to the mainstream theories of migration.   
 
 
3.3.2. Internal Migration 
 
 
Although the two sets of theories presented above were aimed primarily at explaining 
international migration, they also apply to internal migration.  Studies of internal migration 
have tended to be organised around case studies, and theoretical contributions are less 
abundant than for international migration.  Furthermore, studies focus on voluntary, labour 
migration from rural to urban areas (Greenwood 1985), whereas internal forced migration, or 
internal displacement, is often treated as a subset of refugee studies: no specific theoretical 
body of literature exists for internal displacement. 
 
Internal migration was considered a component of the first ‘Laws of Migration’ elaborated by 
Ravenstein (1885): one of these laws stated that the propensity to migrate declined as distance 
travelled increased, a law that seems less relevant today, given the reduced costs of 
transportation.  Modern literature on voluntary internal migration is closely related to the 
analysis of labour markets, and largely builds upon the model developed by Sjaasted (1962), 
which emphasises the role of social capital.  Todaro (1969) focused on labour markets and 
urban employment in developing countries, and showed that job prospects were the main 
driver of internal migration from rural to urban areas in developing countries.  Unemployment 
rate and wage differentials were the main variables of the model, which had considerable 
influence in academic and political spheres.  Todaro, along with Harris, proposed an updated 
version of the model the following year (Harris and Todaro 1970) and argued that rural-urban 
migration flows would continue even when urban unemployment was on the rise.  They 
contended that the creation of more urban jobs in developing countries would result in 
higher, and not lower, unemployment rates, since migration was based on the expected 
income, rather than on the real income.  Todaro’s and Harris’ model contradicted the widely-
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held positive view that internal migration was a way to equilibrate labour markets, and their 
intervention resulted in major policy shifts, since emphasis was put on rural development. 
 
The Harris-Todaro model, however, failed to explain migration differentials, that is, why some 
individuals were more likely to migrate than others.  Beshers and Nishiura (1961) developed 
different hypotheses17 to account for migration differentials: they emphasised individual 
characteristics, and also noted that environmental factors were important variables whereas 
job prospects were of little concern for the migrant.  Over time, the Harris-Todaro model was 
adapted in order to include human capital variables such as ages, family ties, social networks, 
etc.  At the macro-level, this resulted in the development of a gravity model, in which these 
different variables were aggregated in order to provide a explanatory framework for empirical 
research (Alonso 1986; Greenwood 1997).  In its standard format, the gravity model 
aggregates population size and distance (gravity variables), economic variables and labour 
market variables, and also environmental variables.  Andrienko and Guriev (2004) studied the 
importance of these variables against economic variables for internal migration in Russia, and 
found that amenities variables related to the infrastructures or the climate were significant 
migration drivers.  However, these variables do not deal with environmental change, but 
rather with amenities18.   
 
Literature on internal displacement is more recent, since the plight of peoples uprooted and 
dispersed within the borders of their country was only recognised as a matter of concern in 
the 1990s (Mooney 2005).  The definition of internally-displaced persons (IDPs) approved by 
the UN General Assembly in 1998 encompasses migrants who have been forced to leave their 
homes because of an armed conflict, generalised violence, human rights violation or natural 
and man-made disasters, but have not crossed an international border (United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights 1998).  Even though this definition differs substantially from 
the refugee definition provided by the Geneva Convention, no specific theoretical model of 
internal displacement has emerged in the literature.  The traditional view held that internal 
displacements were the result of inter-group conflicts within states, but many authors have 
stressed that patterns of displacement are no different regardless of whether the migrants 
crossed a border or not, and so called for internal population displacement to be considered 
an integral part of a single general theory of population displacement (Ibeanu 1998).  Some 
                                                
17 For example, these hypotheses stipulated that young and educated people were more likely to migrate, as were 
as those who were not farmers. 
18 Such amenities are discussed in further detail in Chapter 3. 
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authors went even further, and made the case for a common protection regime that would 
apply both to refugees and IDPs, pleading for a reconsideration of ‘the use of the crossing of 
international borders as a prerequisite to systematic international protection and assistance of 
people forcibly displaced from their homes’ (Lee 1996: 27).  On the theoretical level, this is 
already largely the case, and theories of internal displacement are incorporated into broader 
theories of forced migration, which will now be reviewed.   
 
3.3.3. Forced Migration 
 
Even though it has recently been argued that it is increasingly difficult for states to distinguish 
between migrants and refugees (Crisp 2007), most theories of forced migration insist on the 
specificities of refugee (and IDP) movements.  Like theories of voluntary migration, models 
of forced migration pay little attention to environmental factors and constraints.  One of the 
most famous models of forced migration, developed by Gordenker (1989), lists four reasons 
that can induce forced migration, none of them having anything to do with environmental 
factors: international war, internal disturbances, changes in the social structure due to political 
perturbations, and international political tensions. 
 
Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo (1989) developed a structural theory of refugee movements on 
which this research will rely.  They argue that refugee movements differ considerably from 
economic migration: the causes for migration, as well as the motivation of migrants, are 
fundamentally different.  In particular, they stress the ‘intrinsically involuntary character of 
refugee movements’ and the violence involved.  However, the couplet assimilating voluntary 
economic movement and migrants on the one hand, and involuntary and political movement 
on the other hand, is problematic: the authors argue against this double, over-simplistic 
dichotomy, and contend that the ‘the causes of refugee movements are not haphazard but 
structural, and result from conflicts’.  Their structural theory states that refugee movements 
are created only if underdevelopment or structural violence coincides with actual violence.  
The authors acknowledge the interconnection of economic and political factors, but affirm 
the predominance of conflicts in the creation of refugee movements.   
 
Even though environmental factors are not mentioned in the theory, I contend that conflicts 
can be substituted by sudden environmental change or disaster in the theory, and that a 
structural theory of environmentally-forced migration can be developed on the same model: 
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such displacements occur when underdevelopment and/or environmental vulnerability 
coincide with sudden environmental change.  This theoretical approach is also rooted in a 
constructivist perspective: the precipitating event as such does not create displacement unless 
it coincides with predisposing factors. 
 
Other scholars have attempted to provide classifications and typologies of refugees to aid 
discussion of the environment-migration nexus.  Joly (2002) proposes a distinction between 
‘Odyssean refugees’ and ‘Rubicon refugees’.  Odyssean refugees are ‘actors who were not just 
victims of the structure of conflict in their country of origin but were positively committed to 
the political struggle and to a project of society in their homeland’, a project that they take 
with them in exile.  On the other hand, Rubicon refugees are at the opposite of this spectrum: 
they have turned their back on their society of origin and do not retain a commitment to it.  
Unlike Odyssean refugees, they are unlikely to return.  In the case of people uprooted by 
environmental change, the desire to return will probably be more dependent upon the 
reversibility of the environmental damage than on any political project. 
 
Kunz argues that ‘it is the reluctance to uproot oneself, and the absence of positive original 
motivations to settle elsewhere, which characterizes all refugee decisions and distinguishes the 
refugee from the voluntary migrants’ (1973: 10).  He recognizes two ‘kinetic’ types of refugee 
movements:  anticipatory movements involving people before the deterioration of the 
situation, and acute movements, that are unplanned and en masse, where the objective is to 
reach a haven or safety.  Richmond (1994) applies a similar distinction to environmental 
migration, and considers that the difference between pro-active and reactive migration is more 
significant than the distinction between forced and voluntary migrants.  Such distinctions 
provide theoretical guidelines for the establishment of a typology of environmental migrants, 
which I will develop in Chapter 4. 
 
 
3.3.4. A Model for Environmental Migration 
 
Classical models and theories of migration barely address environmental change as a driver for 
migration.   I have tried to show the extent to which extent these models and theories can be 
adapted and used as conceptual frameworks for our understanding of the relationships 
between environmental changes and migration, whether forced or voluntary.  Literature 
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addressing specifically environmental migration, however, has produced a specific explanatory 
model, first proposed by Richmond (1994) and later systematised by Hugo (1996).  It is one of 
the very few models developed specifically to address environmental migration, and is based 
on the importance of understanding the dynamic and complex interaction of the multiple 
causes that trigger environmental migration.  First, the model acknowledges that some 
environments and contexts are more likely to generate migration than others.  This is the case 
of fragile environments, areas at risk of natural disaster, or poorer areas/countries where 
people have less resilience to environmental change, and fewer possibilities to adapt.  
Therefore, the predisposing factors are not solely environmental, but also economic and social.  
Overall, these predisposing factors are more present in developing countries, and can be 
understood as variables of social vulnerability. 
 
The second element in the chain of migration is the precipitating event, which can be any 
environmental change, or a series of changes.  Richmond insists that the precipitating event 
and the predisposing factors are not independent from each other: whether or not a 
precipitating event triggers migration is dependent on the predisposing factors.  This 
argument relates to theories of natural disasters and vulnerability outlined above, and echoes 
the structural theory of refugee movements (Zolberg et al. 1989): the precipitating event as 
such does not create a migration flow, unless it coincides with predisposing factors. 
 
The migration is also influenced by constraints and/or facilitators, such as the pre-existence of 
links and networks, or organised evacuation.   These constraints and facilitators will shape the 
migration flow.   
 
Finally, the feedback to the area of origin is of utmost importance for understanding migration 
flows.  This feedback can be produced by the migration itself, alleviating the pressure on 
natural resources and thus reducing the likelihood of the occurrence of a disaster.  The 
feedback can also take the form of environmental policies implemented after a disaster, which 
can also influence migration. 
 
The model is, so far, the most comprehensive theoretical model of environmental migration, 
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Fig.  2 – A Theoretical Model of Environmental Migration (Hugo 1996) 
 
 
However, this research is not concerned with the processes of environmental migration, but 
rather with the normative frameworks and policy responses that address such processes.  In 
that regard, one of my key endeavours is to show how policy responses affect not merely the 
precipitating conditions, the first step of the process, but the whole process. My goal is to 
show that policy responses play a far greater role than the one envisioned by Hugo in his 
model, and act at different levels. The model presented above mentions a specific type of 
policy response that aims to alleviate the impact of the precipitating event.  I argue that policy 
responses penetrate the whole process, and are the main determinants of the relationship 
between environmental change and migration.   
Predisposing conditions 






3.4. Research-Pol i cy  Linkage(s )  
 
As explained in the Introduction, a key feature of this work its emphasis on the importance of 
researchers to the policy-making process.  Before describing the Advocacy Coalition in 
Chapter 2, I will first review some key theories on the linkages between science and policy, 
and delineate how I envision the role of researchers as policy-makers. 
 
3.4.1. The Connection between Science and Policy 
 
The topic of the relationship between science and policy is hardly new: the first works on the 
subject appeared in the late 1930s. Already in 1939, Lynd warned that ‘the scholar-scientist is 
in acute danger of being caught, in the words of one of Auden's poems, “Lecturing on 
navigation while the ship is going down”’ (Lynd 1939). Since then, many authors have called 
for better connections between science and policy, and the matter has been an object of 
dissatisfaction on the part of both researchers and policy-makers (Weiss 1978). Yet science, 
and social science in particular, is embedded in social reform and public policy: the use of 
scientific evidence has long been part of the policy process, although it has taken different 
forms over time. In turn, a great deal of scientific research (perhaps too little) is publicly 
funded, either through structural or project-based funding. 
 
The relevance of scientific research for policy-making varies significantly from discipline to 
discipline and context to context; for example, its impact is very different in environmental 
and migration studies.  I shall discuss here some of its possible uses, following a typology 
established by Weiss (1978).  Firstly, research can be used for problem-solving.  The common 
assumption when discussing the linkages between science and policy is that scientific research 
provides data that can be used to solve political problems. The application of science, in this 
case, is linear and directly instrumental. When research is directly used for problem-solving, 
governments can commission a study on a particular subject in order to get information 
relevant for policy-making.  It is in this same spirit that many scientific advisory committees 
have been set up in different areas of government, and scientists directly used as advisers of 
the policy-makers (Smith 1992). 
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This model, however, assumes that there is an agreement between researchers and policy-
makers on the desired policy outcome, which is hardly the case. Scientists will generally favour 
an outcome based on rationality (Smith 1992), whereas policy-making will be driven by other, 
additional motives, such as ideology, values and interests. Hence there will often be a 
discrepancy between the solutions favoured by scientists and those implemented by policy-
makers.  Furthermore, scientific knowledge will often compete with other types of knowledge, 
produced by the media, public opinion, interest groups, etc. Florence and Martiniello note that  
 
Academic sociologists and political scientists increasingly face competition with media specialists and non-
academic experts. The latter often produce a more seductive discourse, even when it is not scientifically 
sound. As for academic researchers, they are sometimes accused of not engaging enough in social debates. 
But when they do so, their discourse tends to be disqualified because it is “disenchanting”, complex and 
even critical. (2005b: 3) 
 
For these reasons, the linkage between science and policy is hardly one of direct, linear 
instrumentalisation, and other models will be needed. Policy opportunities can also stem from 
the developments of fundamental research, and policy can become research-driven. This is the 
case for new discoveries that can find practical applications (a vaccine, for example), but the 
same is also the case with the social sciences. Social sciences can make apparent a social issue, 
or can be used to conceptualise a policy problem. Overall, the social science can deeply affect 
the way society thinks about a political problem, and therefore impact upon non-scientific 
discourses. In our case, the interactions between scientific and non-scientific discourses will be 
of utmost importance in the production of knowledge, as will be evidenced in Chapter 3. 
 
Finally, research can also be used as ammunition by policy-makers, especially when the topic is 
debated. In this sense, research can be (deliberately) manipulated or used for self-
advancement, often at the expense of those who do not have the same access to the scientific 
data. 
 
Finally, the model I mostly rely upon posits that researchers and policy-makers mutually 
influence each other, in an interactive model. In this model, the use of scientific research is a 
complex process that appeals to values, strategies and interests. The influence of policy-
makers on research is evident in the funding of policy-oriented research projects, or in the 
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formulation of certain research questions (Florence and Martiniello 2005a). It can also happen 
in less apparent ways, however, through mutual interactions, for example when sciences 
becomes an integral part of the policy process, and policy an integral part of the research 
process. This is the model that will be favoured by the Advocacy Coalition Framework, in 




3.4.1.1. Science and Environmental Policies 
 
Environmental policies tend to rely heavily upon the natural sciences. Rosenbaum notes that 
‘what often distinguishes environmental policy making from other policy domains is the 
extraordinary importance of science, and scientific controversy, in the policy process’ (2005: 
56).  Science, indeed, is often at the centre of policy debates, and its impartiality and 
objectivity can sometimes be tested. The advice and expertise of scientists can distort or 
reinforce political conflicts, particularly when scientific evidence and public opinion are 
divided (Rosenbaum 2005: 57).  However, the use of science in policy-making is confronted 
with a double obstacle: 
 
- Firstly, science can often be used as ammunition in case of policy debates and 
conflicts. In such cases, its findings can easily be distorted and manipulated so that 
they fit a policy position.  Furthermore, science is not free from political pressures, 
deliberate or otherwise. Some studies can be commissioned directly – either by the 
government or interest groups – with the purpose of supporting a policy position. 
More generally, many scholars deplore that the research agenda is too often policy-
driven, and thus fails to address some fundamental questions, or addresses them in a 
distorted way (Lynn 1978). As noted by Castles19,  
 
Social scientists often allowed their research agendas to be driven by policy needs and funding, 
they often asked the wrong questions, relied on short-term empirical approaches without looking 
at historical and comparative dimensions, and failed to develop adequate theoretical frameworks 
narrowly […] Focussed empirical research, often designed to provide an answer to an immediate 
                                                
19 Cited in Florence and Martiniello (2005b: 7).  In its original context the quoted text refers to the social 
sciences, but can easily be applied to science at large, in the present context. 
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bureaucratic problem, tends to follow a circular logic. It accepts the problem definitions built into 
its terms of reference, and does not look for more fundamental causes, nor for more challenging 
solutions. (Castles 2003) 
 
- Another obstacle, particularly acute in the natural sciences, is the differences of time 
frame in problem solving. Science typically favours long-term solutions, whereas 
governments are often compelled to act swiftly and will look for immediate benefits. 
Revelle, famous for pioneering research on climate change, observes that  
 
In his search for truth, the scientist is oriented toward the future; the politician’s orientation is 
usually here and now. He desires quick visible pay-offs for which he often seems willing to 
mortgage the future. (Revelle 1981: 134) 
 
Linkages between natural sciences and environmental policies are particularly apparent in the 
case of climate change, where an ad hoc scientific body, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), has been established by two United Nations agencies20 to review 
scientific evidence related to global warming, and to assess the associated risks and impacts. 
Policy-makers participate in the plenary sessions of the IPCC, adopt its work programme, and 
have a say in the reviewing of reports, although they do not contribute directly to them. Major 
IPCC reports (the Assessment Reports) have often resulted in policy responses: the First 
Assessment Report, released in 1990, served as the basis for the drafting of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Second Assessment Report, issued in 
1996, preceded the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
 
3.4.1.2. Science and Migration Policies 
 
The relationship between science and policy is significantly different in the area of migration 
policies, and the limited impact of social sciences on policies (and migration policies in 
particular) is often lamented (Weiss 1978). Why is this the case? Florence and Martiniello 
(2005b) note that the academic discourse on migration faces increasing competition from the 
media and other non-academic discourses, which are often preferred to the former; academic 
                                                
20 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). 
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sources may be disregarded for being too complex and critical, and if they are used, it is 
merely to legitimate a policy action. Furthermore, research findings on migration often 
conflict with politicised pre-conceptions of migration, both in public opinion and amongst 
policy-makers themselves. 
 
The use of pre-determined categories seems particularly problematic, since these categories are 
rooted in national perspectives and policy agendas. Furthermore, such categories are not only 
descriptive, but also prescriptive, and so researchers should question the use of such pre-
determined categories (Florence and Martiniello 2005b). A similar problem arises with regard 
to the definition of research questions and paradigms, which are often policy-driven. Castles 
note that ‘ministers and bureaucrats still see migration as something that can be turned on and 
off like a tap through laws and policies’, and that they have, to a certain extent, imposed this 
paradigm on researchers (Castles 2003). 
 
Reflection on the use of categories is a critical component of this thesis.  Categories are used 
to better apprehend social reality, but they also impose a politically-grounded framework upon 
this social reality.  For instance, if environmental migration is considered as a specific category 
of migration, this implies, one way or another, that such migration flows should be addressed 
differently than other migration categories.  I argue that such categories are always artificial, 
and rooted in specific political contexts. Hence process of categorisation – in which research 




3.4.2. Researchers as Policy Actors 
 
From the above, one might conclude that research plays an important role in environmental 
policy-making and a more limited one in migration policy-making. However, I propose to 
consider not only the role of research in the policy process, but also the engagement of 
researchers themselves in the policy process.  
 
It is now widely acknowledged that ideas are an important input of the policy process 
(Fouilleux 2000); how these ideas become institutionalised in the policy process, however, 
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remains debated. Researchers are obviously prime providers of ideas, but their integration in 
the policy process can take different forms. 
 
In some cases, their role in the policy process is institutionalised: for example, when they are 
affiliated to an advisory committee, think-tank or NGO, or when they are commissioned to 
conduct policy-oriented research. This is not to say, however, that researchers in such 
positions are politically biased, but rather that their role in the policy process is officially 
acknowledged.  
 
In other cases, the role of researchers is more diffuse, as they are not officially involved in the 
policy process21. However, the involvement of scientists in policy debates, to some degree, 
also reflects their personal convictions. Mazur, for example, notes that ‘experts tend to behave 
like other people when they engage in a controversy. Coalitions solidify and disagreements 
become polarized as conflicts become more acrimonious’ (Mazur 1981: 29). For example, 
although the IPCC is policy-neutral and does not make any policy recommendations, it is fair 
to assume that IPCC scientists share the view that greenhouse gases emissions should be 
reduced, even if they disagree on the best way to do so.  
 
In considering researchers to be policy-makers, I am not taking a cynical view of science: I do 
not claim that all research is policy-oriented or has covert policy goals, but rather that 
researchers are not policy-neutral, whether intentionally or not. Naturally, my placing 
researchers within the Advocacy Coalition Framework raises some ethical questions about the 
status of research, as well as some methodological issues about my personal position as a 





Research on environmental migration abounds with proposals for the development of new 
policy instruments to tackle what is framed as a new issue.  Although the material linkages 
between environmental change and migration flows are still under research, the discursive 
linkage between both aspects has steadily gained currency in recent years. I propose to 
examine how this discursive connection has been translated onto the policy level, to analyse 
                                                
21 Note that the same researcher can play different roles in the policy process at different times. 
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policy responses in the fields of environmental and migration policies.  In doing so, I hope to 
shed new light on the conceptualisation of environmental migration – a matter still fiercely 
debated – despite my awareness that additional empirical evidence will be necessary before the 
validity of the concept can be established. 
 
My research reviews the different normative frameworks and policy responses that have been 
developed since the mid-1980s to address the issue, and analyses their parallel evolution and 
interactions. These frameworks and responses are primarily analysed at the international level, 
but some local and national policies will also be analysed and used as illustrations of the 
application of wider frameworks. 
 
My view is that environmental migration is a political construct, shaped by policies upon 
which research has a significant impact, since I contend that science and policy interact with 
and mutually shape each other. 
 
This study relies on models of environmental change derived from environmental economics: 
global commons, public goods and externalities. The impact of environmental change on 
populations, however, is contingent upon their vulnerability: I will reject the deterministic 
perspective in favour of a constructionist approach. I will also attempt to show that none of 
the existing migration models really fits the characteristics of environmental migration, though 
some insights can be gleaned from the new economics of migration and the structural theory 
of refugee movements. The prime reason for this is that environmental factors have long been 
neglected in migration theories and models. 
 
Now that the main theoretical choices have been laid out, the following chapter outlines the 
key research questions and the methodological choices that have been made in order to 









“It is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. 
But above all, try something” 
 






This section aims to delineate the main methodological choices and the techniques of 
investigation that were adopted for this research.  Having described existing theories of 
environmental changes and migrations flows in the previous chapter, I now turn to discussion 
of the policy process itself.  Different theories and models co-exist, and will be described 
briefly.  Of these models, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) seemed the most 
pertinent to the research I intended to conduct.  The reasons for this choice, as well the use I 
make of the model, will be explained. 
 
Although this research is primarily intended as a theoretical contribution to the literature, it 
also features some empirical illustrations, drawn from fieldworks conducted in Tuvalu and 
Louisiana.  For both kinds of research, my methods, techniques and choices will be explained 
in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.  Section 2.3 will outline the main research questions underpinning this 




1. Analysing Policy 
 
The policy-making process is a complex one, involving a wide array of actors and interacting 
elements.  Overall, the process is determined by the ‘manner in which problems get 
conceptualised and brought to government for solution; governmental institutions formulate 
alternatives and select policy solutions; and those solutions get implemented, evaluated, and 
revised’ (Sabatier 1999: 3).  Given the complex concatenation of intertwined elements at work, 
theories of the policy process aim to simplify and schematise the process, in order to provide 
a way of explicating the different steps of the process.  The key theories germane to the 
policy-process are summarised here. 
 
 
1.1. Theori e s  o f  the  po l i cy  process  
 
Until the 1990s, the most widely-held and influential framework was the linear, or ‘stages 
heuristic’, model, which outlines policy-making as ‘a problem-solving process which is 
rational, balanced, objective and analytical’ (Sutton 1999: 9).  The model was the subject of 
considerable criticism in the late 1980s and 1990s; as a consequence of the widespread 
acknowledgement of its shortcomings, a formidable period of model development took place 
in the 1990s with the goal of presenting new ways of understanding the policy process.  These 
models were widely diverse, so much so that some concluded that no theoretical framework 
would suffice to provide a reasonable, meaningful explanation of the policy process, which 
could best be described as a ‘chaos of purposes and incidents’ (Sutton 1999: 8). The Advocacy 
Coalition Framework counts among these ambitious models developed in the early 1990s.  
 
1.1.1. The Stages Heuristic Model, or Linear Model 
 
Until the 1990s, the stages heuristic model was the traditional model for apprehending the 
policy process. The model divided the policy process into a series of separate sequential 
stages22, and discussed the factors impacting upon each stage of the process (Brewer and 
deLeon 1983).  The model was widely used in the 1970s and the 1980s, but by the 1990s the 
                                                
22 These stages comprise agenda-setting, policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. 
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discrepancies between the model and the reality of the policy process had become increasingly 
evident.  In particular, it was argued that the model was unable to provide a causal theory for 
the whole process, was too fragmented and descriptively inaccurate, and ignored the 
intertwining of multiple policy cycles (Sabatier 1999). 
 
1.1.2. Institutional Rational Choice 
 
Theories of Institutional Rational Choice derive from the school of Public Choice.  They 
examine the way in which different institutional rules and constraints affect the behaviour of 
individuals.  These individuals are assumed to act rationally and to pursue their self-interest 
(Shepsle 1989).  Although the model has universal pretensions, it has been applied primarily to 
analyse the relationships between governmental agencies, parliaments and organisations 
(Ostrom 1990).  The model is widely used, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries.  However, 
although it is perhaps the most advanced and developed model, for the purposes of my 
research it seemed overly deterministic. 
 
1.1.3. The Multiple Streams Framework 
 
This framework derives from the classic ‘garbage can’ model of organisational behaviour, and 
was first developed by Kingdon (1984).  Kingdon identified three different streams in the 
policy process, which are supposed to function independently from each other: the problem 
stream, the policy stream and the politics stream.  The problem stream consists of the 
characteristics of the political problem, the policy stream contains potential solutions to the 
problem, and the politics stream gathers the state of politics and public opinion.  Each stream 
contains the various political actors involved in the policy-making, and Kingdon argues that 
policy changes occur when the three streams converge in a ‘window of opportunity’ (Birkland 
2001: 224).   
 
The model offers an interesting metaphor to explain the appearance of new ideas and 
concepts – such as environmental migration – in the policy arena, but is more concerned with 
agenda setting than with other aspects of the policy process (Birkland 2001: 224). 
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1.1.4. The Punctuated-Equilibrium Framework 
 
The punctuated-equilibrium framework is an evolutionary framework of the policy process.  
The proponents of the model, Baumgartner and Jones (1993), argue that the balance of power 
in the policy process remains relatively stable over long periods of time, punctuated by major, 
sudden policy changes.  Policy changes occur when a group manages to present a political 
problem differently and alter the public opinion of the problem.  A key feature of the model is 
the concept of a policy monopoly, which is reminiscent of the coalitions developed in the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework.  A policy monopoly is a closed group of important actors in 
policy-making, who seek to keep the policy system closed, until a group of opponents will 
overthrow them and form a new policy monopoly. 
 
The framework holds some characteristics in common with the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework, but is closely related to the US policy system, and could not easily be adapted to 
other policy contexts.    
 
1.1.5. Constructivist Frameworks 
 
A constructivist framework seemed to be an obvious candidate for my research: such 
frameworks address political problems as social constructions, and emphasise the importance 
of belief systems (Muller and Surel 1998). Nonetheless, constructivist frameworks do not 
easily allow ideas to be connected with people and institutions, and ideas are often conceived 
as ‘free-floating’, as Sabatier correctly observes (1999: 11).  Although I intended to adopt a 
constructivist approach to the issue of environmental migration, the connections between 
ideas and institutions, between research and policy, were an essential part of my research, and 
could not be dealt with adequately by a constructivist framework.  This was one of the reasons 







1.2. The Advocacy  Coali t i on  Framework 
 
 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), 
aims to be a comprehensive and pertinent framework for contemporary policy analysis.  It has 
been applied to a wide variety of policy sectors, including (but not limited to) energy policy 
(Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair 1993), airline regulation (Brown and Stewart 1993) and education 
reform (Mintrom and Vergari 1998).   
 
Research on policy analysis first appeared in the United States in the 1950s, with a managerial 
orientation at that time: the framework of analysis took a top-down approach to evaluating 
the implementation of specific policies in a particular context.  Under the influence of scholars 
such as Easton and Laswell, the interactions of the political system with other social bodies 
was incorporated into the nascent field of policy analysis.  This allowed for the development 
of a bottom-up approach, that could account for the contribution of elements of the social 
system to policy design: the role of lobbies, in particular, was a prime focus of this approach.  
The field was long dominated by public choice theories, and the linear model emerged as the 
most common framework of analysis. 
 
The ACF was developed in an attempt to move beyond the linear model and in order to 
reconcile the top-down and bottom-up approaches.  It was directly inspired by Dahl’s 
milestone work on the pluralistic approach to politics: the ACF attempts to analyse to 
interactions of multiple actors in complex policy processes.  Dahl (1961) drew attention to the 
multiplicity of stakeholders in the policy process; similarly, the ACF attempts to model how 
they interact and shape the policy process. 
 
Following Dahl’s work on theories of pluralism, the importance of non-state actors in the 
policy process has been increasingly acknowledged.  Dahl’s work considered non-state actors 
in an institutional perspective: only institutions were considered, and non-state actors that 
were not officially represented were ignored from the process. Over time however, as the 
analysis of politics was no longer confined to the study of institutions, non-state actors have 
been considered in a more holistic perspective, which included also those not represented in 
political institutions and forums. Studies of civil society and interest groups have emerged, 
along with such concepts as social capital (Gellner 1994; Kaldor 2003).  Overall, it has been 
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recognised that different groups – not limited to institutions and state actors – compete with 
each other in the policy process.  One of the key reasons why the stages heuristic model 
became obsolete was its inability to account for the emergence of new policy actors such as 
civil society. The ACF is the outcome of the long-standing trend, which was first 
acknowledged by Dahl, whereby non-state actors have taken up an increasing role in the 
policy process. 
 
The ACF revolves around five basic premises (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 118-119):  
- Scientific information is an essential part of the policy process; 
- The process can only be understood from a long-term perspective; short-term analysis 
does not permit an analysis of the various strategies pursued by the actors over time; 
- The most useful unit of analysis for policy change is not that of a specific organisation 
or programme, but rather a policy subsystem: ‘actors from a variety of public and 
private organisations who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue’; 
- These policy subsystems include not only civil servants, officials, legislators and 
interest groups, but also journalists, researchers, and actors at all levels of government; 
- Public policies can be conceptualised as belief systems. 
 
The central element of the ACF is the belief system, around which advocacy coalitions are 
formed.  A belief system consists of fundamental values as well as social representations and 
perceptions of political reality.  In any given policy, different belief systems co-exist, 
corresponding to different advocacy coalitions.  These belief systems are organised around a 
hierarchical structure, comprising three layers: 
 
- Deep core beliefs, which relate to basic normative beliefs, such as the traditional left/right 
scale. 
 
- Policy core beliefs, which represent a coalition’s basic commitments and value priorities in 
a given policy subsystem, and perceptions about the seriousness of the problem and 
its causes.  In the policy subsystem of climate change, for example, policy core beliefs 
might focus on the relative importance of environmental protection versus economic 
development.  These policy core beliefs are determinative elements of the coalitions: 




- Finally, secondary aspects, which are policy instruments used to pursue the realisation of 
the policy core beliefs: taxes versus incentives, command-and-control approaches 
versus market approaches, etc.  These secondary aspects are more easily adjusted than 
policy core beliefs, while deep core beliefs are very resistant to change. 
 
The conflicting strategies of opposing coalitions are mediated by policy brokers, whose role is 
to find a compromise in order to produce a policy output.  Such a hierarchisation of beliefs 
permits for the development of predictive hypotheses; these hypotheses are organised into 
three groups, concerning advocacy coalitions, on policy change, and on learning across 
coalitions.   
 
The first hypothesis concerning coalitions argues that the arrangement of allies and opponents 
within a subsystem remain stable over long periods of time, given that policy core beliefs are 
unlikely to change.  The second hypothesis states that actors within a coalition will maintain 
consensus on the policy core beliefs, but are less likely to do so on secondary aspects.  A final, 
related hypothesis stipulates that an actor of a coalition will give up secondary aspects before 
acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core.  These three hypotheses are logical 
consequences of the hierarchy in place within the belief system.  A fourth hypothesis was later 
added, which contends that within a coalition, administrative agents will tend to adopt a more 
moderate position than other members of the coalition. 
 
The hypotheses related to policy change make bolder claims: a first contends that the policy 
core attributes of a governmental programme are unlikely to be revised significantly as long as 
the coalition that implemented the policy remains in power.  In other words, a change of 
coalition or an external intervention is necessary before a policy change can be implemented.  
A second hypothesis proposes a similar argument: the policy core attributes of a system are 
unlikely to be changed in the absence of external perturbations to the subsystem, such as 
technological breakthrough, public opinion, etc. 
 
A third set of predictive hypotheses concerns the possibility of learning across belief systems, 
that is, how can coalitions be influenced by each other? The ACF hypothesises that such 
changes across coalitions are more likely to occur in fields where quantitative data are 
available, in natural sciences more so than in social sciences, or when there exists a 
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professional forum with experts from different coalitions participating.  Additionally, such 
changes are also more likely to take place when there is an intermediate level of informed 
conflict between the coalitions, that is, not a direct normative conflict. 
 
These hypotheses have been tested in an important number of cases23, and proved empirically 
valid.  However, two difficulties arise in the application of the ACF model to practical 
situations: firstly, how to identify the actors of a coalition, and secondly, how to delimitate the 
subsystems? 
 
With regards to the identification of actors, one of the major features of the ACF model is the 
assumption that no actor is policy-indifferent.  All actors are potential and equal members of 
coalitions, no matter whether they are officials, interest group leaders, legislators, journalists or 
researchers.  The ACF model is particularly interesting for challenging the assumed neutrality 
of researchers: empirical studies show that researchers are not policy-indifferent, but usually 
members of a coalition (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998).  Furthermore, these studies also show 
that the number of coalitions within a policy subsystem is higher than expected.   
 
Another problem concerns the delimitation of policy subsystems, which are loosely defined as 
groups of actors interacting with some regularity in a functional policy domain (Sabatier 1988).  
Subsequent refinements of the model distinguished between nascent subsystems (in the 
process of forming), and mature subsystems (of several years’ duration) (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1999: 135).  Given the recent emergence of the topic of environmental migration, I 
consider the relevant policy subsystem a nascent one, and thus accept that greater fluidity of 
the actors is inevitable: nascent subsystems are more loosely defined than mature subsystems.  
In the words of the proponents of ACF,  
 
Subsystems arising because of concern about a relatively new issue […] may initially be characterized 
by rather amorphous situations […].  But as information develops concerning the seriousness of the 
problem, its causes, and the costs of remedying the situation, actors tend to coalesce into distinct 
coalitions […].  (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 136) 
 
4.1.1. Why choose the ACF Model as an Explanatory Framework? 
                                                
23 In 1999, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith acknowledged at least 34 cases of empirical testing of their model. 
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There are many different models that could have been used this analysis. It is likely to each of 
them would have yielded different results, and made the policy process appear in a different 
way. Thus the ACF Model is far from being the only model that could have been used, and its 
choice is dependent upon the research objectives laid out in the previous chapter. A key 
feature of the model is that it seeks to explain the policy process with the policy beliefs of 
policy-makers. Hence it allows me to highlight the interactions between policy outcomes and 
values, which is a central aspect of this research. The model, therefore, was not chosen 
because it was the only one that could be used, but because it could help fulfil a core objective 
of the research. 
   
Furthermore, different specific reasons prompted me to select the ACF model from among 
different possible models of policy analysis: 
 
- Firstly, because of the universality of the model, and its high explanatory value.  
Theories and models of the policy process remain largely influenced by Anglo-Saxon 
policy processes.  Yet the organisation of policy-making and the structures of 
government tend to be significantly different in developing and developed countries, 
in the United States and Europe, or at the national and international levels.  Unlike 
other models, the ACF model seems applicable to a wide range of different policy 
processes in different contexts. The punctuated equilibrium model, for example, also 
has a high explanatory value, but has been tailored specifically for policy processes in 
the United States. Furthermore, the model has been thoroughly tested at an empirical 
level, and has been corrected and refined in order to take into account the results and 
criticisms resulting from empirical testing.  This gives the model a high explanatory 
value (Bergeron et al. 1998). 
 
- Secondly, the model connects research and policy, and considers researchers to be 
political actors.  Many other policy models, such as the stages heuristic model or the 
institutional rational choice model, do not allow for such considerations, and restrict 
themselves to institutions. In my view, the ACF model can shed new light on the 
scientific controversy between ‘alarmists’ and ‘sceptics’, if we consider these two 
positions to be parts of advocacy coalitions.  In that regard, the model perfectly fits 
the constructivist approach of this research, since it recognises that the 
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conceptualisation of the issue is not policy-indifferent, but is shaped by belief systems 
inherent to the policy process.  In a field of study in which the conceptualisation of 
the problem is so important, it seemed appropriate to choose a model that placed a 
heavy emphasis on the role of experts and scientific information.  Furthermore, the 
model considers researchers to be policy entrepreneurs, or actors who, ‘from outside the 
formal positions of government, introduce, translate, and help implement new ideas 
into public practice’ (Roberts and King 1991: 147).  Incorporating researchers as 
actors in the policy process does not go, however, without raising methodological 
concerns regarding the position of the researcher towards his/her field of study.  Such 
considerations shall be addressed in the following chapter. 
 
- The ACF considers policy cycles over relatively long time-frames, usually ten years or 
more.  I have shown in Chapter 1, Section 4 how the time-frames of researchers often 
do not match those of policy-makers.  As observed by Sabatier, ‘A number of recent 
studies suggest that time periods of twenty to forty years may be required to obtain a 
reasonable understanding of the impact of a variety of socioeconomic conditions and 
the accumulation of scientific knowledge about a problem (1999: 3).  By considering 
policy cycles in the long run, the ACF accounts for the different time-frames of policy 
actors.  Given that I intend to analyse the evolution of policy responses over a 
relatively long period, from the mid-1980 onwards, the ACF seemed particularly 
appropriate. 
 
- The ACF uses the policy subsystem as its unit of analysis, rather than a specific 
programme or policy changes.  The policy subsystem is centred around policy actors, 
and encompasses all actors interacting around the policy issue.  A key feature of my 
analysis is the combination of environmental and migration laws, andthe policy 
subsystem seemed to be the single unit of analysis that would allow for these two 
policy areas to be examined in tandem.  Subsystems can arise out of the emergence of 
a new policy issue, and I will consider that this to be the case for environmental 
migration.   
 
- Finally, the ACF was chosen for its emphasis on beliefs, values and interests in the 
policy process.  Other models tend to consider that institutional affiliation is the key 
determinant of policy behaviour.  Following a constructivist approach, I argue that 
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belief systems are more important, and that reaching beyond one’s institutional 
affiliation, as well as across coalitions, is possible.  In many regards, the ACF is the 
opposite of the Institutional Rational model, which is rooted in a deterministic 
perspective.  In contrast to the Institutional Rational model, I argue that policy 
behaviours towards environmental migration are dictated primarily by the belief 




4.1.2. Using the ACF in the Context of Environmental Migration 
 
I propose to consider environmental migration as a policy subsystem, in which advocacy 
coalitions form around core policy beliefs.  Policies dealing with environmental migration 
belong to different policy areas, ranging from disaster management to refugee protection.  
These shall be detailed in the section below.  In my analysis, the spectrum of policy areas 
comprise a policy subsystem, in which two advocacy coalitions emerge.  The first coalition is 
organised around an ‘alarmist’ policy core, calling for the development of new legal and policy 
instruments to address an issue of unseen magnitude.  The second coalition revolves around a 
‘sceptical’ policy core, maintaining that environmental migration does not require the 
development of new policy instruments.  Both coalitions form naturally around the principle 
arguments set forth in academic debates, and include views from researchers, as well as 
international agencies, NGOs, journalists and other stakeholders.  In this analysis, emerging 
policy brokers may attempt to transcend coalitions and transform their competing views into 
policy outputs.  Some authors have attempted to give a numerical value to the policy 
behaviours of coalition members, in order to conduct a quantitative analysis of the policy 
process (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998).  I will not go down this route, and will instead 
concentrate on describing the strategies and interactions of advocacy coalitions.  Overall, the 
ACF will be used more as a theoretical model of the policy process than as a methodological 
tool.  I do not seek to describe precisely all members of each coalition, nor to code their 
behaviours with a numerical value, but rather use the ACF to apprehend a political reality.  




In order to navigate within this policy subsystem, I have identified a series of policy areas in 
the environmental and migration spheres that will be studied.  Policy implications of the 
debate on environmental migration are manifold (Boano et al. 2007; Brown 2008; Biermann 
and Boas 2007), but focus on a series of particularly relevant policy areas detailed in the next 
section.  These policy areas are subsystems in their own right; and different coalitions could 
emerge for each of them.  I argue that these different policy areas are part of a global policy 
subsystem on environmental migration, whose coalitions and strategies shall be described.  As 
an illustration of this policy process, I present empirical evidence from Tuvalu and Katrina as 




4.1.3. Researchers in the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 
As mentioned above, the ACF considers researchers to be members of advocacy coalitions, 
and refutes the idea that they are policy-indifferent.  In Chapter 1, Section 3 I drew attention 
to the interactions of research and policy, and the impact of science upon the policy process, 
particularly in the field of environmental policies.  
 
One of the goals of this research is to highlight the role played by scientific research in the 
policy process, and the role of policy responses in the conceptualisation of research questions 
and issues.  For this reason, researchers will be considered to form part of advocacy coalitions, 
along with traditional policy-makers, governmental agencies, international organisations, 
NGOs and the media.  A few words, however, must be said about the place of researchers in 
the ACF. 
 
Researchers are often consulted by policy-makers for two key reasons: in order for them to 
provide technical information and expertise, and because they are assumed to be rational and 
objective sources of information (Smith 1992).  Beyond this function, researchers also have an 
important role in generating, promoting and disseminating new ideas (Fouilleux 2000).  I 
contend that these ideas are shaped by policy beliefs, and that researchers, whether 
deliberately or not, are part of the policy process.  
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Given their importance in the field of environmental policies, researchers can also play the 
role of policy brokers, and some of are even invested with official functions in the policy 
process.  Walter Kälin, for example, is at the same time Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary General on Internal Displacements, and professor of Migration Studies and Human 
Rights at the University of Bern.  
 
Not all researchers play a similar role in the policy process, however: some engage actively in it 
through think tanks and/or advisory committees, while others do so unintentionally. Some 
have greater access to other policy-makers (such as the media or international organisations) 
than others.  Overall, I aim to describe how ideas are institutionalised, and the interactions and 
strategies of the different actors of the process. Researchers will be placed in coalitions along 
with journalists, NGOs or elected officials; this does not imply that their objectives and 
strategies are similar, but only they share some core policy beliefs on the policy issue (although 
they can disagree and criticise each other on other issues).  It could be argued that I myself am 
part of a coalition, but for the purposes of this research I hope to abstract myself from this 





I have said that the Advocacy Coalition Framework will be used more as a theoretical 
framework to apprehend the policy process than as a methodological tool. The 
methodological approach of this research is detailed in the following section. 
 
 
2.1. Theore t i cal  re s earch 
 
 
The theoretical research informing this thesis was mostly concerned with the analysis of 
normative frameworks and policy responses at the international level.  Section 2.1.1 explains 
the choice of policy areas – the units of analysis – in this study, and Section 2.1.2. reviews the 
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three types of sources used: namely legal documents and archives, expert interviews, and 





2.1.1. Policy Areas under Study 
 
The policy area most obviously affected by the debate on environmental migration is refugee 
protection.  Divers scholars have called for  revision of the international refugee regime in 
order to include peoples displaced by environmental change (Conisbee and Simms 2003; 
Biermann and Boas 2007; Dacyl 1995), whereas others have opposed such a revision and 
warned that it will dilute current protection mechanisms (Castles 2002; Suhrke and Visentin 
1991).  Though refugee protection is certainly a prime target of policy implications, I argue 
that the debate on environmental migration affects other policy areas as well, including 
disaster management, migration policies, adaptation to climate change, protection of IDPs, 
environmental justice and the global governance of migration.  Some authors have also called 
for a reform of development policies (Brown 2008), but these seem somewhat peripheral to 
the debate, and will not be tackled here.   
 
I have grouped the relevant policy areas into two policy streams – environmental and 
migration policies – and  will attempt to study their parallel developments over time in relation 
to environmental migration.  Each policy area will be analysed through the ACF model, and 
considered as a secondary policy subsystem.  At this stage, I focus not on the implementation 
of a given set of policies in a specific country, but rather examine the main policy 
developments at the international level.  The unit of analysis will not be particular policy, but 
rather the ongoing debates germane to the policy area at the international level.   
 
My analysis takes a longue-durée view whenever possible, in order to capture long-term 
evolutions and developments.  Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith have contended that ‘understanding 
the process of policy change (…) requires a time perspective of a decade or more’, since ‘a 
focus on short-term decision-making will underestimate the influence of policy analysis’ (1999: 
118).  Accordingly, I challenge the widely-held belief that the emergence of the concept of 
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environmental migration is directly associated with the hype and media-frenzy24 surrounding 
climate change, and argue instead that this concept has roots in the mid-1980s.  It is 
undeniable that climate change has given new salience to the concept and brought it to the 
fore of political and media agendas in the mid-2000s, but my point is that the emergence of 
the concept can be dated much earlier.  The mid-1980s were a turning point because they 
marked the start of the asylum crisis and interrogations on the nature of the refugee regime, 
and also because they coincided with an accumulation of major natural disasters that 
highlighted the vulnerability of populations to environmental changes.  Concerns about 
climate change also started to make their way onto the political agenda in the mid-1980s, with 
the first hearings on the subject being held in the US Senate, and the establishment of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1989.  Unsurprisingly, it was also in 
the mid-1980s that the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) issued the first report on 
‘environmental refugees’ (El-Hinnawi 1985).  Therefore, wherever possible, the timeframe of 
my research encompasses the last 25 years, from the mid-1980s until now. 
 
In a first step, I describe the normative frameworks and legal instruments of each area 
(environmental and migrational) and interpret its policy developments over time.  The central 
research question of this analysis asks, How have these frameworks shaped the policy 
response to environmental migration?  In a second phase, these policy developments are 
illustrated by empirical evidence from Tuvalu and New Orleans. 
 
2.1.1.1. Environmental Policies 
 
 
This first stream of policies includes disaster management, principles of environmental law 
and adaptation to climate change.  These policies all address the impacts of environmental 
changes on societies, a relatively recent preoccupation of environmental policies. 
 
 In the 1970s, concern for the state of the environment became widespread, and the first 
national environmental policies were designed, following the UN conference on the Human 
Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972.  These policies were directed at protecting the 
                                                
24 These terms are not used in a pejorative fashion; they merely reflect the increased attention received by climate 
change in recent years, and the impression that environmental ‘refugees’ were just another part of a ‘doom and 
gloom’ scenario. 
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environment, and were concerned with pollution control, waste disposal, or the safeguarding 
of biodiversity.  It was only a decade later that the impact of the environment on populations 
was carefully examined and addressed through policy instruments.    
 
With regard to natural disasters, the concept of ‘vulnerability’, outlined above, emerged in the 
mid-1980s, after the disaster of Bhopal (1984) and Chernobyl (1986), as well as the 1983-85 
famine in Ethiopia.  The concept called into question our understanding of natural disasters, 
and reflected greater attention given to the impacts of environmental changes on populations.  
The evolution of the debate on climate policies is equally enlightening: climate change was 
initially addressed in terms of mitigation, and adaptation was perceived as an 
acknowledgement of the failure of mitigation policies.  The first climate policies were 
therefore exclusively concerned with restricting greenhouse gas emissions; a shift occurred in 
the mid-2000s towards policies aimed at strengthening populations’ adaptive capacities to 
climate change.  Finally, it is only recently that debates on environmental justice, including 
ecological debt, responsibility-sharing and compensation, have come to the fore of the 
international agenda. 
 
Unsurprisingly, theories of environmental policy to date have mostly focused on policies of 
environmental protection (Baumol and Oates 1975), which are largely inspired by models 
derived from political economy.  Theories concerning policies that address environmental 
impacts on populations usually draw on other approaches and models  Such policies are not 
always associated with specific decisions, but can be multiple and overlapping (Keeley and 
Scoones 1999).  A common rule shared by both types of policies, however, is that scientific 
expertise plays a major role in shaping the policy debates.  The triangular relationships 
between knowledge, power and policy have been conceptualised in a number of theories 
(Beck 1995; Latour 1987; Foucault 1980), most notably in theories of the mutual construction 
of science and policy (Barnes and Edge 1982).   
 
My analysis will focus on the latter stream of policies, which address environmental impacts 
on populations, and on the interactions between science, power and policy.  Chapter 5 will be 
concerned with interventions of the state and international agencies in disaster management 
and relief.  Chapter 6 will focus on the development of adaptation policies to climate change 




2.1.1.2. Migration Policies 
 
 
Protection of refugees and IDPs is the prime focus of this part of the research.  However, 
some mention will also be made of migration policies, although they remain domestic policies 
for the most part, since a significant of environmental migration flows are voluntary, and not 
forced.  
 
The asylum crisis in the mid-1980s gave birth to a large number of academic interventions on 
the nature, and possible reform, of refugee protection.  Revisiting the definitional issue of 
refugee movements, Zolberg et al.  called for a better international refugee regime (1989).  
Similarly, lawyers called for a reform of the international refugee regime: Garvey argued it was 
inadequate (1985), Hathaway found it irrelevant (1997).  This questioning of the adequacy of 
international refugee law led to further reflection on expanding typologies of refugees (Joly 
2002; Richmond 1994; Marfleet 2006) to incorporate new types of forced displacements, 
including those triggered by natural disasters.  The fifty-year anniversary of the Refugee 
Convention was marked by academic interventions on the ethics of asylum (Gibney 2004), 
and on the protection of those who were not, or were improperly, covered by the Convention, 
such as IDPs (Phuong 2004; Newman and van Selm 2003; van Selm et al. 2003). 
 
According to Boswell (2007), migration policies can be classified into two broad categories: 
those inspired by neoclassical economics (Freeman 1995), which have a high theoretical value 
and predictability potential, but often tend to oversimplify the issues and neglect social 
structures; and those derived from neo-institutional approaches (Joppke 1998; Hollifield 
2004), which provide complex explanations of social issues but often lack predictability, or 
cannot easily be tested empirically.  The former assume that migration policies are shaped by 
conflicting, organized interests within a society, whereas the latter see the key variable of 
migration policies in the relationships between the state and stakeholders who oppose a 
restrictive approach to migration – this model is very close to the advocacy coalition 
framework.  Boswell finds both sets of theories unsatisfactory, and propose instead a theory 
‘focusing on the functional imperatives of the state in the area of migration, which shape its 
responses to societal interests and institutional structures’ (2007: 75).   
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Keeping these theoretical debates in mind, I will proceed to analyse the impact of 
environmental migration on asylum policies.  To the best of my knowledge, the ACF model 
has not yet been applied to the study of asylum policy. My analysis will focus on the 
international refugee regime, but will also seek to address some regional policy responses, 
especially mechanisms of complementary protection in the European Union.  Attempts to 
develop migration policies at the international level will be touched upon briefly in the 
conclusion: these attempts are connected to the global governance of migration, but also to 
the practices of refugee burden-sharing, which are addressed with a theoretical perspective in 
the works of Thielemann (2003, 2006a) 
 
2.1.2. Data Sources 
 
This aspect of the research relied on three types of sources: legal documents and archives, 
expert interviews, and direct observation.   
 
2.1.2.1. Legal Documents and Archives 
 
My primary sources of data were the very documents that constituted the normative 
frameworks.  All these documents were publicly available, with the exception of some 
legislative proposals that were advance previews, which have since been released into the 
public domain.  Archives and records of negotiation (‘travaux préparatoires’) were also a primary 
source to analyse the evolution of the different regimes.  Finally, legal commentaries and 
analyses provided vital insights into the minds of the policy drafters. 
 
2.1.2.2. Expert Interviews 
 
A series of interviews were conducted with key officials at UNHCR and IOM in Brussels and 
Geneva, UNEP and UNFCCC in Bonn, and the European Commission in Brussels.  
Additional interviews were also conducted with journalists, NGO representatives, and 
members of the Belgian and Australian parliaments who proposed asylum reforms to address 
environmental displacements.  About 20 open interviews were conducted, mostly in an ‘off-
the-
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withheld for reasons of confidentiality.  The goal of these interviews was to derive additional 
insights into the future evolution of different policy regimes.  Interviews were conducted off-
the-record in order to allow the interviewee to speak freely, and not as an official 




2.1.2.3. Direct Observation 
 
In recent years, a large number of meetings, workshops and conferences have been organised 
on the theme of environmental migration.  The majority were attended by scholars and policy-
makers alike, and constituted essential policy forums where coalitions exchanged and tested 
ideas.  I tried to attend as many of these events as possible, in order to observe interactions 
between the coalitions first-hand. 
 
 
2.2. Fie ld Research 
 
 
Field research was used to conduct micro-level analysis of policy outcomes, and will serve as 
illustrations of theoretical developments.  The fieldwork component of this work should not 
be understood as case studies per se, but rather as empirical evidence and as an illustration of 
theoretical developments.  As I have stated previously, this thesis does not aim to make a 
contribution on the empirical level, but rather on the theoretical one: empirical findings 
should thus be seen as supporting the theoretical contribution, and not the other way round. 
 
These cases were not studied in a systematic comparative perspective (although some 
elements of comparison are of course possible), but rather as scoping studies of a single unit, 
with a view to generalising to a larger set of units (Gerring 2004).  This section will elaborate 
upon the reasons for choosing Tuvalu and Katrina as places to conduct fieldwork, as well as 
the data used on the field.   
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2.2.1. Rationale for the Selection of the Cases  
 
Possible choices for conducting the fieldwork were numerous: many different environmental 
changes affect migration patterns in diverse ways, and it was clear from the beginning that it 
would not be possible to cover the whole range of environmental changes and migration 
flows. Therefore, the cases would only have an illustrative value, and no generalisation is 
intended. The rationale behind the selection of the places of fieldwork was to pick two types 
of migration flows that were extremely different and would illustrate different types of policy 
responses, and yet were both deemed to be examples of environmental migration.  From the 
beginning it was apparent that I would not be able to cover all possible types of 
environmental migration for practical reasons; accordingly I chose cases that lay at the 
extremes of the continuum of types of environmental migration.  Language was also a 
criterion of selection, since case study research required interviewing in French or English.  It 
was also necessary for the migration flows to be taking place at the time of interviewing, or 
recently, in order to conduct first-hand analysis.  Tuvalu and Katrina met all these criteria and 
seemed an ideal choice. 
 
In the case of Katrina, the displacement was triggered by a brutal event, and migration was 
almost exclusively internal and reactive.  Tuvalu was completely the opposite: an international 
migration flow triggered by a slow onset environmental change, which was mostly proactive.  
Migration was forced in the case of Katrina; it was still quite voluntary in the case of Tuvalu.  
The former occurred in the world’s richest country, and largest greenhouse gas emitter; the 
latter was happening in the developing world, in a country whose contribution to global 
warming was almost nil.  Policy responses were very different in the two cases, and so could 
illustrate different aspects of the theoretical developments. Hence Tuvalu and Katrina 
provided dramatic contrasts, while both appearing as prime examples of environmental 
migration in the press and public discourses.  These reasons, along with practical 
considerations, constituted the principle rationale for selecting these two cases. 
 
 
2.2.2. Fieldwork Conditions 
 
The fieldwork in each location was conducted in similar conditions, thanks to a travel grant of 
the National Fund for Scientific Research, in Belgium.  In each case, I spent several weeks in 
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situ, and I had arranged visiting fellowship agreements with local universities, in order to 
facilitate access to resources and experts as well as to benefit from good research conditions, 
including access to university libraries. 
 
The Louisiana fieldwork (mostly in New Orleans) lasted 14 weeks, between December 2006 
and March 2007, approximately one year and a half after the disaster.  I was a Visiting Fellow 
with the Department of Political Science at Tulane University (New Orleans), as well as at the 
Hurricane Center of Louisiana State University (Baton Rouge). 
 
The fieldwork in Tuvalu, New Zealand, Australia and Fiji took place between June and August 
2007, for a total duration of 10 weeks.  During this period I was a Visiting Fellow at the 
School of Social Sciences of the University of South Pacific (Fiji and Tuvalu), as well as with 
the National Europe Centre of the Australian National University (Canberra). 
 
 
2.2.3. Data Collected 
 
2.2.3.1. Written Sources 
 
In each case, my fieldwork relied heavily on the consultation of archives and official records.  
In Tuvalu, I obtained access to the National Archives of the country and official government 
records, including census data and documents related to migration agreements (most notably 
the Pacific Access Category).  In Louisiana, I had access to the ephemera of the Historic New 
Orleans Collection, a collection of flyers, posters, press clippings, e-mail messages, videotapes, 
etc., gathered in the aftermath of the hurricane, related to diverse aspects of the catastrophe, 
in particular the relief and assistance process.  This allowed me to better perceive how 
assistance had been organised on the ground.  In addition, I had access to partial FEMA 






2.2.3.2. Oral Sources 
 
In addition to written sources, interviews were conducted for data collection purposes.  About 
40-50 semi-open interviews were conducted for each case study.  The list of respondents is 
provided in the Appendix.   
 
Two types of respondents were targeted.  The first group were experts and officials: university 
professors and scholars, elected officials, civil servants, members of NGOs, journalists, etc.  
Unlike the interviews conducted for the desk research part of the study, these interviews were 
all on-the-record.  They were conducted face-to-face, except for some exceptional cases where 
the conversation was held over the phone.  The respondents were selected on the basis of 
their expertise, and were usually contacted beforehand; questions were adapted to the field of 
expertise of the respondent.  My contacts with experts and officials were greatly facilitated by 
the universities where I was a visitor.   
 
A second group of respondents was the persons directly affected by the environmental change 
(or not).  In the case of Tuvalu, this included residents of Tuvalu (non-migrants), but also 
those who had moved to Auckland.  For Katrina, this included people who had returned to 
New Orleans after the disaster, but also people who were still displaced in Louisiana or 
neighbouring states.  Respondents were chosen by means of the ‘snowball method’, where the 
first respondent is asked to provide contacts for other potential respondents.  Given the lack 
of a population database, other methods of sampling were not practicable.  In order to avoid 
strong bias due to the background of the first respondent, three ‘first’ respondents were 
chosen from different backgrounds (race, gender, social class) and asked to refer other 
potential respondents.  After an initial contact by phone, the interviews were conducted on 
face-to-face, and were also semi-open, but followed a structured questionnaire that is provided 








2.3. Research Ques t ions  and Hypotheses  
 
 
The central research question that shapes this research wishes to describe accurately the policy 
processes that are concerned with the concept of environmental migration.  It can be 
formulated as follows:  
 
What are the normative frameworks and policy responses that address environmental migration, and how do 
they influence the conceptualisation of environmental migration as a social construct and policy outcome? 
 
In other words, I will describe the policy developments that have accompanied the emergence 
of the concept of environmental migration, on the assumption that these developments, in 
turn, contribute to the conceptualisation of environmental migration.  This description will be 
conducted in different policy areas, over a relatively long time period.  The level of analysis is 
predominantly the United Nations or regional organisations, except when the national level is 
more appropriate, such as in the case of asylum policies.  In the second phase of the research, 
the two case studies will be used as examples of the application (or non-application) of these 
normative frameworks and policy responses at the micro-level. 
 
The advocacy coalition framework is used as the key theoretical framework for this analysis.  
The various policy areas are grouped in two policy streams: environmental policies and 
migration policies, allowing me to provide a comprehensive overview of the different 
frameworks and policies available to deal with environmental migration.  
 
Two secondary research questions derive from this central question: 
 
- How do policy developments interact with each other and mutually influence each other? 
 
Policy areas are not independent from each other, nor do they follow the same 
direction or the same pace.  Using the hypotheses of coalition learning described 





- Do these normative frameworks and policy responses adequately address environmental migration? 
 
This question relates to the evaluation of the policy response, and its adequacy to 
environmental migration.  Many scholars have called for the development of new 
mechanisms to address environmental migration: Are such mechanisms necessary, or 
are existing mechanisms sufficient to deal with the issue? 
 
 
These research questions are sustained by two sets of fundamental hypotheses that are tested 
throughout the research: 
 
1. The state remains a central actor in the migration process, and patterns of migration 
depend more on state implemented norms and policies than on actual environmental 
changes. The policies shape not only the debate on environmental migration, but also 
patterns of actual migration.  Consequently the structural theory of refugee 
movements (Zolberg et al. 1989) can apply to environmental migration, forced or 
voluntary.  This hypothesis shall be primarily tested through fieldwork. 
 
2. The environmental migration policy process revolves around two coalitions, which 
correspond to the ‘alarmist’ and ‘sceptical’ postures voiced in academic debates.  
Researchers are the main constituents of these coalitions, which also consist of 
journalists, NGOs, elected officials, intergovernmental agencies and national and 
international civil servants.  Policy entrepreneurs play a crucial role in the formation of 
these coalitions. 
 
3. The environmental policy stream is dominated by the ‘alarmist’ coalition, whereas 
migration policy stream is dominated by the ‘sceptical’ coalition.  Some policy brokers 
are needed to reconcile the conflicting interests of both coalitions. 
 
4. The distinct developments of environmental policies and migration policies can be 








The principal theoretical model underpinning this analysis is the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF).  The ACF model explains policy developments by the formation of 
coalitions around belief systems of a policy issue.  I argue that two main coalitions have 
developed with regard to environmental migration, based on alarmist and sceptical platforms 
proposed by researchers in academic debates.  An originality of the ACF is that it allows for 
the inclusion of researchers into coalitions, and rejects the idea that these actors are policy-
indifferent, as is often assumed. 
 
In Chapters 5 to 8, different policy areas will be studied: a stream of environmental policies, 
namely disaster management and adaptation to climate change; and a stream of migration 
policies, including refugee and IDPs protection, as well as governance of migration.  Each of 
these policy responses will be illustrated with empirical findings from New Orleans and 
Tuvalu, which will demonstrate the application of these policy responses on the field.  These 
policy areas will be studied in a constructivist perspective: it is argued that policy 
developments contribute to the conceptualisation of environmental migration, and that 
science and policy interact with and mutually shape each other. 
 
Until now, research on environmental migration has been conducted from a largely 
deterministic perspective that has generally assumed a causal relationship between 
environmental changes and migration flows.  It is hoped that this research will make an 
original contribution to the literature by looking at the topic from a constructivist perspective, 
and by combining two different policy areas.  In doing so, I do not aim to question or discuss 
the importance of environmental disruptions as migration drivers, but rather to explain how 














“66 is the path of a people in flight, refugees from dust and shrinking land, from the thunder 
of tractors and invasion, from the twisting winds that howl up out of Texas, from floods that 
bring no richness to the land  
and steal what little richness is there.” 
 
Chapter 12, p.  150 
 
“Thus they changed their social life - changed as in the whole universe only man can change.  
They were not farm men any more, but migrant men.”  
 
Chapter 17, p.  250 
 




One of the classic novels of American literature, The Grapes of Wrath, tells the story of an 
Oklahoma family of farmers, the Joads, forced to sell their farm and move to California after 
the Dust Bowl drought devastates their crops.  On their way to California, they find 
thousands of other families making the same journey with the hope of finding a better life 
westwards.  The trek is marked with numerous incidents and growing despair, but the Joads 
have no choice other than to go on.  In camps, where they meet other migrants, they realise 
that their prospects of decent jobs and lives in California may not be as expected, and the 
family begins to disintegrate.  Upon their arrival in inhospitable California, they find 
thousands of migrants queuing for jobs, who have been parked in migrant camps set up by 
the Government.  The tale’s tragedy lies in the impossibility of the Joads’ simple dream, their 
disillusion turned into despair and anger.  The story ends dramatically and controversially with 
the break-up and downfall of the Joad family: Rose-of-Sharon, one of the characters, gives 
birth to a stillborn baby and ends up breast-feeding a starving man, as a last display of hope in 
human kind. 
 
The book was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in 1940, and was turned into a major Hollywood 
movie25 starring Henry Fonda in 1940.  The ending of the novel was considered inappropriate 
for public audiences in 1940, and was significantly modified in the movie, which shows the 
Joad family managing quite well in a camp provided by the Government.   
 
Beyond the human story of the Joad family’s fate, The Grapes of Wrath also tells the story of 
one of the largest environmentally-induced migrations in recent history.  During the 1930s, a 
combination of severe droughts, dust storms and inappropriate farming methods resulted in 
the formation of immense, dark clouds of topsoil in Oklahoma, Texas and Arkansas.  Crops 
were devastated, and many farm families, especially from Oklahoma, decided to migrate 
westwards to California with the hope of finding better life conditions.  The exact number of 
people displaced by the Dust Bowl is unknown; most authors believe it to be around half a 
million (Bonnifield 1978; Gregory 1991). 
 
                                                
25 The movie, released in 1940, was directed by John Ford and produced by Daryl F. Zanuck for Twentieth 
Century Fox. It is interesting to note that the movie features some actual ‘Dust Bowl’ migrants, who were paid $5 
a day to play extras in the caravan on Highway 66 (Black 1996). 
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The ‘Dust Bowl Migration’ rapidly became one of the great myths of American history, 
because it was believed to have transformed the geography of its population so radically.  
Actually, this migration was part of a much wider migratory movement.  As James Gregory 
astutely explains, the concept of the Dust Bowl Migration is a ‘wonderful misnomer’ (1991: 
17): many migrants were not affected by the dust storms or the droughts, and were not 
farmers.  The so-called Dust Bowl Migration was a mass migration linked to the Great 
Depression, and not only to the dust storms that hit the Great Plains.  Steinbeck’s novel and 
its stark imagery played a significant role in associating the massive displacements of the Great 
Depression with the journey of Oklahoman farmers forced out of their homes by dust storms. 
 
Furthermore, Hansen and Libecap explain that the Dust Bowl Migration was not the product 
solely of dust storms, but was also induced by the wider economic context, the size and type 
of the farms, inadequate farming techniques, and the lack of collective action (2004: 674).  
They show why, despite similar droughts in the same region in the 1950s and 1970s, massive 
migration flows did not result (Ibid.: 686).  The massive displacement of the 1930s was indeed 
the consequence of a combination of factors, triggered by an ecological disaster. 
 
The Dust Bowl Migration illustrates perfectly on of the central problems addressed by this 
work, namely the difficulties in conceptualising environmental migration as a specific type of 
migration. The following chapters aim to look at how environmental migration has been 
conceptualised so far. Chapter 3 reviews the extant literature on environmental migration, and 
subsequently attempts to delineate the state of the art of the main issues, stakes and challenges 
involved in the concept of environmental migration; Chapter 4 discusses some key elements 














This chapter presents a review of literature on the complex relationships between 
environmental change and migration flows.  This review is crucial for the development of this 
thesis, since it allows us to pinpoint the emergence and formation of the alarmist and sceptical 
coalitions.  Alarmists contend that large migration flows are the direct result of environmental 
disruptions, while sceptics argue that environmental factors are not a distinct, causal variable, 
and in fact distract from other determining factors, such as poverty and political persecution.  
Each coalition is formed around separate academic disciplines, and its policy core stems from 
scholarly debates.  Although the viewpoints of these coalitions have aligned more closely over 
time thanks to increased collaboration and external events, the opposition between the two 
coalitions continues to structure the literature.  
 
Literature on the nexus between the environment and migration is relatively recent, mostly 
dating to the mid-1980s, a period characterised by asylum crises and major natural disasters.  
The nexus has been explored in a variety of different ways, but its two components have 
mostly been associated in a causal relationship.  Some studies have focused on the impacts of 
refugee movements on the environment, whereas more recent studies have primarily 
addressed the impacts of environmental changes on migration flows.  As explained above, this 
thesis is mostly concerned with this second aspect of the nexus. 
 
Overall, four themes permeate the literature on the nexus: that research is impeded by a lack 
of empirical studies; driven by a climate change-dominated agenda; abundantly supplemented 
by ‘grey’ literature; and marked by disciplinary divides. 
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The lack of empirical research was already evident at the fifth meeting of the International 
Research and Advisory Panel on Forced Migration, held in 1996, when a ‘disappointingly 
small number of papers’ on the topic were presented.  During the keynote address of the 
meeting, Kibreab stressed that ‘research on refugees [had] been largely environmentally-blind 
[…], and that in the absence of a body of empirical research, a number of myths and 
misperceptions still predominate[d]’ (Koser 1996: 357-358).  Similar comments still held valid 
twelve years later, as identified by Brown (2008) and Kniveton et al.  (2008).  This area, 
however, has seen recent progress since the commissioning of the EACH-FOR research 
project by the European Commission.  EACH-FOR, an acronym for ‘Environmental Change 
and Forced Migration Scenarios’, aims to produce empirical evidence of the linkages between 
environmental change and migration, thanks to twenty-two methodologically comparable case 
studies conducted in a comparative perspective.  The two-year long project was coordinated 
between seven research centres in Europe26, and was completed at the end of March 2009.  
This multi-disciplinary project is the first empirical study of the topic to be conducted on a 
global scale, and some of its preliminary results are discussed below. 
 
The risk of migration flows associated with climate change was highlighted in the first 
assessment report of the IPCC (McTegart et al. 1990), and the impacts of climate change have 
since increasingly overshadowed other types of environmental change as migration drivers.  
The in shift of the focus has been so evident that it has led some authors to fear that people 
displaced by environmental disruptions not related to climate change may be forgotten by 
future studies and policies (Lassailly-Jacob 2006).  Indeed, the majority of recent works and 
conferences on the topic focus exclusively on climate change and do not address other 
environmental changes as root causes of migration (Biermann and Boas 2007; Piguet 2008; 
Brown 2008; Meze-Hausken 2004; McLeman and Smit 2006; Kniveton et al. 2008).  
Furthermore, many of these works contain the implicit assumption that conclusions reached 
with regard to climate change hold true for other kinds of environmental disruptions, largely 
because the impacts of global warming, such as droughts or floods, do not seem to be 
fundamentally different in nature from other environmental disruptions.  The numerous 
                                                
26 These research centres include: Atlas Innoglobe Ltd (Budapest); Sustainable Europe Research Institute (SERI 
– Vienna); the UN University Institute for the Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS, Bonn); Erasmus 
University Rotterdam (The Netherlands); the University of the Basque Country (Bilbao, Spain); the Centre on 
Migration, Citizenship and Development (COMCAD) at the University of Bielefeld (Germany); and the Centre 
for Ethnic and Migration Studies (CEDEM) at the University of Liège (Belgium). 
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reports27 suggesting that mass migration flows could be one of the most devastating 
consequences of climate change are certainly no stranger to the research agenda on the topic, 
as will be evidenced in the next chapter. 
 
These numerous reports are part of a growing body of ‘grey’ literature, which forms a 
significant part of the research on the nexus, and occasionally drives the research agenda.  
This trend is also apparent for migration research in general, as ‘many of the information 
producers are governments, international agencies, and non-governmental organisations’, 
which produce literature with a ‘practical orientation’ (Mason 1999: 7).  Grey literature has 
been particularly influential in supporting alarmist forecasts of future migration flows, 
sometimes based on inflated estimates (Kniveton et al. 2008). 
 
Finally, literature on the nexus derives from a variety of different academic disciplines that 
offer different, and sometimes conflicting, viewpoints on the topic.  Indeed, the study of 
environmental migration is multi-disciplinary by nature: while the study of environmental 
change usually draws on the natural sciences for its evidentiary basis, the study of migration is 
typically the reserve of the social sciences.  These disciplines often lack forums where they can 
exchange ideas, and want for common underpinning theories, concepts and terminologies.  
Typically, researchers belonging to different disciplines simply do not know each other, and 
mutual collaborations remain scarce, though they have been more frequent in recent years.  
Within the social sciences, a range of disciplines are involved: geographers and economists 
study the impacts of environmental changes on populations, whereas migration patterns and 
policies are the focus of sociologists and political scientists.  The diversity of research on the 
topic also translates into a diversity of viewpoints.  The very existence of environmental 
migration is still debated, and the scope of the debate is, in itself, a matter for controversy and 
academic debate.   
 
The field of debate has mostly been organised around the two conflicting perspectives of 
alarmists and sceptics.  These perspectives date from the first mention of the nexus in early 
texts, and map, to a very large extent, onto disciplinary divides. 
 
                                                
27 See for example, inter alia, (European Commission and the Secretary-General/High Representative 2008). 
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1. Early Texts 
 
The issue of ecological refuge was mentioned in 1948 (Vogt 1948), but the first use of the 
term ‘environmental refugee’ in the literature is uncertain: Kibreab detects its first occurrence 
in 1984 in a briefing document from the International Institute for Environment and 
Development (1997: 21), while Black (2001: 2) traces its origins to speeches and reports by 
environmentalist Lester Brown of the WorldWatch Institute in the 1970s.  There seems to be 
universal agreement, however, attributing the first official use of the term to El-Hinnawi 
(1985) in a UNEP report entitled ‘Environmental Refugees’.  In the report, El-Hinnawi 
outlined what was at stake with environmentally-induced migration, and gave a preliminary 
definition of what he called ‘environmental refugees’:  
 
Those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because 
of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardised their 
existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life (1985: 4). 
 
 Many authors, however, were unsatisfied with the definition, largely because it did not 
distinguish between ‘environmental refugees’ and other types of migrants, nor did it provide 
any means to differentiate between the environmental refugees themselves.  As Bates points 
out,  
This definition makes no distinction between refugees who flee volcanic eruptions and those who gradually 
leave their homes as soil quality declines.  So many people can be classified under the umbrella of 
‘environmental refugees’ that critics question the usefulness of the concept.  (2002: 466) 
 
Most subsequent definitions, however, continue to revolve around El-Hinnawi’s, despite the 
critiques it attracted.  El-Hinnawi also attempted to classify these ‘refugees’, distinguishing 
between three types of migrants:  
- Those who had been temporarily displaced because of an environmental stress (usually a 
natural disaster); 
- Those who had to be permanently displaced an re-settled in a new area; 
- Finally, those who migrated within their own national boundaries because ‘the resource 
base in their in their original habitat has deteriorated to such a degree that it can no 
longer meet their basic needs’ (1985: 4) 
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These three types of migrants no longer maintain the classical distinction between forced and 
voluntary migrants, thus allowing for an inflation of the numbers of so-called ‘refugees’.  As 
Suhrke has noted, ‘broad categorizations invite large numbers’ (1993: 6). 
 
In 1988, a working paper by Jacobson from the WorldWatch Institute, attempted to 
systematise the study of this new category of forced migrants.  Jacobson proposed a typology 
similar to that put forward by El-Hinnawi, distinguishing between temporary displacements 
associated with temporary environmental stress, permanent displacements associated with 
permanent environmental stress, and temporary or permanent displacement due to 
progressive environmental change (Jacobson 1988: 5).  This typology, however, was flawed by 
undue emphasis on the time frame of the displacement, to the exclusion of other important 
variables, such as the degree of coercion of the migration, or the distance travelled from the 
point of origin.  There was little distinction made between forced and voluntary migration.  In 
a fashion similar to El-Hinnawi, Jacobson vaguely defined ‘environmental refugees’ as ‘people 
fleeing from environmental decline’ (1988: 6).  His report identified some regions where 
environmental displacements were to take place, and estimated that 10 million could face the 
prospect of displacement.  Jacobson contended that the term ‘environmental refugee’ was first 
used in reference to Haitian boat people, arguing that land degradation in Haiti created these 
desperate people and their dangerous journey to south Florida. 
 
Both El-Hinnawi’s and Jacobson’s reports were received with great interest in the field of 
environmental studies, and attracted harsh criticism in the field of refugee studies: they had a 
‘short-lived shock-effect on the public debate but were rejected as unserious by scholars’ 
(Suhrke 1993: 6).  At the times of publication, El-Hinnawi was working for the UN 
Environment Programme, while Jacobson was a member of the WorldWatch Institute, an 
environmental think-tank: the reports were therefore perceived as an attempt to use forced 
migration to draw attention to environmental problems.  Irrespective of its legal meaning, the 
use of the word ‘refugee’ was criticised.  Suhrke and Visentin (1991) stated that the definition 
provided by El-Hinnawi was  
 
So wide as to render the concept virtually meaningless (...).  Uncritical definitions and inflated numbers 
lead to inappropriate solutions and compassion fatigue.  We should not, however, reject outright the 
concept of environmental refugees.  Instead we should formulate a definition that is more narrow but 
more precise.   
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They proceeded to make a distinction between ‘environmental refugee’ and ‘environmental 
migrant’.  The latter is someone who ‘makes a voluntary, rational decision to leave a region as 
the situation gradually worsens there’, who moves from an area by choice.  In contrast, 
environmental refugees are ‘people or social groups displaced as a result of sudden, drastic 
environmental change that cannot be reversed’ (1991: 77).  Likewise, McGregor argued that 
‘the category “environmental refugee” confuses rather than clarifies the position of such 
forced migrants, since it lacks both a conceptual and a legal basis’, contending that the 
category involved a ‘false separation between overlapping and interrelated categories’ (1993: 
158).  McGregor’s criticism was actually aimed at the very concept of ‘environmental refugee’ 
rather than its definition, prefiguring the academic controversies that were soon to appear 
with regard to the conceptualisation of environmental migration.   
 
Richmond, in a book called Global Apartheid, devoted a chapter to ‘Environmental Refugees’.  
The chapter outlines his theoretical framework surrounding environmental migration, and 
attempts, for the first time, to situate it within migration system and theories.  Richmond 
insists on the necessary distinction between international and internal migration, as well as 
between proactive and reactive migration.  He proposes a multivariate model of 
environmentally-related population movements that acknowledges the mingling of 
environmental factors (constraints or facilitators) with social, economic, political and 
technological factors (1994: 82).  The model replicates the continuum between proactive and 
reactive migration he had developed in an earlier work (Richmond 1993), suggesting that this 
continuum should replace the traditional dichotomy between voluntary and forced migration.  
Richmond also proposes a typology of environmentally-related disasters, classified in different 
categories according to their origin: natural, technological, economic, political or social (1994: 
80).  Outlining many of the challenges facing the study of environmental migration, he notes 
that the scale of this kind migration is ‘difficult to estimate’, depending greatly on ‘whether 
past, present, or possible future movements are considered; whether worldwide migration is 
considered or only that occurring in developing countries is considered; whether internal as 
well as external migrations are taken into account; and whether environmental degradation is 
considered in isolation or in conjunction with other political, economic, and social 
determinants of population movement’ (1994: 76).  Nevertheless, he goes on to suggest some 
policy ramifications: the need for a new instrument of international law to address the 
‘humanitarian needs of all those displaced from their homes’, the need for a system of 
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humanitarian priorities, the importance of more effective coordination of the work of UN 
agencies, and finally the need to integrate population movements in the concept of sustainable 
development. 
 
At the time of publication of Global Apartheid, the first conference on the nexus between 
environment and migration was organised in Nyon, Switzerland, jointly sponsored by the 
Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 
and the Refugee Policy Group (RPG).  The background paper of the conference aimed to 
synthesise the burgeoning academic debates on the nexus, with an emphasis on migration 
induced by environmental changes.  The paper classified the most important causes and 
dynamics of environmental migration into six categories: elemental, biological, slow-onset, 
accidental, development-induced disruptions, and environmental warfare.  The classification 
proved short-lived and of little practical use, but did acknowledge other intervening factors, 
and the multi-causality of displacement.  The report also pointed to policy issues, and stressed 
the need for a common definition and typology (Migration and the Environment  1992).  Overall, 
the conference aspired to summarise the debates and raising some policy issues, including the 
need for a better coordination of relief and protection efforts by different UN agencies and 
NGOs. 
 
Debates on the conceptualisation of the issue were soon to crystallise around the two 
conflicting coalitions of alarmists and sceptics.   
 
 
2. Conceptualising the Nexus: Alarmists and Sceptics 
 
 
The 1992 Conference in Nyon invited further research on the conceptualisation of the nexus, 
following early endeavours by El-Hinnawi and Jacobson.  This conceptualisation addressed 
both aspects of the nexus: the impact of environmental changes on migration, as well as the 
environmental impacts of migration, though this latter aspect was addressed by fewer 
researchers.  A clear divide quickly emerged between those who adopted a maximalist 
perspective and those with a minimalist perspective: the former insisted on strong causal 
relationships between both sides of the nexus, whereas the latter stressed the multi-causality of 
the nexus and other intervening factors.  Logically, scholars with a maximalist perspective 
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forecasted waves of ‘environmental refugees’ and pinpointed environmental factors as a major 
driving force of migration, whereas scholars with a minimalist posture adopted a more 
sceptical stance vis-à-vis the empirical reality of such migration flows, insisting on the 
complexity of the migration process.  For sake of ease, I describe the former as ‘alarmists’; and 
the latter as ‘sceptics’.   
 
I argue that this divide is more than a scientific controversy, and that it continues to shape the 
policy debate on environmental migration.  Both positions represent the policy cores of 
advocacy coalitions, whose influence remains important for policy responses to environmental 
migration.  The coalitions initially formed around scholars from different disciplines: alarmists 
were mostly scholars from the natural sciences, and security experts, while sceptics were 
found among social scientists, and migration scholars in particular.  NGOs and interest groups 
usually sided with alarmists, and the grey literature also tends to adopt a maximalist 
perspective. 
 
This debate emerged soon after the coining of the expression ‘environmental refugees’, and 
has been ongoing since.  Already in 1993, Suhrke noted that  
 
While literature on environmental change and population movement is quite limited, two different and 
opposing perspectives can be discerned.  One – which I call the minimalist view – sees environmental 
change as a contextual variable that can contribute to migration, but warns that we lack sufficient 
knowledge about the process to draw firm conclusions.  The other perspective sets out a maximalist 
view, arguing that environmental degradation has already displaced millions of people, and more 
displacement is on the way.  (1993: 4) 
 
Fifteen years later, this debate continues in pretty much in the same terms.  Then, ‘unable to 
marshal a critical mass of social scientific research, the scholarly discourse on environmental 
refugees nearly died’; continues Suhrke (1993: 7).  Fortunately, Suhrke’s works, as well as 
those of Myers and Kent (1995), Black (2001, 1998) and Kibreab (1997), amongst others, 





2.1. The Alarmis t  Coali t i on    
 
The taxonomy established by El-Hinnawi (1985) and Jacobson (1988) paved the way for an 
alarmist perspective that was used to forecast impressive migration flows related to a wide 
variety of environmental changes.  Many scholars who adopted this perspective were initially 
interested in the environment-security nexus (Westing 1989; Homer-Dixon 1991; Swain 
1996b) – out of concern for the linkage between environmental disruption and conflicts - and 
deployed refugee flows as an exploratory variable to justify a causal relationship between 
environmental change and conflict.  Westing (1992) estimated that there were about 10 million 
‘unrecognised’ refugees in sub-Saharan Africa, and predicted that this number would increase 
substantially, at a rate of 2 million yearly.  He outlined three categories of refugees: 
internationally recognised refugees, cross-border unrecognised refugees, and internally-
displaced refugees (intrinsically unrecognised) – all three categories were set to increase due to 
the increased frequency of natural disasters. 
 
Homer-Dixon took the debate a step further, contending that environmental change would 
lead to acute armed conflicts (Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994); with a distinctly Malthusian air he 
opined that ‘waves of environmental refugees that spill across borders with destabilizing 
effects on the recipient’s domestic order and on international stability’ would be a key 
consequence of environmental change (1991: 77).  Homer-Dixon, however, also invoked 
other factors, such as vulnerability, more acute in the South than in the North.  Population 
displacements are mentioned as a social effect of environmental change, but Homer-Dixon 
underlines the multiplicity of interacting physical and social variables, contending that ‘the 
term “environmental refugees” is somewhat misleading […] because it implies that 
environmental disruption could be a clear, proximate cause of refugee flows’ (1991: 97), 
seemingly contradicting his previous argument.  He developed his research agenda further in a 
subsequent paper, in which he used three hypotheses to link six types of environmental 
change with violent conflict.  The second of these hypotheses holds that ‘large population 
movements caused by environmental stress [will] induce “group identity” conflicts, especially 
ethnic clashes’ (Homer-Dixon 1994: 6-7) .  He tests this hypothesis with empirical evidence 
from Bangladesh, where significant numbers of migrants have fled to the adjacent Indian 
states.  He concludes that, along with other contextual factors, ‘land scarcity in Bangladesh, 
arising largely from population growth, has been a powerful force behind migration in 
neighbouring regions and communal conflict there’ (1994: 23).   
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Migration flows from Bangladesh to India are also cited by Swain (1996a) as empirical 
evidence of conflicts induced by environmental disruption, through migration flows.  Swain’s 
thesis is that ‘population migration transports (…) the conflict from the environmentally 
affected regions to the migrant receiving areas’ (Swain 1996b: 971).  He contends that 
environmental migration poses important security challenges to developing countries, and 
should therefore be at the top of the global political agenda.  Swain distinguishes three types 
of conflicts that can arise from environmental migration: state versus state conflicts, state 
versus group conflicts, and group versus group conflicts.  Such conflicts develop because of 
an altering of power equations induced by environmental migrants.  Swain’s thesis, however, is 
supported by little empirical evidence, and fails to take into account either the role of 
adaptation strategies in receiving areas, or of migration as a coping strategy for those affected 
by environmental change. 
 
To summarise the general approach of these works, the initial alarmist approach to the nexus 
assumed that environmental disruptions were major contributors to insecurity.  Migration was 
conceptualised both as a consequence of environmentally-induced conflicts and as a trigger of 
future conflicts over natural resources.  The theories were deeply rooted in a neo-Malthusian 
perspective, and gained authority with the commonly held perception that climate change was 
a threat to the world’s security.  Climate change prompted a deep questioning over the notion 
of security, and alarmist theories were quick to make their way into the policy realm. 
 
From the mid-2000s onwards, different governments commissioned or were recipients of 
reports warning about the threat that climate change posed to national or international 
security.  The first report of this kind – and the one portraying the most doom-and-gloom 
laden scenario – was commissioned by the US Department of Defence, and reportedly 
censored by the White House.  The report evokes an apocalyptic scenario in which a brutal 
change of weather conditions, induced by the crossing of a climate threshold, triggers massive 
flows of migrants worldwide, who compete for resources, and ultimately threatening US and 
international security (Schwartz and Randall 2003).  The report warns that such a scenario is 
plausible, yet not the most likely, and reveals its political agenda by urging the United States 
Government – which, notoriously, didn’t ratify the Kyoto Protocol – to take climate change 
more seriously.   
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A report on the same topic was submitted to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service the 
following year (McLeman and Smit 2004).  The authors noted that ‘the consequent 
displacement [to the impacts of climate change]) of large numbers of people causes substantial 
disruption in the source area, but also places stress on areas that receive the unexpected 
migrants’ and concluded that ‘security implications are a combination of those in the source 
area and the receiving one’ (2004: 7).  The cases of rural-to-urban migration in China and 
Pakistan, induced by environmental degradation and unequal distribution of natural resources, 
are cited by the authors as empirical evidence of the relationships between climate change and 
migration that might bear security concerns for Canada.   
 
Another report, submitted to the German Government and endorsed by UNEP, also 
addresses climate change as a security risk (German Advisory Council on Global Change 
(WBGU) 2008).  The report warns that climate change amplifies the mechanisms that lead to 
insecurity and violence, such as political instability and weak governance structures, and 
identifies four climate-induced conflict constellations.  Environmentally-induced migration is 
one of these constellations, and authors assert that there is a ‘particularly significant risk of 
environmental migration occurring and increasing in scale’ in developing countries (2008: 
120).  They also raise the question of who will bear the costs of environmental migration, and 
contend that this issue contains the seeds of potential conflict.  Among the threats to 
international stability and security listed, the triggering and intensification of migration is 
mentioned as one of the potential major fields of conflict in international politics.  The report 
goes on to recommend a reform of the UN Security Council and UNEP in order to address 
the challenge, as well as increased cooperation among migration management agencies, 
including a new, ad hoc convention to protect environmental migrants.   
 
Finally, a report recently prepared for the European Council adopts a similar stance, and 
warns that ‘Europe must expect substantially increased migratory pressure’, especially from 
Africa (European Commission and the Secretary-General/High Representative 2008: 4).  The 
report recommends that a comprehensive European migration policy take into account 
environmentally-triggered additional migratory stress, but does not further elaborate on this. 
 
The ongoing conflict in Darfur is often cited as an empirical evidence of neo-Malthusian 
theories: it is a case in which environmental change and resource scarcity have induced 
migration, leading to violent conflicts.  The UN General-Secretary Ban Ki-moon has endorsed 
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such assumptions, and argued in an op-ed article in The Washington Post that ‘amid the diverse 
social and political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in 
part from climate change’ (Ki-moon 2007).  The UN chief added that the repercussions 
reached far beyond Darfur, contending that conflicts in Somalia, Ivory Coast and Burkina 
Faso were rooted in similar ecological crises.  Reuveny (2007) provides more systematic 
evidence however, and reviews 38 cases of migration movements prompted by environmental 
factors, often acting concurrently.  Half of these movements resulted in violent conflict.  A 
major flaw in his theory is that he conflates migration flows in which environmental factors 
played a major role, such as those between El-Salvador and Honduras in 1969 that lead to the 
“Football War” (Durham 1979),  with other flows in which environmental drivers only played 
a minor role compared to ethnic tensions and other factors, such as in the case of the 
Rwandan genocide.  Consequently, the cases cited by Reuveny can be used as evidence of 
violence triggered by migration, but not really as evidences of violence triggered by 
environmental change, with migration acting as the link between the former and the latter. 
 
 Overall, the alarmist coalition views environmentally-induced migration as a security threat, a 
threat that has been exacerbated and brought to policy level by climate change.  Attention to 
the linkages between climate change and security is rapidly gaining currency, and the recent 
award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Al Gore and the IPCC can be interpreted as an 
acknowledgement of such linkages.  In April 2007, the question of the linkages between 
climate change and security was discussed for the first time in the UN Security Council, at the 
request of the British chairman of the Council. 
 
Building upon this initial approach to environment and security, some scholars tried to 
examine the linkages between environmental disruptions and migration, and forecast future 
migration flows.  The priority of their research was no longer security threats, but the risks 
facing the environment and the consequences of environmental disruptions.  Those scholars 
were led by environmentalist Norman Myers, without doubt the most prominent 
whistleblower in the field.  Myers wrote extensively on the topic and he dared to forecast 
precise estimates, which were broadcast widely in the media (1997, 2002, 1993).  Myers was 
himself inspired by the works of Westing (1992), who was amongst the first to conceptualise 
what he saw as a new form of displacement.  In 1995, Myers published jointly with Kent a 
book entitled Environmental Exodus, and whose impact has remained considerable: it is one of 
the most oft-cited sources on the subject, for good reason.  The study was the first to offer a 
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forecast of future flows, as well to identify hotspots at the country-level.  Myers and Kent fed 
the well-known media appetite for numbers, sometimes at the risk of oversimplifying a 
complex situation.  In particular, they insisted that demographic growth, sea-level rise and 
natural disasters could be used as explanatory variables for future flows of environmental 
migrants. 
 
In subsequent works, Myers continued to draw attention to the ‘fast-growing numbers of 
people who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their homelands because of drought, soil 
erosion, desertification and other environmental problems’ (1997: 167).  As for the estimates, 
he scaled up Jacobson’s estimates of 10 million, stating that there are ‘at least 25 million 
environmental refugees today (…), mainly located in Sub-Saharan Africa (…), the Indian sub-
continent, China, Mexico and Central America’ (ibidem).  Myers also addressed the other side 
of the nexus, pointing out the environmental damages wreaked by these migrants upon fragile 
environments, aggravating the environmental decline.  He identified several environmental 
causes that could provoke displacements, and tried to assess the extent of these displacements 
at two time horizons, 2010 and 2025, warning that ‘environmental refugees could become one 
of the foremost human crises of our times’ (1997: 181).  Myers updated his estimates in 2002, 
forecasting that ‘when global warming takes hold, there could be as many as 200 million 
people overtaken by sea-level rise and coastal flooding, by disruption of monsoon systems and 
other rainfall regimes, and by droughts of unprecedented severity and duration’ (2002: 609).  
Through frequent repetitions, this latest figure, though highly speculative and questionable, 
has become taken as empirical evidence, and has been frequently cited in media reports and 
other studies, most notably in the Stern Review on the economics of climate change (Stern 
2007). 
 
Myers can certainly be credited with drawing worldwide attention to the topic of 
environmentally-induced migration.  However, his work is largely based on speculative 
common sense rather than on actual figures and estimates – a point that has been vigorously 
criticised by scholars adopting a more sceptical perspective.  Other scholars and many NGOs, 
however, followed the path forged by Myers. 
 
In April 1996, UNHCR, IOM and the Refugee Policy Group convened a follow-up 
symposium to the 1992 conference.  The symposium issued a statement of principles based 
largely upon Myers’ theories (Environmentally-induced population displacements and environmental 
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impacts resulting from mass migrations  1996).  The statement classified environmental causes of 
migration and related them to migration patterns, in a deterministic perspective, but also drew 
a typology of environmental changes that could be induced by migration.  Once again, the 
typology was not rooted in empirical evidence and proved short-lived.  An interesting feature 
of the symposium, however, was the equal weight it gave to both aspects of the nexus, and its 
claim that ‘the link between environmental damage and decline, and population movements 
can be sufficiently strong to justify separate attention’ (Environmentally-induced population 
displacements and environmental impacts resulting from mass migrations  1996: 11). 
 
This deterministic perspective is a common feature of works written from an alarmist 
perspective.  Bates (2002) assumes a direct causal relationship between environmental changes 
and migration, and attempts to provide a typology of these changes.  Her classification is 
based on three binary criteria related to the environmental disruptions causing the migration: 
their origin (natural or man-made), their duration (acute or gradual), and whether migration 
was an intentional outcome of the disruption or not.  She then proceeds to identify three 
categories of disruptions: disaster, expropriation and deterioration.  This classification might 
seem to have a high explanatory value, but it possesses some major shortcomings.  A 
consistent classification based on three binary criteria would have produced eight categories, 
not three28.  The explanatory value of the subcategories, as well as their consistency, is also 
dubious: as a result of these binary subdivisions, many cases of environmental disruptions are 
left out of the classification, such as erosion or land degradation. 
 
Byravan and Rajan (2006) focus on sea-level rise and insist on the ‘inevitability’ of the 
displacement of people living in coastal areas and small islands by 2050, because of sea-level 
rise.  In line with Myers, they estimate that about 200 million people will be at risk with a one 
metre rise in sea-level, representing a land loss of about 212,000 square kilometres.   
 
Numerous reports from NGOs have also contributed to the alarmist perspective, and 
provided additional estimates and forecasts.  The Red Cross stressed in 2001 that more people 
were forced to leave their homes because of environmental disasters than war (International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2001), while Friends of the Earth 
                                                
28 There are eight possible permutations for three binary variables. However, it is possible that some categories 
would have been left empty. It is difficult to imagine a planed natural disaster deliberately displacing a population. 
But, even if we reduce the number of possible categories to four, leaving out the two categories that would have 
implied an ‘intentional’ natural disaster, we still have six possible categories, not three. 
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Australia (2004) emphasised Myers’ predictions and urged the Australian Government to take 
action against climate change.  Lester Brown, who was amongst the first to use the term in 
1970s, noted that flows of ‘environmental refugees’ were just in their beginnings and were ‘yet 
another indicator that our modern civilization is out of sync with the earth's natural support 
systems’ (2004).  Adopting a neo-Malthusian approach, Brown recommended the use of 
family-planning techniques and a reduction of carbon emissions to solve the problem and 
stabilise the earth’s climate.  In a much-debated report, the NGO Christian Aid dramatically 
revised Myers’ forecasts, and predicted that up to one billion people could be displaced by 
environmental disruption by 2050 (Christian Aid 2007).  Even though the report 
acknowledged that 600 million of the predicted one billion would actually be displaced 
because of development projects, rather than actual environmental change, the estimate was 
still significantly higher than those made previously. 
 
Even though environmental degradation has been recognised as a root cause of refugee flows 
by UNHCR since 1993 (Ogata 1993), nonetheless many scholars claim that no protection has 
evolved to help people displaced by environmental change.  Accordingly, they initiated a 
debate at the policy level, where the alarmist perspective translated into a case for the 
development of new policies and instruments to fill in what was perceived as a protection gap. 
 
Hermsmeyer (2005) has claimed that the inadequacies of the international refugee regime have 
denied the humanitarian rights of environmentally-displaced people.  Her work reviews some 
causes of environmental migration, and suggests a series of policy measures, for example, the 
creation of a specialised agency, and development of effective strategies for prevention, 
response and recovery.  She has also pleaded for an expansion of the UNHCR definition of 
refugees: such an expansion, she argues, is ‘essential in order to provide environmental 
refugees with a legal mandate guaranteeing the security of basic human rights’, and to ‘create 
more consistency between practice, evidence and legal mandate of UNHCR’, as well as 
increase donors’ contributions (2005: 14).  However, her analysis fails to delineate how 
‘environmental refugees’ should be defined.  King (2006) has also proposed the creation of a 
dedicated mechanism to address environmental migration – an International Coordination 
Mechanism for Environmental Displacement (ICMED) – whose role would be to coordinate 
the activities of the different agencies involved in providing relief to the displaces.  She 
attempts to provide a typology of environmental displacement, according to the acuteness of 
the environmental disruption (acute vs. slow onset) and the possibility of return of the 
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displacees.  Conisbee and Simms (2003) have made yet another case for a radical policy 
change, and pleaded for the inclusion of ‘environmental refugees’ in the population protected 
by the Geneva Convention, arguing that environmental degradation is, in many ways, a form 
of political persecution.  If their amendments were adopted, people uprooted by 
environmental change would be entitled to the same protection as those uprooted by war and 
violence. 
 
Finally, Bell’s contribution to the debate (2004) took a more original approach, since his is one 
of the few papers to frame the issue in terms of global environmental justice.  He adopts a 
strong prescriptive stance, asking ‘how… should [we] respond to the plight of potential and 
actual environmental refugees’?  Bell rebuts most objections to the use of the words 
‘environmental refugees’; he also judged that the well-known sceptics’ argument that 
definition of the category ‘environmental refugee’ might encourage receiving states to reduce 
asylum rights was ‘unconvincing’, and reflected ‘scepticism about the severity of the situation’ 
(2004: 136-138).  He suggested an original approach to the issue, built on two leading theories 
of international justice: John Rawls’ ‘Law of Peoples’ approach, and Charles Beitz’s 
‘cosmopolitanism’ theory.  He concluded that neither theory could serve as an adequate 
framework to address the plight of ‘environmental refugees’, though the latter had some 
advantages over the former – and that a new framework for global justice was therefore 
required.   
 
Such claims intersected directly with those put forward by another coalition that had 
developed in reaction to Myers’ and Homer-Dixon’s theories.  Led by two senior figures of 
migration studies, Gaim Kibreab and Richard Black, the sceptical coalition contended that the 
concept of environmental migration made little sense, and that environmental impacts of 
migration flows were grossly overestimated. 
 
 
2.2. The Scept i cal  Coal i t i on    
 
 
Kibreab (1997, 1994)  was the first to attack the alarmist approach, which was increasingly 
accepted as ‘scientific truth’.  According to Kibreab, the concept of environmental migration 
served to depoliticise the causes of displacement, allowing states to derogate their obligations 
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to provide asylum, since ‘environmental conditions (did) not constitute a basis for 
international protection’ (1997: 20-21); he perceived the concept as a threat to refugee 
protection, and an excuse for governments to justify restrictive asylum policies.  According to 
him, the concatenated causal relationship between environmental degradation, population 
displacement and insecurity needed to be reversed, insecurity being the cause – and not the 
consequence – of population displacement.  The second part of Kibreab’s work is related to 
the environmental impact of refugee movements, and leads to the conclusion that 
‘environmental change and population displacement are the consequences of war and 
insecurity rather than their causes’ (1997: 33).  Though Kibreab’s argument might be 
perceived as radical, it is important to note that he does not challenge the significance of 
environmental change in relation to migration, but rather the nature of its relationship with 
insecurity.  Kibreab’s argument was partially presented in a keynote speech at the Fifth 
International Research and Advisory Panel Conference on Forced Migration held in Eldoret 
(Kenya) in April 1996, only to be contradicted by other papers presented in subsequent panels 
that cited empirical evidences of environmentally-induced migration, as reported by Koser 
(1996) – a sequence of events that gave a foretaste of the fierce debates to follow. 
 
Black adopted a similar sceptical approach in his milestone book, Refugees, Environment and 
Development, published in 1998.  The book asks the pertinent question, What is the reason for 
the linkage between forced migration and environmental change.  Black notes that that ‘one 
reason frequently given in recent years to explain mass population displacement is the growth 
of environmental problems’, and wonders ‘in whose interest it is that environment 
degradation should be seen as a possible cause of mass displacement’ (1998: 1)?   He considers 
that it is ‘academically (or, rather, ‘theoretically’) interesting to consider relationships between 
forced migration and environmental change’, but far from unproblematic.  The book 
addresses both environmental causes and consequences of forced migration, drawing on 
several case studies in Africa (such as Rwanda, Senegal River Valley, and the Forest Region of 
Guinea).  Black, however, refutes Kibreab’s argument that the concept is just an excuse for 
Northern governments to enforce tighter asylum policies, given that most of the literature on 
the topic calls for an extension of the current refugee regime, rather than a restriction.  Yet he 
agrees with Kibreab that most of the ‘alarmist’ literature ‘serves only to differentiate a single 
cause of migration’ (1998: 12) and therefore may lead to restrictions in asylum policies in the 
North, which is important because most of these migration flows occur in developing 
countries.  Black notes however that the origin of the concept lie in the environmentalist and 
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‘conflict studies’ literature rather than in asylum literature, and (rightly) suspects that Myers’ 
concern is not migration, but the threat associated with climate change.  He then assesses 
empirical evidence from the linkage between environmental change and forced migration, 
concluding that there is a ‘lack of evidence of simple causality’ between environmental change 
and forced migration, and identifying a multiplicity of linkages and variables: 
 
There is also a need to reconsider our approach to analysis of what are often complex and 
multidimensional linkages between refugees and environment.  Rather than seeking evidence to isolate 
or “blame” environment as the cause of migration, or migrants as the cause of environmental damage, 
we need instead to ensure that relationships between people and environment, and dynamic changes in 
these relationships, are considered as a part29 of any analysis of the causes or consequences of human 
movement, within their wider context (1998: 50). 
 
In a subsequent working paper for the UNHCR’s New Issues in Refugee Research series, Black 
further questions the very notion of ‘environmental refugees’, saying that the ‘linkages 
between environmental change, conflict and refugees remain to be proven’ (2001: 3).  He 
presents various empirical cases that show little evidence of a direct causal linkage, stressing 
that migration can also be seen as a coping strategy, in the case of desertification for example.  
He sees more justification for the concept of environmental migration in the case of brutal 
disasters, which must be analysed in conjunction with human-induced environmental 
degradation.  Black asserts that current statistics and case studies on ‘environmental refugees’ 
are not ‘encouraging in terms of staking out a new area of academic study or public policy’ 
(2001: 11), and that these so-called refugees may be no more than a myth.   However, he 
concedes that environmental changes can be factors behind large-scale migration, but raises 
doubts about the possibility of defining these migrants adequately.  He concludes with some 
reflections on a possible international protection regime for ‘environmental refugees’, asking if 
such a regime would rather help or hinder ‘the battle to focus the world’s attention on 
pressing environmental problems’ (2001: 15). 
 
Wood also agrees that there is no simple relationship between environmental causes and 
societal effects, and argues, along with Black, that the debate on ‘environmental refugees’ has 
been driven by ‘simplistic generalisations rather than solid empirical research’ (2001: 43).  He 
insists that it is impossible to separate economic and environmental factors as root causes for 
                                                
29 Italics are in the original text. 
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population displacement.  Consequently he coins the term ‘ecomigration’ to refer to the 
economic and ecological factors that combine to induce migration, and are impossible to 
separate from each other.  The impossibility of isolating environmental from other factors is 
also emphasised by Lonergan and Swain (1999), who stress that generalizations about the 
environment-migration nexus mask ‘a great deal of the complexity that characterizes migration 
decision-making’.  Isolating environmental factors is especially difficult in the case of 
voluntary movements, and the duration of the displacement is a key, but often overlooked, 
factor in order to determine the volume of the migration flow.  The authors also stress that 
movement induced by environmental changes can result in additional socio-economic 
stresses, or sometimes additional environmental problems – a claim that echoes the arguments 
made by Locke, Adger and Kelly (2000a).  Interestingly, Swain switches collations and no 
longer holds the alarmist view he put forward with regard to environmentally-induced 
conflicts (1996b, 1996a).   
 
The coexistence of two such antagonistic positions as the alarmist and sceptical ones could in 
the literature struck Castles, who ventured to compare both perspectives through Myers’ and 
Black’s arguments, trying to ‘make sense of the debate’, as the title of his paper suggests 
(Castles 2002).  The paper is based on a speech made in 2001 at Green College, Oxford 
University; it opens with a call for the need to bridge the disciplinary divide between forced 
migration studies and environmental studies.  Castles notes that the two approaches are 
difficult to reconcile, for example, in Black rejecting the ‘apocalyptic vision’ put forward by 
Myers.  He underlines a methodological difference between the conflicting perspectives: 
Myers uses wide-ranging estimates in a deductive perspective, whereas Black uses empirical 
studies at the national and local levels.  In particular, Castles stresses that Myers does not 
provide figures on actual displacements, but only on potential displacements.  The 
disagreement, however, is far from being purely methodological, and Castles points out that 
‘general forecasts and common sense linkages do little to further understanding’, and that it is 
crucial to look at specific cases, and strengthen empirical research (2002: 4).  Castles then 
abandons his neutral stance and reaches to the same conclusion as Kibreab and Black: ‘the 
notion of the “environmental refugee” is misleading and does little to help us understand the 
complex processes at work in specific situations of impoverishment, conflict and 
displacement’.  However, he acknowledges that environmental factors are not unimportant in 
these situations, but rather are part of ‘complex patterns of multiple causality, in which natural 
and environmental factors are closely linked to economic, social and political ones’ – he calls 
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therefore for ‘much more research and better understanding’ (2002: 5).  Yet Castles later 
writes that ‘emphasis on environmental factors is a distraction from central issues of 
development, inequality, and conflict resolution’ (Castles 2004).  He further sides with Black 
in arguing that the term ‘environmental refugee’ is ‘simplistic, one-sided and misleading, (and) 
implies a mono-causality that very rarely exists in practice’ (2002: 8).  Regarding a possible 
extension of the category of international refugee, he stresses the importance of a better, 
clearer definition, and warns that there is currently no political consensus concerning the 
extension of the refugee regime, and that a notion like ‘environmental refugee’ might be 
harmful for the current regime.  Revealing his policy agenda, he invites scholars to do their 
utmost to defend the Geneva Convention, but also to call for an improved international legal 
regime and institutions to protect other types of migrants –agendas that might appear 
mutually contradictory.   
 
Suhrke (1993) also reflects on the divide between the alarmist and sceptical coalitions, and 
affirms that the distinction between migrants and refugees must be restored in order to 
produce more accurate estimates of people forcibly displaced by environmental changes.  She 
sees environmental degradation as a ‘proximate cause of migration’ that interacts with 
demography and political economy, but wishes to escape the ‘trap of environmental 
determinism’ (1993: 7-8).  Following from this, she distinguishes two types of population 
movements: the first, ‘especially vulnerable people who are displaced due to extreme 
environmental degradation’, ‘responding primarily to push-factors, they become refugees in 
much the sense that current sociological and legal terms define the condition’; the second, 
migrants who move pro-actively, before environmental disruption leaves them no choice, 
respond to a ‘combination of pull-and-push factors’, and ‘migration here is part of the 
solution rather than the problem’ (1993: 9).  Listing five common forms of environmental 
degradation (deforestation, sea-level rise, desertification and drought, land degradation and 
water and air degradation), she questions whether migration type (forced or voluntary) is 
dependent upon the nature of the environmental degradation.  Although she doesn’t provide a 
definitive answer, she discusses each form of environmental degradation, and identifies 
‘pressure points’ throughout the world.  The second part of her paper deals with 
environmental migration and social conflict, drawing on numerous case studies.  From this 
review of causes and consequences of environmental migration, Suhrke divides the most 
relevant forms of environmental degradation into different categories: general processes, 
degradation of specific ecological areas, and impacts of specific development projects.  She 
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concludes that environmental disruption was a proximate cause of migration in all the cases 
studied, but that ‘it is difficult to argue that environmental degradation produces particular 
forms of outmigration except in one respect: the appearance of distress migrations occasioned 
by sudden or extreme environmental degradation’: only in the latter case is the term 
‘environmental refugees’ appropriate, she argues (1993: 32).  In a subsequent article (Suhrke 
1994), Suhrke suggests some response strategies for those in refugee-like conditions.  She 
proposes a further distinction to be made between simple displacement, where political 
violence is not an issue, and complex displacement, where environmental disruption and wars 
combine to force people from their homes.  She calls for a continuation of the current system 
of relief assistance in the case of simple displacement, warning that a special programme for 
‘environmental refugees’ would divert the scarce resources of the international refugee regime.   
Suhrke’s reflection on the divide between what she calls ‘maximalist’ and ‘minimalist’ 
perspectives does not absolutely reject the alarmist views in the same way that Black, Kibreab 
and Castles do.  Instead, her proposal transcends the divide and emphasises the multi-causality 
of migration.  In doing so, she opened the way for a more moderate approach to the nexus in 
which: the importance of environmental factors in the nexus was acknowledged, as was the 
intertwining of these factors with other migration drivers.  This stance is adopted by Gonin 
and Lassailly-Jacob (2002), Kliot (2004) and Hugo (1996).   
 
Gonin and Lassailly-Jacob (2002) take a very cautious approach: they insist on the multiple 
and complex causes of migration, internally or internationally, and put a strong emphasis on a 
role of the state in creating environmental disruption.  They mention examples of industrial 
accidents hushed up by governments, development projects, cases of the environment used as 
warfare or as an excuse to displace minorities, and they stress the need to acknowledge 
political responsibilities along with environmental disruption.  Using the case study of Sahel, 
they show that international migration can also be a response, and even a resource, in coping 
with droughts.   
 
Kliot (2004) reviews critically the main components of the nexus.  She makes a distinction 
between the two patterns of mobility of migration and circulation.  Drawing from a 
Malthusian perspective, she insists on the importance of population growth as a push factor 
for migration, but also identifies other push factors such as disasters, natural and man-made 
hazards, and development projects.  The complexity of these intertwining variables is central 
to her argument, her suggestion that ‘one explanation of the variation in patterns of reaction 
 132 
to environmental forces lies in the concepts of resilience and vulnerability’ (2004: 83).  Yet, 
unlike most members of the sceptics’ coalition, she affirms that ‘the research nexus which 
links environment and migration made significant progress in empirical studies, but it still 
struggles for a sound/solid theoretical foundation’ (2004: 96). 
 
Finally, Hugo focuses on ‘international migration occurring as a result of environmental 
changes and processes’ (1996: 105) and regrets that knowledge of the relationships between 
those two concepts is rather limited.  He contends that most migrations caused by 
environmental change have occurred within national boundaries, and argues that their 
international dimensions have been paid little attention, despite being of increased scale and 
significance.  He considers the environment both a direct and a contributing factor to the 
migration process, and makes the case for a continuum, rather than a clear-cut distinction, 
between forced and voluntary migration (1996: 108).  This position is similar to Richmond’s, 
but diverges from Suhrke’s.  Hugo sees environmental migration, whether proactive or 
reactive, as a current reality, but insists on the need to ‘understand the dynamic interaction of 
the multiple causal factors’ at play (1996: 109).  He also assesses the environmental impacts of 
international migration, and contends that hypothetical impacts were used as an excuse by the 
Australian government to adopt more stringent immigration policies.  Overall, Hugo makes a 
strong point for more research and criticises researchers and policy-makers for neglecting the 
significance of environmentally-induced migration: he cites the examples of acute, massive 
environmental displacements in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.  Among scholars of the sceptical 
coalition, Hugo is clearly the closest to the alarmist position, and can almost be considered as 
a policy broker: his work concludes with a call for international cooperation to address forced 
migration caused by environmental disruption.   
 
The demarcation between the alarmist and sceptical coalition is principally their stance 
towards the importance of environmental factors as (sole) migration drivers.  The controversy 
between the two is connected with the very conceptualisation of environmental migration, 
and impacts upon the debate on policy implications – alarmists favouring reform and sceptics 
the status quo.  This debate was first addressed by legal scholars, then by a new, revived 
stream of research on the topic, prompted by natural disasters in the mid-2000s and 
worldwide concern with climate change. 
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3. Legal Studies 
 
Contemporaneously with debates over the conceptualisation of environmental migration, 
scholars started to enquire into the regime protecting those uprooted by environmental 
changes.  Sceptics argued that the term ‘environmental refugee’ was misleading from a 
sociological viewpoint, because it presumed a single causality in the migration decision; legal 
scholars asserted that the term was equally misleading from a legal perspective, since it did not 
fall within the scope of the 1951 Geneva Convention.  This latter objection to the term, 
however, reinforced the alarmist coalition: most scholars argued that a new protection regime 
was needed to address what were perceived as migration flows neglected by policy-makers.  
The development of legal studies in the field was mostly conducted by environmental law 
scholars, rather than by refugee law scholars; with the exception of Cournil and Mazzega 
(2007), all papers reviewed in the following section were published in environmental law 
journals and reviews.   
 
As mentioned above, most members of the alarmist coalition were found among 
environmental scholars and conflict specialists, while migration scholars typically sided with 
the sceptics.  The same can be said for legal scholars: most studies supporting the alarmist 
perspective can be attributed to environmental law, whereas refugee law scholars only 
addressed the issue marginally. 
 
The first thorough study on the topic of migration in the law was conducted by Magniny 
(1999), who raised the hypothesis of creating a special status in international law for 
‘environmental refugees’.  Starting with a discussion of the origins and founding principles of 
refugee law, as well as the limits of the Geneva Convention, she elaborated on the 
controversial concept of environmental damage, and proposed considering victims of the 
damage in a collective dimension.  This laid the basis for a discussion of a specific legal status 
for ‘environmental refugees’, as well as of the organisations that might implement such a 
status.  Magniny claimed that legal protection mechanisms had to be international, 
autonomous, temporary and collective.  According to Magniny, such a protection could be 
best assured by a multilateral agreement that would incorporate customary laws of asylum and 
hospitality that have been implemented in some developing countries.  In addition, the 
agreement would include secondary rights – such as decent housing or working permits – for 
displaced peoples.  The agreement would apply to internal migrants as well. Magniny’s 
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proposition was deemed utopian rather than concrete and practical, and it is unlikely that a 
sufficient number of states would ratify it, given the stringent migration policies developed by 
most of them (Cournil and Mazzega 2007). 
 
Magniny’s work opened the gates for a flood of legal reflections on the status of 
‘environmental refugees’, particularly in France, which culminated in a conference addressing 
the issue, held in Limoges on 23 June 200530.  The conference resulted in a formal declaration, 
the Appeal of Limoges, calling for an international status for ‘ecological refugees’ similar to 
refugee status; preventive action; better disaster management, including a mechanism of 
ecological assistance; and long-term policies guaranteeing the rights of ‘ecological refugees’, 
including an international assistance fund and the possibility of an ad hoc international 
convention.   
 
Along with Magniny, Cournil (2006) underlined several inadequacies of the current regime, 
pointing to the weaknesses of specific legal texts (such as the Geneva Convention or the 
Addis-Ababa Convention of the Organisation of African Unity).  She stressed that human 
rights were not guaranteed for ‘ecological migrants’, and that a case-by-case, inconsistent 
approach prevailed in the treatment of asylum claims on an environmental basis.  
Furthermore, Cournil did not limit her analysis to international law but also called into 
question European law, contending that a protection regime for the ‘ecological refugee’ was 
still to be built.  She outlined the difficulties of creating such a regime, in particular the lack of 
an accepted upon typology, concluding that any legal status for ‘ecological refugees’ must 
necessarily be multi-faceted, in order to reflect the multiple patterns of environmental 
migration.  In subsequent papers written in collaboration with Mazzega (Cournil and Mazzega 
2007, 2006), the insufficiencies of international norms and national protections were discussed 
further, including an assessment of the pros and cons of some innovative protection 
mechanisms, including ecological intervention31 and environmental asylum.  These two 
authors agree that an international protection regime for ‘environmental refugees’ is currently 
unrealistic, and suggest instead reinforcing the protection of internally-displaced people 
(IDPs).  Were an international regime to be developed, however, they favour protection with a 
                                                
30 The conference, entitled ‘Les Réfugiés Ecologiques’ (Ecological Refugees), was convened by the Centre de 
Recherches Interdisciplinaires en Droit de l'Environnement, de l'Aménagement et de l'Urbanisme (CRIDEAU - CNRS/INRA), 
in collaboration with the Observatoire des Mutations Institutionnelles et Juridiques (OMIJ) and the Centre International de 
Droit Comparé de l'Environnement (CIDCE). 
31 This term refers to the French doctrine of ‘droit d’ingérence’, by which a state intervenes in another state’s 
internal affairs with the mandate of a supranational authority, usually for humanitarian reasons. 
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collective dimension and variable duration, according to the circumstances (therefore example, 
if there is the possibility of return or not), and rights for those displaced.   
 
Michelot (2006) introduces the issue of environmental responsibility to the debate.  In his 
analysis, the figure of ‘environmental refugee’ embodies the threats facing humanity: 
accordingly, the recognition of a status for those displaced might imply the acknowledgement 
of global responsibility and implementation of the principles of environmental justice.  In this 
way, the creation of an international status would have implications far beyond the issue 
environmental displacement, and would hold much greater significance for environmental 
responsibility: potential flows of environmental ‘refugees’, she argues, would embody 
disrespect for environmental law.  Chemillier-Gendreau (2006) also reflects on the possibility 
of creating an international status for ‘ecological refugees’.  She identifies three major 
difficulties in this endeavour: first, the large variety of causes that can induce displacement, 
thus diluting the responsibility assigned to each cause; second, the individualistic dimension of 
asylum, which allows states to restrict access to their territory; and finally the lack of a 
conceptual and legal definition for ‘environmental refugees’, which can be explained by a lack 
of willingness to develop the concept of collective responsibility in international law.  
Chemillier-Gendreau states that it is humanity’s duty to express its solidarity through adequate 
international mechanisms.  She proposes to extend the definition of refugee to ‘all people 
whose life is threatened or whose normal living conditions are made impossible due to an 
environmental degradation, whether its origin is natural or the result of human actions 
perpetrated by states or private agents’ (2006: 450), adding that the granting of refugee status 
could be based on class action, rather than on individual procedures.  However, she believes 
that the main obstacle to developing protection mechanisms lies in the inadequacy of 
international law to address environmental protection and human solidarity.  She stresses in 
particular the fact that international law remains rooted in states’ sovereignty, which impedes 
the development of global governance mechanisms.  She argues that a central authority is 
needed in order to guarantee the application of the burgeoning volume of international law, 
and urges scholars to develop a doctrine on the issue, and also press for support from public 
opinion: these two combined actions might persuade policy-makers to eventually address the 
problem. 
 
Most legal scholars have argued that the refugee definition should be extended to include 
‘environmental refugees’.  Cooper suggests a new definition of refugee that would include any 
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person who, ‘owing to degraded environmental conditions threatening his life, health, means 
of subsistence, or use of natural resources, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or (…) unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’ (1997: 494).  Most 
of her fellow scholars, however, contended that broadening the definition of a refugee was 
not the way to go, and that environmental law offered other alternative solutions. 
 
An early work by McCue judges that ‘the refugee system was never intended to address the 
problem of environmental refugees’ (1993: 177).  Given the reluctance of states to expand the 
current refugee regime, McCue suggests that advocacy efforts to protect ‘environmental 
refugees’ should be directed at securing a multilateral convention in environmental law, rather 
than at an extending the refugee protection regime.  In his own words,  
 
Environmental and immigration organisations interested in making headway on the issue of 
environmental refugees should abandon broadening the definition of refugee as a useless expenditure of 
political capital.  They should focus on a multilateral convention for the purpose of coordinating 
existing aid for migrants and the environment.  (1993: 177) 
 
He argues for the adoption of basic principles of international environmental law, such as the 
duties to prevent environmental disasters, to notify and provide information about them when 
they occur, and to develop contingency plans32.  The convention would go further and include 
a general duty to compensate the victims, in what the author admits is the ‘most difficult 
political leap’ posed by his proposal.  The compensation would not be based on a ‘polluter-
pays’ principle, but rather on ‘pooling the compensation that all states might have to render 
each other into a fund’ (1993: 186).  Thus the issue of environmental responsibility would be 
avoided.  McCue presents his radical proposal as a ‘more effective alternative to improve the 
plight of environmental refugees’ (1993: 190) compared to broadening the definition of 
refugees, which McCue sees as a waste of time and resources. 
 
Falstrom makes the case for a new convention to address both the causes of the problem 
(environmental degradation) and its consequences (displacements):  
 
                                                
32 Such contingency plans, applied to environmental migration, would ‘extend the principle of non-refoulement in 
the case of an environmental event causing trans-border migration in an amount recognized by the convention’ 
(1993: 184).  
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Merely allowing environmentally-displaced individuals to move does not solve the problem.  Not only is 
their homeland continually decimated, but also the massive influx of environmental refugees to other 
areas creates a vicious cycle of environmental problems in these new areas.  (2001: 5) 
 
Falstrom notes that most protection mechanisms usually focus on the consequences of the 
problem, but fail to deal with its root causes.  Hence she advocates a convention that would 
address displacements, but also contain obligations for states to prevent environmental 
damages from occurring.  She suggests that such a convention could be modelled on the 
Convention Against Torture, drafted in 1984: as she notes, this Convention applies to all 
persons fearing torture, or whether acts of torture have been perpetrated or not, and whether 
the person is prosecuted because of her belonging to a specific group or not.  Furthermore, 
she points out that the protection obligation imposed on states is not permanent, and 
therefore makes it easier for states to comply with the obligation.  Once the period of 
protection ends, states would be entitled to re-examine the situation and return the person to 
her home if the situation were deemed safe.  The convention would also deal with the root 
causes of the environmental problem, and Falstrom recommends that ‘as in the Convention 
Against Torture, the Convention on the Protection of Environmentally Displaced Persons 
should incorporate extensive provisions outlining State responsibility to find, correct, and 
prevent occurrences of the environmental degradation and destruction that forced people to 
migrate’ 33 (2001: 23).  She further notes that the Convention Against Torture is one of the 
most successful and widely ratified international agreements, and thus declares herself 
reasonably optimistic regarding the possible success of a similar convention to address 
environmental displacement.   
 
The idea of a convention similar to the Convention Against Torture is enthusiastically 
endorsed by Lopez (2007).  Lopez details the insufficiencies of the current protection regimes 
in Europe and the United States, and observes that neither European directives on temporary 
and subsidiary protection nor the American Temporary Protected Status34 can offer adequate 
protection to ‘environmentally-displaced persons’.  Thus she considers Falstrom’s proposal 
the most concrete framework to deal with the issue.  She notes that it would not only ‘reassert 
the obligation of non-refoulement, the essential element of instruments of international 
                                                
33 Such measures might include educating and training farmers regarding sustainable land use, stricter regulations 
for hazardous industries and waste dumping, disaster prevention mechanisms, etc. 
34 For example, this status was provided to the people of Montserrat displaced by a volcanic eruption in 1997, 
and to the people of Honduras and Nicaragua displaced by hurricane Mitch in 1998. 
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protection’, but also ‘provide an extensive set of rights and obligations, combined with an 
elaborated mechanism of implementation’ (2007: 408).  She stresses that literature on the topic 
usually concentrates on discussion of the refugee definition and its application 
‘environmentally-displaced persons’, a discussion that ‘has lasted for many years and has not 
proven constructive’ (ibidem).  Furthermore, such a discussion does not address the root 
causes of the problem, though this is paramount in order to remedy the issue 
comprehensively, she argues.  Surprisingly, she concludes that ‘the particular issue of 
protecting those environmentally displaced does not (…) pose any major legal or political 
difficulties’ that could not easily be dealt with by the convention proposed by Falstrom. 
 
Although these studies seem unconnected from debates on the very concept of environmental 
migration and the meaning of the environment-migration nexus, they also contributed to the 
conceptualisation of the issue.  A majority were published in environmental law journals, 
further contributing to the divide between migration and environment scholars.  Efforts to 
bridge this disciplinary gap, however, have been undertaken in recent years: most of the latest 
works on the issue acknowledge the multi-causality of environmental migration, and suggest 
some policy responses. 
 
 
4. Towards a Synthesis? 
 
 
From the mid-2000s onwards, the positions of the alarmist and sceptical coalitions underwent 
something of a rapprochement, for several reasons: first, the increasing number of multi-
disciplinary collaborations; second, a number of major disasters that struck different parts of 
the world in 2004 and 2005; and third, the increased attention given to climate change.  These 
three sets of factors drove a significant evolution in both coalitions. 
 
Regarding the first factor, it is noticeable that many recent publications have been co-authored 
by scholars from different disciplines, or from opposing coalitions (Boano et al. 2007; 
Kniveton et al. 2008; Renaud et al. 2007; Cournil and Mazzega 2007).  As a matter of fact, 
collaboration between environmental and migration studies coincided with cross-coalition 
collaboration, as I have shown that the divide between both coalitions was also a disciplinary 
divide.  Additionally, an increasing number of conferences and workshops addressed the 
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topic, bringing together members from both coalitions.  Such events included an IOM expert 
workshop in Bangkok, held on 22-23 February 2007; a UNU-EHS and IOM research 
workshop, held in Munich on 16-18 April 2008; a Climate Change & Migration conference, 
organised by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) in London, on 29 April 2008; a 
policy dialogue on environmental migration, held in Brussels on 4 July 2008; and an 
international conference on Environment, Forced Migration and Social Vulnerability, held in 
Bonn on 9-11 October 2008, to name just a few.  Collaborative research projects, such as the 
EACH-FOR project, the Global Governance project (GloGov) or the International Human 
Dimension Programme on Global Environmental Change (IHDP), were also initiated.  These 
collaborative publications, events and projects greatly contributed to the rapprochement of 
both coalitions, which had until then few for a for exchanging ideas. 
 
Second, the debate was influenced to a great extent by current events.  Between December 
2004 and October 2005, no fewer than three major disasters struck the world: a tsunami in 
South East Asia, on 26 December 2004; hurricane Katrina on the Gulf Coast, on 29 August 
2005; and the Kashmir earthquake in Pakistan, on 8 October 2005.  All three disasters induced 
important population displacements, and two of them (the tsunami and the earthquake) 
prompted major UNHCR operations.  Empirical evidence of environmentally-induced mass 
displacements was obvious, and the lack of empirical data on the issue could no longer be 
plausibly claimed by the sceptical coalition – even though in-depth studies of these 
displacements reveal the role played by other factors.  As empirical evidence was mounting – 
at least in the media, if not in academic works – it was increasingly difficult to downplay the 
role of environmental drivers in forced migration.  Radical arguments claiming that emphasis 
on environmental drivers was a distraction from other, more pressing issues (Kibreab 1997; 
Castles 2004) no longer held, faced with contradictory evidence on all television screens.  On 
the other hand, the alarmist coalition could use these three events as striking examples of the 
theses they had long been defending. 
 
Third, climate change received increased and sustained attention from the media, policy-
makers and public opinion, following the almost simultaneous release of the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007b) and Al Gore’s An 
Inconvenient Truth (Guggenheim 2006).  This led to a significant evolution in the positions of 
both coalitions.  Alarmists’ presentation of migration flows as a devastating consequence of 
climate change was, at least partly, aimed at raising awareness at the dangers of climate change.  
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This goal had been achieved, at least to a certain extent, and this might explain why the 
alarmist coalition lost some steam post-2006.  On the other hand, the doubts of the sceptical 
coalition could have been interpreted as questioning the very evidence of climate change, 
rather than climate change as a migration driver.  Scepticism about climate change-induced 
migration was easily assimilated to scepticism about climate change itself, a position that could 
prove damaging for the academic careers of those who held it.  Sceptics were keen on 
dissociating themselves from climate deniers, and most post-2006 studies focused on 
migration flows associated with climate change, rather than with environmental change at 
large. 
 
Although the positions of both coalitions have come notably closer under the influence of the 
above set of factors, the divide still persists.  Literature from the mid-2000s has been 
characterised by two underlying trends: a focus on climate change, and a heavier emphasis on 
policy implications.  The debate between alarmists and sceptics is no longer about the 
conceptualisation of environmental migration – both groups seem to agree on the multi-
causality of the movements – but rather about policy implications and responses. 
 
Most recent papers have discussed the specifics of climate change-induced migration.  Piguet 
(2008) distinguishes between three types of impacts associated with climate change: 
hurricanes, torrential rains and floods; droughts and desertification; and rising sea-levels.  Of 
these three categories, he notes that the latter ‘appears to be the aspect of global warming that 
represents the greatest direct threat for numerous populations’ (2008: 8).   On the contrary, 
the potential of hurricanes and floods to induce long-term and long-distance migration 
remains limited (with the significant exception of Bangladesh), and ‘forecasts of increased 
migrations linked to drought related phenomena remain hazardous’ (2008: 7).  He concludes 
that empirical evidence shows a clear link between environmental change – especially sea-level 
rise – and migration, but also notes that no climatic or environmental hazard of itself results in 
migration, given the number of other factors involved.  Turning to policies, he argues against 
a revision of the Geneva Convention, and favours increased burden-sharing of assistance and 
preventative efforts in the affected countries, as well as the development of subsidiary 
protection schemes, such as temporary asylum.  Brown (2008) also focuses on climate change 
impacts, and distinguishes between climate events – brutal disruptions such as hurricanes and 
floods – and climate processes – slow-onset changes such as sea-level rise.  Only climate 
events can be identified as sole drivers for migration, whereas climate processes combine with 
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non-climate drivers – population, poverty and governance – to induce migration.  He notes 
that climate-induced migration will impact upon different policy sectors: development, urban 
policies, economy, security and social cohesion, as well as health policies.  Despite these major 
policy implications, Brown regrets the ‘collective, and rather successful, attempt to ignore the 
scale of the problem’, and identifies three areas where progress can be made: expanding the 
refugee definition to include people displaced for environmental reasons or drafting a new, 
specific convention (which does not amount to the same thing); strengthening the adaptation 
capacities of affected countries; and finally relaxing immigration policies for climate migrants.  
Biermann and Boas (2007) agree with Piguet that the three climate-change related causes of 
displacement are sea-level rise, extreme weather events and droughts.  They see little use in 
expanding the definition of a refugee, because of uncertainties regarding its political feasibility 
and effectiveness, and also because it has ‘problematic ethical consequences by threatening the 
protection of current political refugees’ since it will not sufficiently account ‘for the specific 
character and needs of climate refugees’ (2007: 20-21).  Instead, they propose a sui generis 
protection regime, to be added as a protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC).  They argue that ‘climate refuges’ need international recognition and 
protection, as well as financial assistance, but that current mechanisms are currently 
insufficient to deal with the issue.  The additional protocol they suggest rests on five core 
principles: 
 
- Planned re-location and resettlement, since they argue that climate change impacts are 
more predictable than wars and turmoil; 
- Resettlement instead of temporary asylum, a view that contrasts sharply with authors 
favouring an extension of temporary protection regimes (Magniny 1999; Piguet 2008); 
- Collective rights instead of individual ones, a position shared by virtually all scholars; 
- International assistance for domestic measures;  
- International burden-sharing of resettlement costs, based on common but 
differentiated responsibilities, respective capabilities and the reimbursement of full 
incremental costs incurred.   
 
Such a protocol, they argue, would best fit within the framework of UNFCCC, and would 
thus benefit from the wide support of parties to the climate convention.  They suggest the 
establishment of a committee on recognition, protection and resettlement of ‘climate 
refugees’, which would determine the populations needing relocation due to climate change.  
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They acknowledge that such a proposal is likely to create some friction with the Geneva 
Convention, but contend that there is no reason to reserve the term ‘refugee’ to people fleeing 
persecution and not apply it to people fleeing climate change impacts.  They also propose 
founding a new, specific funding mechanism aimed at fully reimbursing the incremental costs 
incurred by the resettlement of ‘climate change refugees’, though they remain vague about 
how the fund would be financed.  Finally, a recent report of the Norwegian Refugee Council 
(Kolmannskog 2008) took a more conservative approach, and argues that more research is 
needed to identify protection gaps, before any concrete step can be taken.  The report notes 
that ‘many of the forced migrants will probably fit into already existing categories of protected 
persons, but they may need to be made more visible and recognised within the categories’ – 
thus it recommends that preventative mechanisms are strengthened and protection 
possibilities further examined (Kolmannskog 2008: 31).   
 
These four policy-oriented takes on climate change-induced migration all recommend 
different solutions, which are best seen on a sceptic-alarmist continuum, rather than as 
separate approaches.  Policy-wise, the sceptical end of the continuum does not call into 
question the international asylum regime, and does not favour the development of new 
instruments, whereas the alarmist end calls for an extension of the refugee definition or the 
drafting of a new, ad hoc convention.  Unsurprisingly, reports found at the alarmist end of the 
spectrum are authored by environment scholars (Brown, Boas and Biermann), whereas more 
conservative reports are written by migration scholars (Piguet, Kolmannskog). 
 
Two papers, in particular, co-authored by environment and migration scholars, tried to move 
beyond the debate, and to consider environmental changes at large as migration triggers.  
Renaud et al. (2007) sought to provide a better conceptual framework for environmental 
migration.  They identify three main dimensions in the scholarly debate over environmental 
migration: a definitional issue over the terminology ‘environmental refugee’, a debate over 
‘whether such people even exist’ (2007: 15), and a debate over the protection to which these 
people should be entitled.  The paper aims to shed new light on these three aspects of the 
debate.  Regarding the definitional issue, they propose a new typology of environmental 
migrants, distinguishing between: 
 
- Environmentally motivated migrants, who ‘may leave a steadily deteriorating 
environment in order to pre-empt the worse’; 
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- Environmentally forced migrants, who ‘have to leave in order to avoid the worst, 
often on a permanent basis’; 
- And environmental refugees, who ‘flee the worst’ (2007: 29-30) 
 
Regarding the second aspect of the debate, they provide ample evidence of the reality of 
environmental migration, associated with climate change, disasters, or loss of ecosystems.  
Finally, they suggest a set of recommendations to address the third aspect of the debate, 
ranging from strengthening the scientific empirical basis of environmental migration, 
increasing awareness, improving legislation (with new mechanisms rather than an amendment 
to the Geneva Convention), providing the resources for adequate humanitarian aid, and 
strengthening institutions and policies.  They call for the implementation of such policies not 
to be impeded by the continuing debate over the conceptualisation of environmental 
migration, but to move beyond it.   
 
Boano et al.  take a similar path, and argue that ‘in a warmer world, the traditional definition 
and understanding of the concepts of ‘refugee’ and ‘protection’ may both need to change’ 
(2007: 3).  They make the case for mechanisms that improve communities’ resilience to 
environmental change and reduce their vulnerability, and challenge the deterministic approach 
to vulnerable groups as passive victims.  At the same time, they also call for new institutional 
responses and greater multi-disciplinary research.   
 
Two other contributions explored new angles on the issue.  McNamara (2007) examines the 
discourse of different UN agencies and officials, and asserts that discursive politics reproduce 
and reinforce the absence of multilateral protection for ‘environmental refugees’ at the United 
Nations.  She sees this protection gap from a neo-structuralist perspective as an outcome of 
debates and discourses held at the UN.  She argues that reasons for these discourses lie in the 
shifting attitudes toward the role of multilateralism in environmental issues.  Her arguments 
are further delineated in a doctoral dissertation devoted to the analysis of such discourses 
(McNamara 2006).  Another emerging approach deals with migration not as a consequence of 
climate change, but as an adaptation strategy to mitigate its impacts upon populations.  
McLeman and Smit (2006) develop a theoretical model of migration in response to climate 
change, and test it – successfully – on the famous historical case of the Dust Bowl migration.  
The model describes vulnerability as a function of exposure and adaptive capacity, and 
includes different types of response to climate change, among which migration is not always 
 144 
the preferable option.  The authors show that particular types of exposure to hazards 
influence the potential for migration, and that migrants and non-migrants are differentiated 
through different adaptive capacities.   
 
Finally, although this is not the focus of my research, a few words must be said about 
attempts to improve estimates and better understand the empirical linkages between 
environmental change and migration.  Kniveton et al. (2008) compare different theoretical 
models in order to understand different migration behaviours developed by people coping 
with environmental stresses.  They focus in particular on two models, the Sustainable 
Livelihoods Approach – which seeks to explain how households cope with external 
vulnerabilities – and the New Economics of Labour Migration – which seeks to understand 
why people migrate.  They propose continuing both approaches to analyse ‘how households 
respond to climate shocks, and the extent to which migration is part of their response’ (2008: 
32).  They proceed to discuss some statistical methods that quantify migration flows 
associated with climate impacts.  They rightly note that common predictions are usually based 
on the projected number of exposed people, and assume in a deterministic fashion that 
migration is the only possible response.  They use agent-based modelling to simulate peoples’ 
responses to climate signals, and assert that it is a ‘potentially highly effective tool for 
modelling climate change impacts on migration’ (2008: 53).  Afifi and Warner (2007) use 
another tool, the gravity model, to address the same question.  The gravity model is a 
common statistical tool used to predict geography and flows of migrations.  Afifi and Warner 
are the first to use it to address environmental migration.  They use basic independent 
variables – economic, social and political factors – and add dummy environmental variables 
such as occurrence of earthquakes, overfishing, floods, etc.  They analyse about 30,000 
observations, controlling for the former variables, and conclude that environmental variables 
have a significant, positive impact on migration flows across countries.   
 
Finally, the Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR) project 
was launched in order to address the dearth of empirical studies on environmental migration.  
The project selected 22 case studies of environmental change, and surveyed the affected 
populations’ migration behaviours.  Although the final results of the project are not yet 
available at the time of writing, some preliminary conclusions suggest that ‘disasters, 
development and slow-paced environmental change are three factors that contribute to 
environmentally induced migration’ (EACH-FOR 2008).  Environmental factors increasingly 
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prompt governments to plan for relocation and resettlement of vulnerable populations.  
Though migration can be an adaptation strategy to cope with environmental change, the most 





The conceptualisation of the environment-migration nexus has witnessed different notable 
evolutions.  Scholarly debates initially focused on the environmental impacts of migration, 
before turning to environmentally-induced migration, as the first impacts of climate change 
became apparent and the world was struck by a number of major natural disasters.  Legal 
studies and policy proposals were conducted while conceptual controversies were ongoing, 
before comprehensive empirical studies were undertaken.  The development of scholarly 
literature on the subject was chaotic in many regards, but was traversed by two opposing 
perspectives, organised around the alarmist and sceptical coalitions respectively.  This 
opposition supplied the prime analytical framework for the evolution of the literature, as well 
as the conceptualisation of the nexus. 
 
In recent years, an increased number of forums, workshops and joint publications have 
brought environmental and migration scholars together.  One of the hypotheses of the ACF is 
that policy actors tend to accept information confirming pre-existing beliefs, and reject 
dissonant information, especially when it concerns policy core beliefs.  Although learning 
from one’s own coalition is an easy process, learning across coalitions proves more 
problematic. Policy forums, especially if they are repeated over time, provide ideal venues for 
the process of facilitating learning across coalitions.  Nonetheless, despite the fact that these 
occasions have multiplied in recent years, the opposition between alarmists and sceptics has 











“Those who track the effects of global warming had assumed that the first flow of climate 
refugees would likely be with the abandonment of Tuvalu in the South Pacific or other low-
lying islands.  We were wrong.  The first massive movement of climate refugees has been that 
of people away from the Gulf Coast of the United States.” 
 






This chapter will discuss the key elements around which the two advocacy coalitions revolve. 
First the question of the definition of environmental migration is addressed.  The issue of 
definition, which is directly linked to estimates and forecasts of environmental migration, 
remains highly debated.  Debates over definitions remain greatly influenced by the opposing 
coalitions, and by the ‘numbers game’ of estimates and forecasts of future migration flows.   
 
Finally, the different environmental causes of migration, as well as resulting migration 
patterns, will be described and discussed.  Earlier studies tended to link types of 
environmental change to specific migration patterns, in a deterministic perspective.  It is now 
widely acknowledged that the causes of migration are multiple and intertwined, including 
environmental factors.  As for migration patterns, the case is made here for the existence of a 
continuum, rather than discrete categories of migrants. 
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1. The Definitional Issue 
 
Among the core issues at stake in the conceptualisation of the nexus is the definition of 
environmental migration.  Despite numerous attempts and proposals, no agreed upon 
definition has yet emerged, and this void has lead to a great confusion over the terms used to 
describe the people displaced by environmental events.  ‘Environmental refugees’, ‘ecological 
migrants’, ‘climate refugees’, or ‘environmentally-displaced people’ are all terms frequently 
used by scholars and the media alike to describe what they assume is a common reality.  The 
definitional issue is directly linked to the conceptualisation and typologies of environmental 
migration, its estimates and forecasts, and the policy responses aimed at addressing it.  
Furthermore, the debate is marked by a number of confusions over different concepts, and 
‘environmental migration’ has eventually become a hold-all for different migration dynamics 
that often have little in common. 
 
 
1.1. Why Defining Environmental Migrat ion i s  Problemat i c  
 
Different reasons account for the difficulty of defining environmental migration.  These 
reasons are rooted in the debates over the conceptualisation of environmental migration, but 
the lack of definition also contributes, in a ‘Catch-22’ situation, to controversies over the 
concept.    
 
One of main reasons for the lack of definition is linked to the difficulty of isolating 
environmental factors from other drivers of migration.  Most authors stress the multi-causality 
of migration and the intermingling of factors (Black 2001; Castles 2002; Brown 2008; Boano 
et al. 2007).  Therefore, one can legitimately ask whether isolating environmental drivers is 
possible, or makes much sense conceptually.  Sceptics tend to argue that it does not, and that 
doing so is a distraction from other, more pressing issues (Castles 2004; Kibreab 1997).  
Alarmists, on the contrary, see the urgency of acknowledging and defining environmental 
migration.  Lassailly-Jacob (2006) rightfully questions whether environmental migrants make 
up an additional category of forced migrants, or are better understood within existing 
conceptual categories.   
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The question of causality relates to the relative importance assigned to environmental factors 
among other drivers: the former are deeply rooted in socio-economic, cultural and political 
contexts, and are not easy to disentangle.  Even though the importance of environmental 
drivers is widely acknowledged in the literature, the debate remains ongoing regarding the 
need to conceptualise these drivers as distinct from other migration drivers.   
 
This intermingling of migration drivers, however, is far from being the sole obstacle to 
defining environmental migration.  Another major hindrance lies in the confusion of forced 
and voluntary migration.  A common assumption is that environmental disruptions trigger 
only forced – and often brutal – displacements, an assumption emphasised in the term 
‘environmental refugees’.  Suhrke wonders whether there is ‘something about the nature of 
environmental degradation that tends to produce refugee-like movement rather than 
migration?’ (1994: 480) Many authors stress, however, that environmental factors also induce 
voluntary migration (Renaud et al. 2007; Suhrke 1994; Hugo 1996).  As will be discussed in 
Section 4.2, the distinction between forced and voluntary migrants is a fine one in the case of 
environmental migration.  Yet the distinction is a fundamental one in migration studies and 
policies, which is a cause for some confusion over the definition and the policies most 
adequate to address the phenomenon. 
 
Finally, a further difficulty arises from the absence of any legal definition of the concept.  
Unlike refugees or internally-displaced persons, no specific legal framework exists to address 
environmental migration.  Once again, this can be seen as another ‘Catch-22’ situation: the 
development of a legal definition is also impeded by the conceptual fuzziness that prevails.  At 
the time of writing, talks were under way between several agencies in Geneva, including 
UNHCR and IOM, to find common ground on a definition and typology of environmental 
migration. 
 
Though this study does not discuss the characteristics of environmental migration or the need 
to categorise it, definitions and typologies do matter, and not only for the scholarly debate.  
Environmental migration as a social phenomenon is generally apprehended through its 
definition, which bears high responsibility for the development of normative framework and 
policy responses.  Without a clear definition, one cannot identify which populations are of 
concern and require assistance nor can one accurately estimate the number of people 
displaced or prompted to migrate because of environmental factors.  Words and typologies 
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also matter for the populations themselves, because of the images and meaning they carry: as 
will be shown in the Section 1.3, people displaced by hurricane Katrina objected angrily to the 
use of the term ‘refugees’.  Thus getting the wording right is important; in the next section, I 
shall attempt to summarise previous attempts to provide a definition, and clarify the concepts 
I intend to use in subsequent parts of this work. 
 
 
1.2. A Working Defin i ti on  
 
 
The first definition provided by El-Hinnawi (1985) was met with widespread criticism, with 
most authors asserting that the definition was too wide and had little practical relevance 
(Suhrke and Visentin 1991).  In subsequent years, many other attempts to define 
environmental migration have been made by a wide range of authors (Myers 1997; Renaud et 
al. 2007; Cooper 1997).  The majority still revolve around some key elements that were already 
present in El-Hinnawi’s definition: 
- With only few exceptions, most definitions address only forced displacement, 
excluding voluntary migration; 
- A strong emphasis is placed on the destruction of peoples’ habitat or livelihoods; 
- Environmental changes are loosely defined, and can include man-made or natural 
disasters35, brutal or slow-onset changes. 
 
More recently, a definition proposed by IOM and has been used as a working definition by a 
number of scholars (Kniveton et al. 2008; Brown 2008): 
 
Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons, who, for compelling reasons of sudden or 
progressive changes in the environmental that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged 
to leave their habitual homes, or chose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and either within 
their country or abroad.  (International Organization for Migration 2007) 
 
The three features observed in El-Hinnawi’s definition are also present in the IOM definition, 
which is remarkably close to the former: a definition that met with harsh criticism in 1985 is 
                                                
35 Even though this distinction is questionable, as explained in Chapter 1. 
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greeted with tacit approval 22 years later.  The same criticisms made then can certainly be 
applied to the IOM definition: it is extremely broad, thus inviting alarmist forecasts, and does 
not distinguish between different types of migration (voluntary and forced, temporary and 
permanent, internal and international).  Furthermore, it does not acknowledge the multi-
causality of migration, and does not elaborate on the characteristics of environmental drivers.  
Hence the definition is of limited policy relevance, since it implies that similar policies could 
apply to different types of migration – especially forced and voluntary migration – which is 
hardly the case. Overall, the broader definitions tend to be used by members of the alarmist 
coalition.  
 
Renaud et al. attempted to distinguish between different types of migration, and proposed a 
definition based on a triple distinction between environmentally motivated migrants, 
environmentally forced migrants and environmental refugees (2007: 29).  The distinction 
between the first and the two latter categories is based on the voluntary or forced character of 
the migration, while the latter categories differ in the ‘swiftness of necessary actions’: 
environmentally forced migrants can plan and prepare their migration, whereas environmental 
refugees have to flee in panicked circumstances. 
 
Policy-wise, the distinction between forced and voluntary migration is of utmost importance 
(Hugo 1996; Suhrke 1993): protection regimes and migration policies are rooted in this 
fundamental divide.  Distinctions between slow-onset, brutal, internal and international 
movements, though important, are secondary in comparison to the fundamental distinction 
between forced and voluntary migration.  Hence I propose use of the working definition 
developed by the EACH-FOR project, which distinguishes between environmental migrants 
and environmental displacees:  
 
Environmental migrants are people who chose to move voluntarily from their usual place of residence 
primarily due to environmental concerns or reasons.  (…) 
Environmental displacees are people who are forced to leave their usual place of residence, because their 
lives, livelihoods and welfare have been placed at serious risk as a result of adverse environmental 
processes and events36 (natural and/or triggered by people) (Dun et al. 2007). 
 
                                                
36 Italics in the original. 
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The core distinction between the two categories is the element of voluntary versus forced 
migration.  Yet these two types of migrants share a common motive for departure or flight 
from their usual place of residence, that is, a situation of objective environmental degradation 
or change.  This factor can be combined with other factors, for example, social, economic or 
political.  In the case of forced migration, those moving must identify environmental factors 
as one of the main motive forces.  It is important the migrants themselves identify the reasons 
prompting their migration, and that these reasons are not just assumed from an external 
viewpoint.  No distinction is made whether the migration is temporary or permanent, or 
whether it is international or not.  ‘Environmental migrants’ refer to people who are prompted 
to migrate because, in their mind, environmental factors are one of the foremost reasons for 
leaving their usual place of residence.  Their migration is pro-active, and can be viewed as a 
coping strategy.  On the other hand, ‘environmental displacees’ are forced to move by both 
slow onset and rapid onset environmental process and events.  Their departure or flight is 
forced, and it is assumed that they are unwilling to leave their place of residence but have no 
other choice.   
 
Unlike many other definitions, the one described above carefully avoids the use of the term 
‘refugee’, because of its specific legal meaning in international law, its policy implications, and 
its political connotations and symbolic weight.   
 
In subsequent chapters, the terms ‘environmental migrants’ and ‘environmental displacees’ 
will be used in accordance with this definition.  When referring to both types of migrants, I 
shall use the neutral term ‘environmentally displaced persons’, or EDPs.  Finally, 
‘environmental migration’ refers to the social phenomenon as a whole, including both types of 
migration, forced and voluntary. 
 
This distinction between forced and voluntary migrants should ‘infuse some realism in the 
projection of future flows’ (Suhrke 1993: 7), which shall be discussed in Section 2. 
 
1.3. Empiri cal  I l lus t rat ion : The Refugee  Controversy  in  the  Wake o f  Hurri cane 
Katrina 
 
Labelling people displaced by environmental changes is a daunting prospect, and the 
definitional issue is far from being resolved.  Discussions of the definition, however, seldom 
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take into account the perception of such labels and categories by those they intend to name 
and classify.  Names and labels matter for the migrants as well, as is evidenced by the 
controversy that erupted over the use of the term ‘refugee’ in the wake of hurricane Katrina. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the media were highly praised for their role in 
assisting the recovery efforts.  A Louisiana local radio station WWL, an affiliate of CBS, took 
phone calls from people trapped in their house and helped rescuers locate them.  The local 
newspaper The Times-Picayune did not miss a single day of the crisis, despite its offices being 
flooded; the whole staff relocated in the Communication Department of LSU at Baton Rouge, 
and the paper continued to be published on the Internet.  CNN dispatched its reporter 
Anderson Cooper to New Orleans very early after the flood, and played an instrumental role 
in alerting the general public about the drama that was unfolding in New Orleans.  In the 
absence of any local or state officials, the media were the only link between the trapped 
residents and the external world.  I shall first discuss the role played by the media in shaping 
the catastrophe, and then discuss how the refugee controversy developed. 
 
1.3.1. Imagining the Victims 
 
Given their role in the aftermath of the disaster, it is not surprising that the media played a 
central role in shaping the language characterizing the disaster and its victims.  Many studies 
have shown the process and mechanisms that lead to this characterization (Hopkins 2007b; 
Sommers et al. 2006; Tierney et al. 2006).  Most reporting was conducted with people who 
had not evacuated New Orleans or those who had relocated in Houston, and less attention 
was given to those who had fled earlier and relocated elsewhere.  Soon the image of Katrina’s 
victims became black and poor, as clumsily expressed by Wolf Blitzer on CNN: ‘You simply 
get chills every time you see those poor individuals… so many of these people, almost all of 
them that we see, are so poor, and they’re so black’ (Brinkley 2006: 204).   
 
Through this characterization, the media also constructed social perceptions, sometimes 
different from the perception of the victims themselves: the National Guards were often 
pictured hugging babies or rescuing people, but they were perceived as ominous by the very 
people they were supposed to help.   
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Soon the focus shifted from the levees and the floods to scenes of social unrest, looting and 
shooting that were supposed to be taking place in the city.  The lack of food supplies in New 
Orleans strongly contrasted with the fully-stocked shelves of stores and supermarkets, which 
had all been locked up.  Before long stranded residents broke into the stores, looking for food 
and supplies.  These actions were often described by the media as ‘looting’, leading to a 
‘criminalisation of New Orleanians in Katrina’s wake’ (Kaufman 2006).  Overall, it was widely 
acknowledged that these reports were grossly exaggerated and over-dramatized.  I argue that 
this view contributed to the semantic shift that took place in the Texan media, in which 
evacuees were described as victims in the first days following the evacuation, and increasingly 
as troublemakers and even thugs and criminals as time went on.  Furthermore, Hopkins 
showed that these reports impacted negatively on the public perception of the poor and the 
black (Hopkins 2007a), while Tierney, Bevc and Kuligowski brilliantly traced the linkages 
between these perceptions and the handling of the crisis by the authorities (Tierney et al. 
2006).  They posit the existence of a common myth about disasters that connects disaster to 
social unrest, violence and looting, arguing that ‘the media’s relentless adherence to disaster 
myths and to frames emphasizing civil unrest and urban insurgency, along with the strategic 
response measures these reports justified, had a number of immediate negative consequences’ 
(2006: 77).  The most obvious of these negative consequences was the dispatch of military 
personnel to New Orleans, with the mission of enforcing law and order, rather than of 
bringing food and supplies.  Tierney and her colleagues argue that the conjunction of media 
reports and disaster myths of social unrest reinforced political discourse for the greater 
involvement of the military in disaster management, as well as militarism as an ideology in the 
United States.  As mentioned above, the presence of the military in New Orleans and their 
focus on law and order generated much criticism. 
 
Overall, the media constructed a particular image of the victims of the hurricane.  In focusing 
on those who had not evacuated, they presented a portrait of the victims that was exclusively 
black and poor, and therefore stressed the social vulnerabilities and inequalities that were 
suddenly exposed by Katrina: although they had existed for a very long time before the storm 
hit.  Furthermore, the media insisted heavily on incidents of looting and social unrest, and 
conveyed an image of the victims as vandals and troublemakers.  In doing so, they reinforced 
a distorted racial framework in which blackness and poverty had long been pathologised 
(Dyson 2006).  If the victims were impotent to act against the construction of images and 
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1.3.2. Naming the victims, or the Refugee Controversy 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, the word most commonly used to describe the 
victims was ‘refugees’ (Sommers et al. 2006: 40), but the term was unanimously rejected by the 
victims themselves, who insisted on being called ‘evacuees’ or ‘survivors’.  Among the two 
dozens of persons I interviewed, only one agreed to being called a refugee.  Interestingly, she 
had been a refugee before37, when she fled France during the Second World War to settle in 
Louisiana with her husband.  ‘I felt I was reliving my life again’, she explained, ‘that was 
exactly the same experience.  I don’t see what’s wrong with “refugees”, that’s exactly what it 
was.’  The remaining interviewees insisted they were not refugees, and the most common 
rationale they presented was that ‘refugee’ implied they were foreigners in their own country.  
‘We were transplants, not refugees’, explained one evacuee, ‘refugees are from foreign 
countries’.  Refusing the ‘refugee’ label was also a way, for many, to stress the duties and 
obligations of their country towards them.  Former New Orleans Mayor Marc Morial 
proffered the term ‘citizen refugees’ without success (Gordon 2005), and President Bush also 
weighed in the controversy, stating during a meeting with representatives of voluntary 
organization on 6 September 2005:  
 
You know, there's a debate here about refugees.  Let me tell you my attitude and the attitude of people 
around this table: The people we're talking about are not refugees.  They are Americans, and they 
need the help and love and compassion of our fellow citizens.  (White House Press Secretary 
Office 2005b) 
 
Shortly after the controversy erupted, many news media stopped using the word and replaced 
it with others, most often ‘evacuees’.  Mark Schleifstein, of The Times-Picayune, explained that 
he received a memo from his editor asking reporters to no longer use the word38.  Lolis Ellie, 
another reporter for the same newspaper, told me that he stopped using it ‘Because it 
obviously hurt people’s feelings’, but he felt there was no other adequate word to describe the 
                                                
37 In the traditional meaning of the word, displaced by war rather by a natural disaster. 
38 Interview with the author, New Orleans, February 2007. 
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plight of the evacuees: ‘In my view, “evacuee” is not strong enough; these people had lost 
everything and were looking for a refuge, but I didn’t want to add more suffering to their 
life’39.  Other news media, on the other hand, persisted in using the word, most notably CNN, 
The New York Times and The Associated Press.  On 7 September 2005, Lou Dobbs made the case 
for the continued use of the term ‘refugee’ on CNN: 
 
You've heard on this broadcast, by the way, several people, including Reverend Jesse Jackson and 
others admonish us not to use the term refugee when describing the New Orleans citizens who have 
had to flee their homes.  Jackson and others including President Bush have said or implied that term is 
racially insensitive.  In my opinion, straightforwardly, Reverend Jackson and President Bush are not 
entirely correct.  The Miriam Webster Dictionary defines refugee as one who flees.  (…) The president, 
Jackson and others apparently think that news organizations created the term refugee just to describe 
victims of Hurricane Katrina.  Hardly.  Even a cursory review of reporting of such disaster of 
Hurricane Andrew, the 1993 midwestern floods and wildfires through the west have all prompted the 
use of the term refugee by news organizations.  I'm proud to tell you that this network has resisted 
others telling them how to use words.  Rejecting, in fact, the United Nations suggestion that we use, 
instead of refugee, the expression internally displaced persons.  I love that one.  We’ll continue here to 
use the term on this broadcast where we think it is most descriptive.  (Dobbs 2005) 
 
Other reasons were also put forward to dismiss the term ‘refugee’: some argued that the term 
stripped people of their dignity (Masquelier 2006)40, while others, such as reverends Jackson 
and Sharpton, contended that the term was racially biased.  Linguist Geoffrey Nunberg, in a 
study posted on his personal website, observed that the term had been used before, to 
describe the people fleeing the Dust Bowl – another case given the label of ‘environmental 
migration’ – and also that the word ‘refugee’ was twice more likely to be used than ‘evacuee’ 
when the word appeared within ten words of the words ‘black’ or ‘poor’ (Nunberg 2005).  
This led him to the conclusion that ‘Those disparities no doubt reflect the image of refugees 
as poor, bedraggled, and forlorn, and they suggest that there's a genuine basis for the 
impression that the word tends to single out one group, even if unwittingly’. 
 
As Masquelier points it, the unease about the word ‘refugee’ in New Orleans points toward a 
categorical void: 
                                                
39 Ibidem. 
40 Interestingly, after the 1999 floods in Venezuela, President Chavez suggested that the victims should be called 
dignificados, instead of damnificados. 
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The word (…) was unsuitable to describe the plight of people who had been (…) forced to evacuate 
their homes prior to or in the days following the storm: they had left their homes, not their country.  
And yet (…) there appeared to be no adequate substitute that would convey with enough intensity the 
nightmarish experience so many New Orleanians had gone through in the wake of Katrina and the 
dire predicament survivors (…) faced as they prepared to start life anew away from the ravaged Gulf 
Coast.  (2006: 135) 
 
Masquelier further argues that this categorical void reveals a social void in which poor New 
Orleanians had been confined for years.  
 
The failure of the authorities in the aftermath of the disaster was not confined to emergency 
relief: there was a much larger social failure of the social system, and the disaster exposed 
vulnerabilities to a country that had long been blind about them.  In many ways, Katrina was a 
social disaster of unprecedented amplitude.  In that regard, the word ‘refugee’ was more than 
just a name, but a summary of these vulnerabilities.  In many ways however, those stranded in 
the city experienced a refugee-like situation of stress, trauma and despair; for many of them, 
the place where they had been relocated was indeed another country.  Though the word 
‘refugee’ was widely used by the media to describe all people displaced by the hurricane, the 
images accompanying the term exclusively focused on the poor, black residents stranded in 
the city, and soon the word ‘refugee’ equalled ‘black’ and ‘poor’, as if those who had evacuated 
before the hurricane belonged to another category: the ‘evacuees’. 
 
The reason why those called ‘refugees’ were stranded in the city was directly related to their 
social vulnerabilities, as I have tried to show in the first section of this paper.  I argue that they 
rebutted the R-word because it was perceived as a stigma for these vulnerabilities.  Masquelier 
rightly asserts that ‘Our failure to find a word that would describe appropriately the dire 
circumstances of so many Katrina victims without further victimizing them hints at a much 
larger failure, one that resulted over the years in the virtual disenfranchisement of a whole 
stratum of the U.S. population’ (2006: 741).  The lack of an adequate vocabulary also reveals 
the invisibility of these vulnerabilities, and the lack of a conceptual machinery to acknowledge 
and address them.  
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In the context of Katrina, two readings of the rebuttal of the word ‘refugee’ can be given: a 
refusal to be considered ‘second-class’ citizens, or foreigners in their own country, and also a 
refusal to admit that New Orleans residents had been failed and abandoned by their own 
government.  This dual reading reflects a double estrangement.  The first conveys the idea that 
the refugee label confiscated the identity and citizenship of those it designated, and confined 
them to a state of displacement: when in fact their only wish was to return to New Orleans as 
soon as possible. The second reading emphasizes the obligations of the state towards its 
citizens, and conveys anger at the lack of response by the authorities.  Many interviewees 
insisted that their government had a duty of care towards them, and refused to accept the 
notion of a failing state that would just abandon them and let them become refugees.  
 
This controversy has deep implications beyond the immediate circumstances of Katrina for 
current academic and political debates on the definition and typology of environmental 
migration, as it reminds us how much categorizations matter, even in the most dramatic 
circumstances.  These categorizations shape the identity of the victims, and thus one can 
assume that they also affect their ability to cope with the disaster.  Until now, the academic 
community has widely considered the term ‘refugee’ to be a misnomer in cases of 
environmental migration for legal reasons: people displaced by environmental changes are not 
recognised as refugees under the 1951 Geneva Convention.  The controversy that erupted in 
the wake of Katrina invites us to reconsider the role of language and labels in shaping 
perceptions of the victims of disasters, and the impact of these categories on the people they 
are supposed to classify.  As the case of Katrina makes clear, the ‘refugee’ may be a misnomer 




2. Predictions and estimates 
 
Predictions and estimates are one of the most contentious issues in the conceptualisation of 
the nexus.  They are used abundantly by alarmists to support their views; the same numbers 
are criticised for artificial inflation by sceptics.  The multi-causality of displacement, as well as 
the confusion between forced and voluntary migration, make it difficult to identify an exact 
number of environmentally displaced persons.  Given the lack of comprehensive 
methodology and empirical studies, the field is wide open for guesses and pessimistic 
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estimates41 rather than actual numbers.  Boano et al. cite no fewer than 10 different estimates 
from different scholars and organisations (2007: 11-12).   
 
With regard to actual displacement, the most oft-cited figure comes from the Red Cross, 
which claims that there are currently more people displaced by environmental change than by 
war: approximately 25 million (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies 2001).  As for future flows, a figure frequently cited is derived by Norman Myers 
(2002), who forecasted that there could be up to 200 million displaced by 2050.  This figure 
gained even wider currency after it was endorsed by Stern, in his highly-publicised report on 
the economics of climate change (2007: 56).  Some estimates were even more doom-filled, 
predicting that up to one billion people could be displaced by 2050 (Christian Aid 2007).  The 
figure, however, included all types of displacement, and not only those triggered by 
environmental changes42, contrary to what has often been reported.  The table below 
summarises some of the main estimates and forecasts. 
 
Source  Current  e st imates  Forecas t s  by 2010 Forecas t s  by 2050 
El-Hinnawi (1985) 30 million 50 million 150 million 
Myers (1993, 2002) 25 million - 150, then 200 million 
Myers and Kent (1995) 25 million 50 million 212 million 
Stern (2007) - - 200 million 
Christian Aid (2007) 25 million - 300 million 
Table 1 – Estimates and forecasts of environmental displacees. 
 
 
Different factors impede the collection and development of accurate data and forecasts.  
Some of these factors are common to all displacement-related issues, others are specific to 
environmental migration.   
 
Crisp notes that ‘while all of the standard works on refugees are replete with numbers, few 
even begin to question the source or accuracy of those statistics’ (1999: 2).  A similar 
observation can be made for works on environmental migration: most of them reproduce 
                                                
41 Or ‘guesstimates’, in Kolmannskog’s vocabulary (2008: 4) 
42 The people displaced by climate change-related events accounted for 250 million and those displaced by 
natural disasters for 50 million, whereas people displaced by development projects, such as dams, accounted for 
645 million. 
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previous statistics without critically assessing them.  Figures provided by Myers are often 
quoted as scientific truth, without questioning his methodology.   
 
The quest for numbers is also hampered by the controversy over the concept and definition 
of environmental migration.  Without clear definition, providing accurate data seems a 
daunting task.  It is worth noting, however, that a similar problem is encountered when 
counting refugees, even though a legal definition exists.  In the words of Crisp,  
 
Any form of enumeration exercise must be based upon a clearly defined unit of measurement if it is to 
produce reliable, usable and comparable data.  In the case of refugee statistics, however, such clarity does 
not always exist.  (1999: 4) 
 
Most displacements triggered by environmental factors are internal, not international.  This 
poses a further statistical problem, since counting cross-border movements is much easier 
than internal movements: ‘the machinery to collect data on these movements simply does not 
yet exist’ (Brown 2008: 25).  Crisp provides a list of questions that are left unanswered when 
one is attempts to count internally-displaced people (IDPs): 
 
In the absence of a clear criterion such as the crossing of an international border, how far does a person 
have to move to be considered ‘internally displaced’? When do internally (displaced) people cease to 
warrant that status: when they return to their original place of residence, or when they have achieved a 
certain degree of physical and socio-economic security in the place to which they have fled? Given that a 
large proportion of the world’s IDPs are thought to live in towns and cities, how can they be 
differentiated from other rural-to-urban migrants? (1999: 5) 
 
Some further problems are specific to the nature of environmental migration.  When it comes 
to predictions, figures are usually based on the number of people living in regions at risk, and 
not on the number of people actually expected to migrate.  Estimates do not account for 
adaptation strategies, different levels of vulnerability to change, or simply – though it might 
sound harsh – disaster-related casualties.   
 
Predictions also need to take account demographic changes that are expected to occur over 
the next few decades.  Whereas global population growth can be predicted to a certain extent, 
its geographic distribution remains uncertain.  In recent years, migration to urban areas has 
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accelerated.  An increasing number of people live in regions highly exposed to natural risks 
and hazards, resulting in an increased number of disasters.  These evolutions are particularly 
significant in developing countries, and make estimating the number of potential migrants a 
dubious task. 
 
Finally, a large number of future displacements are expected to be caused by the impacts of 
climate change.  It is possible to mitigate these impacts through adaptation strategies, and to 
mitigate climate change itself by reducing our greenhouse gas emissions.  Thus the future 
impacts of climate change on societies will greatly depend on future levels of greenhouse gas 
emissions and on the amount of funding that will be allocated for the development of 
adaptation strategies in vulnerable regions.  In a nutshell, future displacements depend, to a 
large extent, on present-day actions.  Because of the inertia of the climate system, the impacts 
of global warming until 2050 are largely pre-determined by our past emissions (Hansen et al. 
2006).  Impacts beyond 2050 depend on our current emissions, and this is the reason why 
predictions generally do not go beyond 2050.  Though the impacts of climate change until 
2050 are largely known thanks to the IPCC reports, adaptation strategies can minimise how 
these impact affect societies.  Hence future displacements also depend, to a great extent, upon 
the adaptation strategies that are implemented today – of which pro-active migration may be 
part. 
 
Despite these difficulties, getting the numbers rights is an important step in developing 
adequate policies.  The programming of assistance and mobilisation of resources, including 
funding, depend on accurate numbers (Crisp 1999).  In the absence of reliable statistics, 
numbers can be easily inflated and manipulated, in order to attract attention to some 
populations, sometimes at the expense of other needy groups.   
 
In order to move forward, Boano et al. suggest that, instead of drafting global estimates, ‘a 
more valuable route to understanding the potential scale of displacement, and thus the scope 
of policy intervention’, would consist in obtaining a more nuanced understanding of the 
different forms of environmental migration, and developing a more empirically-grounded 
approach to the issue (2007: 12-13).  Kniveton et al. agree that a first step is to ‘try to 
understand how people cope with the different types of gradual stresses and sudden shocks 
brought about by climate change and variability’, and suggest that a second step involves 
quantitative methods, such as agent-based models, in order to simulate future migrations 
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patterns based on current migration behaviours (2008: 7).  What is now needed is detailed data 
collection through empirical studies, a task that the EACH-FOR project has started exploring.   
 
 
3. Environmental Causes of Migration, and Multi-Causality 
 
 
Environmental causes of migration are usually vaguely described, as if all types of 
environmental disruption resulted in similar migration flows.  In fact, research shows that this 
is far from the case: not all environmental changes induce similar movements, and some of 
them do not induce movements at all (Kniveton et al. 2008: 32-36).  Furthermore, similar 
movements can be induced by different kinds of disruption, while the same disruption can 
result in very different movements – the case of hurricane Katrina is particularly revealing in 
this regard, as will be exemplified in this section.  Some authors, however, have attempted to 
classify environmental changes, and have proposed different typologies.   
 
3.1. Class i fy ing Environmental Disrupt ions  
 
 
The confusion over types of environmental changes is a major difficulty in understanding the 
driving forces behind the environment – migration nexus: El-Hinnawi (1985) distinguishes 
between disasters, what he calls ‘major environmental changes’ (such as the construction of 
dams), and slow-onset degradations of the environment.  He assumes that natural disasters 
only produce temporary displacement, while permanent relocation is the sole outcome of 
major and gradual environmental change, a claim dismissed by empirical research.  The 1992 
Conference on Migration and the Environment identified six categories that ‘highlight the 
most important causes and dynamics of environmental migration’: elemental disruptions, 
biological disruptions, slow-onset disruptions, accidental disruptions, disruptions caused by 
development, and environmental warfare (Migration and the Environment  1992: 11).  Each 
category comprises different degrees of disruption, ‘ranging from mild to catastrophic’, and 
environmental migrations are supposed to be the result of the most severe of these 
disruptions.   
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Richmond addresses the multi-causality of migration, and proposes a multivariate model of 
environmentally related population movements, aimed at highlighting the interaction between 
political, technological, economic and political factors with the environment.  He 
differentiates between five categories of environmentally related disasters, and insists that 
‘they are not independent from each other but may be interactive and mutually aggravating’ 
(1994: 81).   Natural disasters form the first category (hurricanes, volcano eruptions, 
earthquakes, etc.), while the second category comprises technologically-induced environmental 
disasters such as pollution, industrial accidents or the construction of dams43.  The third 
category deals with economically-induced disasters, including deforestation, crop failure, and 
also species extinction.  The fourth and fifth categories are less expected.  The former deals 
with politically-induced disasters such as war, terrorism, apartheid or anarchy, whereas the 
latter category is made up of socially-induced disasters that include ecological activism, jihad 
and boycott.  Richmond admits that the connection of these last two categories to the 
environment can be somewhat remote, but he aims to show the political, technological, 
economic and social factors underlying so-called ‘environmental disasters’.   
 
Bates (2002) also attempts to provide a typology of environmental changes that induce 
migration.  Her classification is based on three binary criteria: the origin (natural or man-
made) of environmental disruptions, their duration (acute or gradual), and whether migration 
is an intentional outcome of the disruption or not.  She proceeds to delineate three categories 
of disruptions: disasters, expropriations and deterioration.  Disasters are defined as ‘acute 
events that are not designed to produce migration’, expropriations as ‘acute anthropogenic 
disruptions’ aimed at dislocating populations, and deterioration as a ‘gradual, anthropogenic 
changes (…) that were not intended to produce migrants’ (2002: 469).  This classification 
might seem to have a high explanatory value, but actually possesses some major shortcomings.  
A consistent classification based on three binary criteria would have produced eight categories, 
not three.  Some types of disruptions are left out, such as gradual natural change (not aimed at 
displacing populations), or man-made gradual change aimed at displacing populations, such as 




                                                
43 Displacements induced by dams and other development projects are usually not considered environmental 
displacements. 
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In recent years, the literature has mostly focused on climate change-related disruptions, 
neglecting other environmental causes of migration (Lassailly-Jacob 2006).  Such disruptions 
have sometimes been categorised according to their pace: Brown distinguishes between 
climate processes, which are slow-onset changes, and climate events, which are sudden and 
dramatic hazards (2008: 16-17).  Other distinctions are made according to the expected 
impacts of climate change, and three of them are usually selected as likely to induce migration 
flows: sea-level rise, droughts and extreme weather events (Piguet 2008; Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change 2007b).  Piguet notes that only sea-level rise is likely to produce 
large-scale, permanent displacement.   
 
Overall, the usefulness of categorising environmental changes seems limited: patterns of 
migration, I argue, depend more on policy responses than on the type of change involved.  
Furthermore, environmental changes are often cumulative, and tend to mutually aggravate 
each other.  Finally, they tend to be so diverse that the number of categories needed to 
accommodate all types of changes would too large as to be meaningful from a practical point 
of view.  Rather than drafting clear-cut categories, a more promising avenue consists in 
analysing these changes as part of different continua.  Such continua would include: 
 
- The geographical extent of the change, from the local to the global level.  Some 
changes need to be addressed locally (a volcano eruption, for example), while others, 
such as climate change, require global action44. 
 
- The level of human responsibility in the change.  Disasters used to be attributed to 
fate and destiny.  Increasingly, human responsibility, including states’ responsibility, 
has been acknowledged in disasters and other gradual changes.  The acknowledgement 
of this responsibility is central to policies of compensation and environmental justice. 
 
- The pace of the change.  Migration patterns and policies differ greatly according to 
whether the change is brutal or slow-paced.  Brutal changes usually trigger 
humanitarian assistance, whereas slow-onset changes can be best addressed through 
adaptation strategies and development programmes. 
 
                                                
44 Impacts from climate change, however, can also require local solutions in addition to the international 
framework. 
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Analysing environmental changes is a necessary but insufficient condition in order to 
understand the forces driving environmental migration.  These changes are often intertwined 
with each other, but also with a wide range of other migration drivers, which mutually 
influence each other. 
 
3.2. Mult i -Causal i t y  
 
 
The biggest problem in analysing environmental changes is not their categorisation, but 
evaluation of their relative importance compared with other migration drivers.  The literature 
has repeatedly emphasised the complexity of the relationship between environmental factors 
and migration.  Although alarmists initially viewed it as a simple causal relationship and 
sceptics as a non-existent relationship, both positions evolved in recent years: alarmists 
admitted that environmental drivers were intertwined with other factors, while sceptics agreed 
that environmental factors could contribute to driving migrations.  Comparing both 
approaches, Castles noted that environmental factors were ‘part of complex patterns of 
multiple causality, in which natural and environmental factors are closely linked to economic, 
social and political ones’ (2002: 5).  This view has since prevailed in the literature, and has 
been part of a wider movement stressing the importance of environmental factors in social 
transformations (Diamond 2005).   
 
Lonergan and Swain (1999) use evidences from El Salvador and Sahel to show how diverse 
factors interact to induce migration: ‘certain populations are becoming more vulnerable to 
environmental change because of other factors, particularly poverty and resource inequities 
intertwined with population growth, institutional constraints, and economic insufficiency’.  
They refute the idea that there could be a ‘direct cause and effect relationship between 
environmental degradation and population displacement’, and contend that ‘degradation of 
the environment is inextricably linked to (social, economic and political) factors’ (1999: 4).  
Though it might be ‘relatively easy to identify the parallel occurrence of environmental 
degradation and population movement’, they argue, movement takes place in response to a 
combination of stimuli, and not a single – be it environmental – stimulus.  Hence ‘separating 
environmental processes from the structures within which they are embedded is both difficult 
and a distortion of reality’ (1999: 5). 
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The acknowledgement of multi-causality is a victory for both coalitions.  Environmental 
processes are no longer perceived as separate from social, economic and political relations, as 
claimed by early alarmists, but rather embedded in them.  On the other hand, they are no 
longer perceived either as non-existent, or minor migration drivers, as claimed by the most 
radical sceptics.  Therefore the debate focuses on the importance of environmental factors 
amongst other drivers. 
 
Hugo asserts that there can be no doubt that ‘the incidence of disasters has (…) increased as 
have the associated population displacements’ (1996: 113), but identifies several other factors 
that exacerbate the predisposing conditions for environmental migration, thus increasing the 
incidence of precipitating, migration-inducing events.  Such factors include population 
growth, poverty, intensive agriculture, weak environmental regulations and corruption.   
 
Environmental changes are increasingly perceived as a trigger for migration, if combined with 
predisposing conditions.  These proximate predispositions have to do with social vulnerability, 
poverty, population density, policies, etc.  Sceptics argue that these are the crucial 
determinants of the ensuing pattern of migration, even more so than the nature of the 
precipitating environmental change.  Hence the underlying causes of environmental migration 
lie in social, economic and political processes.  Alarmists argue these causes are to be found 
directly in environmental changes.   
 
Environmental changes as causes of population movements are therefore best understood as 
precipitating events and processes, which can subsequently induce migration when they match 
predisposing factors.  The fact that such changes are increasingly numerous and increasingly 
associated with population movements is not contested.  The underlying causes of these 
movements, however, remain a highly debated topic among alarmists and sceptics. 
 
 
4. Migration Patterns 
 
 
Environmental changes are very diverse, and so are the migration flows induced by these 
changes.  Although they are often gathered under the label of environmental migration, these 
flows actually represent a wide spectrum of migration patterns, trajectories and behaviours.  
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Many attempts have been made to classify and categorise them – Black rightly points that 
‘there are perhaps as many typologies as there are papers on the subject’ (2001: 2).   
 
My goal here is not to present yet another typology, nor to present typologies that have been 
suggested so far.  The most pertinent of them, including the one made by Renaud et al.  
(2007), have already been presented in my coverage of the definitional issue.   
 
A common shortcoming of many typologies is that they try to combine the classification of 
environmental changes with the classification of migration patterns (Jacobson 1988; Piguet 
2008; Masters 2000).  Such a combination is rooted in a deterministic perspective, which 
assumes that certain migration patterns correspond to certain types of environmental change.  
I argue that both classifications need to be separated, as migration patterns depend not only 
upon the type of environmental disruption, but also upon other social, economic and political 
factors, as well as individual characteristics.   
 
Furthermore, different levels of analysis are often confused. Environmental migration is often 
viewed as a collective process, yet migration behaviours vary according to the individuals. 
Hence it is important to distinguish between different levels of analysis: the macro- , meso- 
and micro-levels. The micro-level relates to individual migration behaviours, whereas the 
meso-level is concerned with the movement of groups and the macro-level with global 
migration flows. Individual migration patterns can be different from patterns of the meso-
level, let alone the macro-level. Given that most of protection regimes are based on individual 
persecutions, as will be shown in Chapters 7 and 8, this distinction is important to make. 
 
Besides the different levels of analysis, there are a number of distinctions that need to be 
made, since not all migration flows are similar and nor do they require the same policy 
responses. 
 
4.1. Internat ional and Internal Migrat ion  
 
 
The distinction between international and internal migration is one for which it is possible – 
and fairly easy to establish clear-cut categories.  This distinction bears naturally an essential 
meaning for normative frameworks and policies: the fundamental building block of 
 167 
international law remains states’ sovereignty, thus any international agreement on 
environmental migration excludes consideration of internal displacement.  Apart from the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, adopted in 1998 (Commission on Human 
Rights 1998), no document of international law offers any protection to those IDPs. 
 
Research shows that most people moving because of environmental reasons tend to stay close 
to their former place of habitat, and travel relatively short distances, within their country 
(Hugo 1996).  When international migration occurs, it is usually because former patterns of 
migration between two or more countries pre-existed prior to the environmental disruption 
(Entzinger 2008).  Yet most policy proposals to address environmental change are rooted in 
international law (Falstrom 2001; Biermann and Boas 2007; Conisbee and Simms 2003), and 
therefore can hardly apply to internally displaced peoples.   
 
Hugo, however, suspects that environmental factors are set to become more significant in 
impelling international movements, and not only internal movements (1996: 119).  Sea-level 
rise is the main reason for the expected increase in international movements in the coming 
decades.  Coastal and deltaic regions are the most densely populated worldwide, and the 
potential for migration from these areas due to sea-level rise is thus considerable.  For many 
low-lying island nations, the possibilities of internal resettlement are extremely limited, so 
there will be a pressure for resettlement abroad, especially when strong social networks exist 
between the origin and destination countries, as it is the case between many island countries 
and Australia, New Zealand and the United States (Moore and Smith 1995).  Hugo also points 
to some non-climate drivers that may account for an increase of international environmental 
movements in the future: the proliferation of migration facilitators, such as social networks 
between origin and destination countries, as well as the emergence of an international 
immigration industry.  He concludes that ‘a greater proportion (of environmentally-induced 
migration) will occur between nations in line with globalization trends and proliferation of 
migration networks and increasing numbers of institutions, businesses and people facilitating 
international migration’ (1996: 119).   
 
Finally, another type of environmental migrant highly prone to international migration are 
those attracted to a destination country by a perceived more favourable environment.  Pull 
factors are the determinant migration drivers here, and these migrants are usually labelled 
‘amenity migrants’ (Moss 2006; Greenwood 1985).  This type of migration occurs both 
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nationally and internationally45, but is also expected to increase as some countries benefit from 
a more favourable climate thanks to climate change46.  These migrants are worthy of mention, 
although they are not the focus of this work,. 
 
 
4.2. Voluntary versus Forced Migrat ion  
 
The distinction between voluntary and forced migration is often presented as paramount for 
the implementation of assistance and protection policies, but is not easy to make in the case of 
environmental migration.  Environmentally-displaced persons are often labelled refugees, 
although they do not fit the legal definition contained in the 1951 Geneva Convention, 
irrespective of whether their movement is compelled or not.  I first discuss the problematic 
use of this label before addressing the blurring between forced and voluntary movements in 
the case of environmental migration. 
 
4.2.1. The Refugee Label 
 
Suhrke observes that ‘the reason why the term “refugee” has been attached to a number of 
environmentally related population flows is grounded in sociological, not legal, reasoning’ 
(1994: 481).  ‘Refugee’ has indeed a double meaning: sociologically, it refers to a person forced 
to flee her habitat and seek refuge elsewhere; legally, it refers to a person meeting the criteria 
defined in the Geneva Convention.  In the literature, the debate on the definition of refugee 
has often revolved around the causes of displacement, and these are generally assumed to be 
political rather than economic or environmental.  Zolberg et al. (1989) recognise that 
economic and political processes are interconnected – they don’t mention environmental 
processes – but assert the predominance of conflicts in the creation of refugee movements.  
They further contend that the fundamental distinction between refugees and migrants lie in 
the involuntary character of their movement. 
 
                                                
45 Examples of internal amenity migration include movements to Florida and other Southern states in the United 
States, or to Northern Australia. Examples of international amenity migration include retirees from Northern and 
Western Europe moving to Mediterranean countries. 
46 For example, this is the case for Russia and Canada. 
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Other authors, however, have provided much broader definitions, which can extend to 
include environmental displacees.  Examples of such definitions include Olson’s: 
 
Refugees are forced to leave their homes because of a change in their environment, which makes it 
impossible to continue life as they have known it.  They are coerced by an external force to leave their 




It is the reluctance to uproot oneself, and the absence of positive original motivations to settle elsewhere, 
which characterizes all refugee decisions and distinguishes the refugee from the voluntary migrants.  
(1973: 130) 
 
Such definitions are closer to the common, sociological notion of refugee, rather than its legal 
definition.  As shown in the refugee controversy in the wake of hurricane Katrina, ignoring 
the sociological dimension of the term in order to focus solely on its legal connotations would 
be a profound mistake: refugees were not born with the Geneva Convention, and the term 
has an existence of its own.  It bears heavy symbolic connotations of powerlessness and 
vulnerability. Suhrke further observes that symbolic connotations of the term ‘refugee’ are 
important not only for the migrant herself, but also for the host country or region:  
 
Whether a population movement consists essentially of migrants or refugees has great significance for 
the impact on the receiving areas.  Refugees (…) are more likely to be seen as a net burden in the 
receiving areas and typically require assistance.  (1994: 10) 
 
Thus speaking of ‘environmental refugees’ when discussing environmental migration is a 
double misnomer: it implies that the migrants benefit from a refugee status, which is not the 
case (legal misnomer), and also implies that they are all in refugee-like situations, which is 
hardly the case either (sociological misnomer).  In many cases, environmental migrants 
respond to a combination of push- and pull-factors, and migration can be part of the solution 
to environmental stress, rather than the problem itself.  Furthermore, as shown above, the 
term ‘refugees’ may be rebutted by the migrants themselves: its heavy symbolic load should 




4.2.2. A Blurred Line between Forced and Voluntary Movement 
 
 
Though this distinction is essential, it is also highly controversial, and not as clear-cut as it 
might seem.  Migration that is perceived to be voluntary often conceals a certain level of 
constraint, whereby migrants have little choice about the conditions of their migration.  On 
the other hand, some cases of forced migration, such as resettlement, may leave some 
discretion to the displacee as to the time and place of her/his relocation.  For these reasons, 
Hugo argues that ‘population mobility is probably best viewed as being arranged along a 
continuum ranging from totally voluntary migration (…) to totally forced migration’, rather 
than in clear-cut categories (1996: 107).  This difficulty of clearly distinguishing between 
migrants and refugees is not only conceptual, but bears practical implications: Crisp (2007) 
notes that mixed groups of migrants make it increasingly difficult for states to differentiate 
between refugees and migrants.   
 
Such observations are particularly valid when applied to environmental migration: whereas 
some people have to flee for their lives when faced with a brutal disaster, for example, most 
will experience a progressive degradation of their habitat, and decide to leave once a threshold 
has been reached, or once migration facilitators make it possible.  Though their migration is 
compelled, those who migrate retain the possibility of choosing when and where to go.  Most 
often, the line between forced and voluntary migration is blurred, and the distinction between 
‘environmental migrants’ and ‘environmental displacees’ is also best understood as a 
continuum, in which amenity migrants represent one end, and people fleeing for their life in a 
disaster situation the other.  The extent to which migration is compelled largely depends upon 
the time when migration occurs, an aspect that shall now be developed. 
 
4.3. Proac t i ve  and Reac t i ve  Migrat ion  
 
 
Kunz (1973) makes a fundamental distinction between ‘anticipatory refugee movements’, in 
which people flee before the situation deteriorates, and ‘acute refugee movements’, where the 
objective is to find a haven of safety at a time of crisis.  Richmond (1994) goes a step further 
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and argues that this distinction is more essential than the distinction between forced and 
voluntary migration, and it reflects the degree of autonomy of the actors regarding their 
migration decision.  He applies the distinction to environmental migration, and differentiates 
between ‘proactive migration’ and ‘reactive migration’.  He argues that  
 
Gradual environmental degradation, soil erosion, etc., may initially lead to proactive migration, but 
eventually result in reactive movements as the process of degradation accelerates.  Reactive migration 
that combines environmental and social determinants occurs when whole communities are forced to 
move as a consequence of environmental degradation or disaster and re-establish in a new location.  
(1994: 78-79) 
 
The time when people move actually reflects their degree of autonomy as to their migration, 
and is often related to its degree of constraint.  Islanders leaving Tuvalu because they are 
concerned with sea-level rise are considered voluntary migrants if they do so now, proactively.  
If they flee at a time when the island flooded however, they will be most likely considered as 
forced migrants – because they fled reactively.  Yet those who fled New Orleans in prevision 
of Katrina were undoubtedly considered forced migrants, as were those trapped in the city 
and eventually evacuated.  On the other hand, a New Orleaner leaving the city proactively, 
outside the hurricane season, because of the fear of another hurricane, would be considered a 
voluntary migrant.  Furthermore, the threshold when environmental degradation becomes no 
longer bearable may vary greatly from one migrant to another, as does the degree of 
proactivity.   
 
Two conclusions need to be drawn from these quick examples: first, the distinction between 
proactive and reactive migration does not exactly match the distinction between forced and 
voluntary migration, even though they relate to each other; second, these two types of 
migration are not discrete as ‘before’ and ‘after’ can be, and are thus best perceived as the two 
ends of a continuum.  This continuum influences the policies that are implemented to deal 
with the migration: reactive migration suggests the development of humanitarian and disaster 
management policies, whereas proactive migration seems to be best addressed by migration 




4.4. Short -Term and Long-Term Migrat ion  
 
 
At what point is a movement considered a migration? Statistical guidelines usually consider 
that the duration of the move must be at least one year before it can ‘qualify’ as a migration 
(Bilsborrow et al. 1997).  Hence temporary movements are not considered migrations.  
Although these guidelines were developed to collect data on international movements, they 
also apply, to a great extent, to internal movements. 
 
The question of the duration of the movement is of great importance with regard to 
environmental migration.  On the one hand, some kinds of environmental changes, such as 
floods and other extreme weather events, are assumed to induce temporary movements, and 
to allow people to return to their home after a short period of time (Piguet 2008).  Empirical 
evidence, such as the displacements induced by hurricane Katrina, prove otherwise.  On the 
other hand, although voluntary migration is often perceived as a long-term move, if not a 
permanent one, studies suggest that seasonal – hence temporary – movement can be an 
effective adaptation strategy to cope with environmental change (McLeman and Smit 2006). 
 
I argue that the duration of the move is not only dependant on the nature of the triggering 
environmental change, but also, and more importantly, on the social and economic 
characteristics of the migrant, and on the policies implemented to address the movement and 
return of those displaced.  Even though some changes are irreversible, such as sea-level rise, 
many of them are, and the possibilities of return for migrants will depend mostly upon social, 
economic and political factors.   
 
For those displaced, when does displacement end? It is a long-standing question in refugee 
studies.  The answer usually relates to policies: instead of setting a precise duration, it is 
considered that the displacement comes to an end when they displacees are able to return 
home, or when they have reached a livelihood level improved or comparable to their pre-
displacement level (Cernea 2003).  Similarly, setting a cut-off point between short-term and 
long-term migration makes little sense, and this distinction is best understood along a 
continuum. Migration initially thought to be of short-term can become permanent, as will be 
evidenced in the case of Katrina, where temporary housing became permanent habitat. 
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4.5. A Synthesi s  
 
 
In addition to the distinction between international and internal migration – which represent 
discrete categories – I have argued that three other important distinctions are best understood 
as a continuum, rather than as clear-cut categories.  These continua, to a certain extent, are 
related to each other, and need to be considered together in order to provide a comprehensive 
picture of the migration flow, and to allow for the development of appropriate policies.  I 
therefore propose considering them in a three-dimensional view, as shown below. 
 




The two ends of the three continua are as follows: 
- In the forced-voluntary continuum, at one end is migration compelled by a life-
threatening event, and at the other an amenity migration; 
 
- In the short-term – long-term continuum, at one end is a displacement where people 
are able to return to their homes after a few days, and at the other end a permanent 
relocation; 
 
- In the proactive-reactive continuum, at one end is a carefully planned migration 
associated with a slow-onset environmental change, and at the other end an 
emergency evacuation. 
 
This visual representation of the migration patterns, which can be duplicated for both internal 
and international migration, allows for a comprehensive overview of the main characteristics 
of the movement, as well as for a visual comparison between different types of movement.  
People evacuated after hurricane Katrina who were permanently relocated in another US city, 
for example, would be placed near the bottom right-hand edge at the front of the cube.  
Those leaving Tuvalu to relocate in New Zealand because they’re concerned with sea-level rise 
would be placed near the top right-hand corner at the back of the cube. Both cases will now 
illustrate how different migration drivers and patterns interact with each other on the field. 
 
 




From relative obscurity a few years ago, Tuvalu has become in recent years a media darling: no 
fewer than six television documentaries about the small archipelago have been produced in 
the last decade47, and countless articles have appeared in magazines and newspapers.  Despite 
                                                
47 These documentaries are:Aït Habbouche, M. and Corbière, H. (2007) Tuvalu, les nouveaux réfugiés. France, 52 
minutes. 
Bayer, J. and Salzman, J. (2005) Time and Tide. United States: Wavecrest Films, 59 minutes. 
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small variations, they tell pretty much the same story: that of a small atoll country whose very 
existence is threatened by sea-level rise, and its quest to accommodate its population abroad as 
‘climate change refugees’.  Portrayed as an Atlantis in the making or the canary48 of global 
warming, Tuvalu has come to ‘epitomize the environmental catastrophe of worldwide climate 
change and sea-level rise’ (Chambers and Chambers 2007: 294).  Particular emphasis is usually 
placed on ‘king tides’, high waters flooding the island at certain times of the year, that many 
see as an empirical evidence of the first impacts of climate change (Connell 2003: 89).  A key 
scene in one of the abovementioned documentaries shows an islander packing his luggage to 
leave for New Zealand directly after the floods, afraid that another wave could wipe out his 
house (Aït Habbouche and Corbière 2007).   
 
 
5.1.1. The Current Conceptualisation of ‘Environmental Migration’ from Tuvalu 
 
This popularity of Tuvalu in the international media hardly comes as a surprise: one of the 
smallest and most remote countries on earth, Tuvalu seems to exemplify a typical case of 
forced migration induced by environmental change.  The government of Tuvalu itself has 
encouraged this growing popularity, repeatedly emphasising the threats faced by the small 
archipelago, and the possibility of its disappearing.  One year after the admission of Tuvalu to 
the United Nations, its permanent representative Enele Sopoaga addressed the 56th General 
Assembly in the following terms:  
 
In the event of further rising sea levels, where are we to hide? (…) How ironic it would be if decades 
from now the last Member to enter the UN, Tuvalu, was the first Member State to withdraw 
because it has disappeared without a trace.  (Sopoaga 2001)  
 
                                                                                                                                              
Horner, C. and Le Gallic, G. (2004) The Disappearing of Tuvalu: Trouble in Paradise. France: Documentary 
Educational Resources, 75 minutes. 
Lindsay, P. (2005) Before the Flood. United Kingdom: Stampede Limited, 59 minutes. 
O'Connor, M., Jones-Middleton, S. and Tourell, W. (2001) Paradise Drowned: Tuvalu, The Disappearing Nation. 
New Zealand: Off the Fence, 47 minutes. 
Pollock, E. (2005) Tuvalu: That Sinking Feeling. United States: PBS, 16 minutes. 
48 Historically, coal miners took canaries into mines as detectors of noxious gases.  If a canary died, the miners 
realized that they were in a region of danger and took the necessary precautions. 
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From then on, most media reports would describe Tuvalu as a lost paradise, a remote 
community whose lifestyle, culture, and very existence were threatened by sea-level rise, 
leaving its people with no other choice than fleeing abroad49.   
 
However, Farbotko and Connell have demonstrated that such accounts fail to capture the 
complexity of environmental changes in Tuvalu and the realities of migration flows.  
Furthermore, they have shown that these accounts could actually hinder the adaptation efforts 
undertaken (Connell 2003: 102) and affect the inhabitants’ resilience and resourcefulness, 
since they were represented as ‘disempowered in the face of rising sea-levels, helpless victims 
of the refusal of Australia and other Western nations to promote mitigation of climate change 
or modify their policies towards refugees’ (Farbotko 2005: 288).   
 
Tuvalu has become essentially perceived through the lens of environmental displacement and 
vulnerability to climate change, a perception that has been consistently reinforced and 
sustained by the discourse of its government.  Connell argues that ‘for Tuvalu the greenhouse 
effect has proved an exceptionally powerful and all-embracing garbage can, encompassing the 
totality of observed environmental change and scientific explanation’ (Connell 2003: 105).  
Reports on other environmental changes are scarce50, and emigration is almost always 
described as the sole possible option in the face of climate change.  It seemed therefore 
relevant to my research to examine how this option was considered by the islanders 
themselves, as well as the motives behind the migration decision of Tuvaluans who had 
relocated to New Zealand.   
 
 
5.1.2. Environmental Changes  
 
 
Although discourses on Tuvalu often reduce its environmental vulnerability to the impacts of 
climate change, the archipelago is affected by other types of environmental disruption.  These 
disruptions are a major concern for the population, and yet are often overshadowed by 
                                                
49 See for example (Roberts 2007; Simms 2001) 
50 Some reports mention however issues related to waste management (Noualhat 2005) or unrestrained and ill-
adapted development (Baram 2005). 
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climate change impacts in media discourses.  They are described and discussed in this section, 
starting with climate change. 
 
5.1.2.1. Climate change 
 
Small island states are extremely vulnerable to climate change and sea-level rise, as stressed in 
the latest assessment report of the IPCC:  
 
Sea-level rise is expected to exacerbate inundation, storm surge, erosion and other coastal hazards, 
thus threatening vital infrastructure, settlements and facilities that support the livelihood of island 
communities.  (…) There is strong evidence that under most climate change scenarios, water resources 
in small islands are likely to be seriously compromised.  (…) Climate change is likely to heavily 
impact coral reefs, fisheries and other marine-based resources.  (…) It is very likely that subsistence 
and commercial agriculture on small islands will be adversely affected by climate change.  (Mimura et 
al. 2007b). 
 
Sea-level rise is naturally a major concern for the Tuvaluan population, and some have already 
started building small dikes to protect their house.  Actual measurements of sea-level rise, 
however, are surprisingly scarce, and people tend to rely on their own observations and 
anecdotal evidence to find proof of the rise.   
 
Twenty years ago, there were lots of beaches in Funafuti, lots of them… Now there’s only one, close to 
the hotel.  Oh, and there’s one in the North, as well, but it’s very small.  It’s very sad.  Erosion is a 
big problem now, and there are also people who take sand from the beach to build their houses.   
(Enate Evi) 
 
Hunter calculated that the average long-term sea level change at Funafuti would be a rate of 
0.8 mm per year (with a margin of error of +/- 1.9 mm), relative to the land.  However, 
Hunter also noted that uncertainties in the calculated trend remained ‘undesirably large’ 
(Hunter 2002: 2), and Connell added that ‘sea levels are not now perceptibly rising’ (2003: 104) 
In the absence of reliable data, Tuvaluans turn to empirical observation for evidence of 
climate change.  Two phenomena in particular attracted wide attention.  The first is the 
disappearance of a small islet in the Funafuti lagoon.  The islet, which used to be abundant in 
 178 
trees, has now been reduced to a small pile of sand and rocks, which some see as evidence of 
climate change; others prefer not to put forward an explanation.  The second phenomenon is 
probably more striking and has a deeper impact on peoples’ perception of the dangers 
associated with climate change: every year around April, large parts of the atoll are submerged 
by ‘king tides’.  King tides are yearly high tides that come directly from beneath the ground, 
and penetrate it from behind.  Instead of being carried by giant waves, the water springs 
directly and slowly from the ground, making the event even more spectacular.  King tides used 
to occur once in every five or six years; they have now become annual, triggering fears of 
some that they might eventually become permanent.   
 
Tomorrow I’ll take you to the islet over there.  It used to be like the islet you see there (he shows a 
distant, tree-covered islet, while the first islet is only a mass of rock)… But the trees fell into the water 
one after the other, no there’s nothing left.  I don’t know if it’s about sea-level rise or anything like 
that, but it didn’t use to be like that. 
(Eti Eseta) 
 
Climate change in Tuvalu started when the islet started to drown, that was five years ago.  And what 
happened to the islet can happen tomorrow to Tuvalu, people know that. 
(Tataua Pese) 
 
Last year we had to evacuate five families because of the king tides, they had to live in the school for 
one week.  Every year we need to evacuate some families, but now they last longer, so it creates more 
damage and the people cannot return to their homes. 
(Eseta Lauti) 
 
Furthermore, the salinity of the soil has also considerably increased, rendering the culture of 
taro almost impossible.  Taro is Tuvalu’s main agricultural product and, besides fish, is its only 
natural resource.  Moreover, the formation of Tuvalu atolls is primarily based on coral reef, 
which barely holds any soils, making planting on the atolls extremely difficult.  Declining 
yields have forced Tuvaluans to rely increasingly on imported products for their diet, resulting 
in severe health problems, including diabetes. 
 
Another consequence of climate change for small island states is the increased frequency of 
extreme weather events.  A depression is created in the Pacific Ocean when the surface 
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seawater temperature reaches 27° C.  The depression can develop into a tropical cyclone that 
then wanders around in the Pacific Ocean.  Several times during recent years the islands have 
been hit by severe tropical cyclones even though the most northern part of the island group 
liesoutside the “hurricane belt”.  In 1997 Funafuti was hit by the three hurricanes51, Gavin, 
Hina and Helly.  They eroded half a square kilometre of the 26 square kilometres island state.  
Memories of the hurricane Bebe, which devastated Funafuti in 1972, are still vivid amongst 
the population, and the fear that the atolls might be obliterated by a tropical cyclone is 
perhaps more present than the anxiety associated with sea-level rise.  Tuvaluans know that 
they have nowhere to hide or evacuate in the case of an extreme weather event, and cannot 
plan their migration.  They are particularly anxious that a storm surge might coincide with a 
king tide, especially at night when are sleeping.  A cyclone that devastated Tonga shortly 
before my fieldwork had further reinforced this fear. 
 
A lot of people died with hurricane Bebe.  The problem here in Tuvalu is that we have nowhere to go.  
If there’s a hurricane, many people will die, that’s for sure.  
(Penieli Metia) 
 
5.1.2.2. Other Environmental Issues 
 
 
Climate change, however, is far from being the only environmental concern to Tuvaluans.  
The lack of freshwater is another major difficulty: without any rivers or lakes, the only source 
of water across all atolls of Tuvalu relies on rainwater that the islanders collect in water tanks.  
Scarcity of water is further compounded by the problem of an increasing island population 
that demands greater water consumption.  Furthermore, Tuvalu atolls continuously suffer 
twin water problems that consist of freshwater shortage and saltwater flooding.  Droughts 
have been more frequent in recent years, even though this might sound paradoxical for a 
country threatened by sea-level rise. 
 
                                                
51 Hurricane is normally a term reserved for cyclones that develop in the Atlantic and the North East Pacific 
Oceans, whereas cyclones in the South West Pacific Ocean (where Tuvalu is located) are simply referred to as 
tropical cyclones (terminology of the National Hurricane Center, Miami). However, the word ‘hurricane’ was 
widely used by Tuvaluans to refer to tropical cyclones, hence the choice was made to keep using it when referring 
to specific hurricanes/tropical cyclones. 
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Another environmental problem concerns waste disposal and treatment.  The demographic 
growth of Funafuti, as well as the increasing reliance upon imported goods, has led to a major 
problem of waste disposal (Noualhat 2005).  Two dumps have been created in the borrow pits 
at both ends of the island, further aggravating the soil’s vulnerability to sea-level rise.  The 
dumpsites are also a source for infectious diseases and other health problems. 
 
We asked the Americans to fill up the borrow pits many times, but they don’t want to do anything, 
they say it’s not their fault… But whose fault is it then? We’ve been living with these holes forever. 
(Enele Sopoaga) 
 
5.1.3. The Multi-Causality of Migration 
 
The continuous migration flow between Tuvalu and New Zealand has often been presented 
by scholars (including myself before doing this work) as the epitomy/archetype of 
environmental migration.  For many alarmist scholars and a majority of the mass media, 
Tuvaluans represented the first sacrificial victims of climate change.  This section aims to 
show that the perception by Tuvaluans of migration to New Zealand is much more complex 
than this determinist perspective, and is a social construct that finds its roots in the different 
perceptions of and discourses on environmental vulnerability. 
 
5.1.3.1. Different Views on Climate Change and Vulnerability in Tuvalu 
 
In contrast to popular belief, Tuvaluan views on climate change and the need to migrate are 
not homogenous: there are almost as many opinions on the subject as there are individuals 
living on the island, reflecting a variety of conflicting views on the effects of climate change in 
Tuvalu.  These different views can be organised into two groups: those who do not want to 
leave, and those would like to leave. 
 
Those Who Don’t Want to Leave 
 
The most commonly held view mixes resignation and despair: while acknowledging the reality 
of climate change, these respondents also expressed a deep attachment to their country, and 
asserted they would not leave even if the island was entirely submerged by the ocean.   
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This is my country, I’m ready to die here.  I know some people who are leaving, but I don’t want to go 
with them.  I want to stay here. 
(Eti Eseta) 
I don’t want to leave, if we all leave, Tuvalu is going to die, and I don’t want that.  We need to be 
there, this is where we need to be. 
(Luisa Kakamua) 
The international community needs to do something to help us.  We’re not responsible for climate 
change, so our country cannot disappear.  The other countries need to fix this problem.   
(Suilia Toloa) 
 
Others adopted a more optimistic tone, and believed it was possible for the country to adapt, 
even though it would require international assistance.  These respondents tended to regard 
migration as a defeat, and would only consider it if all other migration strategies had failed.  
Those holding this view were usually amongst the most educated respondents, and closer to 
the government.   
 
If we have enough resources to adapt, Tuvalu can be salvaged.  It’s all a matter of money, you know.  




This discourse, however, could sometimes appear a little disingenuous: a representative of the 
government held forth in this vein for about half an hour before admitting, off the record, 
that he was actually due to leave soon and had bought some land in Fiji. 
 
Others refused to acknowledge climate change as a problem, and viewed sea-level rise as a 
natural process:  
 
We are an atoll country, it is normal that the sea-level changes with the tides and the currents.  One 




A few reacted angrily to my presence, and claimed that climate change was an invention of 
industrialized countries to scare island nations. 
 
We didn’t have any problem before people like you came and started talking about climate change… 
Now the people are leaving for New Zealand because of you.   
(Pulafagu Toafa) 
 
A small, religious minority remained convinced that divine intervention would save Tuvalu at 
the eleventh hour, because God had made the promise to Noah that there would be no more 
flooding on Earth.  The Church is now considering the problem seriously, and has started 
raising awareness about the problem, as well dismissing Noah’s story as a metaphorical legend, 
not to be taken literally.   
 
Those Eager to Leave 
 
Among those considering migration as an option, there were two contrasting commonly held 
views: a first group envisioned migrating out of the fear that the island would be brutally 
flooded. 
 
I don’t want to wake up one morning with the island washed away, look what happened in the 
Salomon Islands! I prefer to leave now before I have no other choice: I don’t know what can happen to 
our country, so I will apply for the Pacific Access Category as soon as I will have enough money. 
(Nofoalofa Petero) 
 
A second group considered migration in a more proactive fashion, as a way to reduce 
environmental vulnerability and develop other projects in New Zealand. 
  
The future of Tuvalu is uncertain, so I think I’ll be better off in New Zealand.  Life is better in New 
Zealand anyway, there are no opportunities in Tuvalu. 
(Kumitia Tekaai) 
 
In most cases, environmental factors mixed with economic and social factors.  Most of these 
would-be migrants had family in New Zealand already, and their family ties were a strong 
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additional ‘pull factor’.  Respondents with families often considered migration to be in the 
interest of their children, and thus as a risk-reduction strategy for the family. 
 
This overview of attitudes towards climate change and migration shows that migration is not 
conceived of in a determinist framework, but is rather a decision taken by the migrant based 
on personal perceptions, values and interests.  A similar perception of climate change could 
lead to two different outcomes (stay/leave), whereas different views on the impacts of climate 
(Tuvalu will survive/will disappear) could lead to the same outcome.  Hence there was no 
direct causal relationship between climate change, attitudes towards its effects, and migration 
behaviour.  Other factors, such as personal values and interests, need to be accounted for in 
order to understand migration behaviours. 
 
 
5.1.3.2. Different Migration Drivers to New Zealand 
 
 
Concern about climate change was very apparent amongst the Tuvaluan community in New 
Zealand, even though they had no direct experience of the situation.  Almost all migrants 
interviewed indicated that climate change and rising sea-levels had been a concern, although 
not always the main one, in their decision to move to New Zealand. 
 
All respondents shared a common concern for the climatological state of their home island 
and were very aware of the trouble and difficulties that their families were facing back on the 
island.  All feared that their country was in danger of being submerged under the seas, and this 
fear was widespread amongst all age groups.  Most respondents had a good understanding or 
fair knowledge of the impacts of climate change on their islands, and had heard from families 
and/or personally experienced flooding situations and coastal erosion.   
 
When I left, it was clear that it would be going worse year after year.  My brother was here already 
with his family, so it was easier for me to leave Tuvalu.  I return once a year, because I still have 
family in Tuvalu.  Maybe they’ll come as well to New Zealand, one day.  That depends on how bad it 
gets.  […] I don’t know if Tuvalu will disappear or what [sic], but I don’t think people have a future 
in Tuvalu, it’s going to get worse. 
(Tomalu Talu) 
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Family ties and social networks played an important role in their migration: many mentioned 
the help they received from island community groups during the immigration process, such as 
sponsorship, help seeking employment, or even assistance in filling in the immigration 
application forms.  Economic factors also played a significant role in the migration decision, 
and almost all respondents mentioned unemployment or insufficient income as a reason 
driving their migration decision. 
Finally, it should be noted that many of those interviewed wanted to obtain New Zealand 
citizenship, with the ultimate goal of being able to move to Australia under the aegis of the 
Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement (TTTA).  The TTTA, a non-binding immigration 
procedure applied and supported by both the governments of New Zealand and Australia, 
allows Australians and New Zealanders to travel to, live and work for an indefinite period in 
each other’s country without restriction.   
In two years from now I’ll be able to get a kiwi passport, I want to go Brisbane.  I’ve always wanted 
to go to Australia, I’ll open a business there.  I don’t know what kind of business yet, but I want to 
have my business.  Work is too hard here in New Zealand. 
(Molu Tavita) 
 
Overall, although concern for the future impacts of climate change and its current impacts 
was generally present in the migration decision, this driver was not always the decisive one, 
and economic and family factors were also significant drivers.  
 
 
5.1.4. Migration Patterns 
 
Before examining the migration patterns of Tuvaluans, it should be noted that the whole 
Polynesian region is highly prone to migration.  Migration is a significant pattern of lifestyle, 
and even a social routine at times (Connell and Conway 2000).  Bedford (1992) argues that 
whole Pacific region is a migration system, with regular and sustained migrations flows 
between Australia, New Zealand and Pacific countries.  He contends that these flows are 




5.1.4.1. A Compromised Tradition of Migration 
 
Among the respondents interviewed, there were many that had migrated several times during 
their lifetime, some up to eight times.  Throughout the islands’ history, ‘migration has long 
been significant in Tuvalu’ (Connell 2003: 94).  From the beginning of the 20th century, 
widespread labour migration first occurred to plantations in Samoa and Queensland, and then 
diversified onto the phosphate mines of Banaba (Kiribati) and Nauru.  Migration increased 
after the Second World War, and further diversified ‘as Tuvaluans were trained to work as 
merchant seamen on the ships of overseas lines, alongside continued migration to Nauru, 
both of which activities brought a substantial flow of remittances to Tuvalu’ (Connell 2003: 
94).  When phosphate mines in Nauru were exhausted, migrant workers were shipped back to 
Tuvalu, resulting in a significant decrease in remittances.  In the absence of higher education 
in Tuvalu, most Tuvaluans are trained overseas, largely at the University of the South Pacific 
in Fiji (see below). 
 
In recent years, migration opportunities in the region have decreased, and international 
migration has been increasingly difficult: for example, the Nauru mines were closed, and 
political tensions between Tuvalu and Fiji led to the suspension of the visa waiver programme.  
Under the government of John Howard, Australia also implemented a very stringent 
immigration policy towards Pacific islanders.  Unlike most islands in the region, Tuvalu is 
completely independent, and is not a protectorate, dominion or colony of any larger country.  
Accordingly, while Tuvalu’s neighbours have different migration opportunities, this small 
nation has witnessed its migration options shrink radically over the past few years, and the 
government has been actively seeking new migration opportunities for its citizens, with limited 
success. 
 
The problem is that we don’t have anywhere to go.  Before, there were several possibilities, but we feel a 
bit stuck now.  It is vital that we develop new migration opportunities, for the economy but also with 
regard to climate change.  Tuvalu has no natural resources.  Its only natural resource is its people. 




5.1.4.2. Tuvalu’s Migration System 
 
Internal Migration 
The most important migration flow in Tuvalu is internal migration.  Since the Australian 
government donated the Nivanga boat to the Tuvaluan government in the late 1990s, 
migration and movement between the different atolls has expanded considerably.  Before the 
boat was introduced, the only public means of moving from one atoll to another was a 
seaplane, whose maintenance was extremely costly and which could only carry a very limited 
number of passengers.  Not only did international aid supply an easier way to travel between 
the atolls, it also provided a major ‘pull’ factor to do so, since Funafuti underwent rapid 
development in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  International support was provided for the 
establishment of numerous facilities, including a new administrative building, a hospital, a 
telecommunications centre, a wharf, and the development of a maritime school just outside of 
Funafuti.  Furthermore, the royalties derived from the sale of the “.tv” internet domain 
allowed for the asphalting of the Funafuti road system and the introduction of luxury goods 
such as DVD players and plasma screens on the island.  Migration from the outer islands to 
Funafuti boomed, and, as mentioned above, the government is now seeking to develop 
services and facilities on the outer islands as well, in order to slow down this continuous flow. 
 
Overpopulation is really the biggest problem in Tuvalu right now.  People have no place to live, it’s 
impossible to buy land or build a house.  Hopefully if there are services and shops on the outer islands 
as well, people will be less inclined to come.  That’s why we’re helping the government in this endeavour 
and we’re providing funding to develop new infrastructures and facilities in Vaitupu and Niutao. 
(Kirk Yates, NZ Aid) 
 
Fiji 
Migration to Fiji is relatively important thanks to the presence of the University of the South 
Pacific in the capital, Suva, of which Tuvalu is an associate member.  Students at the 
University usually receive a scholarship from the Asian Development Bank or the South 
Pacific Commission (SOPAC), which allows them to bring their family with them for the 
duration of their studies.  Upon completion of their degree, students – and their families – are 
required to move back to Tuvalu. International and regional organizations, such as the local 
offices of UNDP or SOPAC, are another major source of the Tuvaluan presence in Fiji.  
Tuvaluan civil servants working for these organizations typically settle in Fiji with their 
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families.  Finally, a limited, but sustained flow still exists between the atoll of Vaitupu and the 
island of Kiao, which was purchased from Fiji in 1951.  Since 2005, Tuvaluans from Kiao 
have been entitled to Fijian citizenship.  However, migration flows between Tuvalu and Fiji 
have considerably slowed down since the introduction of a visa for Tuvaluans and other 
Pacific Islanders.  Tine Leuelu, Tuvalu’s High Commissioner in Fiji, recalls nonetheless that 
the Tuvaluan presence in Fiji remains considerable, and that community organisations are 
active and well-structured. 
 
Australia and the United States 
Migration to Australia or the United States is extremely limited, due to tight migration policies 
and controls.  According the Tuvaluan Ministry for External Affairs, there are no more than 
300 Tuvaluan residents in Australia, mostly in the area of Brisbane.  Australia, however, 
remains commonly viewed as an El Dorado, and a major incentive to take up New Zealand 
citizenship, since migration between Australia and New Zealand is unrestricted for those 
holding a citizenship from one of the two countries. 
 
I would like to migrate to New Zealand when I’ll have enough money.  I will work there for three 
years or so, and then I want to move to Australia.  That’s where I want to stay, because life is better 




Migration between Tuvalu and New Zealand remains much more significant, since an 
estimated 3,000 Tuvaluans currently live in New Zealand52, mostly in the West Auckland area, 
as shown on the map below. 
 
                                                





Fig.  4 – Tuvaluan population in New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand 2007) 
 
Between 2001 and 2006, the Tuvaluan population in New Zealand increased by 34 per cent.  
Of this total, those born in New Zealand accounted for 37 per cent, and those who were able 
to hold a fluent conversation in Tuvaluan accounted for 71 per cent, a figure that has 
remained steady since 2001 (Statistics New Zealand 2007).   
 
Pacific immigration to New Zealand has had a tortuous history: in the 1970s, the New 
Zealand government was highly concerned with Tongan over-stayers, who were perceived to 
be trouble-makers and arrested by the police in dawn raids.  Dawn raids later extended to 
illegal migrants of all nationalities, who were detained and sent back home, while Polynesians 
were subject to random searches by police in the streets: this caused serious trauma to the 
relationship between New Zealand and its Pacific neighbours, as well as an embarrassment for 
 189 
the New Zealand government.  McDonald observes that New Zealand and its Pacific 
neighbours are still ‘tied into a neo-colonial relationship’ by aid, trade and immigration, a 
relationship in which New Zealand’s goodwill is an essential and dominant factor (McDonald 
1977). 
 
The Tuvaluan community in Auckland is a vibrant one, and maintains strong ties with those 
remaining in Tuvalu.  Community-based culture is still evident among Tuvaluan New 
Zealanders mainly through church activities, island celebration functions and sports events.  
However, it is not as strong and obvious as back home in the islands due to the different life 
style and financial pressure of making a living in New Zealand.  The traditional Tuvaluan 
culture does still exist, but it has been blended with New Zealand culture.  The greater 
distance between the houses of Tuvaluans has also diluted the strength of the community-
based culture compared to on the island. 
 
Tuvaluans in New Zealand share a lot of common concerns with other Polynesian 
communities and the relationship with other Polynesian communities remain strong.  In 
general, Pacific Island groups in New Zealand face similar struggles with housing, 
employment and health issues.  It is also worthwhile noting that inter-marriages of Tuvaluans 
with other Polynesians has further enhanced the strong ties between Tuvaluans and other 




The migration process between Tuvalu and New Zealand is far more complicated than is 
often described, particularly in the media.  The dominant approach is an alarmist one, 
whereby flows of refugees flee the rising sea-levels of Tuvalu to seek refuge in New Zealand.  
From an external point of view, Tuvalu at least has an interest in reinforcing this approach, in 
order to gather support for its plight. 
 
Internal points of view contrast radically with that which plays out beyond the realm of 
domestic policies.  First, most Tuvaluans are unwilling to leave their country, and believe that 
Tuvalu will not necessarily disappear.  Second, those who have migrated to New Zealand did 
so for other reasons besides climate change, including economic opportunities and family ties.  
Although environmental factors affected their decision to migrate, the key factor seems to 
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have been an uncertainty regarding the future of their country, and their migration can often 
be characterized as a risk-reduction strategy for the family.  Even in apparently obvious cases 
of environmental migration, the relationship between environmental change and migration 
flows cannot be characterized as a direct, causal relationship.  On the contrary, it seems that 
environmental migration as a concept is a product of individual perceptions and interests, as 
well as of domestic and external policies.  This does not mean that the threat of climate 
change is not real, or that environmental factors do not play a role in migration behaviour, but 
rather that the importance of such factors – environmental migration as a concept – is a social 
and political construct. 
 
This construct is underpinned by a wide range of interests and strategies, mobilised by actors 
in New Zealand. In order to garner support and attract development aid and funding for 
adaptation strategies, the government of Tuvalu has joined the ranks of the alarmist coalition. 
The majority of the media are also part of the alarmist coalition, as well as many researchers: 
typically those who have not conducted fieldwork on the archipelago. Those who have spent 
time with Tuvaluans tend to adopt a more sceptical stance, as does – officially – the 
government of New Zealand, in order to justify its labour migration schemes. However, in 
order to promote its position amongst Pacific countries and as a frontrunner of the fight 
against climate change, the country might be tempted to switch coalition in a near future, 




In the aftermath of hurricane Katrina, approximately 250,000 people fled or were evacuated to 
Houston, Texas.  They were greeted by cheerleaders, and provided with food, clothes and 
blankets.  The media widely reported on these displays of generosity, and news report 
described evacuees expressing their desire to settle in Texas (Hopkins 2007b: 10).   In the days 
following the arrival of the evacuees, beds and basic facilities were installed in stadiums, 
convention centres and supermarkets; children were schooled and paired with local pupils; 
and job fairs were organized so that evacuees could take up temporary jobs.   A few weeks 
later, however, Houston started experiencing problems that many residents associated with 
the massive influx of migrants from flooded New Orleans: a rise in crime rise, traffic jams, a 
housing crisis, unemployment, social unrest… One year later, the songs and dance routines of 
the cheerleaders had turned to complaints and anger.  On the first anniversary of the disaster, 
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on 30 August 2006, 1700 Houstonians gathered at a meeting to urge Mayor Bill White to send 
evacuees back to New Orleans.  The housing scheme implemented by Houston was perceived 
by residents as a ‘giveaway’ programme, and residents asked the authorities to stop the 
assistance programme for evacuees (Kilday 2006).  The attitudes expressed at this event were 
far from just anecdotal; this story is supported by the results of the annual survey of Houston 
conducted by sociologist Stephen Klineberg.  Even though 97 per cent of the respondents 
agreed that ‘the Houston community really came together to help the evacuees’ and 85 per 
cent of them personally donated money, food or volunteer time to help them, 74 per cent 
acknowledged that helping the evacuees had put a ‘considerable strain on the Houston 
community’, and 66 per cent associated a major increase in violent crime with the evacuees’ 
presence.  Overall, 47 per cent of the respondents felt that the impact of the evacuees in 
Houston had been a bad thing for the city, while 36 per cent thought the opposite.  One year 
later, this number had shrunk to 11 per cent, while 65 per cent said the overall impact of 
evacuees had been a ‘bad thing’ for Houston (Klineberg 2006).   
 
One of the most striking effects of Katrina is the demographic depletion of the city of New 
Orleans.  Three years after the disaster, barely half of the population has returned to the city, 
whereas the other half remains scattered throughout the United States.  The situation in 
Houston mentioned above is representative of the unexpected impacts of a population 
movement that was first believed to be temporary, both by the evacuees and the emergency 
planners.  
 
5.2.1. The Environmental Disruption 
 
How the disaster unfolded is now a well-known story, and there is little point covering it in 
great detail.  A few points, however, are worth keeping in mind. 
 
The main reasons why New Orleans was flooded were the huge storm surge and the failure of 
the levee system.  Hurricanes were hardly a novelty for New Orleanians, but Katrina was ‘the 
big one’, the hurricane they had been dreading for years (van Heerden and Bryan 2006).  It 
should be stressed however, that Katrina was only a Category 3 hurricane53 when it made 
landfall, and that this landfall occurred about 40 kilometres west of New Orleans.   
                                                
53 The damage potential of hurricanes is measured on the Saffir-Simpson scale, which ranges from 0 to 5. 
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The hurricane hit New Orleans on August 29, 2005, and was followed by a huge storm surge, 
formed in the Gulf of Mexico.  Many experts had warned that the levees that were supposed 
to protect the city would not be able to contain a massive storm surge, and this is exactly what 
happened (van Heerden and Bryan 2006).  The city was almost entirely flooded in a matter of 
hours, and pumps were unable to drain the muddy water for about three weeks.  About 75 per 
cent of the houses were destroyed, and 2,000 casualties were reported.  Moreover, around 1.5 
million people were displaced, many of whom scattered across the United States.  The 
majority of the population had evacuated before the hurricane hit, but approximately 15 per 
cent, roughly 67,000 people, remained stranded in the city.   
 
The causes of the disaster were mixed.  While many insisted on the social vulnerabilities, lack 
of preparedness and levee failures, others linked the exceptional magnitude of the hurricane to 
climate change (Gelbspan 2005).  The linkage between climate change and hurricane 
magnitude is highlighted in the IPCC’s fourth assessment report, issued in 2007 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007b).  This latest report by the IPCC indicates 
that the strength of hurricanes will increase in the future (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 2007a), and many in New Orleans fear a Category 5 hurricane whose path would 
include the city itself (McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006).   
 
Ultimately, it seems difficult to directly link the hurricane with climate change: its causes were 
multiple, both natural and anthropogenic. I shall now turn to describe the migration patterns 
that preceded and followed the event – as will become evident, they had little in common with 
those observed in Tuvalu.    
 
 
5.2.2. Migration Patterns 
 
 
Two phases of migration occurred: the first one was concerned with the evacuation and its 
aftermath, while the second phase was concerned with the return and relocation of about one 
half of these inhabitants.   
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5.2.2.1. The Evacuation 
 
The evacuation of the Gulf Coast was the largest internal displacement ever experienced in 
the United States: an estimated 1,200,000 people fled the Greater New Orleans area in a 
couple of days, a displacement whose magnitude has frequently been compared to the Dust 
Bowl migration (Grier 2005).  Interestingly, both events were induced, at least in part, by 
environmental changes.   
 
The evacuation plans of local authorities drew much criticism from commentators and 
scholars alike (Shughart II 2006; Brinkley 2006).  Shughart recalls that 
 
Despite the alarms being sounded by LSU’s54 storm-trackers and a personal telephone call on 
Saturday from the director of the National Hurricane Center warning him of the seriousness of the 
threat New Orleans faced, Mayor C.  Ray Nagin did not issue an order to evacuate the city until 
Katrina was within 48 hr of making landfall and did not make evacuation mandatory until late 
Sunday morning, when fewer than 24 hr remained (2006: 37). 
 
The Governor of Louisiana, Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, was also widely accused of being too 
slow to react, and for delegating much of her power to Mayor Nagin when it came to the 
evacuation.  In the final report of the committee set up by the House of Representatives to 
investigate the government failures before and after hurricane Katrina, it was noted that: 
 
Despite warning 56 hours before landfall, Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin delayed ordering a 
mandatory evacuation in New Orleans until 19 hours before landfall.  (…) The failure to order 
timely mandatory evacuations, Mayor Nagin’s decision to shelter but not evacuate the remaining 
population, and decisions of individuals led an incomplete evacuation.  (Select Bipartisan 
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 
2006: 2) 
 
This criticism, however, must be nuanced.  Most of the respondents I interviewed were critical 
of the federal administration, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 
particular, but many of them praised the local authorities for the way the evacuation was 
handled.  Even though this observation has no statistical value, I observed that poorest 
                                                
54 LSU stands for Louisiana State University 
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respondents had a stronger tendency to blame the federal administration, and that their 
judgment of the administration was – unsurprisingly – strongly correlated with their 
experience of the evacuation: an horrendous experience was more likely to be associated with 
criticism towards the administration.   
 
Two Stories of the Evacuation 
 
As Kiefer and Montjoy have observed, there are actually two stories of the evacuation (2006: 
122).  The first tells the tale of the relative success of the traffic flow management for those 
who evacuated by themselves – the vast majority of the population.  This success was 
achieved in large parts thanks to a contraflow system that was implemented on the I-10 
motorway55.  The contraflow allowed motorists to use both sides of the motorway, thus 
reducing potential traffic jams considerably, although several respondents recalled that it took 
more than ten hours to drive to Baton Rouge during the evacuation, instead of the typical 
hour and a half.  Boyd also notes that more than one million people moved out of harm’s way 
within 48 hours, a number far above the 65 per cent exit capacity of the city.  This number 
represented 90 per cent of the population at risk, but only 65 per cent of those who did not 
own a car (car-less population) (Boyd 2006).   
 
The other story of the evacuation is the one that drew the most attention: around 15 per cent 
of the population of New Orleans, representing about 10 per cent of the population at risk, 
did not evacuate, because they were unable or not willing to do so.  Boyd further asserts that 
about 110,000 people rode out the storm at home or in a friend or relative’s house, including 
70,000 in New Orleans (2006). 
 
Following the hurricane, these people were gathered the Superdome football stadium, which 
had previously been identified as a refuge for the stranded population.  As the Superdome 
exceeded its capacity, inhabitants moved into the Convention Center, where similar facilities 
had not been installed.  Some stranded residents were also directly evacuated by federal, state 
and local agencies, as well as by local volunteers.  Coast Guards were credited with 33,000 
rescues, and Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries with 22,000 rescues (Boyd 2006).   
 
                                                
55 The I-10 is the principal exit route out of New Orleans, and connects the city to Baton Rouge, and further to 
Texas. 
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These two stories resulted in a strange paradox: although the evacuation of the city overall was 
a relative success, it was the incompleteness of the evacuation, abundantly depicted in the 
media, that triggered public uproar concerning the management of the disaster.  The 
evacuation rate was far higher than the most optimistic predictions of evacuation planning 
experts (van Heerden and Bryan 2006), but the fact that about 70,000 individuals remained 
stranded in the city in appalling conditions was the focus of the most vehement criticism of 
the disaster management.  I argue that the reason for this was that the evacuation was racially 
and socially stratified, exposing massive inequalities in vulnerability.  These inequalities had 
been grossly neglected, and this negligence was perceived as racism.  In the abovementioned 
survey conducted for The Washington Post by the Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard 
University, 68 per cent of the respondents claimed race and poverty had impacted on the 
speed of the rescue efforts ("Survey of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees"  2005), even though the 
official assessment of the authorities’ failures rather pointed to a lack of preparation, 
coordination and initiative, without mentioning race and poverty as determining factors 
(Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina 2006). 
 
The Social Vulnerabilities of Those who Did Not Evacuate 
 
The reasons why people did not evacuate were multiple and intertwined.  A survey conducted 
by The Washington Post, the Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University among evacuees 
in Houston identifies the main factors that impacted upon the migration decision of those 
who stayed behind ("Survey of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees"  2005): 
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 Yes (%) No (%) Main reason (%) 
I did not have a car or a way to leave 55 45 36 
I was physically unable to leave 22 48 5 
I had to care for someone who was physically 
unable to leave 
23 76 7 
I waited too long 42 58 7 
I thought the storm and its aftermath would not 
be as bad as it was 
64 35 29 
I worried that my possessions would be stolen or  
damaged if I left 
27 73 4 
I didn’t want to leave my pet 9 90 1 
I just didn’t want to leave 37 62 10 
 
Table 2 – Key reasons why New Orleans residents did not evacuate.  Source: ("Survey of 
Hurricane Katrina Evacuees"  2005) 
 
 
- Fifty five per cent of the respondents indicated that a reason for their not leaving was 
they did not own a car or had no way to leave, and 36 per cent indicated that was their 
main reason for not leaving.  It is useful to mention here that roughly one quarter of 
the New Orleans population did not have a car, a situation highly unusual in American 
cities.  Furthermore, internal mobility was more limited in New Orleans than in other 
American cities: 77.4 per cent of the people living in New Orleans were born in the 
city, and had lived there most of their lives (Fussell 2006), and some had never been 
out of the State of Louisiana or even the city.  Some of the respondents I met did not 
evacuate because they simply did not know where to go.   
 
- Another prominent reason that prevented people from evacuating the city was the 
idea that the storm would not be as big as it was.  Sixty four per cent of the people 
surveyed mentioned it a reason not to leave, and it was the primary reason for 29 per 
cent of them.  This might sound surprising given the numerous warnings and intense 
media coverage of the hurricane.  However, as stated above in the first section, one 
must keep in mind that New Orleans was frequently on the path of hurricanes, and 
evacuations were almost an annual routine, resulting in a ‘cry wolf’ effect.  As 
expressed by one interviewee: 
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I didn’t want to evacuate, I thought it would be like every year, a lot of hassle, and the traffic 
jams, all for nothing… My children finally convinced that I had to evacuate, and they came to 
pick me up at 5 in the morning.  I had only packed a few things, because I thought we’d be back 
the day after, as always. 
(Mary Altazan) 
 
- Some were also unable to leave (22 per cent of those surveyed), or had to care for 
someone who was unable to leave (23 per cent of the respondents).  One of these two 
reasons represented the main reason for not leaving for 14 per cent of all respondents.  
Evacuation procedures lacked provisions for those who were ill or disabled.  At a 
conference on the evacuation of the car-less population, many participants pointed out 
the need for the city to compile a database of all its disabled residents, in order to be 
able to organise their evacuation preventively in case of a new hurricane alert.  A girl 
in her twenties that I interviewed told how she had decided to ride the storm in her 
home at Kenner56 because she refused to leave behind her old neighbour, who was 
unable to evacuate and apparently not being taken care of by the authorities.  The 
situation in hospitals was very difficult: approximately 250 residents were stranded in 
the city’s Memorial Hospital, among whom 34 eventually died as a result of Katrina 
(Curiel 2006: 2067).  Some medical personnel chose to administer some patients with 
lethal doses of morphine, knowing they would not or could not be rescued, or that 
their medical condition could not tolerate an evacuation procedure.  These cases have 
been widely discussed and meditated upon, and serve as a perfect illustration of the 
disarray in which medial personnel were left. 
 
 
- Other reasons included a too long wait (42 per cent), concern that the house would be 
burgled or possessions stolen (27 per cent), a refusal to abandon pets (9 per cent), and 
simply a refusal to leave (37 per cent)57.  Pets were not allowed in shelters, and some 
residents refused to leave them behind.  An interviewee explained that she did not 
want to leave her dog behind, and she knew the dog would not be allowed in shelters.  
When she saw the water rising in her house, she decided to borrow her neighbours’ 
canoe, and canoed up to the French Quarter, since she had heard on the news that 
                                                
56 A suburb of New Orleans where the international airport is located. 
57 Multiple answers were allowed. 
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this part of the city was not flooded.  She then let herself into an unoccupied friend’s 
house, and stayed there for a few days.  Another interviewee did not want to leave his 
French Quarter house unoccupied, so he bought himself a gun, and rode out the 
storm in his house. 
  
Such a survey, however, fails to capture other reasons that account for why some segments of 
the population did not evacuate.  Laska and Hearn-Morrow have shown how social 
vulnerabilities were concentrated in New Orleans (2006: 10): these factors included poverty, 
race, lack of personal vehicle, and rented housing.  Evacuation required money for food, gas 
and lodging, and many poor families were unable to afford the expense.  Furthermore, the 
hurricane struck at the end of the month: many of the poorest residents were awaiting their 
pay cheque, leaving even fewer resources available for their evacuation (Fussell 2006). 
 
GIS maps illustrate the role played by poverty and race in this process.  The following map 
shows that the neighbourhoods with the lowest evacuation rates were also the poorest 
neighbourhoods of the city, or immigrant neighbourhoods (Vietnamese immigrant 



















Fig.  5 – Map of New Orleans’s non-evacuated population and shelters.  (Map courtesy of 
Ezra Boyd) 
 
John Beggs, professor of sociology at Louisiana State University, further insists on the role 
played by the social environment in explaining evacuation patterns58.  He points out that the 
individuals who were most isolated are less likely to leave, since ‘isolation is crippling their 
mobility’.  This observation was confirmed by many interviewees, particularly by elderly 
people.  Many of them, unwilling to leave, were convinced to do so by their children, 
grandchildren or friends.   
 
Finally, the role of information should not be downplayed.  Several publications have already 
pointed out the importance of access of meteorological information in order to minimise the 
damage inflicted by natural disasters (Watkins 2007).  In the case of Katrina, despite the wide 
media coverage before the hurricane made landfall, only 73 per cent of the respondents to the 
above-mentioned survey were aware of the evacuation order before the hurricane hit ("Survey 
of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees"  2005).  Amongst those who heard the evacuation order 
                                                
58 Interview with the author, Baton Rouge, March 2007. 
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(mostly through television and/or radio), 32 per cent asserted that the evacuation order did 
not give clear information about how to evacuate, and only 38 per cent eventually chose to do 
so.   
 
Overall, many factors influenced the decision and ability to evacuate, and these factors often 
combined.  Although most of the evacuation was rather successful, and carried out before the 
hurricane made landfall, a fraction of the New Orleans population remained trapped in the 
city.  Those trapped in the city were mostly black, poor, renters, and car-less.  These social 
vulnerabilities accumulated and resulted in environmental vulnerabilities, which were directly 
dependent upon socio-economic factors.  Laska and Hearn-Morrow correctly observe that 
‘evacuation decisions were shaped by income, age, gender, access to information and 
transportation, health and physical mobility, occupations, and social networks’ (2006: 11).  
Those who could not evacuate on time were failed by authorities not only before the 
hurricane hit, but also in its aftermath, and this group received most of the media coverage.   
 
Perception of the Evacuation 
 
The term ‘exodus’ was widely used to describe the evacuation of New Orleans, stressing the 
collective dimension of the process.  Thousands of cars flocked on the I-10 motorway to 
Baton Rouge, Lafayette and Houston, and hundreds of thousands of people fled the area with 
48 hours.  The idea of a mass, collective displacement is a common characterisation of 
migration flows associated with environmental change in general. 
 
It is true that hurricane Katrina hit all neighbourhoods of the city, without apparent 
distinction of race, class, or sex, even though the uniform destruction hid wide inequalities 
and different vulnerabilities.  However, the evacuation patterns of its residents were extremely 
diversified, calling into question the commonly held perception that the evacuation was a 
collective process.  During my interviews, not a single evacuee told me the same story about 
her/his evacuation.  Some evacuees fled the city early, others waited until the last minute, 
while some remained trapped in their house.  Some travelled far away, sometimes to 
California or Florida, while others went no further than Baton Rouge.  Some stayed with 
friends and family, some preferred to rent a hotel room or an apartment, and others opted for 
the shelters provided by the authorities or the Red Cross.  The help received also varied 
considerably according to the place of resettlement and the conditions of the evacuation.  
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Most importantly, some could choose their destination, while others could not: many of those 
who were trapped in the city and subsequently evacuated by the authorities recalled how they 
did not know their destination before they boarded the bus or the plane that was taking them 
to their new destination.  All mentioned that the fact of not knowing their destination deeply 
affected their ability to cope while they were away.  It would be impossible to mention here all 
the stories and experiences collected during my fieldwork, however, it seemed important to 
stress some notable differences and common characteristics.   
 
A key variable in the ability of the evacuees to cope with their displacement seemed to be their 
sense of place, which affected their individual and cultural identity while away.  This can be 
related to what Giddens called an ‘environment of trust’ (Giddens 1990): a place where some 
identity markers could be found, impacting upon self-identity.  When evacuees did not know 
their destination, this ‘environment of trust’ was naturally more difficult to find and/or to 
build.  All persons I met mentioned that a ‘sense of place’ was important to them, especially 
given that none had brought many personal possessions from their home in New Orleans. 
 
We didn’t know where we were going, that was horrible.  We didn’t know whom we would be with, 
how we would be taken care of.  We were treated like cattle, that was horrible. 
(Claire Cachalan) 
 
There was another common feature to all evacuation experiences: no one envisioned the 
evacuation to be a long-term migration.  All evacuees I met were convinced that they would 
be able to return to their homes after a couple of days, and none had packed many clothes or 
brought with her/his many possessions.  For many, it took several days to realise that their 
only remaining material possessions where the small backpack they had carried with them 
during the evacuation.  An interviewee recalled how surprised she was to receive a US$ 300 
credit card from the Red Cross, and how she turned it down at first, convinced that other 
people needed help more than she did.  The Red Cross volunteer then forced her to accept 
the card, simply telling her: ‘Lady, you lost everything’.  For this interviewee, this was the 
point when she realised that her house and her possessions were gone, and that she would 
need help to cope with a long-term displacement.  As I will show later, the authorities also 
envisioned the evacuation as a short-term displacement, and did not plan for the long term: 
the idea that Katrina could result in an important migration flow was not considered. 
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The evacuation was not a horrendous experience for all evacuees: some evacuated in advance 





Although though the migration process surrounding Katrina has been widely presented as a 
collective exodus, it actually encompassed different types of migration patterns.  The key 
feature of this migration flow, however, was that it was an actual migration, and not merely a 
short-term displacement as was thought in the early stages of the evacuation. Disasters had 
long been associated with short-term displacements, and the possibility of return for those 
displaced.  The case of Katrina destroyed this assumption: in fact, about half of the population 
did not return – for diverse reasons – and what was initially conceived as an evacuation 
became for many a permanent relocation.  
 
What does this mean for advocacy coalitions?  Presenting the case of Katrina as a case of 
environmental migration bears heavy significance for the alarmist coalition: it represents 
evidence that developed countries can also be hit by the impacts of climate change, and that it 
is therefore in their own interest to mitigate their carbon emissions.  On the other hand, those 
who blame the Army Corps of Engineers for the failure of the levees, or the federal and local 
authorities for the slow reconstruction process are more likely to side with the sceptical 
coalition, and to emphasise the responsibility of the authorities in the massive displacement of 
populations.  Hence the local population tends to adopt a sceptical view (in the sense of 
advocacy coalitions), whereas external observers are more likely to present a more alarmist 
discourse.  Once again, the conceptualisation of migration is a social construct, shaped by 












Overall, the environment-migration nexus is a complex and evolving one.  Its 
conceptualisation remains highly debated, and structured by the opposition between the 
alarmist and sceptical coalitions, which revolve around each of the key elements touched upon 
above. The dominant discourse on environmental migration, remains anchored in a 
determinist perspective: environmental migration is most often conceptualised as a forced, 
collective displacement. The emergence of the topic in the media and policy discourses is 
widely associated with this view, and therefore with the dominance of the alarmist coalition 
over the sceptical coalition. 
 
I have tried to delineate here the main definitions, concepts and distinctions that I use in this 
research.  With regard to the definition, I proposed a distinction between environmental 
displacees, whose movement is compelled, and environmental migrants, who move 
voluntarily.  Environmental migration, as a concept, encompasses both types of migration 
flows.  Hopefully such a distinction also allows for clarification of the different estimates and 
predictions that have been made so far.  With regard to the environmental causes of 
migration, multi-causality seems to be the most pertinent theory, and also the one that has 
garnered the most academic support.  Environmental causes are now widely acknowledged as 
a proximate driver of migration, but also one that intermingles with other social, economic 
and political variables.  Finally, with regard to migration patterns, I have attempted to provide 
a visual and comprehensive representation of the main distinctions that inform the debate.  
These distinctions are best understood as continua that relate to each other, rather than as 
independent categories. 
 
Alarmists present broader definitions with larger numbers, and insist on the prime causality of 
environmental factors.  Sceptics present a narrower definition (or refuse to engage in the 
definition debate), and insist on the multi-causality of migration. As said earlier, the current 
dominant conceptualisation of the topic is based on the alarmist view, which doesn’t allow for 
a differentiation between the different types of migration patterns outlined above. Therefore, 
these different types are confused with each other and environmental migration is often 
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envisioned as a uniform type of migration,  which neglects the complexity of the 
environment-migration nexus.  
 
On the policy level, this would assume that all migration flows associated with environmental 
changes could be addressed by the same set of policies. I shall now examine the different 
policy responses that address environmental migration, and whether the alarmist-dominated 
view of the nexus is reflected in the development of normative frameworks. In other words, I 
will seek to examine whether and how the ideational linkage between environment and 















“At the frightful sight of their smoking ashes, 
Will you say: "This is the result of eternal laws 
Directing the acts of a free and good God!" 
Will you say, in seeing this mass of victims: 
"God is revenged, their death is the price for their crimes?" 
What crime, what error did these children, 
Crushed and bloody on their mothers' breasts, commit? 
Did Lisbon, which is no more, have more vices 
Than London and Paris immersed in their pleasures? 
Lisbon is destroyed, and they dance in Paris!” 
 




And now? Bury the dead and feed the living. 
 
 Attributed to Sebastião José de Carvalho, Marquis of Pombal,  
Prime Minister of Portugal,  






One of the key goals of this work is to provide a theorised synthesis of environmental and 
migration policies and normative frameworks dealing with environmental migration.  Norms, 
needless to say, are rooted in specific contexts, periods, and ideologies.  I will not analyse the 
process of norm formation, but rather concentrate on the policy responses that develop 
within these normative frameworks.  I shall start this part of my analysis with an examination 
of environmental policies, predominantly focusing on policies addressing disasters and the 
impacts of climate change. 
 
How has migration been addressed by environmental policies? This part of the research 
discusses the different policy responses related to the natural disasters and climate change, in a 
chronological fashion, and attempts to show the place of migration concerns in their 
development. Disasters are discussed first, in Chapter 5. They represent the biggest form of 
environmental stressors, and the chapter aims to analyse how displaced people have been 
dealt with in disaster reduction strategies.  The discussion begins with a comparative analysis 
of two historical disasters: the 1666 Great Fire of London – one of the first disasters in which 
policies were implemented to deal with the displaced – and the 1755 Lisbon Earthquake – the 
first ‘modern’ disaster and the birth date of the social construction of risk.  Building upon this 
historical foundation, the analysis follows the evolution of disaster management since the 
1950s, and the national and international mechanisms that have been implemented to deal 
with disasters, and, in particular, peoples displaced by disasters, as well as the actors involved 
in disaster management. 
 
Chapter 6 begins with a brief analysis of the development of environmental law since the 1972 
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment.  It looks at the key legal principles 
relating to environmental change, and how these principles inform debates on the climate 
regime. It then turns to global warming, considered to be the most significant of recent 
environmental changes. Since migration flows are often presented as a devastating 
consequence of global climate change, the chapter examines how these migration flows, and 
















“Disasters are very political events.” 
 








Natural disasters are an obvious – perhaps the most obvious – cause of environmentally-
induced forced displacements.  The role of slow-onset environmental change in migration 
factors is debated, whereas the contribution of natural disasters to migration is less contested.  
Natural disasters are the most visible, typically more spectacular and brutal form of 
environmental change; whereas slow-onset changes, although they have the potential to 
radically transform some regions, are often more insidious and less visible.  Logically, before 
states were concerned with slow-onset environmental changes such as pollution and the loss 
of biodiversity, they were concerned with natural disasters.  Policies implemented to deal with 
                                                
59 Federal Emergency Management Agency, the national agency responsible for disaster management in the 
United States. 
60 Quoted in (Shughart II 2006: 31) 
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disasters evolved considerably throughout history, but I shall try to highlight here the aspects 
that are concerned with the displacement of populations.  Disaster management policies can 
roughly be divided into four different, chronological phases: mitigation, preparedness, 
response and recovery (Haddow and Bullock 2004).  Mitigation is concerned with all long-
term efforts aimed at reducing the risk of disaster, while preparedness relates to the 
development of action plans in preparation for an anticipated disaster.  The response phase 
involves emergency services and humanitarian assistance.  Finally, the recovery phase deals 
with the restoration and reconstruction of affected areas, including the return of those 
displaced by the disaster and the possible payment of compensation.   
 
These phases succeed each other in disaster management, but were not developed 
concomitantly: early disaster policies dealt simply with disaster responses, and strategies for 
disaster reduction and prevention were developed later.  This section will address three 
different state methods of dealing with disasters.  First, I will describe the evolving role of the 
state in disaster response, using the Great Fire of London and the Lisbon Earthquake as 
starting points.  Second, as the role of vulnerability in disasters became increasingly evident, 
states developed strategies to reduce and prevent disasters, mostly at the international level.  
This trend is significant, since it aims at institutionalising solidarity beyond the national level.  








Disasters were initially viewed as acts of God61, over which people and states had little control 
(Steinberg 2000; Wijkman and Timberlake 1984).  Consequently, early disaster policies 
focused on disaster response and recovery, and not on prevention and mitigation.   For long, 
the model that prevailed in disaster policies could be characterised as Noachian: disasters were 
unavoidable, and the role of the state was to substitute for Noah and his ark, and rescue as 
                                                
61 An ‘Act of God’ today is a legal term defining an event outside human control, similar to a case of force majeure. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries however, divine intervention was presumed to explain the 
occurrence of such events.  
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many victims as possible.  The biblical story of the Deluge had a lasting impact upon the 
development of disaster policies, as shown eloquently by Dynes (2003a). 
 
The early history of disaster policies is usually linked to the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755, which 
deeply transformed the perception of disasters and how states responded to them.  I argue, 
however, that policies dealing with people displaced by disasters can be traced back to the 
1666 Great Fire of London, which marked, in my opinion, the birth of concern for the 
displaced in situation of disasters, as well as of resettlement policies.   
 
 
1.1. The Great  Fire o f  London o f  1666, and Concern for the  Displaced 
 
The Great Fire of London is one of the first documented major disasters.  It started as a small 
fire in a bakery shop, and after four days of burning eventually destroyed most of the city 
(Tinniswood 2003; Hanson 2001).  The exact number of casualties is unknown, but is believed 
to be quite small, since most of the city’s inhabitants managed to escape the fire.  Abroad, the 
fire was widely perceived as a divine revenge against the English, in retribution for the burning 
of the small Dutch town of Terschelling during the Second Anglo-Dutch War, an event 
remembered as Holmes’ Bonfire. 
 
Eye-witness accounts of the disaster were recorded by two prominent London diarists, 
Samuel Pepys and John Evelyn.  Both commentators recall the chaotic evacuation patterns 
that followed the outburst of the fire: most people remained within the city’s walls, fleeing 
from refuge to refuge, with their belongings.  Many thought they had found a safe haven 
within Saint Paul’s Cathedral, before the building was set alight by the scaffolding that 
surrounded it.  London was then encircled by a large Roman wall, and it was only at dawn on 
the second day of the fire that people began to realise the need to flee beyond the walls.  
Escape by river was difficult: the riverfront was on fire, and the services of ferrymen had 
become very expensive, allowing only the richest to secure a place in barges and light boats.  
Most of people escaped northwards and eastwards through the eight gates of the city walls: 
 
Here, we saw the Thames covered with goods floating, all the barges and boats laden with what some 
had time and courage to save as, on the other side, the carts, &c.  (sic), carrying out to the fields, 
which for many miles were strewed with moveable of all sorts, and tents erecting to shelter both people 
 210 
and what goods they could get away.  Oh, the miserable and calamitous spectacle!  (Evelyn 1854: 
10) 
 
Evacuation procedures were extremely chaotic, and panic scenes frequently erupted at the 
city’s gates.  Cart owners in surrounding regions flocked to London in order to rent their 
vehicles, colliding with people trying to escape.  Chaos further escalated when the police 
decided to close the gates of the city, in the hope of turning the focus of people from fleeing 
and rescuing their belongings to fighting the fire.  The decision proved catastrophic, and the 
gates were soon re-opened.  The chaotic scenes at the crowded gates bore dramatic 
consequences, as people blocked the narrow passages and greatly impeded the progress of 
fire-fighting squads.  Unable to progress through the city, fire engines were unable to prevent 
the spread of the fire.  Lack of leadership and failure to acknowledge the extent of the blaze 
were also crucial factors in the lack of proper emergency response.  The mayor of London, 
Thomas Bloodworth, fled the city the day after the fire started, and King Charles II had to 
take over the command of the rescue operations, which was delegated to his brother, the 
Duke of York. 
 
Those who escaped the inferno gathered in what appears to be refugee camps at the North of 
London.  Evelyn recalls his visit to the camps in these terms: 
 
The poor inhabitants were dispersed about St George’s Fields, and Moorfields, as far as Highgate, 
and several miles in circle, some under tents, some under miserable huts and hovels, many without a 
rag, or any necessary utensils, bed or board, who from delicateness, riches, and easy accommodations in 
stately and well-furnished houses, were now reduced to extremest misery and poverty.  (…) I then went 
towards Islington and Highgate, where one might have seen 200,000 people of all ranks and degrees 
dispersed and lying along by their heaps of what they could save from the fire, deploring their loss; and 
though ready to perish for hunger and destitution, yet not asking one penny for relief, which to me 
appeared a stranger sight than any I had yet beheld.  His Majesty and Council indeed took all 
imaginable care for their relief, by proclamation for the country to come in, and refresh them with 
provisions.  (Evelyn 1854: 12-15) 
 
Both Pepys and Evelyn were horrified by the scenes of distress and desperation at the 
encampments.  Evelyn mentions that the displaced were refreshed with provisions – it is 
worth noting, however, that these provisions were for sale, and no emergency aid was 
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distributed.  Market prices had soared, and the priority of the authorities was to ensure 
continuous food production and supply.   
 
A rumour regarding the origin of the fire soon spread out in the camps: it was claimed that the 
fire had been started by foreign terrorists, and a group of 50,000 French and Dutch 
immigrants were marching on the camps in order to ‘finish what the fire had begun’.  The 
rumour was fuelled by the Second Anglo-Dutch War, and scenes of generalised panic, 
resulting in several deaths, erupted at the camps (Tinniswood 2003: 131-135).   
 
These events led King Charles II to fear that there would massive rebellion and political 
unrest if the displaced were to return to London.  Most people had lost all their possessions, 
fire-fighting and evacuation efforts had been slow and ineffective, and the population was 
looking for scapegoats.  Hence the displaced were encouraged to move away from London 
and resettle elsewhere in the country.  Charles II proclaimed that ‘all Cities and Towns 
whatsoever shall without any contradiction receive the said distressed persons and permit 
them the free exercise of their manual trades’ (Tinniswood 2003: 213). 
 
This internal displacement is significant: it did not occur as a direct result of the fire, but was 
shaped by political motives and targeted policies.  My research suggests that the Great Fire of 
London was the first disaster in which population displacements were a concern in the official 
emergency response.  A similar concern was present one century later, during the 1755 Lisbon 




1.2. The Lisbon Earthquake o f 1755, and the  Social  Construct ion  o f  Risk 
 
 
On November 1st, 1755, Lisbon was struck by a major earthquake, which is now believed to 
have been of magnitude nine on the Richter scale.  It destroyed most of the city’s buildings, 
and was followed by a tsunami.  The disaster is often considered the first ‘modern’ disaster 
(Dynes 2003b), because of the lasting impact it had upon society.  This impact manifested 
itself through a profound transformation of the role of the state, and the way disasters were 
dealt with.  The Lisbon earthquake is a turning point because it was the first disaster that 
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prompted a coordinated disaster response by the state, and the first earthquake whose causes 
were scientifically analysed and discussed, rather than being attributed to the will of a 
supernatural being (Ray 2004).   
 
The Marquis of Pombal, Portugal’s prime minister, organised and supervised the emergency 
response. With regard to those displaced, Pombal relied on the Church to provide temporary 
housing and food items: ‘churches became the centre of temporary facilities for those 
displaced’ (Dynes 1997: 15).  An anonymous German engraving from 1755 shows a camp 
housing the displaced in the outskirts of Lisbon in ruins.  The camp is administered by priests, 
and scenes of looting and criminal activity are depicted. 
 
 
Fig.  6 - 1755 German copperplate image, The Ruins of Lisbon (Museu da Cidade, Lisbon). 
 
It was also feared that many inhabitants would leave the city and resettle in another region of 
Portugal.  Eager to pursue the development and reconstruction of Lisbon, Pombal instructed 
the governors of provinces that had received displaced people to send them back to Lisbon 
(Dynes 1997: 15).  Once again, migration patterns following the disaster were determined by 
the policies implemented – except that those of the Lisbon Earthquake were the exact 
opposite of those of the London Fire. 
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For the first time in history, the state emergency response was accompanied by recovery 
policies, which included preventive efforts to avoid future disasters.  After the quake, Pombal 
appointed several military engineers to make inventories of property rights and draw plans for 
a new city.  Unlike London, which was rebuilt in almost identical form after the fire, Lisbon 
was deeply transformed in the course of the reconstruction process.  Streets were widened, 
the waterfront was levelled and more flexible, quakeproof materials were used in the new 
buildings.   
 
The policies designed as a consequence of the Lisbon Earthquake marked a turning point: for 
the first time in history, ‘the state accepted the responsibility for mobilizing the emergency 
response and for developing and implementing a collective effort for reconstruction’ (Dynes 
1997: 28).  To a large extent, contemporary disaster policies are the direct heirs of Pombal’s 
policies, which set a model for disaster management: the state was no longer exclusively 
concerned with the disaster response, but also with prevention and recovery.  The realisation 
of this responsibility was made possible thanks to a radical shift in the perception of disasters 
associated with the birth of the modern state. 
 
Before the Lisbon quake struck, the dominant European explanatory framework for disasters 
was epitomised by Leibniz’ theodicy of the ‘best possible world’.  Theodicy was offered as a 
solution to the apparent paradox between the suffering of human beings and belief in a 
benevolent, omnipotent God.  Leibniz and his followers argued that disasters were part of a 
divinely designed ‘pre-established harmony’; they concluded that the Lisbon quake was not a 
catastrophe, but rather served God’s purpose, since He had necessarily created the best of all 
possible worlds.   
 
The place of disasters and monstrosities in nature received much attention in Enlightenment 
thought, hence the Lisbon Earthquake prompted widespread questioning of the meaning of 
disasters.  The fact the quake occurred on All Saints’ Day, and that most churches of the 
capital were destroyed further reinforced this line of thinking.  Voltaire, in particular, reacted 
viscerally against Leibniz’ theodicy, and ridiculed his views through the character of Pangloss 
in Candide, a play set against the backdrop of the Lisbon disaster (Voltaire 2007 (1759)).  
Pombal also rejected a theodicean explanation, insisting that the event must have a ‘natural’ 
explanation, and was not a signal sent by God, as his arch-rival Malagrida claimed.   
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Rousseau, however, disagreed and claimed that men, and not nature, were to blame for the 
disaster.  Reacting to Voltaire’s Poem on the Lisbon Disaster, he wrote him on 18 August 1756: 
 
Moreover (...) the majority of our physical misfortunes are also our work.  Without leaving your 
Lisbon subject, concede, for example, that it was hardly nature that there brought together twenty-
thousand houses of six or seven stories.  If the residents of this large city had been more evenly dispersed 
and less densely housed, the losses would have been fewer or perhaps none at all.  Everyone would have 
fled at the first shock.  But many obstinately remained (...) to expose themselves to additional earth 
tremors because what they would have had to leave behind was worth more than what they could carry 
away.  How many unfortunates perished in this disaster through the desire to fetch their clothing, 
papers, or money?62 (Masters and Kelly 1990: 110). 
 
Rousseau was one of the first thinkers to address risks as social constructs, and to blame men, 
and not God, for natural disasters.  Rousseau did not seek to excuse nature or justify God’s 
actions, but insisted on the mankind’s potential to prevent disasters and reduce their impacts.  
With the realisation that men are responsible for the disasters comes the acknowledgement 
that they can prevent them.  Thus Rousseau created the Lisbon model, in which risks were no 
longer a fatality, but rather a social construct that could be mitigated (Larrère and Larrère 
1997: 208).  The social construction of risks marks a turning point in the evolution of the 
state, and coincides with the emergence of modern states (Manent 2007).  In this regard, the 
Lisbon Earthquake can be viewed as a landmark event in the Enlightenment, which deeply 
transformed men’s relation to their environment. 
 
Just as the rise of modern states was marked by the autonomy of political thought and 
decisions from supernatural forces, the Lisbon disaster set a model for modern and 
coordinated disaster response, paving the way for contemporary disaster management.  This 
response was made possible by the fact that disasters were no longer considered fatalities with 
supernatural causes; instead they were construed as social constructs, and notions of risk and 
vulnerability were placed at the core of future disaster policies from this point onwards. 
 
 
                                                
62 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Lettre à Voltaire sur la Providence’, 18 August 1756. 
 215 




Following the chaotic and disorganised response that surrounded the Great Fire of London, 
the policies that addressed the Lisbon Earthquake set a model for future disaster managemen 
that would not significantly evolve until the beginning of the twentieth century.  This century, 
marked by two world wars and an increased number of disasters, experienced a number of 
evolutions in the organisation of disaster relief, leading to the current regime. 
 
 
2.1. The Growing Importance  o f  Disas t er Preven t ion  
 
The recognition that disasters were potentially avoidable risks rooted in social structures 
considerably expanded the scope of disaster policies.  States were not only mandated to 
respond to disasters, they also had to prevent them.  However, in the last decades of the 
twentieth century, although the number of natural hazards remained relatively stable, the 
number of disasters rose sharply (Guha-Sapir et al. 2004).  This apparent paradox can only be 
explained by the increased vulnerability of peoples facing natural hazards: more people were 
living in the affected regions, with fewer resources to adapt.   
 
From the late 1970s, the sharp increase in disaster casualties and damages prompted a deep 
questioning of disaster policies, which at the time were focused almost exclusively on 
emergency relief and humanitarian aid.  The 1970s and 1980s were marred by a series of 
devastating natural disasters, including the 1970 cyclone in Bangladesh (300,000 victims), the 
1976 Tangshan earthquake in China (290,000 victims), the 1985 Armero eruption in Colombia 
(25,000 victims), and the 1984-85 famine in Ethiopia.  Technological disasters and accidents 
also became more numerous, with the accidents of Seveso (1976), Three-Mile Island (1979), 
Bhopal (1984) and Chernobyl (1986).  Soon the state of emergency became permanent, and it 
was realised that a solely humanitarian response could not suffice to deal with disasters.   
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2.1.1. Paradigm Changes 
 
Two academic paradigm shifts occurred simultaneously in the aftermath of these disasters.  
The first entailed abandoning the chimerical pursuit of absolute security and risk eradication.  
Technological scientism was rejected, and instead risk management was privileged as a way to 
apprehend risks in their relation with their social environment (Dourlens et al. 1991).  Risk 
management involves a systemic approach to risk that acknowledges that it cannot be 
eliminated, but may be prevented.  The second rejected a deterministic approach to disaster, 
and introduced the concept of vulnerability.  Vulnerability is defined as a set of conditions that 
increase an individual’s or a community’s likelihood of being affected by a disaster (Blaikie et 
al. 1994).  The acknowledgement of vulnerability implies the development of disaster 
prevention, which is no longer solely a matter of urban planning and engineering, but also of 
social policy and development (Nathan 2004).    
 
Both paradigm shifts were instrumental in the movement away from humanitarian emergency 
relief to disaster reduction, the latter being a wide concept that encompasses all aspects of 
disaster prevention and mitigation.   The concept of disaster reduction was adopted by the 
United Nations in the 1990s, and that decade was declared ‘International Decade for Natural 
Disaster Reduction’, culminating in the first World Conference on Natural Disaster 
Reduction, held in Yokohama in 1994.  Disaster reduction relies not only on state actions, but 
also on actions emanating directly from people.  It is therefore a process with a more ‘bottom-
up’ focus: whereas crisis management views people as powerless, vulnerable victims, disaster 
reduction mobilises peoples’ resources and knowledge.   
 
 
2.1.2. Resettlement Policies 
 
With regard to migration and displacement, the ‘top-down’ approach of disaster reduction has 
often been associated with resettlement.  This option, however, is often seen as the last resort.  
It is usually highly unpopular with local populations and provokes social disruption in the 
resettlement area.  Furthermore, it yields variable results in terms of efficiency.  Nonetheless, 
it is sometimes privileged at the expense of other prevention strategies. 
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In Sri Lanka, a country prone to disasters, the ministry for disaster relief services is currently 
coupled with the Ministry of Resettlement63.  In Burma, another country highly vulnerable to 
disasters, relief services and resettlement are part of a single department within the Ministry of 
Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement64.  In Indonesia, natural disaster relief and refugee 
relief are coordinated by a single coordinating agency, Bakornas, but refugee relief is often 
assimilated into resettlement programmes (Age 2005).  Resettlement is especially implemented 
with regard to flood prevention: such examples include Vietnam, Mozambique (EACH-FOR 
2008) or Malaysia.  In the An Giang province of Vietnam, approximately 20,000 households 
have been marked for relocation into nearby residential clusters until 2020.  Research 
conducted in the area reveals that people about to be relocated ‘[fear] that when they move to 
the residential clusters their social networks [will] be destroyed and they [will] not be able to 
secure a daily income’ (Dun 2008: 8).  Before they can move into the residential cluster, 
people need to buy a plot of land, in which they are assisted by a government loan.  The loan, 
however, does not suffice to cover the purchase price and people often have to get into 
further debt in order to afford housing.  Resettlement is also a common policy to deal with 
flood disasters in Malaysia: Chan, however, notes that such schemes are not always efficient, 
and that systematically there is a trade-off between flood prevention and the induced social 
disruption (Chan 1995). 
 
 
2.2. Mutuali s ing Risk 
 
Recognition of the state’s responsibility for disasters resulted in two important outcomes: the 
creation of national agencies for disaster management, incorporating different aspects of 






                                                
63 See http://www.resettlementmin.gov.lk/ for an overview of the Ministry’s organisation and activities. 
64 More details on the department can be found at 
 http://www.myanmar.gov.mm/ministry/MSWRR/index.html, although the website is often unresponsive. 
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2.2.1. The Creation of National Disaster Management Agencies, and their Plans for the Displaced 
 
Many countries now have a dedicated agency in charge of dealing with disasters: the simple 
fact that such agencies exist implies acknowledgement of the state’s responsibility to protect 
its citizens in case of a disaster.  The principle for such protection is stated in Article 3 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which reads that ‘Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of person’.  The organisation of such protection is usually part of civil 
defence, which was initially concerned with the protection of civilians during wars, but has 
since evolved towards a wider protection role.  Some countries have created a specific agency 
separate from the civil defence department, while others have made such protection a new 
priority for existing civil defence departments.   
 
In the US, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created in 1979 by 
President Carter, who sought to gather all services concerned with disaster management under 
a common umbrella (Mushkatel and Weschler 1985).  FEMA replaced the Federal Disaster 
Assistance Administration, which was part of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development.  Its creation was intended to ‘strengthen federal leadership in emergency 
management, particularly in efforts to avert disaster losses’ (May 1985: 40).  FEMA’s role is to 
coordinate an emergency response to disasters that overwhelm state and local authorities, thus 
it highlights the shared responsibilities for disasters between different levels of government.  
The Agency was independent until its incorporation into the newly created Department of 
Homeland Security in 2003. 
 
Some countries highly prone to disasters have created a ministry dedicated to disaster 
management.  This is the case for Bangladesh, where a Ministry for Disaster Management and 
Relief was created in the early 1990s, before being transformed into a Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management.  The Ministry developed a Comprehensive Disaster Management 
Programme in 2003.  Japan, notoriously prone to earthquakes, has also established a Ministry 
for Disaster Management; as have Mongolia, Uganda and Sri Lanka.   
  
Most national agencies and departments have developed comprehensive plans of action that 
include many of the different aspects set out in the Yokohama Strategy and the Hyogo 
Framework for Action (World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction 1994, 2005), which 
crystallised the paradigm shift from disaster relief to comprehensive disaster management, 
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including prevention and mitigation.  Most of these plans include provisions for emergency 
evacuation procedures and temporary housing arrangements, but fail to address long-term 
housing needs.  Amongst the plans publicly available, the one developed by FEMA – called 
the Integrated Emergency Management System, or IEMS – stands out for two specific 
reasons: 
- Unlike previous, hazard-specific national plans, IEMS applies that all types of hazard, 
recognising that they all share similar characteristics and require similar responses; 
- IEMS contains provisions for long-term housing; several services and grants are 
incorporated for people with longer-term housing needs.   
 
These grants and services are designed to help victims rebuild their homes or find permanent 
replacement homes.  In order to be eligible, the applicant’s home must be her primary 
residence, must have been destroyed or damaged by the disaster, and is required to be 
insufficiently covered by an insurance scheme.  It should be noted, however, that FEMA 
provides funding for the construction of a new permanent home ‘only in insular areas or 
remote locations specified by FEMA, where no other type of housing assistance is possible’ 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 1980).   In addition, the agency maintains 
a housing portal on the Internet, designed to help those displaced by a disaster find a place to 
stay.  The database lists properties for rent provided by several governmental agencies, as well 
as private organisations and individuals65.  FEMA also offers grants to pay for rental costs on 
a temporary basis.  As part of disaster assistance, the agency also runs a programme aimed to 
help those who lose their jobs due to a disaster: the Disaster Unemployment Assistance 
(DUA) scheme provides unemployment benefits as well as services to help find new 
employment.  In the early 1980s, FEMA also tried to implement a plan targeted at relocating 
people from large cities in case of a nuclear attack or other major disaster.  The plan, called 
Crisis Relocation Planning (CRP), aimed to provide a framework for collaboration between 
federal, state and local governments regarding the relocation of people.  Though federal 
funding was forthcoming, the programme was abandoned because of local reluctance to 
implement it (May 1985). 
 
Overall, national approaches to disaster management have shifted from a variety of disaster-
specific strategies to comprehensive, multi-hazard strategies.  This shift is based on the 
recognition that all disasters share common characteristics, and that similar responses can 
                                                
65 The database can be searched at https://asd.fema.gov/inter/hportal/home.htm 
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apply to different types of disasters.  Most of these plans, however, do not contain provisions 
regarding long-term displacement, and usually cater only for short-term housing and other 
needs.  Only FEMA developed a strategy for long-term displacement: but Hurricane Katrina 
called into question the feasibility of the strategy. 
 
 
2.2.2. Payment of Damage Compensation 
 
The payment of compensation for damages wreaked by a disaster is traditionally dependent 
on acknowledgement of responsibility for the disaster.  In the case of man-made disasters, this 
responsible party is usually evident, and principles of retributive justice apply.  According to 
the ‘polluter-pays’ principle, those responsible for the disaster are required to pay damage 
compensation to the victims.  Numerous historical examples attest, however, that mediation 
by the state is often required before compensation is handed over (Marcus 2008).  The 
polluter-pays principle is currently undergoing a rapid expansion, most notably under the 
influence of the development of tort law reform in the United States, and the 
acknowledgement of the concept of ‘environmental prejudice’ in France during a trial related 
to the Erika’ oil spill in Brittany.    
 
Instances of natural disasters do not allow for easy acknowledgement of responsibility: 
accordingly, many/most industrialised countries have set up government-sponsored disaster 
insurance programmes.  Such programmes vary greatly in scope, but share the common goal 
of compensating for damages not covered by private insurance schemes.  Moss identifies 
three different phases of the government involvement as risk managers, and notes that each 
phase addresses different risks as their societies move through different stages of 
development.  In the first phase, risk assumption by the government is limited to risks 
associated with industrial development; the second phase covers risks associated with the 
employment of labour; finally, a third phase expands coverage to environmental risks, such as 
natural disasters (Moss 2004). 
 
In most countries, this third phase occurred after World War II, and resulted in the setting up 
of disaster funds aimed at mutualising risk among citizens.  As mentioned above, these funds 
are very diverse, and typically reflect the political ideology and organisation of the country 
where they are implemented.  In the United States, the federal government’s involvement in 
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disaster financing is minimal, with no mandatory insurance programme.  The National Flood 
Insurance Programme, established in 1968, is the only federal programme, while individual 
states have developed their own disaster-specific programmes, such as the California 
Earthquake Authority or the Hurricane Catastrophe Fund in Florida.  At the other end of the 
political spectrum, France’s National Disaster Compensation Scheme, CAT NAT, established 
in 1982, is a classical example of risk-sharing between public and private sectors: all insurance 
policies66 contain a mandatory, government-fixed, 9 per cent surcharge to cover for losses 
resulting from natural disasters.  This surcharge is applied to all citizens, irrespective of 
whether they live in a risk-prone area or not.  The Fund kicks in after commercial insurance 
schemes have compensated up to 150 per cent of the damage.   
 
Despite their differences, these funds have in common the fact they do not provide 
compensation for displacements that result from disasters: they cover personal and property 
losses, but not the costs related to relocation.  Hence the funds imply that people displaced by 
disasters are expected to return home after a short period, since they do not provide 
compensation for resettlement-induced costs.  More importantly, similar funds do not exist in 
developing and emerging countries, where most natural disasters happen.  Moss (2004) argues 
that these governments have not yet reached the third phase of government risk management; 
lack of funding might be a simpler explanation for the absence of such funds, but this 
question lies beyond the scope of this research.   
 
 
2.3. The Emergence o f  New Actors  
 
Until the Lisbon earthquake, religious organisations, and not the State, was the initial 
respondent to disasters.  From the eighteenth century onwards, states have taken on 
increasing responsibility for the management of disasters.  In the 1970s, however, as disaster 
management became internationalised, a number of other actors emerged and started playing 
an expanded role in disaster management.  Beyond the United Nations, whose role in disaster 
management matches its internationalisation, other actors such as NGOs, experts and the 
international media gained a wider role at the scene of disaster relief.   
 
                                                
66 With the exception of life-insurance policies. 
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2.3.1. The United Nations System 
 
Since its creation in 1945, the United Nations has been very active in disaster management 
through its diverse branches and agencies, despite the fact that the charter of the organisation 
makes no distinction between humanitarian assistance per se and economic and social co-
operation, as noted by Stephens (1978: 33).  In fact, disaster management is not explicitly part 
of the UN mandate, but has been a significant component of its activities from its very 
inception. 
 
UN involvement in disaster management is characterised by the fragmentation of its activities: 
with the exception of the short-lived UN Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO), disaster 
responses by UN agencies have never been centralised and are scattered between different 
actors.   
 
The UN Development Programme (UNDP) and Environment Programme (UNEP) have 
both developed specific branches to deal with disasters, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and 
Recover and the Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch respectively.  Agencies such 
as the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 
have long been involved in food security and the provision of emergency food supplies, while 
the UN Chidren’s Fund67 is usually the UN agency most consistently associated with 
emergency relief operations (Stephens 1978).  The World Bank, through its Disaster 
Management Facility, is a major donor to programmes of disaster prevention and 
reconstruction. 
 
Among UN agencies, the role of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is of 
particular interest to this research.  Its role in natural disasters has increased consistently over 
the last few years, despite not being part of its mandate.  This evolution will be further 
described in the next section and following chapter. 
 
In the early 1970s, the UN sought to establish an embryo organisation of international 
governance in the field of disaster management.  The Office of the United Nations Disaster 
                                                
67 Interestingly, the original name of the agency was the ‘United Nations International Children’s Emergency 
Fund’, hence its acronym. UNICEF was created in 1946 and initially established as a three-year temporary body 
aimed at post-war reconstruction. It soon became a permanent agency, with an extended mandate and 
autonomous fund-raising capacities. 
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Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) was created in 1971 as a ‘focal point in the United Nations 
system for disaster relief matters’ (United Nations General Assembly 1971).  UNDRO, 
however, was severely understaffed, and was never able to fulfil its role of emergency relief 
coordinator; it was replaced by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) in 1991, as part of the Department for Humanitarian Affairs.  In addition to being 
the UN focal point for disaster relief, the OCHA mandate includes coordination of 
humanitarian responses and policies aimed at preventing disasters.  Nathan notes that 
OCHA’s role is geared towards disaster relief rather risk management, a task devoted to the 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) (Nathan 2004: 27).  The ISDR’s role is 
to centralise and disseminate data on disasters worldwide, as well as to coordinate efforts in 
disaster prevention and mitigation.    
 
OCHA and ISDR also supervise two platforms where UN agencies and NGOs discuss and 
coordinate their efforts: the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), created in 1992 and 
supervised by OCHA, is the primary mechanism for the inter-agency coordination of 
humanitarian assistance; the Inter-Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction, supervised by 
ISDR, is a discussion forum for risk management gathering various UN agencies, regional 
organisations and NGOs.  The IASC is currently the main forum for discussion of the 
humanitarian assistance available to displaced peoples, since one of its roles is to identify areas 
where gaps in mandates or lack of operational capacity exist (United Nations General 
Assembly 1993). 
 
2.3.2. Private Organisations and NGOs 
 
Over the years, international NGOs have played a greater role in disaster management.  This 
role is complementary to, and sometimes in competition with, the role played by national 
governments and the United Nations system. 
 
Among the NGOs involved in disaster management, the most prominent are undoubtedly the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), both commonly referred to as the Red Cross.  The 
organisation was founded in 1863, in the aftermath of the battle of Solferino.  Like many UN 
agencies, the initial goal of the Red Cross was to protect victims of armed conflicts.  After the 
end of World War II, however, the scope of its operations shifted to encompass natural 
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disaster relief in addition to conflict relief.  The IFRC publishes annually one of the most 
authoritative reports in the field, the World Disasters Report.  Other major NGOs in the field 
include Doctors Without Borders, Christian Aid, Care International, Caritas Internationalis, 
the Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam, Save the Children, the World Council of Churches, 
and World Vision International.  Approximately half of these organisations68 are religious 
organisations, and most of them – with the exception of Doctors Without Borders and 
Christian Aid – compose the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), an 
alliance of major relief organisations for information sharing and policy coordination.  The 
Steering Committee is itself a standing member of the IASC, as are the ICRC and the IFRC.   
 
In a context in which public funding is declining, the involvement of private companies in 
public-private partnerships for disaster reduction is increasingly solicited.  Some of these 
private companies have also developed research capacity: Munich Re and Swiss Re, the world’s 
leading reinsurers, are concerned with the consistently growing impacts of disasters, and have 
become major promoters of disaster reduction.   Munich Re is a now a member of the Inter-
Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction, as well as a major donor for research on disasters.  
One of the world’s leading research centres on disaster reduction and vulnerability, the 
Institute for Environment and Human Security of the United Nations University (UNU-
EHS), in Bonn, works in close cooperation with the German reinsurer.  UNU-EHS played a 
key role in promoting the topic of environmental migration on the international agenda, and 
organised the first international conference on the topic, which took place in Bonn on 9-11 
October 2008: Munich Re was one of the key sponsors of the event.  More recently, the 
company donated £3 million to the newly established Grantham Research Institute on 
Climate Change at the London School of Economics and Imperial College. 
 
Overall, the NGOs and private organisation sector has been instrumental in raising awareness 
of the topic of environmental migration, whereas the UN system initially kept silent on the 
issue: reports from both the Red Cross (2001) and Christian Aid (2007) have highlighted the 
plight of ‘environmental refugees’, and received a great deal of attention from the media, 
policy-makers and scholars alike. 
 
 
                                                
68 Christian Aid, Caritas Internationals, the Lutheran World Federation, the World Council of Churches, and 
World Vision International. 
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2.3.3. Other Regional and International Organisations 
 
Regional organisations have also set up disaster management facilities.  In Europe, the 
European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), established in 1992, centralises and 
channels humanitarian assistance provided by member states: this amount of financial 
assistance is considerable, and represents roughly one half of the world’s total humanitarian 
aid budget.  Other regional organisations69 promote disaster reduction through workshops, 
education programmes and the implementation of local strategies.  In addition, regional banks 
provide pre- and post-disaster funding. 
 
Finally, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), which is not affiliated with the 
UN system, has also developed intervention capacities in disaster management.  Initially 
created to assist with the resettlement of people uprooted by World War II, it evolved into a 
global migration agency in the 1980s and 1990s: as the organisation expanded, so did the 
scope of its missions.  Environmental migration has recently become a focus of the 
organisation, as well as an important item on the agenda of the International Migration 
Dialogue, an IOM-promoted policy forum.  This interest reflects the increasing involvement 
of IOM in situations of natural disasters, following the 2004 tsunami and the 2005 Kashmir 
earthquake: in 2007, an overwhelming majority of its ‘flash appeals’ for funding were directly 
related to natural disasters.  IOM is also a standing member of the IASC. 
 
2.3.4. Donor Governments 
 
Western governments are, by far, the largest providers of disaster aid internationally; as a 
result, they have considerable influence on disaster reduction policies.  They have set up 
specialised agencies70 to direct the funding, which usually mix long-term development aid and 
emergency assistance.  Davis and Seitz (1982) have shown the importance of economic 
efficiency in the allocation of this aid, hence the great emphasis on disaster prevention and 
mitigation.  Furthermore, the allocation of the funds reflects the donor government’s national 
interests, and is largely determined by the country’s foreign policy (Nathan 2004). 
                                                
69 Such organisations include the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Organisation of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), the South Pacific Commission (SOPAC), and the African Union (AU). 
70 USAID in the United States, DFID in the United Kingdom, GTZ in Germany, and the Agence Française de 
Développement in France, to name just a few. 
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2.3.5. The International Media 
 
Every year, the NGO Doctors Without Borders publishes a report on forgotten crises, or the 
‘most under-reported humanitarian stories’.  The existence of such a publication serves to 
illustrate the importance of the international media in the governance of disaster management.  
The media is often instrumental in raising awareness and donations for emergency situations.  
It can also prompt the international community or a government to act towards providing 
relief to people affected by disaster.  The 1985 LiveAid concert significantly raised the 
international profile of the then-ongoing famine in Ethiopia; Green also reports that German 
assistance towards a previous famine in the same country was largely the result of a year-long 
campaign in Stern magazine, and concludes that ‘it is doubtful that there ever would have been 
an Ethiopian famine operation had the press not intervened’ (1977: 41).  More recently, the 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami prompted considerable coverage and fund-raising efforts in the 
media, resulting in an estimated 13.5 US$ billion in disaster relief aid (Tsunami Evaluation 
Coalition 2006) 
 
In a similar vein, the international media has devoted considerable attention in recent years to 
environmental migration, particularly in relation to climate change.  The perspective adopted 
is consistently alarmist, and scholars from the sceptical coalition are often dismissed at the 
expense of their alarmist counterparts.  Numerous press articles, television broadcasts, 
documentary films71, and even a coffee-table book (Collectif Argos 2007) were devoted to the 
topic.  These appearances in the media were instrumental in raising awareness about the topic 





It is necessary here to distinguish between experts and researchers: experts may be 
researchers, but they act in a special capacity, since they have been mandated by a government 
to provide technical information to inform policy decision. Hence they engage directly and 
                                                
71 Among others, ‘Über Wasser: Menschen und gelbe Kanister’ by Udo Maurer, as well as the series ‘Sale temps 
pour la planète’ by Hervé Corbière and Morad Aït-Habouche, are particularly noteworthy. 
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deliberately in the policy process, whereas researchers are not necessarily intentionally part of 
the process. 
 
The role of experts in disaster management dates back to the Lisbon earthquake, when 
Pombal entrusted a group of architects, city planners and engineers with the task of 
redesigning the city layout in a way to reduce its vulnerability to disasters.  Experts have since 
expanded their role to encompass all aspects of disaster management, risk awareness in 
particular.  Nathan notes that the field of awareness raising is now dominated by scientific 
referents, which seek to replace popular, local knowledge and traditions about disaster 
management (2004: 12). 
 
The assessment of disaster risks is now extensively left to experts, who are also in charge of 
identifying the populations at risk of displacement.  Although this intensive reliance on 
expertise has certainly help refine the identification and understanding of disaster risks, public 
debate on ways to deal with these risks has increasingly been hijacked by a ‘government of 
experts’, which is particularly powerful in the field of disaster management. 
 
The role and importance of experts in political decision-making has long been a contentious 
topic, not just within the confines of disaster management and risk assessment.  The social 
construction of the risk implies that this risk in embedded in scientific rationality; for example, 
soon after the Lisbon earthquake, Pombal established a scientific committee with the mission 
of understanding and analysing the causes of the disaster.  Political decision-making based on 
scientific expertise should ideally integrate science as part of the public policy debate, but 
Larrère and Larrère assert that the debate is often annihilated by scientific authoritarianism, 
used by policy-makers to justify decisions that may prove unpopular with their constituents 
(1997: 220-221).  Hence experts are consenting victims of ‘consensus blackmail’, a situation in 
which uncertainties and disagreements cannot be exposed for fear that they would undermine 
the decision-making process.  Yet controversies are essential to the progress of science and to 
informed decision-making.   
 
Given their importance to the decision-making progress, the social responsibility of experts is 
considerable, and their relationship to policy-makers needs to be questioned.  Science is at the 
centre of disaster: Serres (1999) opines that eighteenth century theodicy has been replaced by 
an epistemodicy,  in which the fear of risk is fed by both the advancement of science and its 
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inability to provide certainties about it.  He concludes that although scientists have a duty to 
identify risks, the decision on how to cope with it should rest with policy-makers. 
 
2.4. The Internat ional i sat ion  o f Disas t er Management 
 
Although formal cooperation mechanisms for disaster management were not implemented 
until the 1970s, the deployment of international cooperation in the face of disasters is not a 
recent idea.  In the aftermath of the Lisbon earthquake, ships loaded with relief supplies were 
sent from England, Hamburg and Sicily (Quenet 2005: 450).  The first, large-scale 
international relief effort was organised during World War I, when Herbert Hoover agreed to 
head an international endeavour aimed to providing relief supplies to the victims of the war, 
and called the Commission for Relief in Belgium. 
 
The interwar period saw the first and only attempt to provide disaster relief assistance in the 
form of a treaty, the International Relief Union (IRU) (Macalister-Smith 2007).  Interestingly, 
the IRU was one of the few organisations in the field that was not established in the aftermath 
of war: its founding stemmed from the Messina earthquake of 1908 (Macalister-Smith 1985: 
18). In many ways, the IRU was the civil equivalent of a military alliance: member states 
pledged to come to each other’s aid of each other in case they were hit by a disaster due to 
force majeure.  The idea behind the organisation is credited to an Italian senator and national 
Red Cross president, Giovanni Ciraolo.  Ciraolo presented his idea in different meeting and 
conferences, until the League of Nations formally endorsed the project and convened an 
international conference, where 42 countries72 signed the treaty.   
 
The principle behind the IRU was highly innovative: international assistance was no longer a 
matter of goodwill and charity, but a matter of common responsibility guaranteed by a treaty.  
Plagued by a permanent shortage of staff and resources, and ignored by governments, the 
Union failed to live up to its promises and instead concentrated on stimulating research on 
disaster prevention until it was finally dissolved in 1968.  The experience of the IRU has now 
been largely forgotten, and the principle of providing international disaster assistance through 
a treaty has never been revived.  It must be noted, however, that the convention establishing 
the IRU did not oblige states to take on people displaced by disasters, and excluded 
                                                
72 Of these forty-two countries, thirty eventually ratified the treaty. 
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humanitarian interference: Article 4 states that ‘intervention by the International Relief Union 
in any country is subject to the consent of the government thereof’ (League of Nations 1927).   
 
At a time when the IRU was practically exhausted, the Second World War saw the creation of 
another relief organisation, which would precede the creation of the United Nations proper: 
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), initiated in 1943 by 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to provide assistance to the war-torn allied countries.  A major focus of 
the work of UNRRA was assistance to refugees, which included the set-up and administration 
of camps.  UNRRA was in existence for four years only, and later transferred most of its 
functions to other UN agencies, in particular the International Refugee Organisation. 
 
Following the foundation of the United Nations, disaster assistance was split between several 
agencies, including UNICEF and the World Health Organisation.  The Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, founded in 1951, was originally set up as a non-
operational office focused on the legal protection of refugees73.  In the after-war period, 
international disaster assistance became increasingly complex and fragmented.  In addition to 
existing agencies, a number of ad-hoc bodies were created in order to deal with specific 
disasters.  Such bodies included the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 
founded to care for Palestinian refugees, the UN Korean Reconstruction Agency, the UN 
Civilian Operations Mission in Congo, as well as the UN East Pakistan Relief Office, initially 
aimed at coordinating assistance for the victims of a cyclone that ravaged modern-day 
Bangladesh in November 1970, but later focused on the East Bengali refugees who fled to 
India following the outbreak of civil war (Stephens 1978: 56). 
 
International disaster assistance started to restructure itself in the 1970s and 1980s.  These 
decades were marred by a series of major disasters, which increased the need for a coordinated 
international response.  The catastrophes that occurred at the turn of the 1970s, in particular, 
provided the background for general agreement that the role of the United Nations in disaster 
relief should be expanded.  At that time, disasters were widely seen as unpredictable and 
unpreventable, and disaster relief was the prime responsibility of the affected state: ‘Not one 
single international governmental organisation had within it a permanent body that dealt with 
disasters or disaster preparedness’ (Kent 1983: 694). 
 
                                                
73 The origins, role and evolutions of UNHCR will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter. 
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A report of the UN General Secretary, entitled Assistance in Cases of Natural Disaster, 
recommended that countries affected by disasters should be able to rely on the assistance of 
the international community, and implicitly acknowledged that the ad-hoc bodies set up by the 
UN were insufficient to deal with the increasing number of devastating disasters.  The need 
for a coordinated international structure was met with the creation of the UN Disaster Relief 
Office (UNDRO) in 1971.  As a focal point for disaster relief matters, UNDRO was entrusted 
with two core missions: ‘To mobilize, direct, and coordinate external aid (…), and promote 
the study, prevention, control and prediction of natural disasters’ (United Nations General 
Assembly 1971).  From its birth, UNDRO – like the IRU – was hindered by problems of 
staffing and funding, and was never able to effectively coordinate relief efforts.  Furthermore, 
its relationship with other UN agencies (UNDP in particular) and NGOs (the Red Cross in 
particular) was fraught with continuous tensions and jealousy: ‘The Office faced considerable 
competition from other UN agencies for relief fund raising and often did not have the full 
cooperation of other UN agency field staff’, notes Green (1977: 32). 
 
During the 1970s, the UN passed a number of important resolutions to reinforce the 
international disaster regime.  The 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
Economic Order, in particular, contained a special funding programme aimed at providing 
emergency relief to the most seriously affected developing countries.  Despite significant 
expansion in the mid-1970s, UNDRO failed to achieve a real coordinative position, and was 
replaced in 1991 by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), part of 
the newly created Department for Humanitarian Affairs.  One of the motivations for the 
resolution establishing OCHA was the deep concern about ‘flows of refugees’ and the ‘mass 
displacement of people’ (United Nations General Assembly 1991).  This concern for the 
suffering of displaced people materialised in the creation of an Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC), a platform of exchange and policy-making involving diverse UN agencies 
and other organisations, including UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM).  The inclusion of these two agencies reflects the willingness to address the plight of 
those displaced in natural disasters.  ‘Climate change and migration’ was explicitly on the 
agenda of the 71st meeting of the Working Group of the IASC, held on 18-20 June 2008. 
 
The 1990s were declared the International Decade for Disaster Risk Reduction, and saw the 
creation of numerous regional offices for disaster assistance, including the European 
Community Humanitarian Office, the Comité Andino para la Prevención y Atención de Desastres in 
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Latin America, as well as the Centro de Cordinación para la Prevención de los Desastres Naturales en 
América Central.  The highlight of the decade, however, was undoubtedly the convening of an 
international conference on disaster reductionin Yokohama in 1994.  The conference attached 
key importance to the role of vulnerability and other socio-economic factors in disaster 
reduction, and the Yokohame Strategy – the main outcome of the conference – specified that 
disaster prevention and development were more important than disaster response (World 
Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction 1994).   
 
The International Decade for Disaster Reduction was marked by the increasing specialisation 
of actors: almost all UN agencies developed a branch for disaster reduction, and NGOs 
gained wider currency.  The decade gave birth to yet another UN organisation74, the 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), a platform designed to foster and 
facilitate international cooperation amongst multiple stakeholders in the field of disaster 
reduction.  In the present day, disaster management at the UN-level is roughly between 
disaster relief, overseen by OCHA, and disaster prevention, coordinated by ISDR. 
 
This myriad of actors constitutes the embryo of a governance system for natural disasters, but 
one that is not yet strongly structured.  The system remains highly fragmented, increasingly 
specialised, and marred by institutional rivalries.  While concern for people displaced by 
natural disasters has become more central to disaster management efforts over time, with 
attention devoted to the issue on discussion agendas, and the inclusion of agencies dealing 
with refugees and migrants in the system, no concrete mechanism has yet been implemented, 
and the system remains organised according to sovereign states, despite increasing 
internationalisation. 
 
3. The Current International Regime of Disaster Management 
 
Although disaster prevention and relief remain primarily a matter of national policies, recent 
years have witnessed the emergence of an international system – some would say a governing 
structure – to deal with disasters on a global level.  What are the normative frameworks 
shaping this system, and how does it care for those displaced by disasters? 
 
                                                
74 Note that the term ‘organisation’ was carefully avoided. 
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3.1. An Overvi ew o f  Disast ers  Worldwide  
 
According to the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) maintained by the Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the University of Louvain, a total of 
414 disasters were reported in 2007, resulting in 16,487 casualties and affecting more than 211 
million people (Scheuren et al. 2008).  This figure confirms an upward trend in the occurrence 
of disasters, which has been identified since the start of the systematic recording of disasters 
in the early twentieth century: the number of people killed in disasters has been steadily 
decreasing since the mid 1970s, while the number of affected people75 has been on the rise.  
Overall, despite the upward trend in the occurrence of disasters, the number of victims 
(people killed and people affected) has remained quite stable, meaning that the average 
number of victims reported per disaster is decreasing.  It is not clear whether this decrease can 
be attributed to improvement in the reporting of disaster, or to better preparedness of the 
population; the question remains unanswered as the search for better statistical methods on 
disaster reporting continues. 
 
Fig.  7 – Number of natural disasters reported, 1975-2007.  Source: EM-DAT, OFDA/CRED 
International Disaster Database. 
                                                




Fig.  8 - Number of people affected by natural disasters, 1975-2007.  Source: EM-DAT, 
OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. 
 
Not all countries are equally affected by disasters: most disasters occur in South East Asia, a 
region that also reports the largest numbers of victims.  Between 1974 and 2003, the 10 
disasters with highest numbers of people affected all occurred in either China or India, 
suggesting the importance of demographic growth to the exposure to disaster risks.  Of the 
total number of people killed by natural disasters between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, 
more than 75 per cent were in Asia (Guha-Sapir et al. 2004: 29).  Overall, developing countries 
are disproportionately affected by disasters, although OEDC countries report the highest 
economic losses.  In developing countries, the poor are the hardest hit by disasters, since they 
tend to live in more hazard-prone and/or overpopulated areas, a claim that has long been 
substantiated by studies on environmental racism in the United States (Downey 1998; Boer et 
al. 1997). 
 
Not all victims receive the same level of assistance: certain types of disasters are more likely to 
attract international assistance than others.  During the period from 1990 to 1999, the amount 
of international assistance for disaster relief more than doubled, from US$ 2.1 billion in 1990 
to US$ 5.9 billion in 2000.  This aid, however, was not evenly distributed, nor was it 
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distributed in proportion to human need.  People affected by drought received an average of 
US$ 2.8 per capita in international aid, while people affected by floods received US$ 7.4 per 
capita on average, and people affected by wild fires and tidal waves received more than US$ 
500 per capita (Guha-Sapir et al. 2004: 50).  The latter disasters tend to be brutal, large-scale 
events, and attract more spectacular media interest – and hence more financial assistance – at 
the expense of objective criteria of need. 
 
Finally, no comprehensive data exist for people displaced by disasters: statistics are generally 
related to the number of fatalities, the number of people affected, and the extent of economic 
losses.  The only way to apprehend displaced people from a statistical point of view is through 
data on affected people, which also include people displaced and evacuated.  Though the 
media frequently report on people made homeless by disasters, no comprehensive statistical 
effort has been undertaken to systematically collect data on these people.  Nonetheless, it 
would seem that the acquisition of accurate, specific data on displaced people is a necessary 
preliminary step for the design and implementation of adequate policy responses.   
 
 
3.2. Normat ive  Frameworks 
 
Normative frameworks on disaster management remain disparate, highly fragmented, and 
dominated by the classic tension between national sovereignty and world governance.  
International norms are most often recommendations and guidelines, without holding binding 
value.  National frameworks, on the other hand, are often uncoordinated with each other, 
even though ISDR has aimed to foster coordination in recent years. 
 
At the international level, the most ambitious document is undoubtedly the Hyogo 
Framework for Action 2005-2015, appropriately subtitled ‘Building the Resilience of Nations 
and Communities to Disasters’.  The document, which is the main outcome of the World 
Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, held in Kobe (Japan) on 18-22 January 2005, 
follows the path of the Yokohama Strategy.  Today it is the principal international framework 
for disaster management, setting out priorities for the period 2005-2015.  It is a document of 
soft law, that is, without binding force, although many countries have incorporated its 
priorities into their national disaster action plans.  
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The Hyogo Framework draws heavily upon the concept of vulnerability, and sets itself three 
strategic goals: 
 
- ‘More effective integration of disaster risk considerations into sustainable development 
policies, planning and programming at all levels’ (…); 
- Development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms and capacities at all levels 
(…), that can systematically contribute to building resilience to hazard ; 
- The systematic incorporation of risk reduction approaches into the design and 
implementation of emergency preparedness, response and recovery programmes in the 
reconstruction of affected communities’ (World Conference on Natural Disaster 
Reduction 2005). 
 
The document makes a series of recommendations to national governments for better disaster 
reduction: only one of these recommendations addresses the issue of displacement, and 
governments are advised that programmes for displaced persons should not increase risk and 
vulnerability to hazards.  The document, however, does not elaborate upon whether this 
recommendation applies to temporary camps and/or housing, or permanent relocation or 
resettlement, or both.  However, it does make clear that states have the ‘primary responsibility 
to protect the people and property on their territory from hazards and (…) to give high 
priority to disaster risk reduction’.  In cases where reasonable measures to prevent disasters 
have not been taken, Walter Kälin, Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the 
Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, recommends that displaced people should 
have the right to claim compensation from the government and public officials (Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2005).  With regard to disaster relief, 
the Hyogo Framework encourages – but does not impose – mutual assistance, and 
recommends the promotion of ‘a culture of insurance in developing countries’.   
 
The Hyogo Framework is supported by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and 
Recovery (GFDRR), a fund managed by the World Bank on behalf of the ISDR.  The 
GFDRR provides funding for projects aimed at reducing vulnerability to natural hazards, 
especially in the global South.  Funding, however, remains modest – approximately US$ 78 
million have been pledged so far – but the mechanism also contains the first global disaster 
recovery fund, the Standby Recovery Financing Facility, created in 2006.  This facility consists 
of two funds: a fund for long-term recovery technical assistance, and a fund that can be 
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immediately activated when a disaster strikes.  The overarching goal of the facility is to make 
disaster recovery financing easier to predict, although it also recognises the central role 
national governments play in this process.  Though this is not explicitly stated, the fund could 
also be used to facilitate the return of those displaced by disasters, and to aid the 
reconstruction of their homes.   
 
Besides the Hyogo Framework and its Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 
other regional agreements also aim to foster international cooperation in disaster management.  
The Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, signed in 1991, outlines the 
conditions of mutual disaster assistance amongst its member states.  Some national plans for 
disaster assistance are more explicit than others with regard to forced displacement and 
refugees: in addition to the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the United States 
established in 1962 an Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA), a 
contingency fund of US$ 100 million to be used at the discretion of the President.  Though 
the fund aims to respond to the objective of preventing or minimizing the human costs of 
conflict and natural disasters, it appears that the fund is primarily directed to refugees 
displaced by conflicts, ignoring those displaced by natural disasters (Margesson 2006).   
 
Other general principles of international law can also provide relevant normative frameworks 
for disaster management.  Such principles include: 
 
- The principle of precaution, formally established at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, which 
contains an obligation to act to prevent natural disasters; 
 
- Human rights, including the most fundamental right, the right to life; 
 
- The duty to inform other states in case of disaster, particularly in cases of pollution, 
also established at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and since reiterated at numerous 
regional conventions. 
 
Overall, international disaster law remains weak and fragmented, and resorts almost 
exclusively to soft law.  It is not yet a consistent body of law, even though disaster 
management has been increasingly institutionalised and internationalised under the impulse of 
ISDR.  The development of binding international law on the subject remains hampered by 
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national sovereignty: recent history shows that there are still numerous occasions when a 
country struck by a disaster refuses international assistance76.   
 
Furthermore, existing normative frameworks do not address directly the issue of disaster-
related displacement.  As shown above, the displaced are all but absent from disaster statistics, 
and they are equally absent from normative frameworks.  Over time, these frameworks have 
placed greater emphasis on social vulnerability and community resilience without providing 
effective, systematic protection and assistance to those displaced.  The next section highlights 
the role of international organisations and agencies in providing this protection in the absence 
of formal, normative provision.   
 
3.3. Internat ional Organisat ions and the  Prote c ti on o f  those  Displaced by Natural  
Disas t ers  
 
Over time, international organisations dealing with refugees and migrants have been 
increasingly solicited to provide protection and assistance to those displaced by disasters, even 
though such role is usually not part of their initial mandate.  This is especially true for 




The UN Refugee Agency has long been an important actor of disaster relief.  Its action, 
however, has been confined to theatres of wars and civil conflicts, and has only recently 
extended to the field of natural disasters.  A turning point in this evolution was UNHCR’s 
intervention in the aftermath of the Asian tsunami, at the end of 2004.  Prior to this 
intervention, UNHCR’s policy was not to become involved in situations of natural disasters, 
ad it had limited experience of responding to them.  At a discussion event on the topic of 
environmental migration held in New York in May 2007, a UNHCR representative justified 
this policy by the fact that people displaced by disasters were not part of UNHCR’s mandate, 
and were already taken care of by other organisations (Gorlick 2007).  The role of the UN 
Refugee Agency in situations of disasters was therefore limited to people displaced by wars 
                                                
76 The United States initially refused international assistance after Hurricane Katrina, as did the Burmese 
government after Cyclone Nargis, and the Chinese government after the Sichuan earthquake. 
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and civil conflicts.  UNHCR was originally conceived as a non-operational agency, and even 
sought the abolition of its Emergency Fund in the 1960s (Kent 1983: 496). 
 
The tsunami was UNHCR’s first major intervention in a situation of natural disaster, and 
prompted wider reflection on its role in such situations.  The rationale for the agency’s 
intervention in Indonesia and Sri Lanka was manifold: first, there was a moral imperative to 
assist those in need faced with one of the world’s worst ever disasters. As then-UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Ruud Lubbers, described ‘the magnitude of this disaster is so 
enormous and shocking that we will do everything we can to join the international community 
in bringing help as rapidly as possible to the victims of these gigantic waves’ (United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees 2004).  The duty to help was reinforced by UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan’s call to all UN agencies to join the relief effort, as well as UNHCR’s 
previous presence and expertise in the region.   
 
Furthermore there was a ‘long-term protection imperative of maintaining positive relations 
with countries where UNHCR needed to carry out its traditional mandate’ (Lambert and 
Pougin de la Maisonneuve 2007: 1).  As stated above, the agency had a well established 
position in Sri Lanka.  The success of future operations of refugee protection in the region 
would doubtless have been compromised by a passive attitude of UNHCR at a time when the 
country was confronted with its largest disaster ever.  The situation in Indonesia was more 
sensitive, due to the civil war raging in the Aceh province: here the tsunami operation was also 
a way for UNHCR to enhance its presence in the country, in the case of a possible return of 
refugees from Malaysia to the Aceh province. 
 
Finally, strategic considerations were also part of the agency’s decision to intervene.  In an 
independent review of the tsunami operation, Lambert and Pougin de la Maisonneuve note 
that there was a ‘strategic organisational imperative, at a time of UN reform, of indicating a 
practical organisational capability which would be valued whatever the eventual outcome of 
such reform’ (2007: 1).  Indeed, the tsunami operation happened at a time when UNHCR’s 
role within the UN system was questioned.  The operation’s evaluation report details the 
reasons for this questioning, and suggests that UNHCR should take a more proactive role in 
situations of natural disasters: 
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Over recent years, there has been a significant drop in the global number of refugees, UNHCR’s 
traditional beneficiaries.  In parallel, there has been a rise in the number and impact of natural 
disasters and in the numbers of internally displaced people.  In the days following the Tsunami there 
was huge support, and pressure, for a response from all humanitarian actors, backed up by an 
unprecedented injection of funding.  In this context and at a time of considerable change within the 
UN system, UNHCR could demonstrate that it had a good capability to deliver, both in its 
protection mandate and in the area of emergency and transitional shelter.  (…) 
UNHCR’s current policy is not to become involved in natural disasters.  However, as has happened 
in recent major disasters (the Tsunami and the South Asia earthquake), it is likely that response 
capacity will be a key consideration in deciding who should respond.  Recognising this, and bearing in 
mind its relationships with other emergency shelter actors, UNHCR should make it clear that it will 
be prepared to respond, or provide support to a response, in major natural disasters.  (…) In 
exceptional circumstances, should it be requested to lead a response, it should be prepared to do so.  It 
is important to clarify this to avoid the need for distracting internal debates at the time of a major 
sudden-onset disaster.  (Lambert and Pougin de la Maisonneuve 2007: 9 & 39) 
 
Hence the decision by UNHCR to respond to the tsunami disaster was not only justified by 
the scale of the disaster and of public outcry, but also by internal motives, which related to the 
agency’s presence in the region and strategic considerations about its future role in the UN 
system. 
 
At this stage, three observations can be made about UNHCR’s involvement in natural disaster 
relief efforts: 
 
1. The tsunami operation was not planned: not because the tsunami was unpredictable, 
but because UNHCR’s policy was not to intervene in cases of natural disasters.  
Although the operation was overall rather successful77, it was largely improvised.  The 
initial response was modest: the agency initially decided upon an aid package of US$ 
7.8 million in Indonesia.  The budget was later increased to US$ 40 million, and a flash 
appeal was finally issued, requesting US$ 75 million – about ten times the amount of 
the initial commitment.  In the emergency phase of the relief effort, UNHCR assisted 
roughly 250,000 people with shelters in Sri Lanka and Indonesia.  In later transitional 
phases, it coordinated the provision of shelters to about 300,000 people, mostly in Sri 
                                                
77 Except for the Aceh province, as detailed below in point 4. 
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Lanka, and successfully advocated for an equal treatment of people affected by 
conflict and by the tsunami.  None of these programmes had been previously 
coordinated with local governments, which led to several difficulties with the 
Indonesian government in the Aceh province. 
 
2. Though the tsunami response was not part of UNHCR’s mandate, and therefore not 
planned, the agency’s involvement in disaster relief has considerably increased since 
the tsunami.  Less than a year after the Indian Ocean disaster, a violent earthquake 
struck Pakistan, prompting another intervention by UNHCR.  The intervention was 
justified on similar grounds as the tsunami operation, as synthesised on the ad-hoc 
page of UNHCR’s website: 
 
The UN refugee agency has traditionally played a very minor role – if any at all – during 
natural disasters.  Its mandate is for refugees – the product of deliberate persecution or war – 
with a recently expanded role for people displaced within their own countries by similar man-
made causes.  However, within a couple of days of the earthquake, it became clear that 
UNHCR's services would be needed for the second natural disaster in under a year (it also 
launched a major operation after the December 2004 tsunami in Asia).  There were two 
main reasons for this: firstly, after 25 years managing major operations in Pakistan for the 
care and maintenance – and subsequently repatriation – of millions of Afghan refugees, it 
was still one of the biggest operational agencies on the ground.  Secondly, after decades of 
setting up and running refugee camps all over the world, it is the UN system's specialist on 
the provision of emergency shelter and camp management.  (United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 2005) 
 
Following the Pakistan earthquake, the refugee agency intervened in several other 
disasters: during the Kenya flooding in November 2006, and more recently during 
after Cyclone Nargis hit Burma in May 2008.  The agency’s response to natural 
disasters has not yet become systematic, but can now be qualified as regular – a trend 
that finds its origin in the 2004 tsunami response.  The response, however, remains ad-
hoc, and has not been formalised and systematised.   
 
3. Finally, UNHCR’s assistance remains limited to the provision of emergency and 
transitional shelters, not permanent housing.  After the initial emergency response, the 
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Sri Lanka government asked UNHCR to coordinate the provision of transitional 
shelters, which it successfully did.  Things went differently in Indonesia, where the 
agency was in charge of providing emergency and permanent shelters, but not 
transitional shelters (which were set up directly in wooden barracks by the Indonesian 
government).  Because of management problems and tense relationships with the 
government, the delivery of permanent shelters was far lower than the initial targets, 
and it was recommended that UNHCR no longer be involved with the provision of 
permanent shelters, because severe problems were encountered and the agency did not 
perform well overall (Lambert and Pougin de la Maisonneuve 2007).  In subsequent 
disasters, UNHCR provided emergency shelters (tents in particular) and supplies, but 
did not attempt to engage in long-term reconstruction efforts.  Thus it appears that 
the agency’s involvement in disasters has focused primarily on emergency response, 
rather than on reconstruction building. 
 
 
3.3.2. International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
 
Along with UNHCR, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) focuses specifically 
on the needs of displaced populations.  The IOM Constitution does not explicitly include 
assistance to populations displaced by disasters, but article 1.b. states that the organisation 
should ‘concern itself with the organized transfer of refugees, displaced persons and other 
individuals in need of international migration services for whom arrangements may be made 
between the Organization and the States concerned, including those States undertaking to 
receive them’ (International Organization for Migration 1951), which can be interpreted as an 
implicit mandate to care for those displaced by natural disasters.   
 
As in the case of UNHCR, IOM has increasingly been involved in natural disasters over time.  
In contrast to UNHCR, however, the migration organisation seems to be more concerned 
with disaster prevention, preparedness and reconstruction.  Whereas UNHCR concentrates its 
efforts on the provision of shelters, food and emergency supplies, as well as on the legal 
protection of refugees and IDPs, IOM adopts a more holistic approach, which includes the 
provision of health services, professional training, disaster risk management, prevention of 
human trafficking and construction of permanent homes and shelters. 
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The tsunami catastrophe also constituted a seminal event in the organisation’s approach to 
natural disasters.  An IOM report on the tsunami response noted that the international effort 
appeared to have been characterized by ‘an excessive emphasis on the emergency response 
and an over-supply of goods to some groups of victims, whilst missing some more marginal 
groups, and a relative failure to move to the reconstruction phase’ (Naik et al. 2007: 29).  IOM 
provided different types of assistance in the aftermath of the tsunami, moving beyond a 
simple emergency response to engage in reconstruction efforts.  Since the tsunami, the 
organisation has assisted in a wide number of other disasters.   
 
Overall, IOM interventions in situations of natural disasters are more formalised and 
systematic than UNHCR’s, in large part thanks to its wider mandate.  However, a notable shift 
has also occurred within the organisation since the tsunami disaster: whereas assistance to 
people displaced by disaster used to be somewhat of a peripheral activity for the organisation, 
it is now becoming a core aspect of its activities. 
 
3.4. The Operat ional Guide lines  on Human Rights  and Natural Disas t ers  
 
In the absence of normative frameworks, organisations have stepped up to provide 
operational responses to natural disasters.  These responses have consisted of ad-hoc, 
unplanned but increasingly frequent interventions in the case of UNHCR, while for IOM they 
represent a planned, holistic and increasingly important sphere action.  These operations have 
been analysed and assessed at great length, such as the extensive work of the Tsunami 
Evaluation Coalition (Telford and Cosgrave 2006). 
 
The assessments of these on-the-ground responses translated into a policy document entitled 
Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters, edited by the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (2006).  The guidelines were drafted by Walter Kälin, Representative of 
the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (RSG), after 
the 2004 tsunami and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina, and later enriched by the inputs of member 
agencies of the IASC. 
 
The documents outline four types of protection that ought to be guaranteed to people 
affected by disasters: the protection of life, security of the person, physical integrity and 
dignity; the protection of rights related to basic necessities of life; the protection of other 
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economic, social and cultural rights; and finally the protection of other civil and political 
rights.  The guidelines also address second-generation human rights, and not only the most 
basic, first-generation human rights. 
 
The first type of protection relates directly to the displacement of populations following a 
disaster.  The guidelines here stress the importance of free movement within the country, 
forbid of forced resettlement, and enjoin the obligation to apply the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement to those displaced within their country: 
 
A.1.4 When the natural disaster has occurred, persons affected by it should be allowed to move to 
other parts of the country and to settle there.  This right may not be subject to any restrictions except 
those which are provided by law, and are necessary to protect national security, the safety and security 
of affected populations, public order (ordre public), public health or the rights and freedoms of others.   
A.1.5 Persons—including evacuees—who have been ordered or forced to flee or to leave their homes or 
places of habitual residence as a result of a natural disaster or its effects, or have left in order to avoid 
them, and have not crossed an internationally recognized State border should be treated as belonging to 
the category of internally displaced persons covered by the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement.   
A.1.6 After the emergency phase, persons displaced by the natural disaster should be granted the 
opportunity to choose freely whether they want to return to their homes and places of origin, to remain 
in the area to which they have been displaced, or to resettle in another part of the country.  (Inter-
Agency Standing Committee 2006: 18) 
 
The document further stresses the freedom of movement and the right to return: 
 
D.2.1 In accordance with their right to freedom of movement, persons displaced by natural disaster 
should be provided with the information necessary to exercise their right to decide freely where they 
want to live—whether they want to return to their homes, to integrate where they are staying during 
their displacement or to resettle in another part of the country.   
D.2.2 Appropriate measures should be taken as soon as possible to establish conditions conducive to 
sustainable return in safety and dignity.  Conditions are considered sustainable if:  
(i) People feel safe and secure, free from harassment and intimidation, as well as from unmitigated 
risks of further calamitous effects produced by natural hazards;  
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(ii) People have been able to repossess their properties or homes, and these have been adequately 
reconstructed or rehabilitated;  
(iii) People can return to their lives as normally as possible, with access to services, schools, livelihoods, 




These guidelines are undoubtedly the most advanced effort to address the issues of people 
displaced by disasters directly; however, they have not yet been approved by any legislative 
body, and therefore cannot be considered a normative framework. 
 
In order to understand the process that led to the development of these guidelines, I will 
consider the IASC to be a policy forum, and its member organisations to be part of competing 
advocacy coalitions.  If we recall the terms of the debate between the sceptical and alarmist 
coalitions, on a policy level the former advocated a better use of the existing instruments, 
whereas the latter favoured the development of new norms and tools.  Within the IASC, 
agencies with strict mandates, such as UNHCR, ranked with the sceptics, while NGOs and 
agencies with a broader mandate, such as IOM, ranked with alarmists.  This positioning was 
not solely determined by their mandate, but also by their approach to disasters and thus the 
way they saw their role in emerging international disaster governance: UNHCR considers 
disaster interventions to be exceptional extensions of its mandate, whereas NGOs and IOM 
see them as part of their core activities.  One should not underestimate, however, the strength 
of internal debates within both organisations – and in particular within UNHCR – which will 
be developed in the next chapter. 
 
The development of the operational guidelines was the results of two concurring factors: 
 
- First, the perturbation of the system by external events.  The tsunamis, hurricanes and 
earthquakes which hit parts of Asia and the Americas in 2004-2005 were explicitly 
cited as the events that precipitated the adoption of the guidelines.  These disasters 
were unprecedented in their scale and the damage and suffering they induced. 
 
- Second, the action of a policy broker, Walter Kälin, who initiated the effort and 
mediated between the two coalitions through a participative process.  Both coalitions 
had a chance to review and modify the Operational Guidelines through the policy 
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forum constituted by the IASC.  Kälin, as a policy broker, successfully sought to reach 
a compromise that could result in a policy output. 
 
This policy output has not yet established itself as a standard for disaster management 
operations; it has not been much publicised, and nor has it been transposed in a resolution of 
the UN General Assembly, which would make it a normative framework.  The reason for this 
low profile has to be found in the continuing opposition between the two advocacy coalitions: 
the document is the result of a mediated compromise, a compromise based on the fact that 
the operational guidelines would not be a normative framework, but rather a soft law 
document. The sceptical coalition opposed the idea that the guidelines could become a norm, 
and managed to impose its views. Before the document is able reach a higher level, similar 
mediation will be necessary in other policy areas. 
 
These guidelines and recommendations, however, are not always applied, as evidenced by the 
failing policy responses in the case of hurricane Katrina. 
 
 
4. Empirical Illustration: Disaster Management of Hurricane Katrina 
 
‘Brownie, you’re doing a heck of a job’ – these words addressed by President George W.  
Bush to FEMA Director Michael Brown during a field visit in Mobile, AL five days after the 
hurricane landfall (White House Press Secretary Office 2005a) spurred an immediate and 
widespread uproar.  The same day President Bush made these remarks, local New Orleans 
newspaper The Times-Picayune’s headline read ‘Help Us, Please’.  It would take an additional 48 
hours before rescue teams finally reached the flooded city.  Different stages of 
mismanagement of the crisis can be distinguished here: first, the lack of evacuation planning 
for New Orleans’ most vulnerable residents; second, the belated and sometimes inadequate 
relief efforts in the immediate aftermath; and finally, the slow and sometimes inefficient 
recovery efforts.  Failures were too numerous to be listed here exhaustively; it is nevertheless 
useful to identify some key points at which the discrepancies between disaster planning and its 
applications were most blatant. 
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4.1. Percept ions  o f the  Fai lures  
 
The evacuation was the key target of criticism, from media, commentators, and evacuees 
themselves.  The experience of the evacuation varied greatly according to the characteristics of 
the evacuees, but those who had the worst experience of their evacuation also had a tendency 
to blame FEMA and local authorities more severely.  Much criticism focused on the military 
rather than the local, state or even federal administration.  The military were the first external 
presence in the city four days after the hurricane hit, and their role was to secure the city and 
enforce law and order, rather than actually providing help to the residents.  Leah Hodges was 
particularly critical during her hearing before the Select Bipartisan Committee: 
 
My family was ordered to evacuate our home.   We were directed to evacuation points.   Beforehand, I, 
my mother, my brother and two sisters visited a nursing home where the elderly clients had been 
abandoned by the owners and staff.  There were five elderly persons there; the others had been 
evacuated earlier, perhaps by family.  The day before the flood, the manager had come and told 
everyone they had to get out.  Taking the keys to the bus that the home used to transport the senior 
citizens, the manager left them stranded.  We rescued them.  We shared all our food and provisions.   
When we approached the police and asked for help, they refused to help us.  Instead, they threatened to 
shoot my baby brother. 
 
We were then lured to the so-called evacuation points.  This was several days after the hurricane had 
struck.  The city was flooded.  Soldiers had showed up with M16s and military weapons. They had 
declared New Orleans and Jefferson Parish a war zone.  They loaded us onto military trucks after 
they told us they would take us to shelters where our basic needs would be met. 
 
We were dropped off at a site where we were fenced in, and penned in with military vehicle.  The 
armed military personnel brought in dogs.   There we were subjected to conditions only comparable to a 
concentration camp.   (…) 
 
We were just three miles from an airport, but we were detained there for several days.  Many of those 
who were there when we arrived had already been there several days.  On any given day there were at 
least ten thousand people in the camp.  On my last day there, I would estimate there were still three 
thousand detainees.  By that time, nearly all the white people had been selected to evacuate first.   They 
were put on buses and shipped out, leaving the remaining population 95 per cent black.  (…) 
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The camp was so big, and people were scattered.  People were deliberately kept apart.  One woman 
was not allowed to see her two children. 
 
At the camp, they lied and told us all the buses were going to the same place.  They wouldn’t tell us 
when the buses were coming.   Meanwhile, my Mother sat in the blazing hot sun… 
 
On the last day they refused to give food and water to the ill for 24 hours.    
 
People died in the camp.   We saw the bodies lying there. 
 
They were all about detention, as if it were Iraq, like we were foreigners and they were fighting a war.   
They implemented war-like conditions.  They treated us worse than prisoners of war.  Even prisoners 
of war have rights under the Geneva Convention.    
(Written testimony for the record by Leah Hodges  2005) 
 
The evacuation trajectories and itineraries were also more complex than initially thought, and 
sometimes involved return to New Orleans before further displacement.  The displacement of 
the following evacuee is particularly exemplary of the complex trajectories that were 
sometimes followed: 
 
I was watching reports about the hurricane on Saturday, and then my son called and said ‘We might 
have to leave’.  We left on Sunday78at 5 AM.  We drove to Jackson, Mississippi, because my son had 
a good friend there, and we could stay in his house.  It took us twelve hours to get there.  I thought 
we’d be gone for three days, so I didn’t pack anything: I even packed a swimsuit, because I knew there 
was a swimming pool!  We had been there before.  We stayed in Jackson for one week, then we flew to 
Boston, to stay with my daughter.  Everybody was very kind with us over there.  Katrina people were 
celebrities!  Everybody wanted to help us and talk to us.  I didn’t know exactly what had happened to 
our house before I saw a report on CNN about our neighbourhood.  There was a Shell station at the 
corner of the street, and I saw that only the top of the gas station was emerging from the water.  That’s 
when I realised that my house was gone.  That was a hundred times worse than you could possibly 
imagine.  I signed up with the Red Cross, and I received some clothes in Boston.   
 
                                                
78 28th August 2005, the day before the hurricane made landfall. 
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But I wanted to see my house, and we couldn’t go back to New Orleans.  That was horrible.  It took 
seven weeks before I could fly back with my daughter to New Orleans, to see the house.  We stayed 
with friends in New Orleans for a couple of days, then my daughter flew back to Boston and I flew to 
California to stay with relatives.  I stayed there for about six weeks, and FEMA sent me a cheque 
there.  (…) 
 
If it wasn’t for cell phones, we wouldn’t have survived.  All the main lines were down, so the cell 
phones carried us through.  (…) 
 
I don’t blame local officials, I think it’s primarily the fault of the Corps of Engineers79.  I was 
interviewed by NBC when we were in Jackson.  NBC was trying to push me to put the blame on the 




4.2. Analys i s  o f  the  Fai lures  
 
The bipartisan committee set up to investigate the failures in the management of Katrina 
pointed to different problems with the evacuation planning, which include:  
 
- A failure to implement the lessons learnt from the Hurricane Pam evacuation exercise, 
conducted in 2004.  This failure is also stressed by van Heerden and Bryan (2006: 
146).  A hurricane such as Katrina had been dreaded for years, and the Pam exercise 
was designed as a rehearsal for a possible complete evacuation of the city.   
 
- The delay in the issuing of a mandatory evacuation order.  As said earlier, this order 
was delayed by Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin until 19 hours before the 
hurricane’s landfall, despite adequate prior warning.  This delay, as well as Mayor 
Nagin’s decision to shelter but not evacuate the remaining population, in tandem with 
individual decisions, led to an incomplete evacuation, resulting in preventable deaths, 
great suffering and further delays in relief. 
 
                                                
79 The Corps of Engineers was in charge of the design, construction and maintenance of the levees that failed. 
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- Overall, the lack of proactive federal response drew heavy criticism and uproar.  
Amongst the failures listed were the inadequate information and advice given to 
President George W.  Bush, the incompetence of the then-FEMA Director Michael 
Brown, and miscommunication.  In particular, the failure to invoke the Catastrophic 
Incident Annex80 prevented the full implementation of the National Response Plan, 
including a switch from a reactive to a proactive mode of operations. 
 
- The lack of coordination and communication between different federal agencies and 
local authorities was also stressed as one of the key reasons that impaired effective and 
timely response.  These communication problems have been extensively documented 
in almost all books published on the disaster (Brinkley 2006; McQuaid and Schleifstein 
2006). 
 
- The sheltering process was acknowledged as inadequate and haphazard: relocation 
plans did not provide adequate shelters, and the shelters of last resort were not 
carefully selected.  Furthermore, delays due to manufacturing limitations led to delays 
in getting evacuees out of the shelters and into temporary housing.  This problem is 
also addressed by Nigg, Barnshaw and Torres (2006). 
 
Overall, the majority of failures identified by the Select Bipartisan Committee report were 
attributed to a lack of communication, preparation and communication.  Many observers, 
however, saw racism as the root cause of the inefficiency (Dyson 2006).  As a matter of fact, 
most of the residents trapped in New Orleans were black and poor – as mentioned above, 
social vulnerability was a major factor hindering the evacuation (Cutter 2006).  The image of 
Katrina’s victims rapidly took on the traits of those trapped in New Orleans: black, poor, 
angry and desperate, leading to accusations of racism in the government’s response to the 
disaster.  ‘It was not long before some black leaders in New Orleans and around the country 
began to cast the inept handling of the crisis in racial terms’ (van Heerden and Bryan 2006: 
129).  These accusations were sometimes fuelled by the Mayor himself, most notably by his 
‘chocolate city’ speech ("Transcript of Nagin's speech"  2006). 
 
                                                
80 The introduction to the Catastrophic Incident Annex states that: ‘The Catastrophic Incident Annex establishes 
the context and strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive response to an incident 
where there are mass casualties and destruction within the City boundaries from a single event.’ 
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The Gretna Bridge incident catalysed the accusations of racism in the handling of the crisis by 
authorities.  On September 1st, three days after the disaster, a group of people, the vast 
majority of whom were black, tried to walk away from New Orleans and enter the small town 
of Gretna, south of New Orleans.  In order to do so, they had to cross the Crescent City 
Connection bridge, where they were turned down by police officers, who fired shots above 
their heads and refused to let them enter the predominantly white city of Gretna (2006: 469).  
The incident was widely reported as criminal and racist.  As van Heerden put it, ‘I picture a 
different welcome if they had all been white’ (van Heerden and Bryan 2006: 130).  Other 
accounts of the incident, however, tell a different story and reveal that the main motivation 
for shutting down the access route to Gretna was that the small city was already overwhelmed 
by evacuees and could not take any more of them, being ill-prepared to welcome them and 
provide them with basic necessities (Colby 2005). 
 
Many of the evacuees I met did not perceive the response as racially biased, and many 
accepted the official conclusion that the inefficient response was more the result of a lack of 
coordination, leadership and communication.  Terroll Williams testified before the House of 
Representatives that ‘[he didn’t] think the federal response was radically motivated in any way 
- [he thought] the Federal Government was simply unprepared and incorrectly staffed for a 
natural disaster.’ (Statement of Mr Terrol Williams  2005).  As I will show in the next section, 
I argue that perceptions of the evacuation and its handling were primarily a reflection of each  
evacuee’s experience. 
 
Many scholars have provided hypotheses to explain why the government did not respond 
adequately to the disaster.  Sobel and Leeson, for example, provide six explanatory hypotheses 
(Sobel and Leeson 2006):  
- The tragedy of the anti-commons, a problem that occurs when too many individuals 
have the power of exclusion, i.e., there are too many actors in the decisions process; 
- Errors resulting from under cautiousness and over cautiousness; 
- Political manipulations in order to get more votes; 
- The imperfect disclosure of the actors’ preferences, partly imputable to the media; 




Shughart adds that the setting of Katrina is no different from any other political problem, and 
that therefore ‘no one should have expected government to be any more effective when 
confronted with natural disaster than it is in more mundane circumstances’ (Shughart II 2006: 
55). 
 
This resulted in a strange paradox: although the evacuation of the city overall was a relative 
success, it was the incompleteness of the evacuation, abundantly shown in the media, that 
triggered public uproar concerning management of the disaster.  The evacuation rate was far 
above the most optimistic predictions of evacuation planning experts (van Heerden and Bryan 
2006), but the fact that about 70,000 individuals remained stranded in the city in appalling 
conditions was the focus of the most vehement criticism of the disaster management.  I argue 
that the reason was that the evacuation was racially and socially stratified, exposing massive 
inequalities in vulnerability.  These inequalities had been grossly neglected, and this negligence 
was perceived as racism.  In the abovementioned survey conducted for The Washington Post by 
the Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University, 68 per cent of the respondents claimed 
race and poverty had impacted on the speed of the rescue efforts ("Survey of Hurricane 
Katrina Evacuees"  2005).   
 
The issue of racism in the organisation of the evacuation will most likely remain a hotly 
disputed topic, and deeply affect race relations in the city of New Orleans.  It has even lead to 
belief in a surprising conspiracy theory, among some members of black community 
organisations I met, particularly in the Lower Ninth Ward81, that the levees had been blown 
up on purpose.  According to the theory, whites had used dynamite on the levees when they 
saw the hurricane approaching, in order that the black neighbourhoods would be flooded, the 
black population would be chased away, and they would be able to regain control over the 
city.  This conspiracy theory actually found its origin in an episode related to hurricane Betsy, 
which devastated New Orleans and the Gulf Coast in September 1965.  Some levees had been 
intentionally breached by the authorities at that time, in order to divert the water and salvage 
most of the city from complete flooding, thus ‘sacrificing’ some neighbourhoods for the sake 
of most of the city.  The episode is recalled in Colten (2004).  Although the rumour, in the 
                                                
81 The Lower Ninth Ward was probably the neighbourhood hit the hardest by the flooding. It was a 98 per cent 
black neighbourhood, and has not yet been rebuilt. 
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case of Katrina, is not supported by any empirical evidence82, its impact on race relations in 
New Orleans has been profound. 
 
Overall, it appears that the policy response to the disaster was strongly biased towards 
emergency management, at the expense of assistance to rebuilding and relocation.  As noted 
by Fussell (2006): 
 
The ideology of disaster management disempowered the people it was supposed to help.  (…) Disaster 
professionals were focused on distributing food, clothing and medical supplies and neglected to provide 
phones, computers and social workers to assist people in utilising their own resources. 
 
 
4.3. Conc lus ion 
 
I argue that the focus on emergency relief in response to Hurricane Katrina was shaped by the 
conceptualisation of environmental migration following a natural disaster as a temporary 
movement with almost immediate return.  According to this conceptualisation, migrants were 
perceived as helpless victims rather than resourceful migrants.  This resulted in a policy 
response that focused on emergency assistance, and ignored two key elements: 
 
- The absence of assistance towards rebuilding; 
- The absence of assistance towards relocation. 
 
Overall, both rebuilding and relocation policies were characterised by great uncertainty, 
reinforced by media representations.  As a result of this uncertainty, people remained confined 




                                                
82 Unlike what happened with hurricane Betsy in 1965, many white or mixed neighbourhoods of New Orleans 





Natural disasters are very political processes: each of them sets into motion a machinery of 
norms and policies, which are embedded in assumptions about the role of the state to protect 
its citizens from insecurity.  The increased numbers of disasters has forced the international 
community to rethink its approach to disaster: this approach is now more international and 
institutionalised that it has ever been.  However, international normative frameworks for 
disaster management remain weak, non-binding and disparate, though the Operational 
Guidelines on Human Rights and Disasters represent significant progress.  This is currently 
the most advanced document addressing the situation of people displaced by disasters, but its 
scope remains limited: the responsibility for protection of displacees lies within their home, 
disaster-struck, nation, and the document does not impose any obligations on the 
international community.  Furthermore, despite being inspired by the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, the Operational Guidelines do not benefit from the same status in 
international law, and cannot even be considered as soft law, as they have received approval 
only from an operational working group, and not any legislative body. 
 
The same working group is currently discussing how migrants uprooted by the impacts of 
climate change might be legally protected and assisted, and insider sources report that debates 
within the group are particularly fierce, crystallising around the two competing advocacy 
coalitions.  Agencies are not policy-indifferent, and are also concerned for their future role in 
disaster management. 
 
Despite the greater acknowledgement of social vulnerabilities and the prevention imperative, 
disaster management remains largely focused on emergency operations, with little 
consideration of the long-term needs of those displaced.  Displacement is often viewed as 
temporary, and few contingency plans exist for long-term displacement and possible eventual 
relocation.  In the rare cases where such plans exist, such as in the United States, their 
application can be defective, as recalled Fussell recalls in the case of Katrina (2005): 
 
The ideology of disaster management disempowered the people it was supposed to help.  (…) Disaster 
professionals were focused on distributing food, clothing and medical supplies, and neglected to provide 
phones, computers and social workers to assist people in utilising their own resources. 
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Disaster management continues to construct environmental migration as a temporary 
displacement, rather than a long-term or permanent relocation.  Hence, despite some recent 
progress, it continues to limit itself to an emergency response for displaced people, and 
fundamentally biases the conceptualisation of the displacement as short-term, whereas 












“The climate is healthy but lacking in variety.  Shade temperatures rarely range outside 75° to 
90°F day or night, and there is a regular S.E.  Trade Wind.  The lack of variety in day and 
night temperatures and of a noticeable change in season is found monotonous  
by expatriates and tends to be rather enervating.” 
 
 
Extract from The Gilbert and Ellice Islands.  A short guide (1967, p.  3),  







Natural disasters are obviously the most brutal of all environmental changes.  They are 
intrinsically related to an encounter between environmental changes and social vulnerability, 
and are addressed by a specific body of norms and policy instruments, as well as different 
actors than those involved in environmental protection.  At the administrative level, disaster 
management units often depend upon the Ministry of the Interior, rather than the Ministry for 
Environment.   
 
In a nutshell, natural disasters are best understood as a special case of environmental change, 
addressed by specific machinery.  Other types of environmental changes, usually slow-onset 
changes, are addressed by other policy instruments and frameworks, which have steadily 
expanded since the 1970s. It would have been impossible to review here instruments and 
policies related to all types of environmental changes. I have thus made the choice to focus on 
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what appears today as the most serious of all environmental changes, global warming. 
Unsurprisingly, most of the debates on environmental migration relate around climate change, 
as mass displacements are often described as one of the possible and most dramatic 
consequences of climate change.  
 
However, prior to the discussion on the current climate regime and how it addresses 
environmental migration, I will consider some of the major principles of environmental law, 
underpinning the current climate regime, and assess to what extent they address – or fail to 
address – the issue of population movements associated with environmental changes. 
 
 
1. The Environment as a Matter of International Politics 
 
Initial concerns about the protection of the environment are related to the acknowledgement 
of the finitude of nature.  The notion of limit is central to the development of international 
environmental law: nature is viewed as an exhaustible resource that must be to be protected.  
This notion was first introduced by Malthus in his famous Principle of Population (1999 (1798)), 
which argued that as population grows at a geometric rate, while available food grows at an 
arithmetic rate, natural resources will soon be exhausted and will no longer be able to feed the 
world’s ever-growing population.  Malthus’ theories were highly influential amongst his peers: 
Ricardo developed the Law of Diminishing Returns (2004 (1817)), which shows that agricultural 
yield decreases as population grows, and acknowledges that natural resources are exhaustible; 
Mill was the first to question the concept of infinite growth, and proposed the stationary state, 
in which natural resources would be used in a sustainable way (2008 (1848)).   
 
It was not until the 1970s, some 150 years later, however, that these issues will found a place 
on the international agenda.  The development of international environmental law was marked 
by a series of milestones coinciding with the convening of major international conferences on 
environmental issues by the United Nations (Gillespie 1997; Birnie and Boyle 2002). 
 
The conference that placed the environment on the global political agenda was the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, which was convened in Stockholm in June 
1972.  Though the conference focused on technical environmental matters rather on social 
and economic issues related to the environment, the relationship between human societies and 
 257 
their environment was the underpinning theme of the debates, which resulted in a global plan 
of action: the Declaration on the Human Environment, or Stockholm Declaration (Seyfang 
2003).  The Declaration contained a series of principles and recommendations that laid the 
foundations for international environmental law.  The Declaration itself was a rather hybrid 
document, attempting to mix inspirational statements for governments’ environmental 
policies with more specific, legal guidelines for the design of these policies (Sohn 1973).  The 
conference also created the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the first UN 
agency entirely devoted to environmental issues.   
 
International environmental law developed, to a large extent, upon the principles laid out in 
the Stockholm Declaration.  Such principles included the right to an environment of quality 
(Principle 1), the protection of wildlife and biodiversity (Principle 4), a sustainable use of 
resources (Principle 5), or ‘the responsibility to ensure that activities within [a state’s] 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’ (United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment 1972) 
 
In the years leading up to the conference and immediately after it, a large number of countries 
created a Ministry of Environment, or a dedicated environmental agency, to supervise the 
implementation of the action plan agreed in Stockholm83.  Malthusian preoccupations 
resurfaced that same year with the highly-publicised publication of the Meadows Report, 
commissioned by the Club of Rome, which portrayed a gloomy predicament for the future of 
humanity, and recommended that economic growth be slowed down and ultimately halted 
(Meadows et al. 1972). 
 
The publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987, entitled ‘Our Common Future’, marked 
another milestone in the development of international environmental law.  The report, drafted 
by the World Commission on Environment and Development, coined the term ‘sustainable 
development’, which it defined as development that ‘meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (World Commission 
on Environment and Development 1987).  Sustainable development is not only concerned 
with environmental issues, but lies at the confluence of three intertwined pillars: social 
                                                
83 To give a few examples from OECD countries, France created a Ministry in charge of nature protection and 
the environment in 1971, the United Kingdom created a State Secretariat for the Environment in 1970, and the 
US Environmental Agency was created in 1970. 
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development, economic development, and environmental development.  Sustainable 
development has since become an overarching goal of numerous policies and development 
projects.  The same year the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
was signed, still considered the most successful international environmental agreement to date, 
and one of the first binding elements of nascent environmental law. 
 
The Rio Earth Summit, which is the third important milestone of international environmental 
law, was built upon the concept of sustainable development, and followed on the Stockholm 
Conference.  Convened in 1992, it was hailed as a major success, and resulted in the adoption 
of two major conventions: the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD), aimed at 
tackling the loss of biodiversity, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), which initiated the fight against global warming.  In addition, the Rio Conference 
also resulted in the adoption of Agenda 21, a wide-ranging action programme aimed at 
fostering sustainable development worldwide.  Finally, the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development is a continuation of the Stockholm Declaration, which reaffirms 27 
principles to foster sustainable development.  These principles include, inter alia, the 
precautionary principle; compensation for the victims of environmental change; and the no-
harm rule, which states that states have a responsibility to ensure that they do not cause 
damage to the environment of other states.  Unlike the two prior conventions, Agenda 21 and 
the Rio Declaration are elements of soft law, and non-binding. 
 
Although subsequent conferences were organised84, these three events can be credited with 
transforming environmental concerns into a global political issue, and with laying the 




2. Addressing Environmental Changes through Law 
 
International environmental law is primarily concerned with the mitigation of environmental 
changes, and slow-onset changes in particular.  International agreements address the loss of 
biodiversity, the progress of desertification, the depletion of the ozone layer, and global 
                                                
84 Most notably the World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg in 2002. 
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warming.  These changes are usually characterised by their global scale: the state alone is no 
longer able to safeguard the environment, and mechanisms of international cooperation are 
therefore needed.  The internationalisation of economic externalities has made the provision 
of environmental protection an intrinsically international endeavour.  Environmental 
protection is now widely seen as a global public good, whose provision can only be achieved 
through international agreements (Kaul et al. 1999a). 
 
These agreements have not yet directly addressed the issue of environmental migration.  None 
of the abovementioned treaties, recommendations or guidelines actually mentions that people 
could be forced or willing to migrate because of environmental changes.  This omission can 
be explained by the fact that international environmental law is founded on a number of key 
principles, which inform the debate and conceptualisation of environmental migration. 
 
 
2.1. The Precaut ionary Princ iple  
 
The precautionary principle, which came to prominence in the 1990s, is now a customary 
principle of environmental law.  The principle was delineated as follows in the Rio Declaration 
(principle 15): 
 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities.  Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.  (United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development 1992). 
 
The principle is broadly understood as a general obligation not to undertake any action that 
could possibly cause damage if there are uncertainties about the consequences of the action.  
Kriebel et al. identify four central components in the application of the principle: ‘taking 
preventive action in the face of uncertainty; shifting the burden of proof to the proponents of 
an activity; exploring a wide range of alternatives to possibly harmful actions; and increasing 
public participation in decision making’ (2001: 871).   
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The principle, however, can also be interpreted in a more proactive way: rather than being 
simply a general obligation of prudence, it can also be understood as a more active obligation 
to prevent harm and damage.  The principle derives from the German Vorsorgeprinzip, which is 
best translated as ‘foresight principle’ and involves an duty of prevention (Freestone and Hey 
1996).  In the case of environmental migration, a broader interpretation of the principle could 
imply that states have the legal duty to prevent any environmental change that could possibly 
induce forced displacement – even in cases when the linkages between environmental change 
and migration are not proved.  This nuance is important, since many authors have argued that 
linkages between environmental change and migration have yet to be proven by empirical 
evidence (Black 2001; Castles 2002).  With a broad understanding of the precautionary 
principle, the linkage between environmental change and migration – the harm – would not 
need to be empirically proven: the simple possibility that this linkage might exist would be 
sufficient for the state to be obliged to prevent the damage from happening, and to mitigate 
its effects should the damage eventually occur. 
 
2.2. Environmental Respons ibi li t y  
 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, reprinted in the preamble of the UNFCCC and in 
the Rio Declaration, imposes responsibility for environmental harm upon the state: states bear 
the prime responsibility for environmental damage they cause beyond their borders. Principle 
21 was debated thoroughly when it was drafted (Sohn 1973), and the scope of state 
responsibility has been, and continues to be, a matter of fierce debate.  Case law was 
instrumental in the evolution of this responsibility from a limited formulation to a customary 
principle of international law: ‘What began as a so-called “soft law” declaration in 1972 has 
become (…) an important catalyst in the evolution and development of international 
environmental law (Taylor 1998: 77).   
 
Environmental responsibility includes the obligation to prevent harm, but also the obligation 
to pay compensation to victims of environmental damage, as stated in the Principle 13 of the 
Rio Declaration: 
 
States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution 
and other environmental damage.  States shall also cooperate in an expeditious and more determined 
manner to develop further international law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of 
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environmental damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their 
jurisdiction.  (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 1992) 
 
This obligation to compensate is directly derived from the polluter-pays principle, which 
requires that the polluting party pay for harm done to the environment.  Although the 
polluter-pays principle has been applied to private companies on many occasions and has 
experienced significant developments in recent years85, its application to states remains limited.  
The principle, however, has been invoked in a number of cases: Bangladesh has repeatedly 
accused India of provoking flooding on its territory because of the construction of dams on 
the Ganges River (Salman 1998); and the case that Tuvalu intended to make against the 
United States and Australia before the International Court of Justice in the early 2000s was 
also based on harm (sea-level rise) caused by the actions of the defendants (emitting 
greenhouse gas)86.  These cases, however, did not lead to the payment of compensation. 
 
Overall, environmental responsibility remains constrained by state sovereignty, and the 
international community is still struggling to construct a notion of shared, global 
environmental responsibility.  Though the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol acknowledge 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the principle has not yet been 
applied to the people affected by climate change or to any environmental change.  For now, 
state responsibility remains strictly conceived as an obligation from state to state, and not as 
an obligation from a state, or a cluster of states, towards the affected population.  Such an 
expansion of meaning would allow people displaced by environmental change to claim 
compensation from the state(s) responsible for the harm, which could help meet migration 
costs – provided such a responsibility is established.  For now, such a development is hardly 






                                                
85 The most significant development in recent years is certainly the acknowledgement of the concept of 
‘ecological prejudice’ by a French tribunal, with reference to the Erika oil spill that occurred on the coast of 
Brittany in 1999. The owner of the responsible freighter, the oil company Total, was charged with paying a 
€375,000 fine in compensation towards local municipalities, for failing to prevent environmental harm. 
86 The case was eventually dropped.  Chapter 6 features further discussion of this issue. 
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2.3. Environmental jus t ic e  
 
The concept of environmental justice emerged in the United States in the 1980s, in reaction to 
what was perceived as ‘environmental racism’, that is, the fact that minority communities were 
living in more degraded environments.  A number of studies showed that racial minorities 
were more likely to live in a hazardous and/or polluted environment (Boer et al. 1997; 
Downey 1998), and therefore had a higher social vulnerability to environmental change.  
Furthermore, environmental racism also implied that areas inhabited by minorities were more 
likely to be selected for the location of polluting industries, hazardous activities, or waste 
dumps. 
 
At the global level, it has been pointed out that developing countries are disproportionately 
affected by environmental changes, and global warming in particular, although they often bear 
minimal responsibility for these changes (Müller 2001; Roberts and Parks 2007).  In the case 
of climate change, the worst impacts and highest temperature rise will take place in the global 
South, meaning that they countries most affected will be those that have the least historical 
responsibility87 for global warming.  Furthermore, these countries are also developing 
countries, and thus have the least capacity to adapt to a changing environment. 
 
Principles of justice and equity have been increasingly important in negotiations on the climate 
change regime, and most observers consider that equity will need to be a central component 
and a necessary condition of the new, post-Kyoto climate regime.  Many advocate that justice 
and equity concerns should not only be a core component of the mitigation efforts, but 
should also comprise part of the talks on adaptation to climate change (Adger et al. 2006b; 
Paavola and Adger 2002).  The different conceptions of environmental justice in the context 
of climate change will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Furthermore, environmental changes and hazards also aggravate pre-existing patterns of 
global inequality, such poverty or health issues.  This is particularly the case for climate change 
(Watkins 2007) and natural disasters (Blaikie et al. 1994), but other environmental hazards also 
have a toll on global inequality: Sattertwhaite (2003), for example, has shown the impact of 
                                                
87 Although greenhouse gas emissions from emerging countries are quickly rising, these countries’ historical 
responsibility for current climatic changes, which is directly related to the accumulation of carbon in the 
atmosphere over time, remains minimal. 
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biological pathogens, chemical pollutants and other hazards on poverty in urban areas of 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
 
Nations that have been early victims of climate change have evoked the principle of 
environmental justice frequently in debates about environmental migration: Tuvalu, for 
example, has repeatedly insisted upon its infinitesimal contribution to global warming.  In the 
context of climate change, the concept of environmental justice has evolved from an issue of 
racial discrimination to a global, wide-ranging matter of North-South equity.   
 
2.4. Human Securi t y  
 
The first principle of the Stockholm Declaration states that ‘Man has the fundamental right to 
freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits 
a life of dignity and well-being’ (United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
1972).  The right to a sound environment is often considered a third-generation human right: 
a right of soft law, which cannot really be enforced on the ground (Taylor 1998: 196).   
 
At present, no existing United Nations instrument expressly states the existence of a human 
right to a sound environment, but some commentators argue that such a right can be derived 
from Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees a right to life.  
Respect of the right to life, it is argued, necessarily implies protection of the environment, 
which creates a right to a sound environment.  This connection is the rationale for the 
abovementioned first principle of the Stockholm Declaration.  There is, however, growing 
pressure to recognise the right to a sound environment as a separate human right of its own, 
and not just one derived from the human right to life88.  Ultimately, should such a right be 
created, it would be difficult to enforce.  Nevertheless, the right has particular resonance in 
the context of environmental migration, since one can safely assume that the right to a sound 
environment implies the right not to be displaced because of environmental disruption, and 
even possibly the right to relocate to a new, sounder environment when livelihoods are 
affected by environmental disruption. 
                                                
88 See for example Resolution 45/94 (1990) of the UN General Assembly, which reads: ‘(…) All individuals are 
entitled to live in an environment adequate for their health and well-being; and calls upon Member States and 





3. Climate Change 
 
In recent years, the debate on migration induced by the effects of climate change has 
consistently overshadowed the debate on migration triggered by other kinds of environmental 
disruptions.  Many conferences, workshops and documents aimed at raising public awareness 
in recent years have focused exclusively on migration flows induced by climate change, 
prompting some authors to worry that this focus might lead to the neglect of other types of 
environmental migration (Lassailly-Jacob 2006). 
 
Four key reasons account for this myopic focus on migration triggered by climate change: 
 
- Firstly, climate change encompasses a wide range of environmental changes, making it 
difficult to distinguish between the events related to climate change and those that are 
not.  Hence any migration linked to environmental change – with few exceptions89 - 
can be described as a consequence of climate change; 
 
- Secondly, climate change is expected to dramatically increase the number of 
environmental migrants, both because many environments will become increasingly 
degraded, but also because other environments are expected to become more 
favourable90.  There is, therefore, a new dimension to the scale of the problem; 
 
- Thirdly, negotiations concerning the future climate regime are currently ongoing.  
Authors who make the case for the development of new normative frameworks often 
consider the possibility of including an additional protocol to the UNFCCC 
(Biermann and Boas 2007).  There is therefore an incentive for policy-oriented 
research to focus on climate change-induced migration; 
 
                                                
89 Such exceptions include earthquakes, tsunamis and volcano eruptions.  
90 This is the case, in particular, of Siberia and Northern Canada, which may become new destination areas for 
migration in the near future. 
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- Finally, most of the funding possibilities for research in the field, as well as media 
requests, are currently related to projects on the impacts of climate change.  This 
creates a strong incentive to orient research in this direction. 
 
The following section will examine the place of environmental migration in the current 
climate change regime, as well as in the negotiations that are due to result in the new, post-
Kyoto regime.  The impacts of climate change on migration will first be discussed briefly, 
before turning to an analysis of the current normative frameworks – the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol – and the evolution of debates on climate policies. 
 
 
3.1. The Impact s  o f  Climate  Change  on Migrat ion  
 
Climate change will affect societies through an extensive range of impacts.  The magnitude of 
these impacts depends, to a large extent, on the efforts currently undertaken to curb 
greenhouse gas emissions and to mitigate global warming.  Hence predicting these impacts, 
particularly on a regional level, is a daunting task, since a lot of uncertainties remain (Barnett 
2001a; Webster et al. 2003).  In order to account for these uncertainties, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has classified predictions of climate 
change impacts into different families of scenarios, according to the various policies that could 
be implemented and different hypotheses about climate sensitivity. 
 
Amongst these impacts, four seem most likely to have effects on migration patterns, although 
these effects are not certain and are highly discussed (Black et al. 2008; Piguet 2008).  I will 
briefly mention these impacts, without discussing their possible effects on future migration 
flows, which is beyond the scope of this research: 
 
3.1.1. Extreme Weather Events 
 
Climate change is likely to increase the number and the magnitude of extreme weather events.  
These events include heat waves, tropical cyclones, droughts, and flooding.  The latest IPCC 
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report predicts, by the end of this century, a ‘very likely91 increase in hot extremes, heat waves 
and heavy precipitation’, a ‘likely increase in tropical cyclone activity’, with ‘less confidence in 
the decrease of tropical cyclones’, as well as ‘very likely precipitation increases in high latitudes 
and likely decreases in most subtropical land regions’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 2007d: 8).  In addition, it is expected that annual water run-off and precipitations will 
increase at high latitudes, whereas water resources will decrease in mid-latitudes and tropics, as 
well as in arid regions.  The IPCC notes that the increase of droughts and tropical cyclone 
activity both present a potential for population migration (Wilbanks et al. 2007). 
 
The increase of extreme weather events has been directly linked to an observed increase in the 
number of natural disasters: Ferris (2007) notes that ‘while some of the increase in the 
frequency of natural disasters is undoubtedly the result of better data collection (…) there 
does seem to be evidence that the number and severity of hydro-meteorological events are 
increasing’.   
 
 
3.1.2. Water Shortage 
 
Water shortages will be caused by a series of cumulating factors: droughts, contamination of 
freshwater by seawater due to sea-level rise, and the melting of mountain glaciers over the 
long term.  The IPCC forecasts that ‘freshwater availability in Central, South, East and 
Southeast Asia particularly in large river basins is projected to decrease due to climate change 
which, along with population growth and increasing demand arising from higher standards of 
living, could adversely affect more than a billion people by the 2050s’ (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change 2007c: 10).  The quantity of water stored in glaciers and snow cover 
is also expected to decline, reducing the freshwater availability of regions supplied by 
meltwater from mountain ranges.  But the situation is expected to be most difficult in Africa, 
where an estimated 75 million to 250 million people will be at risk of water shortage due to 
climate change by 2020.  Given that this water shortage will be associated with higher demand, 
especially in big cities, water-related problems are very likely to be exacerbated (Watkins 2007). 
 
                                                
91 ‘Very likely’ denotes a probability of occurrence between 90 per cent and 99 per cent, while ‘likely’ denotes a 
66 per cent to 90 per cent probability. 
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The effects of water shortage on migration patterns remain heavily contested: some authors 
argue that droughts and desertification are a major push factor for migration (Hammer 2004; 
Leighton 2006)92, while others contend that people affected by droughts have a choice 
between different coping strategies, including migration, though international migration 
usually tends to decrease during these periods (Black 2001).  In any case, the nexus between 
drought and migration is not straightforward (Kniveton et al. 2008).  Findings from the 
EACH-FOR project confirm that desertification can affect migration patterns in different 
directions: Van der Geest (2008) found that contemporary North-South migration in Ghana 
was environmentally motivated, but decreased during the worst droughts; Afifi (2008) also 
identified droughts as an important push factor that influence both internal and international 
migration in Niger. 
 
3.1.3. Sea-Level Rise 
 
The most obvious consequence of climate change with regard to environmental migration, 
however, is sea-level rise.  Although sea-level rise will not be uniform across the globe, largely 
because of El-Niño Southern oscillation, most studies agree that the rise will be about 1 metre 
by the end of the century (Hansen et al. 2006; Church et al. 2004).  The IPCC notes that 
 
Many millions more people are projected to be flooded every year due to sea-level rise by the 2080s.  
Those densely-populated and low-lying areas where adaptive capacity is relatively low, and which 
already face other challenges such as tropical storms or local coastal subsidence, are especially at risk.  
The numbers affected will be largest in the mega-deltas of Asia and Africa while small islands are 
especially vulnerable.  (2007c: 12) 
 
Unlike extreme weather events, sea-level rise is more predictable, and populations at risk can 
be more easily identified, thus facilitating the implementation of adaptation plans.  Given that 
coastal and deltaic areas are usually very densely populated, the potential for migration is 
particularly high (Klein and Nicholls 1999; Nicholls et al. 2007). 
 
                                                
92 Hammer argues that one million people were displaced as a result of the 1985 drought in Niger, and that 
‘hundreds of thousands of people from rural Sahel regions are displaced every year as a consequence of 
environmental change and desertification’ (2004: 434); Leighton makes a similar case for North-East Brazil. 
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It also worth mentioning that sea-level rise may be much higher than the above estimate, 
perhaps up to 7 metres, in case of deglaciation of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice 
sheets.  There is medium confidence that this event will occur over a period of time ranging 
from centuries to millennia. 
 
 
3.1.4. Pull Factors 
 
Some other impacts of climate change, whose linkages to migration seem less obvious, have 
not been considered here93.  It should be noted, however, that climate change will also result 
in a number of positive effects, mostly at higher latitudes.  Agricultural yields are expected to 
increase in Siberia and Northern Canada, while heating costs will be reduced.  Although these 
effects are not often considered in the literature94, it is possible that the more favourable 
environment of these regions will make them an attractive migration destination in the not-so-
distant future.   
 
 
When discussing these climate change impacts and their linkages to migration flows, one 
should keep in mind that these impacts will not be felt uniformly across continents.  The table 
below summarises how these impacts will be distributed in different regions of the world. 
 
Africa o By 2020, between 75 and 250 million of people are projected to be 
exposed to increased water stress   
o By 2020, in some countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could 
be reduced by up to 50%   
o Agricultural production, including access to food, in many African 
countries is projected to be severely compromised   
o By 2100, projected sea level rise will affect low-lying coastal areas 
with large populations 
o By 2080, an increase of 5 to 8% of arid and semi-arid land in Africa 
is projected 
Asia o By the 2050s, freshwater availability in Central, South, East and 
South-East Asia, particularly in large river basins, is projected to 
decrease   
o Coastal areas, especially heavily populated mega-delta regions in 
South, East and South-East Asia, will be at greatest risk due to 
                                                
93 This is the case with heat waves or the spreading of tropical diseases, for example. 
94 With the exception (Schwartz and Randall 2003) 
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increased flooding from the sea and, in some mega-deltas, flooding 
from the rivers   
o Climate change is projected to compound the pressures on natural 
resources and the environment associated with rapid urbanisation, 
industrialisation and economic development   
Europe o Negative impacts will include increased risk of inland flash floods 
and more frequent coastal flooding and increased erosion (due to 
storminess and sea level rise)   
o In Southern Europe, climate change is projected to worsen 
conditions (high temperatures and drought) in a region already 
vulnerable to climate variability, and to reduce water availability, 
hydropower potential, summer tourism and, in general, crop 
productivity   
Latin America o Changes in precipitation patterns and the disappearance of glaciers 
are projected to significantly affect water availability for human 
consumption, agriculture and energy generation 
o Productivity of some important crops is projected to decrease and 
livestock productivity to decline, with adverse consequences for 
food security; overall, the number of people at risk of hunger is 
projected to increase 
o By 2050, increases in temperature and associated decreases in soil 
water are projected to lead to gradual replacement of tropical forest 
by savanna in eastern Amazonia 
North America o Warming in western mountains is projected to cause decreased 
snowpack, more winter flooding and reduced summer flows, 
exacerbating competition for over-allocated water resources 
o  In the early decades of the century, moderate climate change is 
projected to increase aggregate yields of rain-fed agriculture by 5 to 
20%, but with important variability among regions   
o Coastal communities and habitats will be increasingly stressed by 
climate change impacts interacting with development and pollution   
Small islands o Sea level rise is expected to exacerbate inundation, storm surge, 
erosion and other coastal hazards   
o Deterioration in coastal conditions, for example through erosion of 
beaches and coral bleaching, is expected to affect local resources 
o By 2050, climate change is expected to reduce water resources in 
many small islands to the point where they become insufficient to 
meet demand during low-rainfall periods   
 
Table 3 – Regional impacts of climate change.  Adapted from (Mimura et al. 2007a), Chapters 
9, 10, 12, 13, 14 and 16. 
 
 
As mentioned above, the empirical linkages between these impacts and migration patterns 
remain little known.  Although some reports, such as the Stern Review on the Economics of 
Climate Change, make the bold prediction that ‘by the middle of the century, 200 million 
more people may become permanently displaced due to rising sea levels, heavier floods, and 
more intense droughts’ (Stern 2007: 56), the IPCC does not venture such precise forecasts: 
 270 
 
Estimates of the number of people who may become environmental migrants are, at best, guesswork 
since (a) migrations in areas impacted by climate change are not one-way and permanent, but multi-
directional and often temporary or episodic; (b) the reasons for migration are often multiple and 
complex, and do not relate straightforwardly to climate variability and change; (c) in many cases 
migration is a longstanding response to seasonal variability in environmental conditions, it also 
represents a strategy to accumulate wealth or to seek a route out of poverty, a strategy with benefits for 
both the receiving and original country or region; (d) there are few reliable censuses or surveys in many 
key parts of the world on which to base such estimates (e.g., Africa); and (e) there is a lack of 
agreement on what an environmental migrant is anyway.  (Wilbanks et al. 2007: 365) 
 
The IPCC report also notes that ‘migration, usually temporary and often from rural to urban 
areas, is a common response to calamities such as floods and famines (…), and large numbers 
of displaced people are a likely consequence of extreme events’ (Wilbanks et al. 2007: 365).  If 




3.2. The Current  Int ernat ional Climate  Change  Regime 
 
Since the signature of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
1992, a considerable number of climate policies, instruments and institutions have emerged to 
tackle global warming.  These form what is commonly called ‘the international climate change 
regime’.  The two milestone elements sustaining the regime are the UNFCCC and the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol, but other instruments and agreements, such as the 2001 Marrakech Accords 
and the 2007 Bali Roadmap, are also core elements of the regime. 
 
Since the UNFCCC entered into force in 1994, the fight against climate change has taken two 
different directions, which have at times been opposed to each other.  One was concerned 
with mitigation, that is, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, while the other dealt with 
adaptation to the impacts of climate change.  Adaptation to climate change has long been 
considered a failure of mitigation, a ‘hypothetical possibility best kept in the background lest it 
reduce the felt urgency of mitigation’ (Wilbanks et al. 2003: 30), and mitigation has 
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consistently been prioritised over adaptation – a situation that continues today, to a large 
extent. 
 
In the past couple of years, as it has become progressively apparent that a number of climate 
change impacts could not be avoided, many voices, from developing countries in particular, 
have called for a greater emphasis on adaptation.  At the same time, adaptation was perceived 
as an effective strategy to reduce the negative impacts of climate change – Tol et al. (1998) 
remark that some authors would even see it as better response strategy than mitigation – and 
also as a way to achieve climate justice, and thus convince developing countries to accept a 
mandatory reduction of their carbon emissions (Roberts and Parks 2007).  Environmental 
migration is most concerned with adaptation, whether as a failure of adaptation or a successful 
adaptation strategy. 
 
This section will attempt to describe the significant evolutions of the international climate 
change regime, and how it has gradually come to address the issue of adaptation.  A second 
part will analyse the place of adaptation in the main instruments of the regime. 
 
 
3.2.1. The Evolution of the Regime 
 
Though the greenhouse effect was detected by Fourier in 1824 and the linkage between 
carbon emissions and the rise of temperature had been shown by Arhenius in 1896, it was not 
until the 1950s that the first measurements of carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere 
were undertaken, under the leadership of Revelle.  It would take another forty years before 
political action was taken to address the issue.  A historical perspective on the global climate 
change regime tells, above all, the story of the transformation of a scientific concern into a 
political issue. 
 
3.2.1.1. Towards a Scientific Consensus 
 
The first World Climate Conference was organised in 1979, but its organisers failed to attract 
any policy-makers.  The first event in which policy-makers participated was a workshop in 
Villach (Austria), in 1985.  The workshop was convened by UNEP and the World 
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Meteorological Organisation (WMO); its conclusions were that  significant climate change was 
highly probable (Weart 2004).   
 
Meanwhile, developments in computer engineering allowed science to make considerable 
progress on the modelling of global warming, and scientific consensus on the reality of climate 
change was growing.  By the end of the 1980s, a number of international conferences had 
recommended that greenhouse gas emissions should be cut, and that a comprehensive 
convention on the protection of the atmosphere be drafted (Bodansky 1993).  The Toronto 
Conference, held in 1988, confirmed the scientific consensus that climate change was a reality, 
and that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions were its prime driver. 
 
3.2.1.2. Climate Change as a Political Issue 
 
In 1987 and 1988, a series of congressional hearings on climate change were held in the US 
Congress, initiated by President Reagan.  The testimony of climate modeller James Hansen 
before the congressional committee had a profound impact on the political treatment of 
climate change, and is generally considered as the birth date of climate change as a political 
issue.  From then on, governments started playing a greater role, notably through the creation 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988.  The panel was jointly 
established by UNEP and the WMO, and was entrusted with the task of assessing and 
synthesising publications and research on the science of climate change and its impacts.  The 
IPCC is one of the largest scientific bodies ever established, gathering around 2,000 scientists.   
 
The IPCC produced its first assessment report in 1990, in which it estimated that global mean 
temperature would increase by about 0.3° C per decade if no effort to curb greenhouse gas 
emissions were undertaken.  The report raised the possibility of climate change triggering 
mass population displacements (McTegart et al. 1990). 
 
3.2.1.3. An International Response 
 
Negotiations over the UNFCCC began in 1990, and were concluded in Rio in 1992.  Initially 
there were two competing approaches with regard to the scope of the Convention: one 
modelled on a general framework, addressing the atmosphere as a whole; the other focusing 
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more specifically on climate change.  The latter approach eventually won out, and agreement 
was reached relatively quickly, thanks to the pressing deadline of the quickly approaching Rio 
summit.   
 
The Convention was a framework agreement, establishing general obligations such as the 
exchange of relevant information.  The Convention did not include any binding targets for 
carbon emissions, but included a number of several key items and principles: 
 
- The overarching principle of the Convention was that of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’: countries were divided into the categories of developed countries95 
and developing countries, and it was agreed that only developed countries (held  most 
responsible for climate change), would be required to carry out mandatory emission 
reductions; 
 
- The funding mechanisms were the most controversial aspect of Convention 
negotiations, but were finally settled at Bali in 2007.  Developing countries were keen 
to secure additional financial commitments from developed countries to help them 
implement the Convention.  Developed countries intended to channel these funds 
through the Global Environmental Facility, a joint body of the World Bank, UNEP 
and UNDP, while developing nations wanted to establish a new fund – over which 
they would have more control.  The issue might appear very technical at first, but it 
was in reality a debate over who should control additional money flows. 
 
- Finally, the Convention established the principle of permanent negotiation: the 
framework was vague and ambiguous enough to allow quick and unanimous 
ratification, and the fine details of the agreement – including mandatory targets and 
enforcing mechanisms – would be negotiated later, during rounds of negotiations 





                                                
95 These countries were listed in the first annex to the convention, hence were subsequently called ‘Annex I 
countries’, whereas developing countries were named ‘non Annex I countries’. 
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3.2.1.4. Towards the Kyoto Protocol 
 
The UNFCCC came into force in 1994, and Conference of the Parties started the year after in 
Berlin.  Two years later, in 1997, the US Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which 
forbade US negotiators from entering any agreement that would not include binding targets 
for developing nations and would harm the US economy.  From this moment, it was clear that 
the US would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which was in the process of being shaped.  The 
resolution stated that ‘the exemption for Developing Country Parties (from any mandatory 
emissions reduction) is inconsistent with the need for global action on climate change and is 
environmentally flawed’, and called upon negotiators not to sign the Protocol (Byrd and Hagel 
1997). 
 
The Protocol was agreed at the third Conference of the Parties, held in Kyoto in December 
1997.  The Protocol aims to implement the UNFCCC, and sets the objective of an overall 5 
per cent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, relative to 1990 levels.  This objective is to be 
achieved through mandatory but differentiated commitments to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions for developed countries.  In addition, in order to facilitate the respect of these 
commitments, some flexible mechanisms have also been devised, allowing developed 
countries to trade emission quotas (carbon market) or to buy emission credits by financing 
‘green’ projects in developing countries (clean development mechanisms).   
 
Though the need for adaptation funding is explicitly mentioned in the Protocol (article 10), 
the sources for such funding are left deliberately vague.  The text barely mentions that ‘a share 
of the proceeds from certified project activities96 is used to cover administrative expenses as 
well as to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation’ (article 12).  This, observes Barrett, 
‘sounds like a tax’ (1998: 31). 
 
 
                                                
96 These ‘certified project activities’ relate to the abovementioned clean development mechanisms, which allow 
developed countries to obtain carbon credits by financing projects that help reduce the greenhouse gas emissions 
from developing countries. These projects have to be approved by the World Bank before they can be 
implemented. Though these mechanisms were initially conceived as a channel of resource transfer from the 
North to the South, only a small minority of projects (3 per cent) were implemented in Africa, the large majority 
being developed in China, India, South Korea and Brazil, where there was a higher potential for emission credits, 
due to higher levels of greenhouse gas emissions.  
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3.2.1.5. The Slow Rise of Adaptation 
 
Until the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and despite the works of the Second Working 
Group of the IPCC97, adaptation had barely been addressed in the climate change regime, and 
developing countries had been, to a large extent, left out of the process.  As new studies on 
the impacts of climate change were issued, including the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report, 
released in 2001, the sense that climate change was already underway became widespread, and 
many voices, especially in the South, urged the international community to develop adaptation 
mechanisms.  The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)98, in particular, was particularly 
vocal in claiming adaptation funding, since its member states were amongst those most 
exposed to the impacts of climate change.  Development scholars joined their voices to those 
of the governments of developing countries, arguing that adaptation should be considered as a 
facet of development in the context of climate change (Adger et al. 2003; Tol et al. 1998; 
Wilbanks et al. 2003). 
 
The 2001 Marrakesh Accords, which took place within the framework of the seventh 
Conference of the Parties, established two new funds for adaptation, governed by the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF): 
 
- A Least Developed Countries Fund, aimed at assisting least developed countries to 
develop the national adaptation programmes of action; 
 
- And a Special Climate Change Fund, aimed at providing financial assistance to 
developed countries which were faced with the first impacts of climate change. 
 
Both funds fall under the Convention, and are supposed to be supported by voluntary 
contributions by OECD governments.  More significantly, an Adaptation Fund was also 
created under the Kyoto Protocol99, to support concrete adaptation projects. 
 
                                                
97 The Second Working Group of the IPCC deals with climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. 
98 The AOSIS is a regional organisation aimed at representing the interests of small island states in climate 
negotiations. 
99 Unlike the two above-mentioned funds, which were created under the UNFCCC. 
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The following year, the Delhi Declaration on Climate Change and Sustainable Development 
reaffirmed the need to connect mitigation and adaptation, stating that although mitigation 
remained a high priority, urgent action was required to advance adaptation measures.  
 
 
3.2.1.6. Recent Developments 
 
Adaptation gained a momentum at the 2005 Montreal conference, with the launch of the 
Nairobi Work Programme. Until then, adaptation under the UNFCCC was limited to the 
three above-mentioned and limited funds and a couple of fragmented programmes, the most 
visible of which being the establishment of National Adaptation Plans of Action by the Least 
Developed Countries (Garnaud 2009: 1) 
 
The twelfth Conference of the Parties, in 2006, was held for the first time in sub-Saharan 
Africa, in Nairobi.   The pressure to increase funding for adaptation was high, and it was 
agreed that the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol would be financed through a 2 per 
cent levy on clean development mechanisms transactions.  However, no other specific 
commitment was made in Nairobi, leaving developing country representatives and NGOs 
angry and disappointed.  The Bali Roadmap, agreed the following year, did not contain more 
specific elements, aside from a call for further enhancement of cooperation to support ‘urgent 
implementation’ of adaptation measures.  It was also recognised that economic diversification 
could form an aspect of adaptation strategies. However, for the first time, adaptation was 
treated on an equal footage with mitigation, and slowly ceased to be perceived as a failure of 
the latter (Garnaud 2009). 
 
At the Poznan conference (COP 14), held in late 2008, adaptation was a top concern for many 
stakeholders, and the progress of the discussions on adaptation was often hailed as a major 
success of the conference. Most of the discussions on adaptation, however, revolved around 
the operationalisation of the Adaptation Fund, including direct access to the Fund from 
developing countries. Currently, discussions on adaptation remain hindered by three ‘taboos’, 
identified as such by Garnaud (2009: 4): 
 
- the first one is the differentiation  of adaptation projects from other development 
project; 
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- the second one is concerned with the allocation of the resources from the Adaptation 
Fund, and on the mechanisms for this allocation (firs-come first-served, 
proportionality, etc.); 
- and the final ‘taboo’ relates to whether adaptation funding should considered as 
development aid, or as a compensation, representing the acknowledgement of an 




3.2.2. A Regime Focused on Mitigation and Dominated by Governmental Actors 
 
 
At this stage, three concluding remarks can be made regarding the evolution of the 
international climate change regime: 
 
1. Overall, the process has remained largely focused on mitigation, and has put little 
emphasis on adaptation.  Despite repeated calls to develop this aspect of the fight 
against climate change, normative frameworks remain vague and instruments to 
enforce them scarce.  As for the three funds designated to provide funding for 
adaptation, they remain chronically under-funded, since they largely depend on 
voluntary contributions by member states, and not on mandatory commitments. 
 
2. Concerns for migration are completely absent from the current process.  Although 
migration, both as a consequence of climate change and an adaptation strategy, is 
mentioned in the IPCC reports and the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change, this concern has not been translated into the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, 
or any instrument or mechanism related to these agreements.  Yet members of the 
alarmist coalition place high hopes in international talks on climate for the 
development of new mechanisms to address climate-related migration.  Biermann and 
Boas (2007) recommend that a new Protocol be added to the UNFCCC to protect 
‘climate refugees’, almost all recent works and reports on the topic urge the 
implementation of adaptation measures to reduce migration pressure, and a recent 
conference held in the European Parliament, attended by both scholars and policy-
makers, went as far as to recommend that the IPCC establish a special ad-hoc group 
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to study climate-induced population displacements ("Declaration on climate 
migrations"  2008).  At this stage, however, there is no sign that migration will be 
placed on the agenda of climate negotiations in the near future. 
 
3. A remarkable feature of the evolution of the climate change regime is the active role 
played by scholars as policy entrepreneurs.  Bodansky (2001: 37) rightly notes that the 
distinction between governmental and non-governmental actors was blurred during 
the agenda-setting phase, in which scientists acted as policy-makers in their own right.  
The story of the climate change regime is also the story of successful scientific 
lobbying to put an issue on the global agenda.  Throughout the process, scientists 
continued to play an important role, most notably through the IPCC – on the agenda-
setting side – and their frequent inclusion as advisers in governmental delegations – on 
the policy-making side.  Scientists were soon joined by NGOs, which have been 
increasingly numerous in attending the sessions of the Conferences of the Parties.  
Although both climate scholars and NGOs form part of the alarmist coalition, the 
international climate change regime remains dominated by governmental actors, who 
usually belong to the sceptical coalition, which may explain why migration has not yet 
found a place on the regime’s agenda. 
 
 
3.3. Migrat ion as  an Adaptat ion  Strat egy  
 
 
Most of the literature addressing the impacts of climate change has portrayed migration as a 
devastating consequence of global warming, and environmental migrants as unwitting victims 
of environmental disruption.  Authors working on adaptation strategies, however, take 
another view on migration, and describe it as effective adaptive response to environmental 
stressors (Adger et al. 2003; McLeman and Smit 2006; Paavola and Adger 2002).  For 
example, Adger et al. write: 
 
Migration […] is a coping mechanism used throughout history by societies as part of their resource 
utilization strategies and as a means of coping with climate variability.  Indeed migration, including to 
urban centres, continues to play an important role in livelihood resilience to the present-day in many 
parts of the developing world.  There is a substantial degree of certainty that areas of the present day 
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developing world will face greater incidence of extreme weather events in the future.  If desirable 
migration is not available to those affected, it may ultimately increase the necessity of displacement 
migration, typically undertaken as a last resort when other coping strategies are exhausted.  (2003: 
189) 
 
This represents a significant paradigm shift: migration is no longer viewed as an adaptation 
failure, but as an adaptive response.  Quite on the contrary, ignoring migration as an adaptive 
response is characterised as inaction in a typology of adaptive responses (Adger et al. 2006a: 
8).  McLeman and Smit (2006) stress that migration is only one possible adaptive response 
among others, and argue against environmental determinism by constructing a model of 
migration in response to climate change, which examines the cases when migration is the best 
available adaptation option. 
 
In order for migration to develop as an adaptation strategy, however, several policy needs 
must be taken into consideration, including the provision of adequate and sufficient resources 
to destination areas so that migrants do not represent an additional burden on scarce 
resources, relaxation of migration barriers, and compensation for the costs of migration.  Such 
policies would require significant adaptation in the post-Kyoto regime. 
 
 Scholars have pointed that current discussions and frameworks on adaptation didn’t account 
sufficiently for equity and climate justice: though an equitable distribution of the burden is a 
central concern for mitigation policies, this aspect has been absent from adaptation policies, 
which are still based on a voluntary, goodwill approach (Adger et al. 2006a).  Baer notes that  
 
It seems likely that Northern governments are resistant to explicit claims for “polluter-pays” liability 
for adaptation investments because there is a clear link between current responsibility for adaptation 
and eventual liability for compensation for actual climate damages.  Northern governments might 
reasonably fear that acknowledging such claims would obligate Northern countries to the largest share 
of a potentially enormous financial liability.  (2006: 132) 
 
Hence the development of equitable adaptation strategies, to account for and compensate the 
costs of migration, is deeply linked to the acknowledgement of a global climate justice, in 
which Northern governments accept responsibility and liability for climate impacts.  This 
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would require a broader definition of equity, not limited to mitigation but including 
adaptation. 
 
However, current discussions of the future climate regime, which should be finalised at the 
end of 2009, are still focused on mitigation as the highest priority, and are unlikely to address 
adaptation thoroughly.  It has been agreed in Bali to impose mandatory emission cuts on all 
countries, including developing ones.  Clever bargaining on the part of developing nations 
could see them accepting emissions reductions in exchange for stronger commitment to 
adaptation from Northern countries.  For now it is too early to tell. 
 
4. Empirical Illustration: Environmental Policies in Tuvalu 
 
 
To the outside world, the government of Tuvalu has consistently supported an alarmist view 
of migration between Tuvalu and New Zealand as a forced displacement triggered by climate 
change.  In domestic policies however, the government’s position on migration has been 
considerably milder. 
 
4.1. External Pol ic i es  
 
Following its membership to the United Nations in 2000, Tuvalu has consistently emphasised 
the risk of its being submerged by rising sea-levels.  On the international scene, Tuvalu has 
worked at being perceived essentially through the prism of environmental migration, as one of 
the world’s most vulnerable geographies to climate change, and at defining its inhabitants 
primarily as the first ‘climate refugees’. 
 
This policy choice was heralded by Enele Sopoaga, then Tuvalu ambassador at the United 
Nations.  Following his arrival in New York in 2001, Sopoaga quickly took up the vice-
chairmanship of the AOSIS, which provided him with a platform to make the plight of 
Tuvalu heard. 
 
This position at the AOSIS represented a formidable opportunity for us.  Nobody had ever heard of 
Tuvalu before, and my duty was to alert the world about what was happening in Tuvalu.  The 
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visibility of the AOSIS changed a lot of things for Tuvalu.  (…) My role at the United Nations was 
to attract the attention of the problems of our country, and the AOSIS was a great way to do it.  
After a couple of years, everybody knew about Tuvalu. 
(Enele Sopoaga) 
 
The AOSIS was clearly perceived as a window of opportunity for the small nation, and 
Sopoaga soon became a leader of the alarmist coalition on a policy level.  The reasons for 
such a posture were threefold: 
 
- First, the international context was favourable: the need to foster international 
cooperation in and support for the processes of adaptation to the impacts of climate 
change was recognised.  The issue had been little explored in climate negotiations, and 
the concept of environmental migration was a convenient vehicle for promoting this 
idea; 
 
- Second, Tuvalu saw – and continues to see – its participation in the United Nations 
and other organisations as an investment.  Being entirely dependent upon foreign aid, 
it was hoped that participation in international forums would raise the profile of 
Tuvalu and ‘put the country on the map’.  Participation in the United Nations, 
moreover, represents a considerable cost for Tuvalu, and was only made possible 
thanks to the royalties of the ‘.tv’ domain name.  Environmental migration was 
therefore also considered to be a convenient ‘marketing instrument’, used to justify the 
investment in participation to the UN and other international bodies; 
 
- Finally, there was also a sense of isolation in the face of climate change.  While 
Tuvalu’s neighbours are able to count on the direct help of the countries with which 
they had a colonial history, Tuvalu, being independent, knew that it could not count of 
such supports, and would instead need to rely on mechanisms of international 
cooperation. 
 
Barnett and Adger rightly observe that there is little difference between the people and the 
state itself when it comes to environmental vulnerability: ‘Small atoll countries have a high 
degree of ethnic homogeneity and high population density, meaning there is little political 
distance between the people and the nation-state’ (2003: 327).  Should Tuvalu disappear under 
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the waves, the international community would be confronted with the unprecedented case of 
a country’s physical disappearance.  But, as said above, a massive emigration could also 
threaten national sovereignty and the very existence of the country. 
 
Tuvalu has consistently insisted upon the moral obligation of the international community to 
compensate for damages induced by climate change.  In this regard, premature resettlement 
might weaken Tuvalu’s case for compensation.  All Pacific Island countries seem conscious of 
the risk to their national sovereignty posed by climate change, and the Alliance Of Small 
Island Sates (AOSIS) has been emphasizing this risk for years.  For instance, it is noteworthy 
that Pacific countries insisted at a 1999 regional workshop on the implementation of 
UNCLOS100, held in Tonga, that maritime zones and airspaces should be retained under 
international law ‘as a useful asset for displaced people’. 
 
In recent years, however, Connell observes that there has been ‘a shift from responsibility to 
litigation’ (2003: 103), with Tuvalu striving to claim compensation and reparation for 
environmental damages that could potentially be solved domestically.  Connell describes an 
increased tendency to blame the global system rather than foster solutions to environmental 
issues, leading him to conclude that climate change has become a ‘garbage can’ for Tuvalu, 
encompassing all environmental issues and diverting attention from the addressing challenges 
of economic development and adequate strategies that could mitigate current environmental 
problems. 
 
4.2. Domest ic  Poli c i es  
 
At the domestic level, environmental migration, either as an adaptation strategy or a threat 
facing the population, has consistently been downplayed in favour of the development of 
adaptive capacities.  It is only in recent years that the Tuvaluan government has started to 
envision migration as a possible adaptation strategy, and has begun to encourage emigration as 
a way of ‘giving people a choice before it is too late’.  Furthermore, as noted above, the pro-
emigration policy also fulfils two other goals of alleviating population pressure, and increasing 
the income from remittances.  However, the government refuses the notion of planning a full 
evacuation of the island 
                                                
100 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
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The evacuation of the population is not the priority right now, we want to focus on adaptation 
strategies.  If we need to evacuate eventually, we will do so in time, but for now we believe it will be 
possible to stay.  (…) We just try to facilitate migration agreements, so that people can have the choice 
and leave if they want to.   
(Kelesoma Saloa) 
 
Internationally, policies and measures of adaptation to the impacts of sea-level rise and climate 
change rarely include migration as a coping strategy: in 1999, following the signing of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the National Communication of Tuvalu to the Secretariat of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) listed adaptation projects, 
the improvement of information and education on climate change and the development of 
renewable energies, as well as some policies by sector, but there was not a single mention of 
migration (Tuvalu Government 1999).  Migration is only mentioned once, as a last resort 
option, in Tuvalu’s 2008 National Adaptation Programme, a document detailing domestic 
policies directed at coping with the impacts of climate change: 
 
The overall impacts of climate and sea-level change will likely increase, and determined by the 
interaction and synergy between adverse effects and on-going climate and sea-level changes.  
Implementation of adaptation measures and strategies in Tuvalu, therefore, should take a “no-regrets” 
approach.  The least cost adaptation options are consistent with this approach, however the highest cost 
options are those that would not be identified as no-regrets strategies and relate to the most severe 
effects, and greatest vulnerabilities and urgency.  A last resort to adaptation would be migration and 
resettlement should the worst-case scenario occur.  (Tuvalu Department of Environment 2007) 
 
 
The development of this minimalist perspective on migration contrasts dramatically with 
perceptions of Tuvalu at the international level.  What can explain such a discrepancy? 
 
The first explanation is that an alarmist approach on the domestic level would clash with the 
views of the majority of the population.  Most Tuvaluans refute the idea that Tuvalu might 
eventually cease to exist.  The government is therefore trying to find a fine balance between 
the risk of abandonment and a sustainable migration policy.  No anecdote illustrates this 
better than the negotiation of Tuvalu’s inclusion into the Pacific Access Category scheme in 
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2002.  The Prime Minister of New Zealand, Helen Clark, offered an initial quota of 300 
migrants to the then Prime Minister of Tuvalu, Saufotu Sopoanga, who admitted that he had 
asked for a reduction of the quota to 75 migrants because he was afraid that the island would 
‘empty itself too quickly’. 
 
The case of the small, neighbouring island state of Niue is very relevant in this regard: 
emigration from Niue has been so important that the population left on the island is now 
currently about 1,500, threatening its very existence.  Unsurprisingly, Niue made an offer to 
Tuvalu to take on some of its population. 
 
They’re desperate to attract some migrants, they don’t even have enough players to form a national 
rugby team.  That’s the only reason why they offered to take on the whole Tuvaluan population.  But 
Niue is as threatened by sea-level as Tuvalu is. 
(John Connell) 
 
Another explanation lies in the adverse effect that migration can have on sustainability, since 
Tuvalu’s adaptation strategies are consistently presented within the frame of environmental 
migration.  Farbotko (2005) has already shown how constant portrayal as victims of climate 
change can disempower people, and prevent them from developing adaptive strategies and 
coping capacities.  Barnett and Adger also note that ‘rates of international migration from atoll 
countries threatened with climate change may pass a critical threshold that constitutes danger 
for a society’ (Barnett and Adger 2003: 328).  Historically, migration has always contributed to 
the resilience and development of Tuvalu, but Barnett and Adger argue that ‘ultimately a 
threshold may be reached which pushes the social system from previously sustainable 
international migration into complete abandonment’ (2003: 328).  The authors go on to 
identify two specific dangers related to massive migration flows: 
 
1.  A loss of confidence in the future among individuals can undermine the sustainable use of 
current resources, since future resource availability is no longer a concern.  The activities of 
the French NGO ‘Alofa Tuvalu’ can serve as an example of this danger: the goal of ‘Alofa 
Tuvalu’ is to foster sustainable development in Tuvalu, inter alia through the development of 
renewable energies and the sustainable use of resources.  An administrator of the association, 
Fanny Héros, reports that the NGO often faces the criticism that its projects are worthless, 
since the country is doomed to be flooded anyway. 
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2.  A reduction of foreign aid and investment, if investors are no longer convinced that the 
atolls will be able to sustain human life in the future.  This risk is also identified by Connell 
(2003), and is definitely a concern of the Tuvaluan government, which is eager to foster future 
development projects and increase international support. 
Tuvalu has therefore taken a dual approach to environmental migration: its alarmist stance in 
external policies contrasts with a sceptical view in domestic adaptation policies.  The 
opposition between the two advocacy coalitions is not channelled through different actors, 
but rather through different levels of policy-making – although the independence of the UN 
mission vis-à-vis the capital Funafuti should not be underestimated.   
 
The existence of two different strategies might appear contradictory, but can be justified by 
the competing demands of the national and international agenda.  On the national level, the 
government seeks to avoid giving the impression of ‘abandoning’ Tuvalu, and thus fosters 
adaptation strategies.  This strategy seeks to downplay the risk of an eventual evacuation, 
because of the possible abovementioned adverse effects.  On the international level, Tuvalu 
strives to garner support for its cause, and to maximise the possibility of obtaining assistance 
for adaptation and possible compensation for the damage caused by global warming in climate 
negotiations.  Thus there is a strong incentive to maximise the risk of environmental migration 
in external policies.  Because of this dual strategy, the same migration flow can be 
conceptualised as a failure of adaptation at the international level and as a risk-reduction 






Since the 1970s, general normative frameworks have developed to address environmental 
changes – including natural disasters.  Many of the general principles underpinning 
international environmental law have become customary law, as attested by the development 
of case law in this field.  Migration movements, however, have only been addressed marginally 
by this quickly expanding body of norms and principles. 
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Environmental changes as a whole are now overshadowed by global warming; this 
phenomenon can be conceived of as global pollution of the atmosphere resulting in a large 
number of impacts, including disasters.  Climate change is addressed through a complex 
international regime, made up of binding laws, funds and institutions.  This regime has mostly 
focused on the source of the problem, the emission of greenhouse gases, rather than on the 
different adaptive strategies that could be developed to cope with the impacts of the change.  
Migration is increasingly recognised as one of these possible strategies, but this aspect re;ains 
undershadowed by the view of migration as a failure of adaptation.  Although migration 
appears to be a core aspect of global climate change, it is not yet on the agenda of the ongoing 
talks on the future climate change regime. 
 
It is remarkable that, although disaster management and climate policy overlap so much when 
it comes to environmental migration, both fields are currently unconnected to each other.  
Ferris (2007) notes that 
 
Those working on climate change and on disaster risk reduction are often talking past each other.  
(…) The Climate Change convention only mentions disasters in terms of countries that are the most 
vulnerable to climate change, including nations with disaster-prone areas.  Those working on disaster 
management usually don’t refer to climate change (perhaps because of the perception that there’s 
nothing that can be done about it).  While climate change policy is almost exclusively discussed at the 
global level, disaster risk reduction (DRR) is guided by an international framework but requires 
national or sub-national action with a particular stress on building resilient communities.  Those 
working on natural disasters see disaster risk reduction as a way of mitigating the effects of disasters 
and for the past decade, considerable energy has been devoted to these DRR initiatives.  Those working 
on climate change are beginning to talk not just about preventing further climate change but also about 
adaptation mechanisms by which communities can adapt to the changed environment.   
 
With regard to the emerging international governance of the environment, a major challenge 
ahead lies in integrating disaster management, environmental law and climate policies.  These 
three areas remain currently quite oblivious to each other, although they intersect in many 
different fields, including that of environmental migration.  This fragmentation can certainly 
explain why environmental migration is addressed marginally, and not comprehensively, by 
these frameworks and policies. 
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A number of recent initiatives aim to fill this gap.  For example, on the national level the 
2009-2012 Federal Plan for Sustainable Development of Belgium includes the issue of 
environmental migration, and proposes the creation of an ad hoc advisory group to examine 
the policies and action that Belgium should implement in the coming years to address the 
issue101.  On the international level, a new initiative has recently been created in the form of 
the Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance (CCEMA), founded by the UN 
Environment Programme, the Institute for the Environment and Human Security of the 
United Nations University (UNU-EHS), Munich Re Foundation102, and the International 
Organisation for Migration.  As a testimony of its willingness to act upon environmental 
policies, CCEMA will be launched at World Water Forum to be held in Istanbul in April 2009.  
The goal of the alliance is ‘to mainstream the environmental and climate change 
considerations into the migration management policies and practice and to also bring 
migration issues into the world’s on-going environmental and climate change discourse’, 
through awareness raising, a forum for policy dialogue, and the provision of practical support 
to the most vulnerable countries.  It will be interesting to observe whether CCEMA will 
function primarily through environmental or migration policies – or both.   
 
Three out of its four founding members belong to the environmental field, while one (IOM) 
belongs to the migration field.  The composition of the Alliance is a testimony to how the 
field of environmental migration lies at the crossroad of environmental and migration policies.  
After reviewing the evolution of policies and frameworks in the environmental field, it seemed 
only logical to conduct the same exercise for the migration field.  This is the purpose of the 
next part of the thesis. 
                                                
101 The plan can be consulted online at htpp://www.plan2009.be. Refer to the action 2.3.15 for the proposals on 
environmental migration. 
102 Emanating from the Munich Re insurance group; the Munich Re Foundation aims to raise awareness and 














“Sovereignty is nowhere more absolute than in matters of  
emigration, naturalization, nationality, and expulsion.” 
 





After reviewing policies and norms relevant to natural disasters, climate change and 
environmental change as a whole, the next step is to review the legal and political instruments 
provided in the field of asylum and migration.  Institutional frameworks dealing with forced 
migration have undergone rapid development over the second half of the 20th century, a 
development that accelerated from the asylum crisis of the 1990s.  On the other hand, the 
international governance of (voluntary) migration has yet to see daylight, and thus won’t be 
treated here.   
 
Chapter 7 examines the evolution of the international refugee regime, through its various 
instruments and actors, and through the prism of the refugee definition.  The Geneva 
Convention remains the paramount of refugee protection, and I shall try to show why it 
should be seen as political rather than a humanitarian construct, and how this reconsideration 
can help the conceptualisation of environmental migration.  I shall highlight in particular the 
political forces and interests behind the evolution of the refugee regime, and the stakes at play.   
 
Chapter 8 looks at asylum and mobility policies, with a focus on Europe. The complementary 
protection schemes that have been implemented in Europe and the United States are also 
treated in this section.  Some space is also devoted to showing the development, from the 
early 1990s, of a normative framework to address internal displacement – this process should 
hopefully prove very insightful for the current debates on the instruments that could best 











“The problem of refugees cannot be considered in the abstract, but,  
on the contrary, must be considered in the light of historical facts.” 
 
Extract from a statement made by the representative of France to the United Nations Conference of 







A common argument often raised in conferences and workshops is that environmental 
‘refugees’ are actually not refugees, because they do not meet the criteria of the Geneva 
Convention.  As Burson has pointed out (2008), this view is over simplistic: ‘Caution needs to 
be exercised before rigid and immutable distinctions are drawn between environmentally 
displaced persons and those to whom the Convention’s protection regime can extend’.  As 
this section will show, a more careful analysis of the norms and institutions of the 
international refugee regime reveals the protection and assistance mechanisms that can apply 
to those displaced by environmental changes.   
 
At the same time, the regime associated with the Geneva Convention has repeatedly been 
called into question, particularly since the asylum crisis that started in the late 1980s (Garvey 
1985; Dacyl 1995; Hathaway 1997).  Critiques of the regime have argued that reforms are 
necessary to make the regime relevant again, and that it is not able, in its current state, to 
accommodate the large numbers of forcibly displaced people who are not covered by the 
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current refugee status.  Furthermore, the restrictive asylum policies in most OECD countries, 
in tandem with a sharp increase in the number of displaced worldwide, has prompted some 
critics to call for a more interventionist approach to refugee flows (Roberts 1998).   
 
This section examines how the international refugee regime has addressed the issue of 
environmental displacees historically and the most significant evolutions in this regard.  
Section 1 looks at the evolution of refugee protection through the various stages of the 
evolution of the regime, while Section 2 discusses the protection of environmental displacees 
within the framework of the 1951 Geneva Convention and its additional 1967 Protocol, as 
well as the protection mechanisms implemented by other regional conventions.  A final 
section looks at the role of the principal institutional actor of refugee protection, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in providing protection and assistance 
to those displaced because of environmental disruption.  
 
 
1. The Origins of International Refugee Protection 
 
 
Before the drafting of the Geneva Convention as the cornerstone of the international refugee 
regime, other international arrangements existed to address the issue of people displaced 
outside the borders of their country. Refugee protection developed from the seventeenth 
century onwards, until the creation, in the modern era, of the first international refugee 




1.1. Firs t  Int ernat ional Arrangements  
 
It was not until the emergence of modern states in the seventeenth century that refugees 
became an international issue.  The Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, marked the start of an era in 
which sovereignty was the key principle of relations between states.  Rulers sought to impose 
territorial unity within the borders of their state, and persecuted those who were seen as 
deviating from the national norm (Loescher et al. 2008: 6).  International refugee protection 
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thus originated as a way to deal with religious minorities, those who did not share the faith of 
their ruler: the Peace of Westphalia recognised an individual’s right to emigrate to another 
country if persecuted on religious grounds (Orchard 2005).  The right to leave and seek refuge 
in another country, however, was not yet a right to settle and remain in the country of 
destination. 
 
It was only after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV, in 1685, that the term 
refugee emerged, with reference to the masses of protestant Huguenots who were forced to 
leave France.  It is estimated that approximately 200,000 fled to England, 30,000 to Germany, 
and another 20,000 to Holland.  The flight of the Huguenots prompted states to recognise 
that people uprooted from their country needed some form of legal protection, rooted in 
domestic law.  The Huguenots were welcomed in England and Germany, and later naturalised 
(Grahl-Madsen 1966: 10).  This early modern refugee regime was characterized by three 
important elements: refugees were differentiated from other migrants, their right to leave their 
country was recognised, and the basis for their legal protection was established in national 
legislation (Orchard 2008).  At this time, the right to leave a country – guaranteed thanks to 
the Peace of Westphalia – was recognised only for religious refugees; hence religion was 
historically the first acknowledged grounds of persecution. 
 
At the beginning of the eighteenth Century, Vattel (1752) made the case for an extension of 
the right to seek refuge, arguing that the individual had a natural right to leave his country for 
three reasons:  
- Economic, if he could no longer find subsistence in his own country; 
- Societal, if society failed to fulfil its obligations towards citizens; 
- Legal, if laws were enacted that threatened the fundamental liberties of the individual. 
 
Vattel also recognised that those leaving their country would require protection from another 
state.  Nevertheless, according to his argument, asylum remained a privilege granted by the 
receiving state, and not a right of the refugee.  
 
The French Revolution saw the emergence of another type of refugee, the political refugee.  
In the aftermath of the French Revolution, an estimated 129,000 refugees fled France: not 
only members of the clergy and nobility, but also political opponents to successive rulers of 
France (Zolberg et al. 1989: 9).  The French Revolution marked the start of a revolutionary 
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period throughout Europe, with increased numbers of refugees. However, refugees fleeing 
revolutionary turmoil were perceived differently by receiving states on several counts.  They 
were thought more likely to seek temporary asylum and return to their origin countries once 
the political conditions became more favourable; states were afraid that political activists 
among the refugees would trigger revolutionary movements abroad; and finally, states did not 
know how to deal with demands issued by origin states to be return refugees.  As Orchard 
argues, ‘this added complexity meant that states needed to develop new processes to deal with 
refugees, processes which became norms designed to stabilize state expectations towards 
refugees and increase the ability of states to cooperate’ (2008: 111). 
 
In the aftermath of the French Revolution, a significant number of countries, most notably 
the United States and the United Kingdom, offered asylum to those fleeing persecution.  As 
flows of refugees increased, a large number of states engaged in bilateral negotiations over the 
status of refugees; the resulting legislation contained the first elements upon which 
international refugee law would later build.  Such laws included France’s Loi Relative aux 
Etrangers réfugiés qui résideront en France, promulgated in 1832, which enacted full refugee 
protection, or Belgium’s 1833 Loi sur les extraditions, which forbade the extraditions of political 
refugees; these acts were soon followed by corresponding legislation or treaties in most 
European countries. 
 
Overall, the French Revolution brought about two significant shifts in the practices of refugee 
protection: 
- Political refugees, and not only religious refugees, were recognised. 
-  The ‘right to leave’ evolved towards a ‘right to stay’, through the development of 
national legislation on refugees, and treaties on extradition, which would later serve as a 
basis for the foundations of international refugee law. 
 
This regime, however, was largely based on ad hoc solutions, and an international mechanism 
to protect and assist refugees was yet to be created.  This would happen in the aftermath of 






1.2. The League o f  Nat ions  
 
The creation of the League of Nations in 1919 marked the start of the development of 
international rules for the treatment of refugees.  After the Great War, there were 
approximately 800,000 Russian refugees, mostly in Eastern Europe, and the Council of the 
League had no choice but to act.  At the same time, nationalism was on the rise on many 
European states, and restrictive immigration policies, based on race and national passports, 
were implemented throughout Europe: those forced to leave their country facing increasing 
difficulty in finding elsewhere, and needed international protection.  Many such refugees had 
become stateless following the collapse of their former empires.  Left without documentation 
or refuge, their existence was felt to be a threat to European regional security. 
 
The Russian refugee crisis was not a problem that could treated on the national level – 
governments were ill-equipped for an influx of destitute people whose dubious legal status 
made them a political problem (Holborn 1975: 5) – but had to be dealt with at the 
international level.  In order to fill the protection gap and alleviate a potential source of 
tension, Allied powers acknowledged the need for an international organisation to address the 
Russian refugee problem (Loescher 1994). 
 
In 1921, the Council of the League of Nations decided to convoke a Conference on the issue, 
and the President of the Council appointed Dr Fridtjof Nansen, the Norwegian conquerer of 
the North Pole, as the first High Commissioner for Refugees.  Nansen’s mandate was initially 
limited to Russian refugees, but was later extended to include Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, 
and Turks.  Nansen managed to convince European governments to pass a series of 
international agreements protecting refugees fleeing disintegrating empires, and implementing 
multilateral protection mechanisms, such as the famous Nansen passport: the first refugee 
travel document.  Refugee protection was no longer provided by national policies, but rather 
by binding international law. 
 
These first instruments of international refugee law adopted a group category approach: a 
refugee was defined as someone outside her country of origin who did not receive the 
protection of this country.  Both conditions were required for someone to be classified as a 
refugee  (Goodwin-Gill 1996: 4). 
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After the death of Nansen in 1930, the High Commissioner’s Office for Refugees was 
discontinued, and replaced by the Nansen International Office for Refugees.  The Nansen 
Office continued the missions undertaken by Nansen: to secure the protection of refugees via 
international agreements, and to provide assistance to them during emergency situation, taking 
on an operational role.   
 
A first refugee convention, addressing directly the status of refugees, was adopted in 1933.  
The Convention was the first agreement to ‘articulate the principle that refugees should not be 
returned involuntarily to their country of origin’ (Beck 1999: 603), thereby establishing the 
principle of ‘non-refoulement’.  Nonetheless, it had some important limitations: it applied only 
to refugee groups that were already under the protection of the League of Nations, and was 
upheld by sixteen nations (Orchard 2008: 177).  Several other agreements were drawn up in 
1936, 1938 and 1939 to address the situation of refugees fleeing Nazi Germany, but these 
instruments failed to prevent the Holocaust. 
 
Overall, Loescher notes that ‘the international refugee response prior to the Second World 
War did not constitute an effective regime’ (1994: 354).  The main reasons for this lie in the 
reluctance of Western states to adopt a universal definition of refugeeism, since these states 
preferred to work to deal with refugees on a case-by-case basis.  Overall, the lack of 
international commitment to a durable refugee solution, as well as anti-immigration 
sentiments and policies in most Western countries, greatly impeded the development of a true 
refugee regime. 
 
Following the Second World War, new refugee organisations were established to deal with the 
tens of millions of people displaced by the war.  In 1943, the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) was created by the Allied Powers to supervise the return and 
resettlement of those displaced.  UNRRA was largely under US control, and not formally 
affiliated with the United Nations, which was created two years later in San Francisco.  
Loescher et al. contend that UNRRA ‘was in no sense a refugee organisation’, and even 
‘played an active part in the controversial forcible repatriation of large numbers of people in 
Europe’ (2008: 10). 
 
Upon UNRRA’s termination in 1947, it was replaced by the International Refugee 
Organisation (IRO).  Unlike UNRRA, the IRO was not so much concerned with relief, 
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rehabilitation and repatriation, as with resettlement.  States had recognised that refugees had a 
right not to be repatriated against their will: between 1947 and 1950, the IRO had resettled 
more than one million people to the United States, Canada, Australia, Israel and Europe 
(Gallagher 1989).  Most importantly perhaps, states adopted a universal definition of refugee, 
based on individual persecution or fear of persecution because of race, religion, nationality or 
political opinion: ‘In so doing, Western powers made refugee eligibility dependent upon the 
circumstances of the individual rather than membership in a group, and accepted the 
individual’s right to flee from political persecution’ (Loescher et al. 2008: 11). 
 
This definition based on individual grounds marked a radical change in the approach to 
refugees: the international community had never tried to provide a universal definition for 
refugees, and had always dealt with specific, identified groups.  According to the past 
definition, one had to belong to one of these groups in order to be recognised as a refugee; it 
was now possible to be recognised as a refugee because of individual persecution or fear of 
persecution.  As a result of this shift, the IRO found itself resettling not only those who had 
been displaced by the war, but also significant numbers of East European citizens who left 
their country in search of political asylum. 
 
The organisation had a fixed term, and was terminated in 1950.  Despite the organisation’s 
achievements in resettling people, there were still large numbers of displacees throughout 
Europe.  In addition to Second World War refugees, large numbers of people had been 
uprooted throughout the world because of the Cold War and new conflicts erupting in India, 
Korea, Palestine and China.  By 1950, the international community recognised that there was 
an urgent need for a new refugee agency, but the US was unwilling to continue funding it as it 
had done for UNRRA and IRO.  As a result, the international community decided to create a 
new organisation, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), supported 
by a new Refugee Convention, adopted in 1951.  Both the organisation and the convention 
remain the cornerstones of the international refugee regime today, and their evolution is 
described in detail in the subsequent sections. 
 
Overall, the progress made towards refugee protection since the Peace of Westphalia was 
significant, and can be summarised by the following major shifts: 
 
- The ‘right to stay’ was recognised in addition to the ‘right to leave’: the right to enjoy 
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asylum in another country, away from persecution, would later be engraved into the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
 
- States gradually accepted that refugee protection had to be guaranteed by binding 
international instruments, and could not be left to domestic immigration policies; 
 
- Finally, a universal definition of refugees emerged, based on individual, not collective, 
grounds.  Furthermore, the definition was based on persecution or the fear of 




2. The 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol 
 
The drafting of the Geneva Convention was inherently linked to the inception of UNHCR.  
The Convention itself was the product of intense preparation, and although it was formally 
adopted at an ad hoc conference convened in July 1951, this adoption was the outcome of a 
long maturation process that had started well before the first ad hoc committee on the 
drafting of the Convention.  The Convention was a document that reflected the 
preoccupations of the time, as will be discussed in Section 2.1.  Section 2.2. examines the 
characteristics of the refugee definition, and how this definition relates to prior and alternative 
definitions.  Finally, Section 2.3. attempts to show how the Convention is able to provide 
protection to environmental displaces, or not, as the case may be. 
 
 
2.1. The Corners tone  o f  the  Int ernat ional Refugee  Regime 
 
The negotiations over the drafting of the Convention were conducted alongside negotiations 
over the creation of UNHCR: the goal of the Convention was not only to formalise a refugee 
definition, but also to define the precise rights of refugees and the obligations of states 
towards them.   
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Although the Convention was negotiated by only twenty-six parties– or perhaps because of 
this fact – fierce debates erupted, between advocates and opponents of a broad definition of 
refugees, and concerning the scope of the Convention.  Great Britain, for example, argued 
that the Convention should apply to all refugees, without distinction of country of origin, 
whether they were already asylum-seeker or might become so in the future.  On the other 
hand, France and the United States contended that states needed to know in advance how 
many refugees they could expect if they were to sign the Convention: they felt that states 
could not commit to future flows of refugees, whose numbers and location were unknown 
(Weis 1995).  Eventually, a limited interpretation of the Convention prevailed, which would 
serve primarily for the protection of a known quantity of European refugees.  In order to be 
eligible for refugee status, people had to have been displaced by an event occurring before the 
1st January 1951.  Furthermore, states could choose to restrict asylum to those coming from 
European countries.   
 
The Convention established a series of rights for refugees, including the rights to employment 
and education, to access national courts, and other economic, civil, and social rights, although 
though many observers noted that such rights were seldom implemented in cases of 
emergencies (Durieux and McAdam 2004).  The most important right, however, was the right 
not to be repatriated to a country where the refugee would face persecution: the right of ‘non-
refoulement’.  The right of non-refoulement is now widely seen as the paramount of 
international refugee protection, as it is a principle that has become customary law and thus 
can impose itself on countries that are not parties to the Convention (Goodwin-Gill 1996: 30; 
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003).   
 
The purview of the 1951 Convention was limited in both time and space: to refugees 
displaced before 1951 and originating from Europe.  The 1967 Additional Protocol to the 
Convention lifted these limitations, and made the refugee definition universal.  Since then, the 
Convention has never been altered, and is one of the most widely ratified international 
agreements to date103, with 147 signatories104.  Over time, the Convention has acquired the 
status of a human rights treaty (McAdam 2006), and some of its core principles, including that 
of finding asylum from persecution, are to be found in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 
                                                
103 Along with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. 
104 Most of the countries that did not ratify the Convention are located in Asia – for example, India, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, amongst others – with the exception of Libya, in Africa. 
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Studies and initiatives on environmental migration, however, have repeatedly called for a 
modification of the 1951 Convention, or an additional protocol, in order to grant appropriate 
protection to people displaced by environmental changes.  These calls have come from a wide 
range of sources: scholars, NGOs, but also policy-makers.  While it is impossible to draw up a 
comprehensive list of these initiatives, it is possible to classify them into two categories:  
 
- Those who argue that environmental degradation is a form of political persecution, 
and that environmental displaces therefore have a legitimate right to claim refugee 
status (Conisbee and Simms 2003); 
 
- Those who contend that the refugee definition no longer matches the realities of 
forced migration, and must be revised in order to incorporate environmental 
displacees (Cooper 1997; Chemillier-Gendreau 2006). 
 
These interventions have not been well received by scholars working on refugee rights, in the 
main members of the alarmist coalition.  Most were afraid that these calls were an excuse to 
limit governmental responsibility for forced displacement (Kibreab 1997, 1994), or that they 
would result in a watering down of the protection mechanisms in place for current refugees.  
Castles expressed these fears in direct fashion: 
 
It therefore seems appropriate to call for a much wider international protection regime that would 
embrace all these groups and – why not? – so-called environmental refugees as well.  The reality is that 
there is no consensus for extending the refugee regime.  Most receiving states want to restrict it further 
rather than improve it.  (…) Any changes in the Refugee Convention in the current climate are likely 
to be for the worse.  That is why a notion like ‘environmental refugees’ is not only misleading, but 
possibly harmful.  It can be used by those who want to restrict asylum opportunities for refugees to 
support claims that those who arrive on our shores are not genuine victims of persecution, but are in 
fact fleeing environmental degradation and impoverishment.  If people making refugee claims are not 
real refugees in the sense of the 1951 Convention then the case for exclusion is strengthened.  (2002: 
10) 
 
I argue that such fears stem not only from the current anti-immigration climate denounced by 
Castles, but also from the status of the Refugee Convention as a human rights treaty.  
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Although a great number of initiatives have called for an extension of the refugee regime, any 
change to the Convention would be perceived as an attempt to alter or diminish human rights.  
Even those scholars from the alarmist coalition who have called for a better protection of 
environmental displaces in international law share these fears and concerns, and have 
recommended that the Geneva Convention not be modified, aware that the current refugee 
regime could be reduced rather than extended (Piguet 2008; Biermann and Boas 2007).   
 
Some initiatives went a step further and called officially for recognition of ‘environmental 
refugees’ within the Geneva Convention.  In recent years the Belgian Parliament has been the 
most active of all legislative bodies on this issue.  In 2006, the Senate passed a resolution 
urging the Belgian government to work towards better protection of ‘environmental refugees’ 
in the Geneva Convention (Mahoux 2006).  This is, to date, the most advanced official 
position on the matter taken by any state.  During the ensuing parliamentary debate, some 
Senators opposed the resolution on the basis that it did not sufficiently address the root 
causes of the problem, but none mentioned the technical and political difficulties of revising 
the Geneva Convention.   
 
Two other resolutions are currently pending in the Belgian House of Representatives on the 
issue: one recommends the drafting of an additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention, 
which would give legal status to ‘environmental refugees’ (Cornil et al. 2008); the other, 
although pursuing the same objective, does not call explicitly for a revision of the Geneva 
Convention (Boulet et al. 2008).  A report under preparation in the Council of Europe follows 
the same line, and declares a ‘pressing need for an elaboration of a specific framework for the 
recognition and protection of environmentally induced migrants, either in a separate 
Convention or as parts of intergovernmental environmental treaties, or as both, yet 
disassociating environmental migration from the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention’ (Acketoft 
2008). 
 
Thus different approaches exist, and not all initiatives calling for the international recognition 
of ‘environmental refugees’ of necessity call for a revision of the Geneva Convention.  
Although the number of such initiatives is on the rise at the legislative level, their number 





2.2. The Refugee  Def ini t ion  
 
 
The refugee definition of the Geneva Convention builds upon a series of previous definitions, 
provided by different international agreements.  Prior to the twentieth century, there was no 
perceived need for a definition of refugee: ideally, those leaving their country were ‘welcomed 
with open arms by European monarchs or municipalities’ (Marrus 1985: 7), and considered as 
an addition to the development of the sovereign state.   
 
2.2.1. Previous Attempts to Define Refugees 
 
 
The need for definition arose only after the adoption of restrictive immigration policies by 
Western states in the early twentieth century.  The beginning of the century was marked by 
massive refugee flows stemming from the Russian Revolution or the Armenian Genocide, and 
restrictive immigration policies were difficult to implement in the face of large humanitarian 
crises.  Hence refugee law developed as a compromise between the need to provide protection 
to persecuted people and restrictive immigration policies; it constituted ‘a humanitarian 
exception to the protectionist norm, in that immigration screening was dispensed with for 
large groups of unprotected migrants’ (Hathaway 1991: 2). 
 
The initial definitions of refugee were collective, and followed a case-by-case basis: states 
recognised some groups of people as in need of international protection, and refugees were 
simply defined as the members of the group.  The refugee definition was relativist, and applied 
only to certain identified groups.  Refugees were protected by virtue of their membership to 
this group; members of other groups that were not entitled to international protection might 
be in a similar situation but did not qualify as refugees.  In the first phase, until 1935 and the 
rise of National Socialism in Germany, the only groups that qualified as refugees were those 
that had lost the protection of their state.  Their refugee status was primarily aimed at 
correcting an anomaly of international law, and providing them with legal documentation and 
national protection.  A second phase occurred after the Nazi party acceded to power in 
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Germany, when refugee status was granted to those fleeing the country not because they had 
lost the protection of their state, but because they needed refuge. 
 
The most fundamental shift occurred with the 1938 Convention, which rejected the collective 
approach in favour of an individualistic approach to refugees.  A refugee was no longer 
defined by his/her belonging to a group, but rather by his/her individual characteristics.  The 
procedure of determining refugee status was considerably affected by this shift, since the right 
to asylum now rested on the applicant’s personal characteristics, and was judged on a case-by-
case basis: this individual approach to refugee status has predominated ever since.  It is 
because of this individual approach that some observers maintain that normative frameworks 
of refugee law, and international law in general, are unfit to address the issue of environmental 
displacees (Cournil and Mazzega 2006; Zetter 2008).  Accordingly, they propose that a legal 
status for environmental displacees should be based on a collective rather than individual 
approach (Cournil and Mazzega 2007; Magniny 1999). 
 
 
2.2.2. In the Geneva Convention 
 
 
The Geneva Convention defines a refugee as any person who has been recognised a refugee 
under previous arrangements, or any person who, 
 
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951105 and owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it (United Nations 1951: art. A(2)). 
 
                                                
105 The definition has a limited time frame: Article B(1) stipulates that ‘for the purposes of this Convention, the 
words “events occurring before 1 January 1951” in article 1, section A, shall be understood to mean either (a) 
“events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951”; or (b) “events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 
January 1951”, and each Contracting State shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification or 
accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the purpose of its obligations under this Convention’. 
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Hathaway has observed that the definition is notable for two main characteristics: its strategic 
conceptualisation and its European focus (1991: 6). When agreeing on a definition, 
representatives of Western governments insisted that the term ‘refugee’ have a highly political 
connotation, in order to highlight the plight of peoples fleeing persecution from communism, 
and those whose flight was motivated by pro-Western political beliefs.  Representatives of 
Soviet countries, on the contrary, were eager to downplay the importance of such motives for 
migration.  Hathaway writes: ‘As anxious as the Soviets had been to exclude political émigrés 
from the scope of the Convention for fear of exposing their weak flank, so the more 
numerous and more powerful Western states were preoccupied to maximise the international 
visibility of that migration’ (1991: 7). 
 
Such preoccupations are evident upon examination of the travaux préparatoires of the 
Convention.  In a preparatory meeting for the Convention, the Soviet representative 
expressed the Soviets’ position on the refugee definition: 
 
The U.S.S.R. delegation considers that persons who collaborated in any way with the enemies of the 
democratic countries should not be regarded as refugees or enjoy the protection of the United Nations.  
It considers it essential to exclude from the category of persons who receive United Nations assistance 
not only those who, during the war, fought actively on the side of the enemy against the people and 
government of their country, but all those other traitors who are refusing to return home to serve their 
country together with their fellow citizens.106  
 
On the contrary, Western countries, led by France and the United States, were keen to restrict 
the refugee definition to political motives: 
 
If […] it was considered that a single text should cover both refugees from Western Europe seeking 
asylum beyond the ‘Iron Curtain’ and refugees from the latter countries seeking asylum in Western 
Europe, he wondered what the moral implications of such a text would be.  The problem of refugees 
could not be considered in the abstract, but, on the contrary, must be considered in the light of historical 
facts.  In laying down the definition of the term ‘refugee’, account had hitherto always been taken of the 
fact that refugees principally involved had always been from a certain part of the world; thus, such a 
                                                
106 Statement from Mr Soldatov, representative of the U.S.S.R., at a preparatory meeting held on 14 December 
1950.  Quoted in (Weis 1995: 25) and (Hathaway 1991: 7). 
 304 
definition was based on historical fact.  Any attempt to impart a universal character to the text would 
be tantamount to making it an ‘Open Sesame’.107 
 
Western nations were the more powerful block, and were able to impose their conception of 
refugeeism: only people persecuted for their political or civil status would be entitled to 
international protection.  As a result, no Soviet nation, apart from Yugoslavia, ratified the 
Convention.  Hence the definition was not grounded in humanitarian motives, but in political 
strategising aimed at stigmatising Soviet ideology in the early days of the Cold War.  The 
refugee definition of the Geneva Convention is thus a direct by-product of the Cold War, 
rather than a genuine attempt to guarantee international protection to those who could no 
longer count on the protection of their country.  The scope of the definition was deliberately 
limited for political reasons, as the abovementioned statement from the French representative 
attests: ‘The problem of refugees could not be considered in the abstract’. 
 
It seems therefore entirely logical that environmental stressors were not included as potential 
push factors entitling displacees to a refugee status: ‘The refugee definition was carefully 
phrased to include only persons who have been disfranchised by their state on the basis of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, matters 
in regard to which East bloc practice has historically been problematic’ (Hathaway 1991: 8).  
Other possible causes were also excluded, so that the definition could be used by the Soviets 
to their advantage.  Hathaway continues: 
 
Unlike the victims of civil and political oppression, however, persons denied even such basic rights as 
food, health care or education are excluded from the international refugee regime (unless that 
deprivation stems from civil or political status).  By mandating protection for those whose (Western 
inspired) civil and political rights are jeopardized, without at the same time protecting persons whose 
(socialist inspired) socio-economic rights are at risk, the Convention adopted an incomplete and 
politically partisan human rights rationale. 
 
Furthermore, the Convention was heavily focused on the issue of European refugees.  
European states complained that they had already shouldered most of the burden for post-war 
refugees, and so they were eager to see other nations share some parts of this burden.  A clear 
                                                
107 Statement of Mr Rochefort, representative of France, to United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Geneva, 16 July 1951. UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.22 
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objective of the Convention was to contribute to the resettlement of refugees beyond Europe 
(Grahl-Madsen 1966; Gallagher 1989): in order to encourage refugees to seek asylum beyond 
Europe’s borders it was necessary to extend the asylum conditions that refugees enjoyed in 
Europe to outside Europe.  In sum, the Convention was nothing more than a burden-sharing 
agreement: its scope was limited to European refugees who had been displaced before 1951108, 
with to the goal of redistributing them to a wider array of countries.  Despite repeated pleas 
and vocal complaints from representatives of developing nations, who argued that the large 
bulks of refugees were located in the South, and not only in Europe, their demands were 
ignored and the Convention kept a Euro-centric perspective (Weis 1995). 
 
There was, however, another reason for the limited scope of the Convention.  Following the 
termination of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO), states agreed that a new refugee 
agency was needed, and UNHCR was created.  However, there were strong disagreements 
between states over the mandate of the agency.  The United States, in particular, was very 
keen to limit its role and authority, and decreed that the newly created agency should possess 
limited, specific functions of international legal protection, have no operational role, and be 
only a temporary agency.  Operations run by the IRO had been very costly, and Washington 
was unwilling to commit unknown quantities of funding to future, unpredictable flows of 
refugee.  Instead, the United States preferred to direct funding to the reconstruction of 
Europe via the Marshall Plan, or to its own refugee agencies, which included the 
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, later known as the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM).  As will be described in the next section, the UNHCR was 
therefore established as a small agency, whose scope, role and autonomy were very limited.  
The Refugee Convention was intended to serve as the framework for UNHCR action, and 
reflected these organisational limitations in its refugee definition.  In a nutshell, the United 
States imposed their vision of a modest organisation, which would only provide protection to 
limited and carefully identified refugees.   
 
As demonstrated above, the original refugee definition was the product of three different 
components: 
- Historical, as a way to resolve a specific situation, without any universal claim; 
                                                
108 States had the possibility of extending the protection to refugees originating from other parts of the world, but 
only on voluntary basis. 
 306 
- Ideological, as a by-product of the nascent Cold War, rather than a by-product of 
humanitarian considerations; 
- Organisational, as the framework of an agency with a deliberately limited mandate. 
 
The 1967 Additional Protocol lifted the formal geographic and time restrictions of the 
Convention, but left the refugee definition unaltered.  Although it has been argued that the 
Additional Protocol transformed the Convention from a Euro-centric document into a truly 
universal agreement (Orchard 2008), the unchanged refugee definition kept the focus of the 
Convention narrowed to a limited European scope, and refugees whose flight was not 
motivated by political or civil persecutions remained outside the protection mechanisms 
guaranteed by the Convention.   
 
The narrow definition of refugee continued to exclude the majority of ‘refugees’, who 
originated from developing countries.  Many commentators observed the absence of equal 
treatment: 
 
(…) Most Third World refugees remain de facto excluded, as their flight is more often prompted by 
natural disaster, war, or broadly based political and economic turmoil than by “persecution”, at least 
as that term is understood in the Western context.  (Hathaway 1991: 10) 
 
The Convention and Protocol (…) designate as refugees only those who have fled from persecution and 
exclude fugitives from natural disasters and from civil and international war.  Such (…) definition 
may well be appropriate for the purpose of determining whether an individual should receive an 
international travel document and should be eligible for the diplomatic protection (…); however, it 
appears inappropriate for the purpose of determining whether an applicant qualifies for admission to a 
country of asylum and to freedom from ‘refoulement’.  The compassionate claim of a fugitive from 
persecution may, after all, be no greater than that of a person displaced by an earthquake or a civil 
war.  (Plender 1977: 54) 
 
Overall, I argue that the refugee definition provided in the Geneva Convention was a social 
category derived from a political construct: it resulted from the willingness of Western nations 
to stigmatise the Soviet regime, from the desire of Europe to share the burden of its refugee 
problem with other states, and the reluctance of the United States to provide funding to 
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address large and unpredictable flows of refugees.  This set of political factors explains why 
environmental motives do not appear in the definition:  
 
- Most of those fleeing natural disasters or environmental changes, along with those 
fleeing poverty, originate from developing countries, and therefore were of little 
concern to the drafters of the Convention; 
 
- Their numbers were unknown and unpredictable, and thus had the potential to 
represent a considerable burden; 
 
- Finally, environmental concerns were not yet on the political agenda, and therefore 
could not be part of a political strategy.   
 
It is remarkable that such a historically contingent and politically biased convention is still, 
more than 50 years after its inception, the apogee of refugee protection109 (McAdam 2006), the 
‘wall behind which refugees can shelter’, as a special issue of UNHCR’s Refugee magazine 
proclaims, edited to mark the 50th anniversary of the Convention110.  The strict limits of the 
Convention, however, have been stretched considerably over the last decades.  This is 
primarily thanks to the actions of UNHCR, whose role will be described in the next section, 
but also to evolving interpretations of the Convention and alternative refugee definitions, 
which shall now be discussed. 
 
 
2.2.3. Alternate Definitions 
 
In addition to the definition provided by the Geneva Convention, two regional conventions, 
in Africa and Latin America, provided alternate definitions, which sought to extend the scope 
of the Geneva Convention: the 1969 Convention of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU), and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees.    
 
                                                
109 A striking parallel can be drawn with the UN Security Council, whose composition is also a by-product of a 
similar historical context and political strategies. The reform of the Council, however, is currently under 
discussion on the official international agenda, unlike a reform of the refugee regime. 
110 Issue 123, July 2001. 
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These regional conventions originated in the dissatisfaction of developing countries with the 
international refugee regime, which was perceived as overly Euro-centric.  The Geneva 
Convention was perceived to be disconnected from the realities of forced migration in the 
South, and it was thought that regional instruments would more adequately address regional 
refugee issues.  The Organisation for African Unity even sought to establish its own regional 
refugee organisation, and the UNHCR worked closely with OAU to convince the African 
Organisation of their capacity to provide regional refugee assistance (Orchard 2008: 303). 
 
Overall, these instruments took a more pragmatic approach to refugee issues that reflected 
more accurately the actual causes of flight in developing countries, and recognised that it was 
usually difficult for refugees fleeing en masse to provide actual evidence of individual 
persecution (Arboleda 1991; Mubiala 2001).  Above all, their main achievement was to 
significantly expand the definition of refugee in a more inclusive way. 
 
In addition to the 1951 Refugee Convention definition, the 1969 OAU Convention defined a 
refugee as  
 
Every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously 
disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to 
leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin 
or nationality (Organisation of the African Unity 1969). 
 
The definition primarily relates to situations of mass violence, which triggered important 
refugee flows in Africa throughout the 1960s.  However, the descriptor ‘events seriously 
disturbing public order’ could certainly encompass natural disasters, and African countries 
have consistently interpreted the definition in an expansive way, and seldom reject refugees at 
the border.  Furthermore, the OAU Convention also considered the security implications of 
refugee flows, and focused on solutions to refugee situations, such as the promotion of 
voluntary repatriation and burden-sharing.  Although the OAU definition is more expansive 
definition, it has greater temporal limits than the Geneva Convention: Gallagher notes that the 
Convention reflects African states’ assumption that refugee problems were temporary and that 
most of the refugees would voluntarily repatriate when independence was secured by newly-
formed governments’ (Gallagher 1989: 584). 
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The Cartagena Declaration, adopted in 1984, proposed a similar expansion of the refugee 
definition: 
 
(…) The definition or concept of a refugee to be recommended for use in the region is one which, in 
addition to containing the elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, includes among 
refugees persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened 
by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other 
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order ("Cartagena Declaration on Refugees"  
1984). 
 
Unlike the OAU Convention, however, this document was not adopted by a regional 
organisation, but rather by an ad hoc group of experts and representatives from Central 
American governments who participated in a conference in Colombia.  Although the 
Declaration is not binding, it has evolved to the status of a principle of customary law in the 
region, and the expanded definition has been recommended for application in situations of 
mass influx (Goodwin-Gill 1996: 21). 
 
Both conventions have made significant progress towards a more inclusive, less Euro-centric 
definition of the refugee.  Their alternative definitions were paralleled in the evolving matched 
the evolution of the role of UNHCR, as will be demonstrated in the next section, as well as 
the more inclusive interpretations of the definition in the context of the development of 
human rights law (Carlier 2001). 
 
Finally, it should be noted that there are currently two distinct refugee definitions in force: a 
wider definition, grounded in sociology, refers to someone who is forced to flee against 
his/her will; a stricter definition is grounded in law and refers directly to the Geneva 
Convention (Suhrke 1994: 488).  I have carefully avoided imprecise use of the term 
‘environmental refugee’ in this work, in order to avoid creating confusion, but it should be 
noted that the term has a distinct sociological meaning111, which holds evidentiary value and 
should not be unthinkingly discarded.  This semantic question relates to the epistemology of 
environmental migration, a topic that is beyond the purview of this paper. 
 
                                                
111 It should be noted that this meaning can be contested by the people themselves, as it will be shown in the case 
study about Katrina (Chapter 6). 
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2.3. Environmental Migrat ion  and the  Geneva Convent ion 
 
It is commonly assumed that environmental displacees are not covered by the Geneva 
Convention, since they do not meet the criteria set out in its refugee definition: they may not 
cross an international boundary, and are not directly ‘persecuted’, and their persecution is not 
a consequence of their race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or belonging to a specific 
group.  As summarised by Castles,  
 
The term ‘refugee’ has a precise meaning in international law.  A refugee is defined by the 1951 UN 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as a person outside his or her country of nationality who 
is unable to return because of a ‘well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion’.  Clearly, someone who flees 
due to environmental problems does not fall under this definition.  Nobody gets asylum just because of 
environmental degradation.   (2002: 8) 
 
However, the situation is not this simple, and I would concur with Burson that ‘caution needs 
be exercised before rigid and immutable distinctions are drawn between environmentally 
displaced persons and those to whom the Convention’s protection regime can extend’ (2008: 
8).  Although the Geneva Convention may not be able to provide protection to all those 
displaced by environmental changes, there are some instances in which it can be helpful in 
addressing their plight. 
 
First, the connections between environmental change and security have long been the subject 
of consideration, and climate change has renewed interest in the nexus between the two  
(German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) 2008; Barnett 2001b).  Some authors, 
usually referred collectively as the ‘Toronto Group’, have argued that environmental 
disruptions are major triggers for conflicts, and that a positive and important linkage exists 
between environmental degradation, conflict and migration (Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994; 
Diamond 2005).  Diamond, for example, claims that the Rwandan Genocide was a primarily a 
by-product of environmental scarcity more than of ethnic hatred (2005: 311-329), and similar 
claims have been made regarding the Darfur conflict.  Other authors have taken a more 
cautious approach, and contended that environmental change does not lead automatically to 
 311 
conflict but can be an aggravating factor (Gleditsch 1998; Ronnfelt 1997).  In cases when a 
conflict originates in environmental disruption, or in a dispute over the use of natural 
resources, the people displaced by the conflict would generally be entitled to protection under 
the Geneva Convention.  A more extreme but clear-cut case concerns the use of the 
environment as a tool of warfare during conflicts.  Historical examples include defoliation 
with Agent Orange during the Vietnam war, or the destruction of the Iraqi Arab marshlands 
during the Fist Gulf War (Chemillier-Gendreau and Gendreau 2006).  Displacements induced 
by such cases also fall within the scope of the Geneva Convention. 
 
A second possible use of the Convention concerns peoples affected by environmental change 
as a result of their belonging to a specific group.  The academic literature on the Geneva 
Convention refugee definition usually considers that the fourth criterion – ‘membership to a 
particular social group’ – contains a safety net designed to encompass new forms of 
persecution, such as persecution against homosexuals, for example (Goodwin-Gill 2006; 
Carlier 2001).  Studies on environmental racism have shown that people belonging to minority 
groups re more likely to be exposed to environmental hazards or to live in a degraded 
environment (Boer et al. 1997).  Roma, for example, often settle on lands at risk of flooding 
because these are the only areas where municipalities will allow them to stay.  Should they be 
displaced by floods, as happens regularly in Eastern Europe, they can legitimately claim to 
have been persecuted because of their belonging to a specific group, and a number of Roma 
have been granted temporary protection in Belgium on this basis112.  Another case of 
environmental racism involving displacement might include discriminatory relief assistance in 
the case of a natural disaster, or discriminatory disaster prevention: the cases of Katrina and 
the recent Cyclone Nargis in Burma serve to illustrate this possibility. 
 
Finally, a growing trend in the literature suggests that a progressive interpretation of the 
Geneva Convention might consider all situations in which states fail to provide protection to 
their citizens as persecution (Carlier 2001).  Instances where a state fails to provide adequate 
protection – such as food supply or shelters in cases of natural disasters or other 
environmental changes – might qualify as cases of protection failure by the state, hence of 
persecution.  Hathaway notes that ‘persecution’ can encompass both the privation of civil and 
political rights, and also the denial of social and economic rights, such as the right to food or 
                                                
112 Interview with a protection officer of the Commissariat Général aux Réfugiés et aux Apatrides (CGRA). 
Further details are given in Section 3 of this chapter. 
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decent housing (1991: 103).  Burson (2008) provides a series of cases showing that the 
interpretation of failure of protection by administrative courts has been rather broad, and 
could include cases of deprivation from relief assistance.   
 
These three types of situation represent cases in which the Geneva Convention could provide 
some protection to people displaced by environmental disruption.  Hence the common claim 
that ‘the Geneva Convention does not apply to environmental refugees’ is overly simplistic, 
although it is incapable of providing protection to all environmental displacees.  Between 
alarmists who push for revision of the Geneva Convention and sceptics who refuse the idea 
of any change to it, there might be a third way that allow for a broader interpretation of the 
Convention.  The needs of environmental displacees, however, are far from being limited to 
legal protection, and the role of UNHCR in providing assistance and relief to people affected 
by natural disasters has expanded considerably over time, as will now be discussed. 
 
 
3. The Evolving Role of UNHCR 
 
 
‘No international organisation has had such an unpromising beginning as UNHCR’ (2008: 17), 
claim Loescher et al..  The refugee agency was initially conceived as an organisation of limited 
scope and three-year mandate, reflecting the strategic interests of Western nations, and their 
unwillingness, the United States in particular, to commit large amounts of funding, and 
significant obligations and responsibilities.  As a result, during the Office’s three-year trial 
period it had very limited funding, no operational role, and almost no autonomy from the UN 
General Assembly.  Over time, however, UNHCR was able to expand its role significantly – 
and thus refugee protection – both regarding its operational activities and the categories of 
people that were of its concern.  The following section describes the initial mandate of 
UNHCR, and how this mandate has been stretched over time – now to its limit, some argue.  
A second section examines the involvement of the agency in situations of natural disasters, 
and asks whether environmental displacees should be considered ‘people of concern’ – to use 






3.1. A Stre t ched Mandate  
 
The initial mandate of UNHCR was very limited, and set out only two principal tasks for the 
newly-created organisation: ‘Providing international protection, under the auspices of the 
United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute and of seeking 
permanent solutions for the problem of refugees’ (United Nations General Assembly 1950: 
art. 1).  Its work was to be entirely apolitical, and carried out under the authority of the UN 
General Assembly.  The High Commissioner would be appointed for a term of three years 
only, and the agency’s budget would be voted by the UN General Assembly113 with no 
possibility of external sources of funding without the latter’s approval.   
 
More importantly, perhaps, the initial mandate did not include two functions that would soon 
become central to the Office’s activities (Morris 2008): 
 
- The provision of material assistance to refugees.  In its initial stage, the UNHCR’s role 
was limited to legal protection, and it did not have operational capacity.  Furthermore, 
could not raise funds for special operations. 
 
- The protection of internally-displaced people (IDPs).  The statute defined the refugees 
in the same terms as the Geneva Convention, on the basis of individual persecution, 
with the same temporal and spatial limitations.  The agency was therefore unable to 
provide refugee status to ‘internal refugees’, or to grant refugee status to large groups 
of ‘prima facie refugees’.  Furthermore, its mandate was limited to those who had been 
displaced by events that occurred prior to 1951, and so it could not engage in future 
emergency operations. 
 
In a nutshell, ‘the United States and its allies sustained their desire to create an international 
refugee agency that would neither pose a threat to their national sovereignty nor impose new 
financial obligations on them’ (Loescher et al. 2008: 14). 
 
 
                                                
113 As a result of the arrangement, the Organisation was completely dependent upon its donor states, and 
continues to be so today. 
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Refugee flows, however, changed considerably throughout the second half of the twentieth 
century, and the leadership of the agency soon came to the conclusion that there was an 
evident mismatch between its tasks as set out in the original statute and the realities of forced 
migration worldwide (Adelman 2001).  From then on, numerous attempts to enlarge its 
mandate would signpost the evolution of UNHCR.  Article 9 of the UNHCR mandate states 
indeed that ‘the High Commissioner shall engage in such additional activities, including 
repatriation and resettlement, as the General Assembly may determine, within the limits of the 
resources placed at his disposal’ – this article was invoked consistently throughout UNHCR’s 
existence.   
 
The purpose here is not to provide a comprehensive historical account of UNHCR’s activities 
and evolution – others have done so far better than I could have (Loescher 2003; Loescher et 
al. 2008; Steiner et al. 2003; Holborn 1975).  However, three important evolutions need to be 
highlighted with regard to the protection of environmental displacees: UNHCR’s greater 
involvement in developing countries, its increasing operational role, and its efforts to protect 
IDPs. 
 
3.1.1. UNHCR’s Presence in Developing Countries 
 
In the 1950s, the beginnings of the process of decolonisation were accompanied by large 
flows of refugees.  Refugee situations in the South differed considerably from refugee 
situations in Europe, and created possibly embarrassing situations, since refugees were often 
fleeing territories that were administered by core donor states of the Office.  Furthermore, 
these refugees usually arrived in large groups and required emergency assistance.  At that time, 
the overwhelming majority of the world’s refugees originated from and stayed in the Third 
World: Western nations had therefore a pragmatic interest in extending UNHCR’s mandate to 
encompass these refugees, and this interest culminated in the adoption of the 1967 Additional 
Protocol to the Convention, which lifted the mandate’s temporal and geographic limits 
(Loescher 1994: 362).  As refugee problems accumulated, states increasingly turned to 
UNHCR to solve them, a task which often included the provision of material assistance.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, UNHCR’s role was thus considerably expanded, and its moral 
authority increased alongside its autonomy from donor governments.  By the close of the 
1970s, UNHCR had been transformed from a small agency concerned with legal protection to 
a global refugee organisation.  Thanks to a series of pragmatic extensions of UNHCR’s 
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mandate and pragmatic regional conventions, de facto refugees could be treated collectively, 
without having to make individual decisions about their eligibility. 
 
3.1.2. An Increasing Operational Role 
 
Nineteen fifty two, the year following UNHCR’s inception, saw the organisation seeking to 
provide material assistance to refugees, and the beginning of its fundraising activities.  The 
commission first directly involved itself with the integration of refugees into Western 
countries, and then took a prominent role in responding to the refugee crisis in West Berlin in 
1953.  This operation raised its international profile, and brought it legitimacy to seek external 
funding and provide material assistance (Loescher et al. 2008: 20-21).  As refugee crises in the 
South were booming, this shift towards a more operational role took a decisive turn under the 
leadership of High Commissioner Felix Schnyder, who emphasised assistance to refugees in 
developing countries and downplayed the importance of legal protection.  This shift resulted 
in tensions within the organisation’s staff, tensions that persist, to a certain extent, until today.  
This shift was nonetheless confirmed and reinforced by High Commissioner Jean-Pierre 
Hocké, who was convinced that the Office was too ‘protection-oriented’, an approach he 
found ineffective in alleviating the plight of African refugees (Morris 2008; Cuny 1981).  
Hocké therefore sought to address the root causes of refugee movements and to promote 
repatriation as the only viable solution to protracted refugee situations (Hocké 1989). 
 
The provision of material assistance to refugees has now become a core part of UNHCR’s 
activities, but tensions between its operational role and the protection role persist.  As the 
principle of asylum faces significant threats from Western governments’ restrictive migration 
policies, and as refugees, asylum-seekers and irregular migrants are increasingly regarded as 
part of a unitary and unwanted phenomenon, many scholars are now calling for the UNHCR 
to re-assume a stronger protection role (Suhrke and Newland 2001; Crisp 2008). 
 
 
3.1.3. The Protection of IDPs 
 
In the early 1990s, there was a widespread concern over the plight of people in refugee-like 
situations who had not crossed the borders of their country, also called internally-displaced 
 316 
people (IDPs).  Unlike refugees, IDPs are not entitled to international protection, and are 
placed under the responsibility of their (often failing) state, because of the principle of 
sovereignty (Beyani 1994). 
 
Empirical evidence shows that the majority of people displaced for environmental reasons 
tend to stay within their country (EACH-FOR 2008).  The assistance provided by UNHCR to 
IDPs is therefore of direct relevance for the plight of environmental displacees.  There has 
been considerable debate over the role of UNHCR in providing assistance and protection to 
IDPs, and the conditions under which this role should be undertaken.  Loescher et al. note 
that ‘from an initially very ad hoc and selective role, IDP protection has become an increasingly 
central and systematic part of UNHCR’s work’ (2008: 106).  The agency stepped in a number 
of IDP situations in the 1970s, mostly on the grounds of humanitarian and/or operational 
reasons.   
 
A turning point came in 1991 under the leadership of High Commissioner Sadako Ogata, who 
perceived IDPs as the new protection challenge for UNHCR (Ogata 1994).  During the first 
Gulf War, she engaged UNHCR as the lead agency to provide protection to the Kurds 
displaced within Iraq.  Following this operation, the agency sought to clarify a number of 
criteria that could justify such interventions.  These criteria included a specific request for 
involvement by the UN Secretary General, the consent of the host state, the guarantee of 
access and security, and finally a clear relationship to UNHCR’s mandate (Loescher et al. 
2008: 107).   
 
After the adoption of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the first normative 
framework to address the issue114, IDPs were enshrined in the framework of humanitarian 
response, and became the joint responsibilities of all agencies coordinated by the UN 
Emergency Relief Coordinator.  The involvement of UNHCR in IDP protection continued 
within this framework, but was hindered by a lack of coordination with other agencies, 
inconsistencies and ambiguities.  In order to resolve these problems, the collaborative 
approach was replaced by a clustered approach in which, for the first time, the UNHCR was 
given an official mandate to assist and protect IDPs. 
 
                                                
114 See Section 2 for a discussion of these principles as a normative framework. 
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The protection of IDPs might appear a logical continuation of the work of UNHCR.  Its 
involvement in this field, however, takes place amid an ongoing debate over the role of 
UNHCR at a time when asylum is under threat, and against a landscape of forced migration in 
rapid evolution.  While the number of refugees has undergone a slow decline in the last 
decade, the number of IDPs has boomed, and is now circa 25 million, more than twice the 
total number of refugees.  In 2004, UNHCR assisted 5.6 million IDPs, roughly half the 
number of assisted refugees (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
2006: 17).  The newly-appointed High Commissioner, Antonio Guterres, has signified that he 
wishes to see UNHCR evolve towards a protection organisation, which would encompass 
both refugees and IDPs.  This orientation has been supported by a number of observers 
(Cohen 2006), but also raises some questions: 
 
- Firstly, there is a risk that funding for refugees will diminish as a result of UNHCR’s 
expanded mandate.  If more people are to be assisted with the same budget, the 
amount of aid available for each person will necessarily be lower.  Antonio Guterres 
has repeatedly emphasised that the budgetary lines for the IDPs must be separate 
from the budgetary lines devoted to refugees, which should be left unaltered.  
Although such a distinction is certainly possible on an accounting level, there is no 
guarantee that it will necessarily be the case on the field or in the wallets of donor 
governments. 
 
- Secondly, some scholars have highlighted that the protection of IDPs is a slippery 
political slope, and that the UNHCR risks being used to justify more restrictive 
policies regarding asylum (Goodwin-Gill 2000).  States are increasingly eager to use 
internal displacement as a way to avoid their obligation to provide asylum, and it is 
feared that extension of the mandate would undermine refugee protection.   
 
 
3.2. Environmental Displacees  as  ‘People  o f  Concern ’ 
 
 
In 1993, UNHCR’s activity report acknowledged that environmental factors were a major root 
cause of displacement, which could be linked to security issues.  I quote the following extract 
at length in order to illuminate the agency’s perspective on this issue in the early 1990s: 
 318 
 
Millions of people have been forced to leave their homes because the land on which they live has become 
uninhabitable or is no longer able to support them.  In some cases the cause is a natural disaster; in 
others, the catastrophe is caused by humans.  The disruption to the habitat may be sudden, as at 
Chernobyl or Mount Pinatubo, or as gradual as the spread of a desert or the retreat of a forest.   
 
The terminology for describing environmentally induced migration is controversial.  For many 
observers, “migration” does not convey the fact that the people affected are forcibly uprooted.  To call 
them refugees seems to convey more accurately that they left their homes involuntarily, for reasons not of 
their own making.  Accurate use of the term “refugee”, however, implies a need for international 
protection.  For most people whose usual places of residence have become uninhabitable, the first 
recourse remains their own governments and societies.  People displaced by environmental degradation 
or natural disaster undoubtedly need assistance.  They do not necessarily require the kind of 
international protection implied in the word “refugee”.   
 
There are, nevertheless, clear links between environmental degradation and refugee flows.  The 
deterioration of the natural resource base, coupled with demographic pressure and chronic poverty, can 
lead to or exacerbate political, ethnic, social and economic tensions which in turn result in conflicts that 
force people to flee.  Africa, for example, accounts for 10 per cent of the world’s population and hosts 
over 29 per cent of its refugees.  It is no coincidence that those parts of the continent that are most 
affected by soil erosion, drought and other environmental problems are also the main theatres of armed 
conflicts, recurrent famine and consequent refugee movements.  […] 
 
Long-term strategies of prevention should address environmental damage as a potential contributor to 
refugee flows.  There is no comfort in the fact that today only a minority of environmentally displaced 
people need international protection.  The international community has every interest in responding to 
the need to preserve and rehabilitate the environment before degradation leads to violence and 
persecution – and a mass of displaced people who easily meet the conventional definition of refugees.  
(Ogata 1993) 
 
In the latest edition of the report, issued in 2006, environmental changes were again labelled 
as a root cause of displacement, but the focus had shifted to natural disasters: people uprooted 
by slow-onset environmental changes were no longer mentioned.  Furthermore, the report 
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assumed that all disaster-displacement would be internal, and could thus be addressed within 
the framework of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: 
 
In many ecological and economic crises, mobility and migration represent crucial survival strategies.  It 
can therefore be very difficult to distinguish between forced disaster-induced displacement and mobility 
linked to people’s coping mechanisms.  (…) But all those displaced by disasters have specific needs, 
including access to assistance, protection from violence, and the restoration of their livelihoods.  The 
UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement suggest that those uprooted by natural or man-
made disasters are entitled to protection and assistance.  (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 2006: 28). 
 
Despite this acknowledgement of entitlement, the agency has consistently rejected the notion 
of ‘environmental refugees’, and ‘opposes any extension of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention 
to include people who have been displaced for reasons unrelated to persecution and armed 
conflict’ (Crisp 2008: 6), a position similar to the views of scholars from the sceptical coalition. 
  
This conceptual reluctance has long been matched with realities on the ground: until the 2004 
tsunami, UNHCR’s involvement with natural disasters had been very limited to exceptional 
cases.  It mostly consisted in contributions of money and relief items, as well as in assistance 
to governments lacking the capacities to respond to disasters. UNHCR gave multiple reasons 
for this limited involvement.  Apart from the limitations of its mandate and financial 
resources, four other reasons were put forward, in a rare presentation given by a UNHCR 
representative on the topic (Gorlick 2007): 
 
- Lack of support from donor governments, whose concern was to limit their 
obligations towards refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants from developing countries; 
- The fact that this role had already been undertaken by other organisations, including 
the Red Cross, IOM or OCHA; 
- Scepticism related to the concept of environmental migration, in particular with regard 
to the lack of precise data, and the belief that UNHCR involvement in natural 
disasters would affect conventional refugees; 
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- Internal concerns within UNHCR over the possibility of refugees losing their specific 
rights of protection and governments blurring their responsibilities towards their 
citizens. 
 
Insights from UNHCR staffers reveal that these internal debates were key to the 
organisation’s reluctance to address natural disasters, and that the arguments used were close 
to those of the debates over the involvement with IDPs.  In particular, some staffers argued 
that assistance to people displaced by disasters would dilute the protection afforded refugees, 
and that the nature of the protection required was fundamentally different, since refugees 
were unable to find domestic protection, which was not the case with environmental 
displacees.  Others, in contrast, argued that environmental displacees were in need of 
protection, and that it was part of UNHCR’s duty to ensure such protection. 
 
McNamara, who conducted thorough interviews with UNHCR officials about this issue, 
remarks that ‘normative discourse on environmental refugees within UNHCR is based around 
them being constructed as displaced people that are not real refugees’ (2007: 19).  All UNHCR 
officials whom she interviewed stated that environmental displacees were not of concern to 
UNHCR, since they were not part of their mandate.  Historical evidence shows that this is 
feeble and facile excuse, since the UNHCR mandate has been extended continually in the past 
to deal with new categories of displacees, and to provide new forms of assistance and 
protection.  McNamara rightly observes that their not being part of UNHCR mandate is a 
social construct, a by-product of the agency discourse.   
 
Things, however, are evolving quickly.  The large-scale operations conducted in the aftermath 
of the Asian tsunami, the Kashmir earthquake and the cyclone Nargis115, demonstrated that 
UNHCR had capacity to respond to natural disasters, and were in line with Antonio Guterres’ 
new doctrine of UNHCR as a protection agency.  These operations represented yet another 
important expansion of the organisation’s mandate.  For now, they remain ad hoc operations, 
similar to those conducted to provide assistance to IDPs in the 1970s. 
 
However, some signs indicate that these ad hoc operations might soon be institutionalised in a 
normative framework: the agency is currently preparing a position statement on 
                                                
115 For a discussion of these operations, please refer to the previous chapter. 
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environmental migration, which is due to be presented at the UN conference on climate 
change in Poznañ in December 2008.  A dedicated team has been formed within UNHCR to 
draft a comprehensive statement on the issue, which includes treatment of people displaced 
by slow-onset environmental changes, as well as by natural disasters.  At the time of writing, 
the content of the statement was not known. 
 
Although there are legitimate reasons for UNHCR to take up a wider role with regard to 
environmental migration, such a role would raise questions about the very nature of the 
organisation.  Among all the UN agencies, UNHCR is clearly the best equipped to assist the 
growing numbers of environmental displacees, and this expanded role would also ensure its 
continuing relevance to donor governments, against a backdrop of declining refugee numbers.  
But the institutionalisation of a wider protection role would also dramatically transform the 
nature of the organisation into a protection agency.  This seems to be the objective pursued by 
current High Commissioner Guterres, but such a transformation would certainly affect the 
protection of current refugees.  Loescher et al. note that UNHCR’s original mandate remains 
unmet, as attested by the growing number of protracted refugee situations, and that an 
expanded protection role would impact on its ability to fulfil its core refugee protection role.  
They conclude that the ‘dilemma about the Office’s future protection role places UNHCR at a 
crossroads’: ‘whether it chooses to be the UN’s refugee agency or the UN’s protection agency 
will have a profound effect on its future work, and its ability to meet the needs of refugees’ 
(2008: 120).  The authors also hint that they favour the first option, in common with a large 
number of migration scholars (Barutciski 2002).  Scholars from the alarmist coalition, on the 






Refugee law, which revolves around the Geneva Convention, deliberately dismisses factors 
other than persecution when defining who may qualify as a refugee.  A core function of 
Convention is to define a refugee, and yet it does so in a performative way: refugees are those 
who fit the criteria of the Convention; migrants in refugee-like situations that do not fit these 
criteria cannot be labelled refugees.  However, the study of the preparatory works of the 
Convention reveals how the refugee definition was based on political motives, and not on 
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scientific grounds.  Furthermore, the work of UNHCR depends, to a great extent, upon the 
range of this definition.  This certainly sheds some light on the conceptualisation of refugee as 
a political construct, and can illuminate debates on the conceptualisation of environmental 
migration or ‘environmental refugees’ 
 
With regard to protection, international refugee law can do very little for those uprooted by 
environmental changes, except in specific cases such as environmental racism, or when the 
state is unable to master the situation. On the operational level, the UNHCR seems to be 
evolving towards a global protection agency, and could therefore take a bigger role in dealing 
with environmental displacement. This would be, however, a further stretch of its mandate, 
and the organisation seems unwilling to take this step at the moment. 
 
Overall, unlike the areas of natural disasters and global warming, the international refugee 
regime remains dominated by the sceptical coalition, which can explain why the regime has 
not been significantly modified since the 1960s. In particular, a common feature of the 
different evolutions is their reactive character: the regime tried to adapt to some new realities 
of forced migration, but did never try to anticipate these new realities. This is a major 
difference between this policy area and the areas considered before, which take a much more 
pro-active and prospective approach – I argue that the domination of another policy coalition 










 “I can’t stand people calling me a refugee.  I am an American, and I love America.” 
 






In the mid-1980s, the number of refugees rose considerably, with large numbers of refugees 
attempting to find asylum in Europe.  This rise was countered with increasingly restrictive 
asylum policies in Western countries (Marfleet 2006: 12), in contexts where asylum policies 
were perceived and used as a tool of migration control, rather than as an obligation of states 
towards refugees (Wihtol de Wenden 1995).  The period also coincided with the 
implementation, mostly in Europe and the United States, of special forms of protection to 
deal with displaced people who were considered to fall outside the scope of the Geneva 
Convention, but were de facto refugees, being in a refugee-like situation. 
 
Given the limitations of international refugee law in providing protection to environmental 
displacees, the following chapter attempts to examine other types of relevant protection.  A 
first section examines how environmentally-motivated migrants are addressed by European 
asylum and immigration policies.  Section 2 examines mechanisms of subsidiary protection 
implemented in Europe and in the United States, and a third and final section addresses the 




1. European Asylum and Immigration Policies 
 
 
From the mid-1990s onwards, European countries have been faced with a mass influx of 
asylum-seekers. In order to respond to the perceived ‘refugee crisis’, a common policy 
response was initiated in 1999. This common response has been implemented through a 
cooperation programme in the field of asylum and immigration, which aims to create a 
common asylum system by 2010. 
 
1.1. Towards a European Asylum Syst em 
 
 
Despite pre-existing agreements on the Schengen regime and the Dublin Convention, the 
European asylum system was really initiated in 1999, when the Amsterdam Treaty 
communautarised the asylum and immigration policy, which used to be reserved to member-
states (Lavenex 2001).  The Tampere Summit, held the same year, launched a cooperation 
programme in the field: in subsequent years, the European Refugee Fund was created (2000), 
the Directive on Temporary Protection – described in Section 2 – was adopted (2001), and 
Eurodac, a database for asylum-seekers’ fingerprints, was implemented (2003). 
 
The common European asylum system rests upon a set of directives establishing minimum 
criteria for eligibility for refugee status, as well as minimum standards for the treatment of 
asylum claims throughout the European Union.  
 
The objectives of the cooperation programme were reiterated at the Hague summit in 2004, 
with the goal of implementing a common asylum system by 2010.  The common system 
would consist of a common procedure and status, partnerships with sending countries, 
common rules regarding visa issuing, as well as an ambitious programme for the control of 
external borders (Frontex) (Lavenex 2001; Hatton 2004; Thielemann 2006b). The programme 
represents a major policy change in a field that used to be the reserve of member-states, but 
has been met with harsh criticism by many scholars and NGOs.  The common asylum system, 
they claimed, departs from European ideals and is nothing less than a way to externalise 




In recent years, the European asylum system has been reinforced with a couple of new 
agreements. The Dublin II Convention, adopted in 2003, aims to replace the Dublin 
Convention and clarify which country is responsible for dealing with a particular asylum 
application. The goal of the Convention is to organise the application of the Geneva 
Convention within the European Union (and Switzerland), and reduce the number of multiple 
asylum applications lodged in different countries. Hence it can be seen as the embryo of a 
common European asylum system. 
 
More recently, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum was adopted during the 
French Presidency of the European Union (second half of 2008). The goal of the Pact is to 
delineate a common strategy for immigration in Europe, revolving around five key policy 
objectives: 
- the organisation of legal immigration based on the needs, priorities and capacities of 
each state; 
- the fight against illegal migration; 
- the strengthening of external border controls; 
- a common asylum policy; 
- and partnerships with origin countries. 
 
Though the pact is presented as the projection of a balanced view on immigration, it seeks 
primarily to attract high-skilled migrants in Europe, while combating illegal immigration at the 
same time. In this regard, it is a manifestation of the concept of ‘chosen immigration’ put 
forward by the French Presidency. Despite its ambition to uphold a holistic view of 
immigration, however, the Pact remains mute on the topic of environmental migration, as well 
as on internal migration as a whole. 
 
 
1.2. An Exception : Swedi sh Asylum Pol icy  
 
Before concluding this section, a few words need to be said about Sweden, as it is currently 
the only country to guarantee asylum to people displaced by environmental disasters. In this 
regard, Sweden constitutes an interesting exception, dissonant with European asylum policies, 
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as it modified its asylum regime in a way that has often been recommended by lawyers 
working on environmental migration. It seemed therefore interesting to devote a section to 
this exception, in order to decipher the reasons for this policy change.  
 
 The  Amendments to the Aliens Act introduced in 1997 considerably expanded the definition 
of people who could be granted asylum in Sweden.  In addition to refugees defined as such by 
the Geneva Convention, three additional categories of people were also entitled to asylum in 
Sweden by the amendments.  These are people who: 
 
- Have a well-founded fear of being sentenced to death or corporal punishment or of being subject to 
torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,  
- Due to an external or internal armed conflict need protection or on account of an environmental 
disaster are unable to return to their country of origin, or  
- Because of his/her sex or sexual preference have a well-founded fear of persecution.   
("Aliens Act with amendments"  1997) 
 
The second category is of course of particular interest for this study: the concept of 
‘environmental disaster’ is not further defined, and this broad category could encompass all 
types of environmental disruptions, either brutal or slow-onset.  This amendment to the 
Aliens Act made Sweden the first country to provide asylum to environmental displacees in an 
institutionalised fashion.  Contrary to a common assumption, the expansion of asylum did not 
lead to a sharp rise in asylum claims, whose fluctuations remain, for the most part, dependant 
upon other factors such as international crises or governmental decisions regarding certain 
nationalities (Abiri 2000). 
 
These changes were introduced against a backdrop of restrictions to asylum in Europe, but 
were in line with the holistic approach promoted by the Swedish government since the early 
1990s.  The decision followed another decision to grant permanent residence to a group of 
40,000 Bosnian refugees, a move perceived as particularly bold at a time when temporary 
protection was on everyone’s lips (Appelqvist 2000).  Both decisions were part of a 
consensual, holistic migration policy, encompassing both refugees and immigrants, as well as 





2. Mechanisms of Complementary protection 
 
In the midst of the asylum crisis of the late 1980s, as the concept of complex displacement 
was dominating the asylum agenda, states sought ways to provide international protection to 
people falling beyond the scope of the Geneva Convention.  Large numbers of people whose 
circumstances did not match the refugee definition, had been forcibly displaced from their 
homes because of torture, exploitation, generalised violence, and natural disasters.  These 
people were often in a refugee-like situation, but were not entitled to the same benefits as 
refugees, though they were obviously in need of special protection (McAdam 2007: 20).  
Although complementary protection has never been legally defined, it stems from the 
principle of non-refoulement contained in the Convention, which has become a customary 
principle of international law (Goodwin-Gill 1996).  This principle is important, because it 
severely hinders environmental displacees from benefiting from complementary protection: 
they can only be accepted in a country if they cannot be returned to their origin country 
without putting their life at risk.  Furthermore, complementary protection is far from being a 
universal right: until now, only a minority of states have developed complementary protection 
mechanisms, all subject to national legislation.  The extent of such mechanisms is dependent 
upon a range of different factors: the interpretation by the state of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, an appreciation of the protection needs, moral and practical considerations, as 
well as practical reasons (Mandal 2005).  Despite some overlap, two broad categories of 
complementary protection can be distinguished in the doctrine: temporary protection, and 
subsidiary protection or humanitarian status116. 
 
2.1. Temporary Prot e c t i on  
 
Temporary protection gained considerable currency in the 1990s, following a successful 
airlifting of Kosovar de facto refugees to divers countries willing to grant them temporary 
protection, until voluntary repatriation was possible.  The operation raised numerous 
questions about the implications of such burden-sharing agreements, but temporary 
                                                
116 Doctrine has almost exclusively focused on the implementation of complementary protection in Europe and 
in the United States, where legislation (Directives and Immigration Act respectively) has been passed in order to 
institutionalise practices of complementary protection. These practices exist in other parts of the world as well, 
but are conducted on an ad hoc basis, without a normative framework. 
 328 
protection was then widely perceived as a useful tool to help states deal with mass influxes of 
de facto refugees (Barutciski and Suhrke 2001).  Temporary protection poses a series of other 
questions, which are aptly summarised by Fitzpatrick: 
 
For refugee advocates, temporary protection expands the protection of forced migrants who cannot 
satisfy the criteria under the 1951 Convention and it promises group-based protection when the 
determination of an individual’s status proves impossible.  At the same time, refugee rights 
organisations fear that informal and discretionary temporary protection may dislodge refugee protection 
from the realm of enforceable human rights.  For refugee agencies such as the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, temporary protection serves as a short-term strategy to secure the 
immediate physical safety of refugees and a way station to more durable protection.  But where 
temporary protection is offered as a diluted substitute protection for Convention refugees, it represents a 
threat to the 1951 refugee regime.  (2000: 280) 
 
The United States was the first country to institutionalise temporary protection, through the 
Immigration Act of 1990.  The law states that temporary protection status can be granted to 
nationals of a country where 
 
1) There is an ongoing armed conflict, and requiring return would pose a serious threat to personal safety; 
2) There has been an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster resulting in a 
substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions; the foreign State is unable temporarily, to 
handle adequately the return of its nationals; and the foreign State officially has requested temporary 
protection for its nationals in the United States; or 
3) There exist extraordinary and temporary conditions that prevent nationals from returning in safety, 
unless the Attorney General finds that permitting the aliens to remain temporarily is contrary to the 
national interest.  (United States Congress 1990) 
 
The temporary protection status has been used on a couple of occasions in the aftermath of 
natural disasters.  In August 1997, the island of Montserrat, in the Caribbean, was affected by 
a volcanic eruption, and 300 of its inhabitants were granted temporary protection status 
between 1997 and 1999 (Martin et al. 1998).  After hurricane Mitch devastated entire regions 
of Central America in 1998, the Clinton Administration granted temporary protection status 
to about 150,000 Hondurans and Nicaraguans. 
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The European Union also issued a directive on temporary protection in 2001.  The directive 
was primarily aimed at providing ‘immediate and temporary protection’ to people who fled 
their country en masse, in particular because of ‘armed conflict or endemic violence’ or 
‘systematic or generalised violations of their human rights’ (European Council 2001).  
Although the directive is primarily targeted at situations of mass violence and human rights 
violations, environmental displacees may qualify for temporary protection without having to 
demonstrate that environmental disruption jeopardised their human rights.  However, the 
directive has not been used for environmental cases so far. 
 
Although temporary protection might appear an adequate solution in situations of natural 
disasters, it only provides – at the risk of being tautological – only temporary solutions.  
Protection expires after three years in Europe, eighteen months in the United States.  In 
addition, those benefiting from the status enjoy more limited rights than conventional 
refugees117.  Furthermore, in the case of the United States, the person already needs to be in 
the country on the date of designation in order to be able to benefit from the status.  Hence 
the status is in no way aimed at facilitating the admission to the United States of people trying 
to escape an environmental disaster, but rather at providing some form of protection to those 
already in the country (Lopez 2007: 401). 
 
More importantly, one should not forget that temporary protection schemes are only available 
in an institutionalised format in a very limited set of countries, and do not represent in any 
way the premises of a universal protection for people displaced by disasters. 
 
 
2.2. Subsidiary  Prot e c ti on and Humani tarian Status 
 
At the peak of the asylum crisis of the late 1980s, de facto refugees were the largest group of 
asylum-seekers in Europe (Cels 1990).  Persons in this group were usually granted protection 
on the basis of humanitarian status, which protected them against refoulement and provided 
them with minimal material assistance.  However, the level of protection varied considerably 
according to countries and situations.   
 
                                                
117 In particular regarding the right to work, or political rights. 
 330 
The Qualification directive of the European Union, issued in 2004 (European Council 2004), 
represents the first international attempt to harmonise these schemes of subsidiary protection 
and to guarantee minimal standards (McAdam 2007; Gil-Bazo 2006).  According to the 
directive, a person eligible for subsidiary protection is someone who ‘does not qualify as a 
refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the 
person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, […] would face a real risk of 
suffering serious harm’.  At first glance, this definition might seem to constitute a basis for the 
protection of environmental displacees.  An examination of what constitutes ‘serious harm’, 
however, reveals that the serious harm consists only of the most basic violations of human 
rights, such as death penalty or torture: environmental threats are not considered to be 
‘serious harm’, thus excluding environmental displacees from subsidiary protection.  McAdam 
notes that concerns related to environmental causes of migration were raised during 
discussions on the elaboration of the directive, but were dropped in a favour of a basic 
harmonisation, drawing on the ‘best’ elements of each member state’s system of protection118 
(2007: 464).  The issue was thus deliberately disregarded.   
 
 
Overall, complementary protection does not offer adequate protection to environmental 
displaces.  Not only can the system apply only in a very limited number of cases, upon strict 
conditions, but it also creates a differentiation of rights and status between conventional 
refugees and beneficiaries of these protection schemes, a differentiation that is not justified by 




3. Internally-Displaced People 
 
 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that most migration movements linked to environmental 
stressors – whether forced or voluntary – are internal displacements (EACH-FOR 2008).  The 
Operational Guidelines of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee recommend that people 
                                                
118 It is interesting to note that the Swedish provision of asylum for people displaced by environmental disasters 
was not considered among the ‘best’ European protection systems. 
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displaced by natural disasters be treated according to the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2006), which are currently the only 
international normative framework addressing the plight of people displaced within their own 
country.  So, is the problem finally solved with regards to internal environmental migration? 
 
Concerns for IDPs began in the early 1990s, when the United Nations first came to deal with 
the issue.  International concerns grew with the nomination of Mr Francis Deng as 
Representative of the UN Secretary General on Internally Displaced People, and culminated 
with the adoption of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement by the UN General 
Assembly in 1998.  IDPs worldwide represent roughly 25 million people today.  The 
overwhelming majority of them are located in developing countries, and particularly in Sudan, 
Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia119.   
 
The present section aims to examine how policies of internal displacement impact upon the 
situations of environmentally-displaced people.  Section 3.1 deals with the definitional issue of 
IDPs, and how environmentally-displaced people can be conceptualised as IDPs.  The 
relevance of the Guiding Principles for the protection and management of environmental 
migration is then examined in Section 3.2. 
 
3.1.  Environmental Displacees  as  IDPs 
 
Internally-displaced people were first defined negatively: they were people who had fled their 
homes, but did not qualify as refugees (Phuong 2004: 2).  The conceptualisation of IDPs is 
indeed deeply linked to the refugee problem, and takes place in the context of containment 
efforts by receiving states aiming to restrict asylum and keep displaced people with the 
borders of their country (Dubernet 2001).  However, problems of internal displacement also 
need to be conceptualised separately from refugee problems, since they raise issues of their 
own, most importantly the question of humanitarian intervention and protection in sovereign 
states.   
 
Phuong, in one of the few monographs devoted entirely to the topic, contends that IDPs and 
refugees share two fundamental characteristics (2004: 37): 
                                                
119 Data are extracted from reports of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, available at 
http://www.internal-displacement.org 
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- The element of forced displacement, 
- The breach of the bond with the state, even though IDPs remain within the 
responsibility perimeters of their state, which still has the duty to protect them. 
 
Some authors, such as Lee (1996), have contended that refugees and IDPs are basically the 
same thing; he argued that border-crossing element was not an element inherent to 
refugeehood, and should therefore be removed from the refugee definition so that both types 
of displacees could be addressed by the same frameworks and agencies.  Although it might be 
argued that the border-crossing element makes no real difference – or, to borrow an 
expression from Richard Holbrooke (2000), a ‘borderline difference’ – when it comes to the 
refugee experience, the nature of the protection required by refugees and IDPs is 
fundamentally different in nature.  While refugee protection is a surrogate of their state 
protection, the prime responsibility for IDP protection remains within the realm of the 
sovereign state.   
 
In the early 1990s, the international community perceived the need to define IDPs in order to 
provide them with adequate assistance.  UNHCR favoured an approach whereby IDPs would 
be defined as people who would have been refugees had they left their country.  The 
definition that was finally adopted in 1998 departed from this approach and chose to focus on 
the causes of displacement, with a view to the prevention of forced displacement.  Phuong 
notes that this focus on the causes permitted a discussion of some root causes of displacement 
which had not been considered with regard to refugee movements, such as natural disasters or 
development projects, despite the reluctance of some authors to consider people displaced by 
disasters as IDPs (2004: 30).  Such views insisted on the role of coercion as the fundamental 
characteristic of forced displacement, and coercion was narrowly interpreted as requiring 
action by the government against its citizens.  Roberta Cohen, who was personally involved 
into the drafting of the definition, explains the choice to include people displaced by disasters: 
 
Not all humanitarian or human rights groups wanted to include persons in the definition who were 
uprooted by natural or human-made disasters – that is floods, droughts, nuclear power accidents.  
They argued that the definition should focus only on persons who would be refugees if they crossed a 
border.   But the overriding opinion was that persons uprooted by natural and human-made disasters, 
or by development projects, are also displaced and in need of attention; moreover, such persons can be 
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neglected or discriminated against by their governments on political or ethnic grounds or have their 
human rights violated in other ways.  (2003: 5) 
 
The definition that was finally adopted in 1998 characterised IDPs as 
 
Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of 
habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, 
situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and 
who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.  (United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights 1998) 
 
The definition includes people displaced by natural disasters, but not those uprooted by slow-
onset environmental changes.  Some impacts of climate change, such as sea-level rise, are 
likely to bring huge challenges to this definition.  Walter Kälin, UN General Secretary 
Representative for Internally Displaced People, recently identified three types of slow-onset 
environmental changes brought upon by global warming which have the potential to trigger 
internal displacements (Kälin 2008): 
 
- Governments will need to identify areas at high risk from environmental change and 
displace – perhaps by force – people from these zones; 
 
- Environmental degradation and slow-onset disasters, for which ‘we need criteria to 
better determine where to draw the line between voluntary movement and forced 
displacement’; and finally 
 
- The case of “sinking” small island states, which currently lie in legal limbo. 
 
These three areas not only have the potential to induce forced migration, but also to call into 







3.2.  The Guiding Principle s  on Internal Displacement  
 
 
By the mid-1990s, the numbers of IDPs worldwide had surged, and it was widely 
acknowledged that there were significant legal protection gaps with regard to internal 
displacement.  Not only were IDPs a humanitarian problem, but they were also a threat to 
security and stability.  Humanitarian organisations were also increasingly able to reach these 
populations, and expose their plight to the world. 
 
In 1994, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Dr Francis Deng, a law 
professor and Sudanese national, as his representative for internally displaced people.  The 
Commission on Human Rights invited him to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the legal 
instruments that could be used to address internal displacement, a review that would later 
serve as a first step towards the elaboration of guiding principles on internal displacement. 
 
Not all stakeholders, however, favoured the development of a new legal instrument (Phuong 
2004: 52).  Three options were discussed; current debates between alarmists and sceptics on 
the best way to address environmental migration are very reminiscent of the debates that took 
place concerning these three options.  Some stakeholders, lead by the International Red Cross 
Committee, opposed the development of any new legal instrument, fearing that a tailored 
normative framework would weaken and dilute existing mechanisms of protection, which 
simply needed to be better implemented.  A second position, which was eventually favoured, 
recommended the adoption of an instrument of soft law, which seemed the most realistic 
option, given the political context.  Finally, a maximalist and comprehensive approach was 
also proposed, in which refugees and IDPs would be subsumed into a single instrument 
addressing forced migration as a whole (Petrasek 1995). 
 
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were officially adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1998, and consist in thirty recommendations upholding the 
human rights of IDPs (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1998).  The principles 
address different aspects of internal displacement: protection from displacement, protection 
during displacement, and humanitarian assistance, as well as return, resettlement and 
reintegration.  The document is exclusively concerned with human rights, and only marginally 
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addresses aspects related to migration management or financial compensation for the 
displacement. 
 
The Guiding Principles are a document of soft law, which states are free to apply or disregard.  
Roberta Cohen, who assisted Francis Deng during the preparation of the document, asserts 
that there were three reasons why it was chosen not to confer binding force on the document: 
lack of political will, time constraints, and overlap with other pieces of law (Cohen 2003).  
Internal displacement was – and continues to be – a sensitive topic, and there was no political 
support for a legally binding document such as a treaty.  Furthermore, the negotiation and 
ratification of a treaty would have taken years, whereas there was an urgent need for assistance 
and protection.  Finally, most of the existing law was already available, but scattered.  The 
Guiding Principles sought to gather these pieces of law into a single, compact document, and 
restate law as appropriate, rather than developing new norms.   
 
Despite being a document of soft law, the Guiding Principles have been widely used by UN 
agencies, governments, NGOs and other groups.  In some cases, provisions of national laws 
have been based on the principles, as have many been many programmes on internal 
displacement.  As the guidelines gained currency, they attained higher levels of moral 
authority, making it harder for governments to ignore them. 
 
There are several reasons why the Guiding Principles were received so positively by the 
international community.  The first probably lies in the way Francis Deng proceeded in 
creating the guidelines.  As noted by Kälin (2001), the document does not constitute typical 
soft law, since it was not negotiated by governments, but written by a group of independent 
experts informed by a wide range of stakeholders.  This inclusive process, which was chosen 
directly by Francis Deng, ensured that the creation and application of norms were closely 
related to each other.  Furthermore, the Guiding Principles did not seek to create new law, but 
rather to codify and gather existing norms from different branches of the law.  Hence the 
document was firmly grounded in laws that had already been agreed upon by states, making its 
acceptance as a normative framework much easier. 
 
Overall, thanks to the original approach that was taken in their elaboration, the Guiding 
Principles have become a strong and accepted standard of international law, despite not 
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having been negotiated directly by governments.  In many regards, the non-binding character 
of the document has been instrumental in sealing this achievement. 
 
4. Empirical illustrations 
 
Migration patterns in New Orleans and Tuvalu were widely dissimilar, hence the migration 
and asylum policies that have addressed these migrations are also widely different.  Whereas 
the Tuvaluan government is actively promoting an emigration policy, return migration is a 
priority for the authorities of New Orleans.  In both cases, policy-makers share a concern for 
the scattering of their population, due to relocation and resettlement. 
 
4.1. Migrat ion Pol ic i e s in  Tuvalu  
 
The alarmist view of Tuvalu’s situation would consider that climate change is currently a 
major migration driver, whereas a sceptical perspective would argue that migration remains 
primarily driven by economic factors.  How do these perspectives translate into policy 
responses?  What are the strategies developed by the Tuvaluan government and its 
neighbours, and how do these choices affect the conceptualisation of migration from Tuvalu 
to New Zealand? 
 
4.1.1. Tuvaluan Policies 
 
The Tuvaluan government is actively promoting an emigration policy with a triple objective: 
 
1. Alleviate the pressure from overpopulation in Funafuti 
 
Internal migration is not managed by the government, and the development of 
Funafuti has resulted in considerable overpopulation, leading to pressures on the 
environment and on resources.  Lately, the government has undertaken large 
investments in the development of the outer islands, in the hope that migration flows 
to Funafuti will slow down.  At the same time, emigration is perceived as a possible 
adaptation strategy to alleviate the demographic burden. 
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2. Increase remittances 
 
Remittances represent about 7 per cent of Tuvalu’s GDP, and 9 per cent of average 
household income (Tuvalu Government 2006).  The largest bulk of remittances used 
to come from phosphate miners in Nauru and international seamen, but the closure of 
the mines has almost halved this source of income.  Labour migration is seen as a way 
of brining additional resources to the country through remittances. 
 
3. Respond to the fears of the population regarding the threat of climate change 
 
Finally, it appears that concerns for climate change are also part of the reason why 
emigration is encouraged by the government.  The opening of new migration routes is 
perceived to be a responsibility of the government, and a measure of disaster 
prevention. 
 
We want to give people a choice: some of them want to go, others don’t want, that’s up to 
them.  But they need to have the choice, for now they don’t have nay choice really.  It is our 
responsibility to do something in case the worst happen.  We don’t want to get trapped, we 
need to have a plan. 
(Kelesoma Saloa) 
 
Thus the emigration policy favoured by the Tuvaluan government is deeply associated with 
the decline in migration opportunities.  Although problems of overpopulation and climate 
change are independent from the decline of migration possibilities, it is unlikely that the 
government would have sought new migration agreements had previous migration routes 
stayed open.  At the same time, while pursuing a proactive emigration policy, the government 
is also concerned that the island might empty itself too quickly, and thus compromise its 
ability to develop.  In many ways, Tuvalu was part of a migration system (Bedford 1992) that 
has disintegrated, which Tuvalu is now eager to rebuild.  The next section will provide an 





4.1.2. New Zealander Policies 
 
Migration to New Zealand is currently possible through two migration schemes: the first, 
often confused with and misnamed as an environmental migration agreement, is the Pacific 
Access Category, a scheme that allows an annual quota of 650 citizens from Fiji, Tuvalu, 
Kiribati and Tonga to settle in New Zealand.  Under this scheme, Tuvalu has an annual quota 
of 75 migrants, which was not reached in either 2005 nor 2006120.  Immigrants are required to 
meet very stringent conditions before they can move to New Zealand, which include having a 
good command of English, a job offer in New Zealand, and undergoing a rigorous and costly 
medical check-up in Fiji.  Once immigrants are settled in New Zealand, they can apply to 
bring other family members under the Family Sponsored Stream.  The second agreement is 
more recent and was only implemented at the start of 2008.  It consists of a seasonal 
migration scheme, that allows Tuvaluans (and other Pacific islanders) to come and work 
(typically in the agricultural sector) for six or nine months before workers are sent back home 
with their wages.  It is too soon to say how Tuvaluans will take advantage of this programme. 
 
I wanted to move to New Zealand in 1997 already, but my wife had to stay to look after her parents.  
It’s not easy to get a job offer in New Zealand when you are in Tuvalu, so I had to travel there to 
apply for jobs.  I got two job offers: one as a farmer, and one as a civil servant.  I don’t yet which one I 
will choose.  I need to do a health check in Fiji first, because I cannot do it here in Tuvalu.  It’s very 
expensive, I don’t have enough money for now.  I’ll go when I’ll have enough money.  (…) The 
Government could do more; for example they could arrange for health checks in Tuvalu. 
(Utala Ktaloka) 
 
New Zealand has no migration plans with Tuvalu other than these existing schemes. Although 
some Ministers and high-level officials have repeatedly claimed they would welcome 
Tuvaluans in New Zealand in case of a major disaster, no such plan exists.   
 
Should the worst happen, I guess we’d send a boat to get them.  It’s clear that we won’t let them down, 
but we don’t plan any relocation scheme, we have migration agreements already that Tuvaluans can 
use if they want to.  But Tuvalu not drowning yet, so I think it wouldn’t be appropriate to have this 
kind of policy for now. 
(Don Wil, NZ Aid) 
                                                
120 There were 16 successful applicants in 2005, and 22 in 2006 (source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
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The situation is indeed difficult: on the one hand, neither the Tuvaluan nor the New Zealand 
governments are willing to consider a full evacuation process: there seems no reason to do so.  
On the other hand, the vulnerability of the island countries is such that any extreme weather 
event would result in massive casualties if a prior evacuation were not undertaken. 
 
For now, the New Zealand government has chosen to be supportive of the Tuvaluan 
community in Auckland, and provides different subsidies for the organization of cultural 
events and bilingual schooling.  It used to have a tolerance policy for overstayers who were 
later regularized through the Pacific Access Category scheme, but recent accounts indicate 
that some overstayers have recently been deported to Tuvalu. 
 
 
4.1.3. Australian Policies 
 
For years, Australia has refused to take any migrant from Tuvalu, and has even tried to set up 
a detention centre in Tuvalu as part of the ‘Pacific Solution’, by offering a lump sum payment 
of AUD $10 million to Tuvalu.  The offer was angrily turned down by the Tuvaluan 
government.  In recent years however, two proposals were put forward that could radically 
change Australia’s policy on the topic: 
 
The first was a proposed bill introduced by Senator Kerry Nettle on behalf of the Australian 
Green Party.  The bill would have created a new visa class in Australia’s 1958 Migration Act to 
formally recognize and create mechanisms to deal with climate refugees.  According to the 
proposed bill, a climate refugee visa would be created for ‘person(s) who (have) been 
displaced as a result of a climate change induced environmental disaster’, following an 
environmental disaster declaration to be made by the Minister.  The declaration would take 
into account the geographical scope of the disaster, adaptation options and long-term 
sustainability, the capacity of the country to absorb displaced persons and international efforts 
to assist.  The Minister could also put a limit on the number of climate change refugee visas.  
The bill was defeated in the Parliament; even if it had been passed, the bill contained no 
guarantee that Tuvaluans would have been able to qualify for this special visa status, since it 
contained some restrictive elements, such as a limit on the number of visas issued, and the 
reference to disasters rather than slow-onset processes, such as sea-level rise.  The assistant to 
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Senator Kerry Nettle, who drafted the proposal, explained the rationale of the bill in the 
following terms: 
 
The bill wasn’t tailored especially for Tuvalu, but Tuvalu could benefit from it, of course.  The idea 
was to try and do something to assist Pacific countries, which are completely ignored by the government.  
(…) There was also the idea that we should assume the responsibility for the impacts of climate 
change, since Pacific countries practically don’t emit greenhouse gas emissions, whereas we haven’t 
signed the Kyoto Protocol. 
(Max Philips) 
 
Internal relocation is hardly possible in the case of small islands, and many observers have 
identified this as an important protection gap.  The proposed bill, however, would have 
covered this protection only partially: it neither addressed slow-onset change, nor the 
important issue of statelessness.   
 
The second initiative was a discussion paper issued by Australia’s Labor Party before it came 
to power in late 2007, dramatically entitled ‘Our Drowning Neighbours’ (Sercombe and 
Albanese sd).  The document calls for an international recognition of ‘climate change refugees’ 
and states that Australia should welcome some of them through a regional coalition: 
 
On current projections, Tuvalu is likely to be the first country that is fully evacuated due to climate 
change, but ultimately Kiribati, the Marshall Islands and others may also have to confront this 
scenario.  (…) Labor believes that Australia should, as part of an international coalition, do its fair 
share to accept climate change refugees as part of our humanitarian immigration program.   Yet 
Australia needs to work with our Pacific neighbours to prepare for such contingencies now.  Firstly, 
Australia should help to develop a coalition of Pacific Rim countries willing to accept climate change 
refugees.  Secondly, Australia should be working at the UN to ensure appropriate recognition of 
climate change refugees in existing conventions, or through the establishment of a new convention on 
climate change refugees.  (Sercombe and Albanese sd: 10) 
 
Interestingly, the document directly addressed the situation of Tuvalu, and proposed a far-
ranging mechanism of international recognition, whose impacts on Australia’s immigration 
policy would have been uncertain.  It also suggested that Australia should help with the 
training of Tuvaluans, in order that they be able to ‘meet the skilled migration requirements in 
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a variety of countries, should some choose to emigrate prior to the full evacuation of Tuvalu’ 
(Sercombe and Albanese sd: 9).   
 
Both initiatives, however, were rather intended for domestic than for external use, and fall 
into the category of campaign documents.  They were launched with a view to the November 
2007 general election, since both the Green and the Labor parties were in opposition to the 
Conservative Government of John Howard.  Both documents were primarily intended for the 
Australian public, and thus choose an alarmist approach in order to attract the maximum 
attention.  There was never, however, any real intent to see these proposals implemented.  
The amendment to the Immigration Act was not concerted with other parties, and the Greens 
knew it would be defeated; as for the policy document of the Labor Party, it was forgotten as 
soon as the Labor Party acceded to power in November 2007.  Once again, the 
conceptualisation of environmental migration was dependent upon external factors, rather 
than actual needs of concerned populations. 
 
4.1.4. Interim Conclusion 
 
Government policies have taken a dual approach, reflecting a two-level policy subsystem.  On 
the international scene, the Tuvaluan government has successfully marketed its country as the 
first victim of climate change, and has called for international help.  Its domestic policy 
regarding emigration, in contrast, is penetrated by a sceptical approach, and seems to be 
equally concerned with alleviating the overpopulation problem and increasing remittances as it 
is with environmental threats.  Massive emigration flows could equally represent a threat for 
the country, and Barnett and Adger state that ‘the result of lost confidence in atoll-futures may 
be the end of the habitability of the atolls’ (2003: 330).  The reverse is also true: the loss of 
confidence might well be the result of uncertainties regarding the future of the country.  Many 
Tuvaluans who emigrated to New Zealand did so because of the uncertain future of Tuvalu, 
as a risk-reduction strategy for their families: to these people future, expected changes were 
more important to their decision than current environmental degradation.  In this regard, 
future policies designed by the Tuvaluan government to address climate change and migration 
will prove crucial if these uncertainties, and thus the threat faced by the country, are to be 
reduced.  Such uncertainties are reinforced by the competing approaches endorsed by the 
government at different levels of policy-making. 
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Furthermore, the constant characterization of Tuvaluans as potential environmental migrants, 
or ‘refugees’, can snare them in a relativist trap (Connell 2003: 103) and prevent them from 
developing adequate adaptation strategies.  The categorization can also result in a loss of 
confidence and individual empowerment, and therefore, as in the case of Katrina, the process 
of categorization needs to be questioned here. 
 
As for New Zealand and Australia, they seem to have adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach, 
based on the implementation of ad hoc policies.  For now, both countries’ approach is 
dominated by a reactive perspective towards migration, and neither of has planned for any 
proactive migration policy.  As expressed by one interviewee, this implies the risk that ‘one 
day, when the waves come, the help will come too late’. 
 
 
4.2. Migrat ion Pol ic i e s in  New Orleans 
 
 
Days after the hurricane struck, the population of the Greater New Orleans area was scattered 
throughout the United States.  This scattering took place through three different pathways: 
 
- The personal choice of the evacuees: factors impacting upon their destination choice 
included friends and family network, travel distance, information available about the 
destination, previous evacuations, and the assistance available.  Many evacuees also 
had multiple destinations. 
 
- Evacuation carried out by the authorities: as mentioned earlier, most of these evacuees 
had no choice in their destination, which was selected by the authorities according to 
the accommodation capacities of different states and cities. 
 
- A burden-sharing scheme that was hastily improvised, following Houston’s inability to 
take on more evacuees.  One week after the hurricane, on 4 September, Texas 
Governor Rick Perry announced that Houston was not able to provide shelter and 
food to the half million evacuees who had relocated to the city.  Perry therefore 
ordered the airlifting of some evacuees to other states willing to take them, including 
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West Virginia, Utah, Oklahoma, Michigan, Iowa, New York and Pennsylvania121.  The 
request for such a burden-sharing scheme was improvised, and reflected the numerous 
difficulties that states and cities encountered upon dealing with a massive influx of 
evacuees. 
 
One year after the disaster, as shown by the following map, the city’s population was still 
scattered across the country, since many had chosen not to return to New Orleans. 
 
 
Fig.  9  – Katrina’s Diaspora (source: New York Times) 
 
 
Almost all displacements linked to the hurricane happened within the United States, with a 
few exceptions of international migration, such as the Tulane Professor who took up a 
professorship in Great Britain, convinced that Tulane University would never completely 
recover from the disaster.  The striking feature of this displacement is its timeframe, which 
qualifies it more as a migration than a displacement.  One year and a half after the disaster, 
only half of New Orleans population had returned to the city: 37 per cent lived in Louisiana, 
34 per cent lived in Texas, 9 per cent lived in Georgia, and 20 per cent lived in another state.  
                                                
121 New Mexico and Arizona also agreed to take up to 6,000 and 2,500 evacuees respectively. 
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Among these, only 11 per cent planned to eventually return to New Orleans, while 52 per cent 
stated they were certain to never return. 
 
A widespread concern in New Orleans was thus the loss of the city’s distinctive culture, which 
explains the use of the word ‘diaspora’ to emphasize the relationship that existed between 
those who returned home and those who did not, either because they were unwilling to do so 
or did not have the resources.  A particular concern for the inhabitants was the loss of 
restaurant chefs and musicians, since the most salient elements of New Orleans culture are its 
cuisine and music.  Several associations or committees were set up with the purpose of 
assisting the musical community, notably providing them with new instruments, since most of 
them had lost their instruments in the storm.  Musicians probably benefited from more 
assistance than any other group of the population, fuelling concerns of discrimination when 
specific housing units were built for their sole use in a village purpose-built by Habitat for 
Humanity NGO, called The Musicians’ Village.  The loss of large parts of their student body 
also had some catastrophic consequences for some universities (Ladd et al. 2006). 
 
4.1.1. Problems Associated with Relocation 
 
Although Texas and Houston were at first well organized in welcoming evacuees from the 
hurricane, they lacked the capacities to deal with 500,000 additional residents in the long term.  
I will focus specifically on Houston in this part, but the situation in other major cities was not 
significantly different.  Overall, the major problems experienced by all evacuees were the loss 
of their ‘sense of place’, and their impression of being in an unknown environment.  Even 
though Louisiana and Texas are neighbouring states, their cultures and attitudes are 






Evacuees from New Orleans were initially sheltered into Reliant Park, which was considered a 
temporary spot that could handle evacuees for up to ninety days (Brinkley 2006: 440).  On 
September 2, Texas Governor Rick Perry announced an emergency plan to allow for some of 
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the evacuees to be moved to Dallas and San Antonio.  Four days later, he called on other 
states willing to accommodate evacuees: Arkansas and Oklahoma ended taking the majority 
(Nigg et al. 2006: 117).  As mentioned above, this burden-sharing was improvised, and 
evacuees were not consulted.  Nigg, Barnshaw and Torres stressed that 
 
Katrina pointed out the need not only to prepare an area for a disaster impact but to prepare a region 
to accommodate the mass, albeit temporary, migration of homeless evacuees.  Evacuees quickly taxed 
the resources of their homestates, then adjacent states into the region.  Some preplanning for “receptor 
states” to take in evacuees would lessen the confusion and uncertainty about financial consequences of 
large-scale disasters for non impacted states.  The development of policies similar to mutual aid 
agreements might facilitate this process.  (2006: 126). 
 
Many residents were eventually housed in trailers, gathered in what were called  ‘trailer parks’.  
These trailer parks were guarded camps, usually located in the suburbs of urban areas, that 
could sometimes accommodate up to 2,000 residents; this was the case for one interview site, 
the park of Renaissance Village located north of Baton Rouge in Baxter.  The parks were 
initially conceived as temporary housing, but most of turned out to be a more permanent 
habitat.  Almost all interviewees within the Renaissance Village trailer park did no know when 





Finding jobs for the evacuees was nothing short of a logistical nightmare.  Many respondents 
indicated they had suffered from discrimination when interviewing for a position.  Overall, 
employers were not keen on hiring evacuees, since they were convinced that they were either 
trouble-makers, or planning to move back to New Orleans.  A short film ‘Be a Houstonian’, 
was even broadcast by Houston’s Chamber of Commerce, in order to help evacuees pass 
recruitment tests.   Advice in the video included the suggestion to change mobile phone 
number, so that the number would have the same dialling code as phones in Houston.  For 
similar reasons, it was also suggested that evacuees change car license plate, and take 
professional interviews in a less casual attitude.  Job fairs were also organized by many 





In the updated edition of her migration atlas, Wihtol de Wenden uses Katrina and Tuvalu as 
‘emblematic examples’ of flows of ‘environmental refugees’ (2009: 70).  A similar choice was 
made in this thesis, as these two cases seem to exemplify and represent different aspects of the 
same phenomenon.  However, this thesis retains the awareness both cases of environmental 
migration are social constructs, shaped by media discourses and a ‘canary-in-the-coalmine’ 
mindset.  The goal of the fieldwork in each locale was to identify the patterns of this social 
construction in both cases, and how they came to be reflected in the policies designed to 
address the phenomenon. 
 
Although the examples of Katrina and Tuvalu are generally described as two manifestations of 
the same phenomenon, the two cases are very different in scale and in nature.  Katrina 
displaced more than a million people in a few days; only a few dozens of people leave Tuvalu 
each year.  Hence the policies and arrangements to care for the displaced have little in 
common, but represent different aspects of the policy responses outlined above.  Beyond the 
scale of the displacement however, the major difference between the two cases lies in the 
nature of the displacement.  Most of those displaced by Katrina returned home – though a 
significant part, mostly from New Orleans, did not – while the overwhelming majority of 
those who left Tuvalu did so with no intention of return.  Katrina’s migration was brutal and 
hastily prepared, whereas Tuvaluans departing for New Zealand have typically thought about 
and prepared their migration over a couple of years.  Furthermore, the former migration 
patterns were purely internal, whereas the latter has a strong international component. 
 
It is therefore only logical that the legal frameworks and policies that apply to each case differ 
substantially.  Normative frameworks in Louisiana derived from the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement and a set of federal recommendations and guidelines in case of natural 
disasters; Tuvalu’s migration to New Zealand is regulated by two labour migration schemes, 
the Pacific Access Category and a seasonal labour arrangement.   
 
Some striking similarities, however, can also be found, in particular with regard to the 
uncertainty surrounding the migration and the representation of the victims.  In both cases, a 
lack of long-term planning regarding the future of the ‘homeland’ has been a key factor 
driving the migration of the inhabitants.  In New Orleans, uncertainties about reconstruction 
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plans, public assistance and the ability of the levees to resist a future hurricane, as well as on 
overall pessimistic state of mind about future prospects for the city, have all played a major 
role in keeping thousands of people away from a city they once called home.  In Tuvalu, the 
lack of a long-term adaptation or relocation plan, as well as of precise knowledge about the 
impacts of climate change, has prompted many to move to New Zealand as a risk-reduction 
strategy for their families.  In both cases, the general feeling of uncertainty was, to a large 
extent, the direct result of the lack of appropriate and long-term policies.  These policies – or 
lack thereof – were not only related to the status, protection and assistance of the migrants, 
but also to adaptation and reconstruction.  Such uncertainties mirror the confusion that 
surrounds the concept of environmental migration: just as the concept is still fuzzy and 
controversial, so are the policies and normative frameworks that address actual migration 
flows.   
 
It is difficult to say whether, and in what ways, the poor conceptualisation of environmental 
migration impacts upon the adequacy of policies that deal with it, but both reflect each other: 
neither of the migration flows studied has been acknowledged by policy-makers to be 
‘environmental migration’, despite this the case with the media, NGOs, and a large number of 
academics. 
 
There is another point that Tuvalu and Katrina have in common: the dominant discourse 
concerning both cases depicts environmental migrants as powerless victims, and both 
migration flows are portrayed exclusively through the prism of environmental migration.  This 
portrayal of the migrants, however, does not always match their motivations and aspirations, 
nor does it account for the complexity of their migration.  Thus labelling both cases as 
‘environmental migration’, though it stresses the importance of environmental factors to the 
migrants’ decisions, also carries at least two drawbacks: 
 
- Firstly, it implies that the migrants are powerless victims of environmental changes, 
thus affecting the kind of protection and assistance required by the migrants, and 
undermining their capacity to cope; 
- Secondly, it can imply that the same normative frameworks and policy responses are 
needed in both cases, neglecting the differences stressed above. 
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The simple fact that two migration flows so different from each other have been categorised 
under the same label evinces that environmental migration is socially constructed as any 
migration associated with environmental factors, whatever these factors may be and however 
different the associated migration can be.  Each migration flow, however, was addressed in 
different ways by the relevant authorities, under different normative frameworks.  Hence it 
seems doubtful that the proposed legislative and policy developments in the field will be 
adequate to deal with the different patterns of migration that the concept – however fuzzy it 
may be – currently covers.  Treating environmental migration as a distinct category of 
migration might actually lead to the oblivion of existing normative frameworks – as was 













“We are still confused, but at a much higher level.” 
 
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland. 
 
 
The research question at the centre of this work seeks to analyse normative frameworks and 
policy responses that address environmental migration, and to assess their influence on the 
conceptualisation of environmental migration and policy outcomes.  Contrary to a commonly 
held belief, I have tried to show that normative frameworks relevant to environmental 
migration in the fields of asylum and migration, climate change or natural disasters are not a 
blank page.  Refugee law and asylum policies contain elements, both at the normative and 
operational levels, which can be useful when dealing with environmental migration. Likewise, 
the more recent development of mechanisms of international governance to deal with natural 
disasters and climate change also provides some policy responses to environmental migration.   
In most cases, however, the response is provided on an ad hoc basis: no lead agency has a real 
mandate to care for environmental displacees, and legal protection can only be provided in 
specific, determined cases.  Refugee law, which revolves around the Geneva Convention, 
deliberately dismissed, for political reasons, factors other than persecution when defining who 
could qualify as a refugee.  As for normative frameworks in the environmental policy area, 
most of them have no binding value, though they also seek to protect the rights of those 
displaced. 
 
Although some norms and policies do exist, important protection gaps remain, especially with 
regard to displacements induced by slow-onset environmental changes.  These gaps and 
challenges will be exacerbated by climate change, and have been summarised by Walter Kälin 
(2008) as follows: 
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While existing human rights norms and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement provide 
sufficient protection for those forcibly displaced by sudden-onset disasters or because their place of origin 
has become inhabitable or been declared too dangerous for human habitation, there is a need to clarify 
or even develop the normative framework applicable to other situations.  (a) In the context of slow-
onset disasters, criteria are needed to distinguish between those who voluntarily leave their communities 
because of the effects of climate change and those who are forced to leave their homes and therefore 
qualify as internally displaced persons.  (…) (b) People displaced across international borders fall into 
a normative gap.  Here, it is necessary to determine under what circumstances such persons can be 
regarded as being in need of international protection.  (…).  (c) The status of people displaced from 
small islands states sinking due to rising sea levels, needs clarification, even if their number is likely to 
be small.   
 
 
Another significant policy gap which is often unmentioned relates to migration management. 
It is increasingly recognised that voluntary migration can be an adaptation strategy to climate 
change, and that forced displacement can be avoided, yet no consistent international 
framework exists for a global, proactive governance of migration.  Forced migration is only 
one dimension of environmental migration, one that can often (but not always) be avoided 
through voluntary migration.  A significant policy gap lies, therefore, in the absence of 
mechanisms aimed at facilitating migration: at a time when the line between forced and 
voluntary migration is increasingly blurred, the development of such mechanisms of 
governance with regard to environmental migration can only be achieved through the bridging 
of environmental and migration policies on a global level. 
 
 
These gaps also reveal how environmental and migration policies have evolved along different 
lines, at different speeds, over the last decades.  Both sets of policies aspire to develop 
mechanisms of global governance within their respective fields, but the desire of states to 
maintain sovereign control over these policy areas has impeded the development of 
comprehensive policies. Environmental migration, lying at the crossroads at these policy areas, 
has thus been addressed in a fragmented fashion by different levels of governance.  
 
I explain this fragmented approach by the lack of connections between environmental and 
migration policies and the dominane of different coalitions in these policy areas.  In this work, 
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I have tried to show the divergent ways in which environmental displacees have been 
addressed by different policy areas. Displacements as a result of environmental disruption 
have been a matter of increasing concern in the field of disaster reduction and adaptation to 
climate change, whereas asylum and migration policies have remained timid in addressing the 
issue, despite creating some subsidiary mechanisms of protection.  
 
This leads to the question, is this discrepancy the result of more developed mechanisms of 
international cooperation in the field of environment as compared with the field of migration? 
My research suggests that this is not the case.  Disaster management, to a large extent, remains 
the responsibility of individual states. No international binding agreement exists to organise 
cooperation between states after natural disasters.  With respect to climate change, although 
the Kyoto Protocol imposes greenhouse gases emissions reductions on industrialised 
countries, aspects of the agreement that touch upon adaptation remain embryonic.  On the 
contrary, an international refugee regime has been established from the 1930s onwards, and 
the Geneva Convention was drafted as early as 1951. Other forms of complementary 
international protection have also been developed, either at the regional level (subsidiary and 
temporary protections) or as soft law (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement). 
International governance of voluntary migration, however, has only recently begun, and still 
needs to develop policy instruments.  For now, environmental migration has yet to be 
addressed by the debates on the governance of migration.  
 
Hence one cannot claim that mechanisms of international governance are more advanced with 
regard to environmental matters than migration and asylum issues, at least for the fields 
considered here.  Yet environmental migration is addressed more by environmental policies 
than migration policies.  I argue that a key reason for this difference is that each field is 
dominated by a different coalition: while the sceptical coalition maintains a strong influence 
over migration policies, the alarmist coalition weighs heavily on environmental policy-making. 
I will now try to describe how these coalitions are formed, and how they interact with each 
other. 
 
How are coalitions formed? 
I have considered scientific information is an essential part of the policy process, and the core 
policy beliefs of the coalitions revolve around academic debates in the field.  These core policy 
beliefs are very resistant to change, and are the key determinants of the belonging to a 
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coalition. Sceptics contend that environmental factors are one among many migration drivers, 
and that isolating environmental migration as a specific type of migration is pointless and 
potentially harmful.  In sharp contrast, alarmists claim that increasing numbers of people are 
displaced by environmental disruptions, and that environmental changes constitute a major 
and distinct driver of migration.  Building upon these core beliefs, members of the coalitions 
will propose and develop instruments and mechanisms to pursue the realisation of the core 
policy belief. At this stage, they might disagree between them, but remain bound together by 
their core policy beliefs. Hence it appears that the representations of environmental migration 
are the foundations of both the sceptical and alarmist coalitions. These representations are 
themselves social constructs embedded in a value system, shaped by different traditions and 
environments. 
 
What do the coalitions consist of? 
Researchers play a prominent role in the coalitions, but these also include journalists, NGOs, 
international agencies and parliamentarians.  
 
Members of the sceptical coalition are primarily drawn from refugee lawyers and migration 
scholars.  Geographers, in particular, are among those who attach great importance to the 
multi-causality of migration . Membership of coalition also extends to international agencies 
and organisations in charge of migration: UNHCR has insisted that its involvement in natural 
disasters must to remain exceptional, whereas the European Commission Directorate General 
for Justice, Liberty and Security has contended that environmental migration is not relevant to 
European migration policies. Hence we find in the alarmist coalition a group of people that 
are often used to working with each other, even though they might disagree on many aspects 
of migration policies. There are no journalists nor policy entrepreneurs in the coalition, but 
rather a majority of migration scholars, refugee lawyers, national and regional immigration 
agencies, as well as UNHCR, even though its position is slowly shifting. Overall, the sceptical 
coalition is quite small, but remains influent through the presence of prominent scholars and 
official agencies and departments. 
 
Members of the alarmist coalition, on the other hand, are more numerous, diverse, and 
powerful.  The coalition was initially led by environmentalists such as Lester Brown and 
Norman Myers, who were soon followed by environmental scholars, elements of the media 
and NGOs, and also private businesses such as Munich Re.  The coalition also included 
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numerous international organisations, such as UNEP, the Red Cross or IOM.  Some 
parliamentarians, mostly from opposition parties, also joined the coalition and proposed some 
protection schemes for environmental displaces.  Over the years, the coalition grew rapidly, to 
the point that it now dominates the policy subsystem of environmental migration. The 
dominance of the alarmist coalition is the result of different factors:  
- first, the increased attention given to climate change and environmental issues created 
a favourable context for the rise of the coalition; 
- the presence of most media in the coalition made the coalition’s discourse available to 
a larger audience;  
- finally, its members are far more numerous than in the sceptical coalition, and have a 
greater influence on traditional policy-makers. 
 
How do coalitions work? 
In some cases, coalitions are organised in associations, lobby groups, etc. This is not the case 
here, and the coalitions are not formally organised. Their members meet at conferences, 
workshops and professional forums, but they do so for other reasons than their belonging to 
a coalition. The reason for this is simple: these coalitions are abstract concepts, a 
methodological framework for the analysis of the policy process. 
 
It is important to note that the coalitions are not sociologically homogenous, and members of 
a single coalition on one issue can be members of opposing coalitions on a different issue.  
The motivations of individual members can also be different: as explained earlier in my work, 
different research agendas and objectives drive migration and environmental scholars. As for 
the position taken by international organisations, this is not contingent on their policy field 
(for example, IOM is a member of the alarmist coalition), but rather on their willingness to 
extend their mandate. IOM, UNEP or the IASC are all seeking to play a greater role in their 
respective fields. 
 
A central idea of the thesis is that ideas and representations matter in the policy process. Both 
coalitions were initially formed around conflicting arguments in the academic literature, and 
researchers involved in these academic debates became unwitting policy entrepreneurs who 




It is useful to note, however, can professional forums – conferences and workshops in our 
case – can help the process of learning across coalitions, and thus bring coalitions closer. 
Given the dominance of the alarmist coalition, policy debates on environmental migration are 
currently concentrated in the area of environmental policy-making, more precisely in the area 
of climate policy-making.  As a result of the different professional forums that revolve around 
climate change, as well as the open forum of climate negotiations122, the two coalitions have 
been able to come closer and adopt some common positions.  The latest manifestation of 
such a common position was the recent submission to UNFCCC of a position paper by IOM, 
UNHCR, United Nations University, the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Representative 
of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons.  The paper 
stressed the need to address environmental migration in upcoming climate change 
negotiations.  Although the entities signatory to this position paper traditionally formed part 
of opposing coalitions, they were brought together in the professional forum constituted by 
climate negotiations. 
  
This apparent reconciliation, which is a recent development, obscures the dominant position 
held by the alarmist coalition.  Climate negotiations have now become the central focal point 
of the policy subsystem of environmental migration, and it is expected that normative 
frameworks to deal with the phenomenon of environmental migration will develop primarily 
in international climate policies.  
 
The assimilating of environmental migration to climate negotiations shapes the current 
conceptualisation of environmental migration in different ways: 
 
- Firstly, it denies the role played by migration policies in determining the size and 
patterns of migration flows, by implying that flows are primarily dependent on the 
extent of climate change impacts and the adaptation strategies that will be 
implemented to mitigate these impacts.  Thus the embedding of policy debates within 
the sphere of climate change reflects a deterministic perspective that assumes that 
environmental displacements depend primarily on the impacts of climate change, 
when in fact these impacts can be mitigated by adaptation policies. 
                                                
122  Core climate negotiations are held annually at the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (or 
COP). The COP hosts the negotiation process regarding the implementation of the UNFCCC, but is also an 
open forum attended by thousands of NGOs, lobbies, companies, international organisations, scholars and 
journalists. 
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- Secondly, it narrows cases of environmental migration to those displacements induced 
by climate change, and thus excludes displacements associated with other 
environmental disruptions.  Furthermore, it has a strong bias towards future 
displacements and considers environmental migration to be a new issue, despite the 
existence of past and current migrations associated with environmental disruptions, 
including the effects of climate change. 
 
- Thirdly, environmental migration is considered as a forced movement, and the 
voluntary dimension of some migration flows is not addressed.  Therefore, policy 
proposals are geared towards protection and compensation, rather than governance of 
migration. 
 
- Finally, and most importantly, it tends to conceptualise environmental migration as a 
specific type of migration that must be addressed by environmental policies rather 
than by migration policies.  Undoubtedly, this is the clearest sign of the dominance of 
the alarmist coalition in the policy subsystem. 
 
These findings verify my initial research hypotheses, with some reservations.  Both the cases 
of Katrina and Tuvalu indicate that states continue to play a central role in shaping migration 
movements, in contrast to the prevailing essentialist understanding of environmental 
migration as a phenomenon shaped primarily by environmental changes and the policies 
designed to address these changes, rather than by policies that address the movements 
themselves.  The existence of two competing coalitions can serve as an explanation for the 
distinct development of environmental and migration policies with regard to environmental 
migration, although the subsystem as a whole is heavily dominated by the alarmist coalition.  
 
This thesis has sought to make an original contribution in bringing a constructivist perspective 
to academic debates that were most often rooted in a deterministic perspective.  In conducting 
the analysis, the Advocacy Coalition Framework was used as a methodological tool, allowing 
me to highlight of the existence of advocacy coalitions in the policy debates. The choices I 
made, however, also meant that I had to leave some fields unexplored. Furthermore, my 
research has also allowed to identify some new research questions, which I hope to investigate 




- First, the choice of the ACF as a model of the policy process revealed certain insights, 
but implied the exclusion of alternative models that might have yielded other, 
additional insights. The conceptualisation of environmental migration is rapidly 
evolving, and so are new policy proposals to address it. Therefore, I hope to be able to 
study these new developments over the next few years, with the help of other 
theoretical models that will allow me to combine different representations of the 
policy process. 
 
-  Furthermore, the thesis sought to combine an analysis of both environmental and 
migration policy areas.  Though I hope that this combined analysis is an original 
feature of the thesis, it also meant that I needed to refrain myself from exploring other 
policy areas, such as human rights policies or development policies. These policy areas 
were deliberately omitted, but a more comprehensive analysis would need to include 
them.  
 
- Finally, I have shown how policy debates have cemented a concept of environmental 
migration as a forced migration caused primarily by the impacts of climate change, and 
have tried to identify the shortcomings of this conceptualisation.  Given that policy 
debates currently revolve around adaptation to climate change, it would be of future 
interest to trace how migration will be addressed in debates on adaptation, and how 
migration strategies on the ground can be used as a way of coping with the impacts of 
climate change.  Although migration is often characterised as a consequence of the 
failure of adaptation strategies, some empirical studies have shown that it can also be, 
of itself, an adaptation strategy (Van Der Geest 2008). I hope to be able to contribute 
that the development and furthering of such empirical studies. In the continuation of 
the thesis, a promising direction of future research might be to look at the way in 
which migration is envisioned within climate negotiations over adaptation. Migration 
remains generally considered to be a failure of adaptation, and not (yet?) as an 
adaptation strategy. My hypothesis would be that the concept of migration as a coping 
strategy will gain currency in policy debates on adaptation.  Once again, the linkages 
between research and policy seem of crucial importance in this regard. But only future 
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1. General overview of Tuvalu 
 
Historical  ou t look 
 
The history of Tuvalu remains difficult to write, and large parts of it are still unknown. 
McDonald rightly notes that the writing of such histories was ‘largely the preserve of non 
indigenous historians’ and that most were ‘Western historians writing about “the other” ’ 
(1996: 37). This might partly explain why little is known about the pre-colonisation era. The 
most reliable source on Tuvalu’s history is the work of Barrie McDonald, an Australian 
scholar, and his book contains only one chapter on Tuvalu’s pre-European history (McDonald 
1982) – as the author says himself, one chapter to ‘encapsulate at least two, and perhaps three 
thousand years of distinctive history’ (1996: 40). 
 
There’s no agreement as to the date, or even the period, when Tuvalu was first settled. Howe 
(2003) suggests that the islands were settled around 1,000 BC by Polynesians from Samoa and 
Tonga, except for the atoll of Nui that was predominantly settled by I-Kiribatis, and this claim 
is also supported by McDonald (1996: 40). An history of Tuvalu commissioned by the 
Government also recalls legends of the settlements of Funafuti, the main atoll, dating back to 
about 3,000 years ago (Faaniu 1983). Other scholars, however, suggest that Tuvalu’s 
settlement ‘may not have been long before Europeans reached the central Pacific; there are 
even suggestions that colonization, originating in Vaitupu, may have been as recent as the 
Sixteenth Century’ (Munro and Bedford 1980: 2). Munro further asserts that most islands 
were settled between the Fourteenth and Eighteenth Centuries, with Nukulaelae being the 
latest atoll to be settled (1982: 7).  
 
Though some islands of Tuvalu were first spotted by Spanish explorer Alvaro de Mendana y 
Neyra in 1568 and again in 1595123, it is only in 1819 that Captain Arent de Peyster’s ship 
landed in Funafuti, making first contact with Tuvaluans (Connell 1983). The ship was owned 
by Edward Ellice, a London merchant and financier, who gave his name to the newly 
(re)discovered atolls.  
                                                
123 The island of Nui in 1568, and Niulakita in 1595. 
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Christianity was introduced in 1860s by missionaries from the Cook Islands and Samoa. At 
the same time, Tuvalu sparked interest from ‘blackbirders’, ships that were sailing the South 
Pacific in search for slaves to work in the sugar cane plantations of Queensland or the guano 
mines of Peru (Maude 1981). The exact number of kidnapped people is unknown, but 
blackbirders devastated the atolls of Nukulaelae and Funafuti, and none of the slaves ever 
returned to Tuvalu.  
 
Tuvalu, then known as Ellice Islands, was proclaimed a British protectorate in 1892, in order 
to protect the population from the hostile raids of blackbirders. The prime interest of the 
British authorities lied in the phosphate mines of Kiribati, but it was proposed to include 
Tuvalu in the protectorate, an offer that was eventually accepted. Following this 
incorporation, trade increased dramatically in Tuvalu, and many Tuvaluans left to work in 
Kiribati’s phosphate mines.  
 
In 1915, the islands were incorporated with the Gilbert Islands (now Kiribati) in order to form 
the Bristish colony of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, and most of the population had been 
converted to Christianity by then. There were major differences between the two groups of 
islands however: while Tuvaluans were Polynesians, I-Kiribati were Micronesians. These 
ethnic differences were further reinforced by linguistic and cultural differences, but the islands 
were aggregated for the convenience of the colonial administration. 
 
Funafuti was later transformed into an American airbase during World War II: large holes – 
the ‘borrow pits’ – were dug at the two ends of the island, an airstrip was built with the soil 
that had been dug up, and the island was used between 1942 and 1944 as a military base to 
bomb Japanese positions in Kiribati, Nauru and the Marshall Islands. At the peak of the war, 
more than 6,000 soldiers occupied the island, while most of Funafuti’s population was 
temporarily displaced on an outer islet (McQuarrie 1994). Remains of this period can still be 
seen today, in particular wrecked tanks abandoned in the lagoon and the ‘borrow pits’, now 
used as waste dumps, that have never been filled up by the American military, despite repeated 
pleas from Tuvalu government. 
 
Shortly after the war, two other significant population movements occurred: the first one 
from the atoll of Vaitupu, and the second one from Niutao.. In 1951, elders from Vaitupu, 
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under the impulsion of Donald Kennedy, an Australian expatriate who was also the 
headmaster of the boarding school, decided to purchase the island of Kioa, an outlier to Fiji. 
The main reason underlying the purchase was the fear that resources on the island would be 
too scarce to sustain demographic growth. A few dozens of families relocated to Kioa until 
1983, and were eventually granted Fijian citizenship in 2005, even though the island still enjoys 
some autonomy and has its own administrative body. Bristish colonial authorities had similar 
thoughts about Niutao, then Tuvalu’s most-populated atoll, and decided to ship some Niutao 
islanders to the uninhabited Niulakita atoll124 in 1949. From then on, Tuvalu, which means 
‘cluster of eight’, would count nine populated atolls. Niulakita remains the least populated 
atoll, with only about 40 inhabitants. 
 
These two displacements reveal that the idea of permanent resettlement was considered by 
some well before the threats of climate change were known. Most media reports tend to 
portray Tuvalu’s current possible relocation as unprecedented – these examples show that the 
very idea of relocation is far from being unprecedented, even if these resettlements were of a 
much smaller scale. Even before these resettlements occurred, the idea was considered in the 
1890s in response to what was perceived as an overpopulation problem (Connell 1983). 
Munro and Bedford note that this idea was born out of a Malthusian perspective: people 
feared that they would not have enough food unless the population was kept under strict 
control (1980: 3). As early as in the 1860s, tight population controls included forced abortions 
and infanticides, and a policy of a maximum of two children per family was implemented 
throughout Vaitupu. These techniques of population controls, though counterbalanced by 
adoption, were abolished by the missionaries, and population grew rapidly from then on. 
Interestingly, as I will show later in this chapter, this Malthusian perspective is still part of the 
rationale of the current governmental policy to encourage and facilitate emigration. 
 
Tuvalu suffered important damages, as well as a heavy toll on human lives, after hurricane 
Bebe, which hit Funafuti in 1972 (Falani s.d.). A few years later, as Kiribati was seeking to gain 
independence, Tuvaluans were concerned that their identity could be overshadowed by I-
Kiribatis, who outnumbered them by seven to one (Connell 1983). Thus they opted for 
secession, and 92 % of the population voted in favour of it in a referendum held in August 
                                                
124 It is interesting to note here that the atoll of Niulakita was not entirely uninhabited, and that some families 
from Vaitupu had already settled the atoll. This group was promptly shipped back to Vaitupu. The anecdote is 
narrated in Bennetts and Wheeler photographic essay on Tuvalu (2001), and was orally confirmed to me during 
my stay. 
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1974. The amiable separation became effective on October 1st, 1975, and Tuvalu gained full 
independence three years later on October 1st, 1978. Tuvalu rapidly established itself as a 
parliamentary democracy, and has been served by twelve different prime ministers between 
1978 and 2008. 
 
A turning point in Tuvalu’s history was the sale of the internet domain ‘.tv’ in 1999. This 
domain, which had been attributed by the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO), 
was sold to internet company VeriSign for US$ 50 million in royalties over a twelve-year 
period, thus representing a significant part of Tuvalu’s annual budget. This unexpected influx 
of money allowed for a number of development projects, including the asphalting of the 
islands’ roads. But the money was also used to send a permanent representative to the United 
Nations in New York. Tuvalu became a member of the United Nations on September 5th, 
2000125. Enele Sopoaga was appointed ambassador to the United Nations, and quickly became 
one of the most vocal advocates of Tuvalu. Sopoaga quickly took up the vice-presidency of 
the Alliance Of Small Island States (AOSIS), a role that would give him a prominent role in 
the negotiations related to climate change.  
 
The government has since consistently used international forums to attract the world’s 
attention to the specific vulnerabilities of small island states and the threats of climate change, 
and Tuvaluan leaders have been particularly successful in voicing their concerns about climate 




Tuvalu is one of the only five countries comprised entirely of low-lying islands and atolls, 
which are ‘rings of coral reefs that enclose a lagoon’ (Barnett and Adger 2003: 322). Despite a 
territory spreading over 750,000 square kilometres in the South Pacific Ocean, its land area is 
only of 26 square kilometres, making it the fourth smallest country worldwide, after Vatican 
City, Monaco and Nauru. Located half way between Hawaii and Australia, the archipelago is 
made up of six coral atolls and three reef islands. Funafuti, Nanumea, Nui, Vaitupu, 
                                                
125 Tuvalu also became a full member of the Commonwealth at the same occasion. The Queen of England 
remains the official head of state, even though republican movements gained some strength under the leadership 
of the late Prime Minister Ionatana Ionatana. On April 30th, 2008, a referendum on Tuvalu’s transformation into 
a republic was defeated by a two to one majority. 
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Nukufetau and Nukulaelae are all coral atolls, with a lagoon open to the ocean; Nanumanga 
and Niutao are reef islands, but have a landlocked lagoon, while Niulakita, the smallest entity, 
doesn’t have a lagoon. In addition, Tuvalu also comprises about 120 islets. None of these 
entities are separated by a distance less than 60 kilometres, and there are 350 nautical miles 
between the most northern atoll, Nanumea, and the most southern island, Niulakita (Barton 
1977).  
 
Map of Tuvalu126  
                                                
126 Source: Intute, University of Manchester 
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The main characteristics of Tuvalu’s geography, and the one that drew most of the attention, 
is its very low elevation: its highest peak127 is at a striking 5 metres above sea-level. This low 
elevation makes Tuvalu extremely vulnerable to sea-level rise and other climate events  
(Barnett and Adger 2003; Mimura et al. 2007b; Lal et al. 2002).  
 
Another factor that makes Tuvalu particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise is the geology of its 
atolls, whose morphology was not developed until the post-mid Holocene period (about 4000 
B.C.).  The atoll reefs are ‘perched atop carbonate platforms which cap buried volcanic 
edifices’, and ‘underlain by 8–28 m of Holocene limestone disconformably overlying a 
substratum of last-interglacial or older limestone’ (Dickinson 2004: 251). The landmass of 
current Tuvalu atolls is formed of uncosolidated limestone sediments, which are less than 85 
metres in depth. Some islands and islets tend to be more stable than others, which are formed 
with migratory sand cays with unstable shoreline. Geophysical research shows than any sea-
level rise above 75 centimetres might trigger wave erosion of stable islets, by overtopping their 
stable reef platform. Hence there exists a threshold in sea-level rise, above which the effects of 
wave erosion would start disaggregating the atoll. The research concludes that ‘the risk of 
future inundation of island nations cannot be evaluated solely in terms of expected sea-level 
rise with respect to gross islet elevations’, but needs to take into account their geological 
morphology, and the existence of this threshold in seal-level rise, estimated at 0.75 metres 
(Dickinson 1999: 124). 
 
Furthermore, in the absence of any lake or river, resources of potable water depend 
exclusively on the rain water that is collected in tanks and reservoirs. Natural resources are 
extremely scarce, and most of the consumed food is now imported. The salinity of soils makes 
it almost impossible to grow any crops, apart from a vegetable garden run under the 






                                                
127 Ironically, this point is known as Mount Howard, in reference to former Australian Prime Minister John 
Howard, who famously refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
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Populat ion  
 
The population of Tuvalu, and of Funafuti in particular, has undergone considerable changes 
over the recent years. Tuvalu’s population slowly rose from the end of 19th century until the 
middle of the 20th century (from 2,497 inhabitants in 1876 to 3,994 in 1931), then expanded 
considerably during the second half of the 20th century, as shown in the table below: 
 
Island Area128 1947 1963 1968 1973 1979 1991 2002 Distribution129 Density130 
Funafuti 2.79 528 687 826 871 2,120 3,839 4,492 47.0 1,610 
Nanumea 3.87 746 1,051 1,076 977 844 824 664 6.9 172 
Nanumanga 2.78 524 544 585 587 605 644 589 6.2 212 
Niutao 2.53 644 797 796 907 866 749 663 6.9 262 
Nui 2.83 490 528 569 569 603 606 548 5.7 194 
Vaitupu 5.60 728 823 876 948 1,273 1,202 1,591 16.6 284 
Nukufetau 2.99 524 655 646 620 626 751 586 6.1 196 
Nukulaelae 1.82 282 317 354 343 347 353 393 4.1 216 
Niulakita 0.42 21 42 54 65 65 75 35 0.4 83 
Total 25.6 4,487 5,444 5,782 5,887 7,349 9,043 9,561 100.0 373 
 
Tuvalu’s population, 1947-2002. Sources: Connell 1983, Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
2005, own calculations 
 
 
Apart from the steep population increase, the most important feature of the demographic 
evolution of Tuvalu is most likely the internal migration from the outer islands to the main 
atoll, Funafuti. The first comprehensive review of internal migration was conducted in 1963, 
when the census asked respondents to provide data about their island of birth. Apart from 
Vaitupu and Funafuti, all other islands have had positive out-migration rates since then. The 
in-migration flows to Vaitupu and Funafuti have a straightforward explanation: Vaitupu is 
home to the country’s only boarding school, while Funafuti, as the country’s capital, 
underwent rapid economic development. The island has been home to new shops and 
services, including a hospital, which attracted many migrants, and it clearly appears that the 
accelerating pace of internal migration is associated with the economic development of 
Funafuti. 
                                                
128 Noted in square kilometres 
129 Noted in % 
130 Noted in persons per square kilometre 
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The total population of Funafuti was only of 871 inhabitants in 1973 (Bailey 1975), with a 
population density of 313 inhabitants per square kilometre; Funafuti’s population, 25 years 
later, is currently about 4,500, with an extremely high population density of 1,610 inhabitants 
per square kilometre. Overpopulation has thus become a major concern for the government, 
and one of the reasons why emigration is encouraged. The whole population is Polynesian, 






As most atoll countries, Tuvalu is particularly vulnerable to global economic change, due to 
low levels of income, low infrastructure and high level of dependency upon foreign aid. 
Besides fish, Tuvalu has very few natural resources. Its economy relies heavily on foreign aid, 
notably through a Trust Fund established in 1987 by the UK, Australia and New Zealand. 
This Trust Fund represents roughly 25 % of the GDP, while an additional 20 % is provided 
by remittances, mostly from sailors working at sea. Economic activity is overwhelmingly 
dominated by the public sector: two-thirds of all waged employment is concentrated in the 
public sector, one of the highest rates in the world (Connell 2003: 93). Only one third of the 
total workforce is formally employed, even though the statistics are somewhat misleading, 
domestic duties being not considered as unemployment (Tuvalu Government 2006). 
 
Tuvalu’s GDP per capita is about US$ 1,600. Most people make a living through exploitation 
of the sea and reefs, or thanks to remittances sent by members of their family abroad. 
Agriculture is extremely limited, mostly due to the salinity of the soils. Copra exports have 
stopped in the 1990s, due to low market rates, and culture of taro remains difficult. Fishing 
industry is not important, but Tuvalu benefits from licensing fees sold to distant nations. 
Manufacturing is almost non-existent, tourism is extremely limited and Tuvalu does not 
export any goods, apart from collectible stamps. 
 
Foreign aid remains the principal source of income for Tuvalu, and has sometimes led to 
poorly sustainable development projects which impacted upon the islands natural adaptation 
capacity. In the 1990s though, Tuvalu experienced some economic growth, mostly thanks to 
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some ‘unusual development strategies’, which included capital investment in the United States, 
the production of collectible postage stamps, and the renting of its telephone country code – 
688 – to phone sex companies131.  A major shift in Tuvalu’s economy occurred with the sale 
of the internet domain “.tv”, as mentioned earlier, which allowed for the development of the 
infrastructure in Funafuti, as well as for the membership in the United Nations and a 
continuous presence in New York. 
 
                                                
131 This latest venture, however, was quickly abandoned after moral concerns were raised. The venture capital 
investment in the United States has also come to an end. 
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2. General overview of New Orleans 
 
 
This section attempts to provide a short, general overview of the situation of New Orleans 
before Katrina hit. Katrina has often been portrayed as an ‘unnatural disaster’, which was 
more than just the consequence of an environmental hazard (Hartman and Squires 2006; 
Dyson 2006) Two aspects proved indeed particularly crucial with regard to the disaster, and 
shall be developed here: the ‘unnatural’ character of the city, and the social vulnerabilities of 
its inhabitants. 
 
An unnatural metropol i s132 
 
Many observers had warned already about the natural vulnerability of Katrina, and had 
stressed the risk of a major hurricane washing the city away (van Heerden and Bryan 2006; 
Brinkley 2006).  I shall not go into details of these natural vulnerabilities here, as they were 
well known and others have described them better than I could possibly do (Colten 2004; 
McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006). 
 
For now, let us simply mention that the natural vulnerability of New Orleans was not only due 
to its low elevation, below sea-level, but also to the chaotic alterations of its natural 
environment, which started at the beginning of the 19th century. The city had grown out of the 
historical French Quarter alongside the banks of Mississippi, in a disorganized and anarchic 
fashion: as the population expanded, levees were built and flood-prone neighbourhoods were 
developed (Colten 2004). Many experts had warned of the risks faced by the city in the case of 
a hurricane: they had pointed the geographical location of the city, under sea-level and nested 
between the Gulf of Mexico, the Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River, but also the 
degradation of the wetlands, the fragile and poorly maintained levees, or the alarming state of 
the pumps. They were not heard, and sometimes not even listened to (van Heerden and Bryan 
2006).  
 
                                                
132 The expression is borrowed from Colten (2004). 
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Early modifications of the natural environment were imposed by the economic development 
of the city. They included the creation of new neighbourhoods, the draining of marshlands, as 
well as the implementations of measures of flood controls. Colten (2004) shows that these 
significant modifications transformed New Orleans in an antithesis of nature, which was 
therefore particularly vulnerable to any natural hazards. Furthermore, these modifications had 
numerous adverse effects on minorities, who were compelled to live in the most vulnerable 
neighbourhoods, whereas the more affluent population could live in safer neighbourhoods 
such as the French Quarter or Garden City.   Thus environmental policies deeply affected the 
social geography of the city, and were marked by environmental racism, even though the term 
did not yet exist when these policies were designed. 
 
A ci ty marked by soc ial  vu lnerabi l i t i e s  
 
 
Abundant literature on disasters has shown that a natural hazard does not always result in a 
disaster, but only when the hazard hits in a context of social vulnerability (Oliver-Smith and 
Hoffman 2002).  The case of Katrina provides an example particularly telling of this 
interaction between natural hazards and social vulnerabilities. Before Katrina hit, the 
economic situation of New Orleans was dire already: the oil and gas industry had relocated to 
Texas, and economic opportunities, apart from tourism, were scarce. Louisiana was one of the 
poorest states in the United States, and 28% of New Orleans’ population lived below the 
poverty line. Amongst those, 84% were African Americans. One quarter of the population did 
not own a car, and many had never left the city.  
 
Overall, statistical surveys show that social vulnerabilities in New Orleans before Katrina were 
far higher than the American average (Fussell 2006; Laska and Morrow 2006): 
 
Pre-Katrina, New Orleans ranked second amongst US cities on to the degree to which poor 
families were clustered in extremely poor neighbourhoods (Berube and Katz 2005). About 
28% lived below the poverty line, compared to 13% on the national level, and 38% of 




About 60% of the pre-Katrina population were black, a figure that has now fallen to 40%. As 
mentioned in the previous section, black people were living in more flood-prone areas as a 
result of the development of the city from the 1940s onwards. As low-lying areas were drained 
and developed, the white population settled on higher grounds, leaving the inner city mostly 
inhabited by African Americans.  
 
About 17,000 elderly lived alone before Katrina. Though New Orleans’ overall number of 
elderly people was only slightly above the national average, 50% of them reported disabilities, 
against 40% nationwide. 
 
The rate of single-mother households among the total number of households was more than 
double the national average, at 56%. These households were also disproportionately poor: 
41% of them were living in poverty. More than 24% of women above 65 were poor, 
compared to a 12% national average. Gender-related vulnerabilities were amongst the most 
under-reported vulnerabilities before the disaster and in its immediate aftermath. 
 
Finally, the rate of tenants amongst the population was also far greater than the national 
average: 51% lived in rented property, against 31% on average.  
 
 
Overall, a striking feature of pre-Katrina New Orleans was the superposition of natural and 
social vulnerabilities: the latter were largely induced by the former, and set the ground for the 










1. What do you know about sea-level rise? Is it something you’re afraid of? 
2. How does sea-level rise impact on your everyday life? 
3. Do you think you’ll have to move eventually? Is it something you plan to do? Why 
(not)? 
4. Have you been offered to move already, or encouraged to do so? 
5. What should the government do? 
6. Do you think other governments have to get involved and deal with the problem? 
7. What do you think will happen? 
8. Do you know people who have moved already? Where did they move? How do you 




1. Are you now living in New Orleans? Where exactly? In what kind of housing? 
2. Before Katrina, where were you living in New Orleans? In what kind of housing? For 
how long had you lived in New Orleans? 
3. How did the evacuation take place? How long did you stay away (for returnees)? 
4. Were you expecting to return to your home soon afterwards, or did you make 
provisions for a longer stay? 
5. Where did you want to go? Were you able to go there? What made you choose your 
destination if you were able to do so? Where did you stay? Did you stay with 
friends/relatives, or on your own? 
6. Did you move with friends, family, or on your own? 
7. Have you established some networks at your destination? If yes, are they with other 
evacuees or with locals? 
8. If you have returned to your home, why did you do so? / If you have resettled 
elsewhere, why did you do so? 
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9. Do you plan to leave/return to New Orleans in the near future, or not? Why? If New 
Orleans were definitely safe from floods, would you choose to live there? Why? 
10. What protection and assistance was offered to you during the course of the evacuation 






4. People interviewed in Tuvalu, Fiji, Australia and New Zealand 
 
Expert s  and o f f i c ials  
 
 Name Place Function 
1 Susie Saitala Kofe Funafuti Chair, NGO Alofa Tuvalu 
2 Nala Ielemia Funafuti Wife of the Prime Minister 
3 Matia Toafa Funafuti Former Prime Minister 
4 Tito Isala Funafuti Historian 
5 Semese Alefaio Funafuti Tuvalu Association of NGOs 
6 Saufatu Sopoaga Funafuti Former Prime Minister 
7 Tataua Pese Funafuti Red Cross 
8 Eseta Lauti Funafuti Red Cross (President of local branch) 
9 Lalwa Silafaga Funafuti Radio journalist 
10 Puafitu Faaalo Funafuti Professor 
11 Enele Sopoaga Funafuti Former Ambassador at the UN 
12 Panapasi Nelesone Funafuti Secretary to the Governor 
13 Kelesoma Saloa Funafuti Secretary to the Prime Minister 
14 Avafoa Silu Funafuti Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
15 Enate Evi Funafuti Director of Environment Agency 
16 Salanoa Tinilau Funafuti Reverend 
17 Daniel Liao Funafuti Resident Ambassador of Taiwan 
18 Pulafagu Toafa Funafuti Tuvalu National Council of Women 
19 Pasemeta Sateko Talaapa Funafuti EU-NZAid In-Country Coordinator 
20 Kirk Yates Suva NZ Aid 
21 Ron Duncan Suva University of the South Pacific 
22 Lynda Newland Suva University of the South Pacific 
23 Jennifer Evans Suva University of the South Pacific 
24 Tine Leuelu Suva Tuvalu High Commissioner 
25 Pascal Dayez-Burgeon Suva French embassy 
26 John Collins Sydney Technical University, Sydney 
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27 John Connell Sydney University of Sydney 
28 James Prest Canberra Australian National University 
29 Bruce Kent Canberra Australian National University 
30 Rod Holesgrove Canberra Advisor to Bob Sercombe MP 
31 Max Philips Canberra Advisor to Kerry Nettle MP 
32 Michael Goldsmith Hamilton University of Waikato 
33 John Campbell Hamilton University of Waikato 
34 Don Will Wellington NZ Aid 
35 Brett Davies Wellington Immigration New Zealand 
36 Gareth Hughes Wellington Climate Coordinator, Green Party 
37 Ruth Laugesen Wellington Journalist, Star Times 
38 Shawn Shen Auckland University of Otago / Auckland 
39 Kaipati Tekavei Auckland Pastor, Tuvaluan community 
40 Paani Laupepa Auckland Former Tuvalu Interior Minister 
41 Paul Spoonley Auckland Massey University 
42 Jocelyn Carlin Auckland Journalist - Photographer 
 
 
 Res idents  
 
 Name Place Age Occupation 
1 Eti Eseta Funafuti 50 < Fisherman 
2 Risasi Finikaso Funafuti 30-50 Hotel manager 
3 Penieli Metia Funafuti 30-50 Shop owner 
4 Utala Ktaloka Funafuti 50 < Engineer 
5 Luisa Fakamua Funafuti 18-30 Shop owner 
6 Sakala Tekavatoetoe Funafuti 18-30 Handcrafter 
7 Suilia Toloa Funafuti 30-50 Teacher 
8 Kumitia Tekaai Funafuti 18-30 Housewife 
9 Lolani Ioapo Funafuti < 18 Student 
10 Simoe Foilape Funafuti < 18 Student 
11 Nofoalofa Petero Funafuti 30-50 Unemployed 
12 Oketopa Tinilau Auckland 18-30 Civil servant 
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13 Tomalu Talu Auckland 30-50 Unemployed 
14 Ani Hemokoa Auckland 30-50 Unemployed 
15 Molu Tavita Auckland 18-30 Student 
16 Peo Tefono Auckland 50 < Retiree 
17 Nouala Ofati Auckland 18-30 Student 
18 Laumua Taulialia Auckland 30-50 Housewife 





5. People interviewed in Louisiana and Texas 
 
Expert s  and o f f i c ials  
 
 Name Place Function 
1 John Kiefer New Orleans University of New Orleans 
2 Shirley Laska New Orleans University of New Orleans 
3 John Renne New Orleans University of New Orleans 
4 Susan Howell New Orleans University of New Orleans 
5 Robert Montjoy New Orleans University of New Orleans 
6 Peter Yaukey New Orleans University of New Orleans 
7 Clarice Kirkland New Orleans Mayor's Office 
8 Mary LeBlanc Baxter Renaissance Village trailer park 
9 Ezra Boyd Baton Rouge LSU Hurricane Center 
10 Marc Levitan Baton Rouge LSU Hurricane Center 
11 Ivor Van Heerden Baton Rouge LSU Hurricane Center 
12 Frederick Weil Baton Rouge LSU 
13 John Beggs Baton Rouge LSU 
14 Michael Leitner Baton Rouge LSU 
15 Nancy Maveety New Orleans Tulane University 
16 Elizabeth Fussell New Orleans Tulane University 
17 Lolis E. Elie New Orleans Journalist, Times-Picayune 
18 Mark Schleifstein New Orleans Journalist, Times-Picayune 
19 Tim Morris New Orleans Editor, Times-Picayune 
20 Chris Sluaghter New Orleans Journalist, WWL-TV 
21 Ed Blakely New Orleans Mayor's Recovery Office 
22 Paula Devlin New Orleans Editor; Times-Picayune 
23 Tara Young Washington* Journalist, The Washington Post 
24 Siva Blake New Orleans The Historic New Orleans Collection 
25 Jesse St Amant New Orleans Sherif, St Bernard parish 
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26 Dexter Accardo New Orleans Emergency manager, Plaquemines 
parish 
27 John Wildgen  New Orleans Emergency worker, New Orleans 
28 Col. Jeffrey A. Bedey New Orleans US Army Corps of Engineer 





 Name Place Age Occupation 
1 Annie Vic New Orleans 50 < Tour guide 
2 Marijke Albers New Orleans 50 < Retiree 
3 Arcenia Crayton Baxter 30-50 Unemployed 
4 Mary LeBlanc Baxter 30-50 Community 
organiser 
5 Marie-Françoise Crouch New Orleans 50 < Retiree 
6 Rob Speiser Boston* 18-30 Student 
7 Anthony Ishmael New Orleans 18-30 Construction 
worker 
8 Sarah Evans New Orleans 18-30 Student 
9 Johnson Caldwell New Orleans* < 18 Student 
10 Mary Altazan New Orleans 50 < Housewife 
11 Cornelia Whitlow New Orleans 50 < Retiree 
12 Paul Areinecke Charlotte, NC* 18-30 Employee 
13 Fred Berner Hammond 30-50 Contractor 
14 Vahe Baladouny Kenner 30-50 Employee 
15 Ibrahim Peña Houston, TX 18-30 Student 
16 Jamie Whiteman Houston, TX 30-50 Cook 
17 Ted Bogan Houston, TX 18-30 Hotel manager 
18 Clare Cahalan New Orleans 18-30 Part-time 
student 
19 Clara Rita Houston, TX 18-30 Barmaid 
20 Elise Ramsey Houston, TX 30-50 Unemployed 
21 Erika Wildgen Houston, TX 18-30 Architect 
 
* denotes an interview by phone. 
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8. Submission by the IOM, UNHCR, UNU, NRC and the RSG on the 






























10. Resolution 1655 of the Council of Europe on environmental 






Environmentally induced migration and displacement: a 21st century 
challenge 
Resolution 1655 (2009)1 
 
1.       Migration – both internal and cross-border – is one of the oldest coping 
strategies for dealing with a degradation of environmental conditions. 
However, the increase in the magnitude and geographical scale of 
environmental change caused or exacerbated by both climate change and 
human activity have led many in the academic circles and in the international 
community to refer to environmentally induced migration as a new type of 
phenomenon, and a new challenge for the 21st century. 
2.       The Parliamentary Assembly recognises that natural disasters and 
environmental degradation will increasingly determine the nature of human 
mobility as well as its humanitarian and human security dimensions, which will 
need to be urgently assessed. 
3.       It notes with concern the drastic estimates predicting unmanageable 
environmental migration flows. Already today, over 30 million people 
worldwide are being displaced because of the increase in desertification, 
droughts, sea-level rise, industrial accidents, major infrastructure projects and 
extreme weather events, and this figure is rising sharply. Alarmingly, this 
figure already exceeds the number of those obliged to flee because of armed 
conflicts and persecution. 
4.       Most in danger are vulnerable groups in the least developed countries 
whose capacity to prevent, adapt to and reduce the effects of climate change 
is extremely poor, those residing in low-lying costal areas and areas of 
considerable over-population. Europe is not immune to the consequences of 
climate change and environmentally induced migration either. 
5.       Environmentally induced migration is rarely mono-causal. The cause-
consequence relations are increasingly complex and multi-factorial. A growing 
number of people flee because of multiple causes of discrimination and human 
rights abuses, environmental degradation, competition for scarce resources 
and economic hardship caused by dysfunctional states. Some leave 
voluntarily, some flee because there is no other choice; and some may make 
the decision to move before they have no other choice but to flee. The 
different degrees of force and the complex set of influencing factors blurs the 
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traditional concepts of migration and displacement, creating confusion among 
the academia and the international community about whether to talk about 
migration or displacement in the case of people fleeing disasters and 
environmental degradation. 
6.       The interaction between the environment and migration is a two-way 
process: besides sudden or slow on-set environmental disasters leading to 
both internal and cross-border movements of people, massive migration for 
environmental reasons may in turn affect environmental conditions both in 
areas of origin and destination and the transit routes in between, notably 
when large concentrations of people are forced to seek refuge in other 
ecologically fragile areas. The Assembly deems it an urgency to develop better 
understanding of the net impact of migration on the environment in areas of 
concern. 
7.       Migration can also be a positive and proactive diversification and 
development strategy that households, individuals and sometimes whole 
communities adopt to improve their lives and reduce risk and vulnerability. 
Mass migration can however have negative impacts, including escalating 
humanitarian crisis, rapid urbanisation, associated slum growth and stagnated 
development. 
8.       One of the most fundamental issues in climate change and 
environmentally induced migration is that it is a global process, not a local 
crisis. Hence it is the responsibility of the global community and not only that 
of local and national authorities to engage in proactive intervention. Adequate 
measures for prevention, adaptation and mitigation need to be taken by the 
global community in order for the “hotspot” countries to reduce their 
vulnerability to the impacts of environmental disasters and manage the 
evolution of environmental processes. 
9.       Mass population flows, caused by scarcity of resources coupled with 
state mismanagement and poor governance can lead to instability and 
provoke conflict situations. Such conflicts could result in increased refugee 
flows and internal population displacement and, more generally, could reduce 
global political stability and human security. The Assembly believes that, in 
order to avoid such negative scenarios, Europe should be at the forefront in 
addressing the growing and shared challenge of environmentally induced 
migration and displacement. 
10.       Vulnerable groups such as women, children, the elderly, persons with 
disabilities and indigenous peoples in the poorest countries are exposed to 
cumulative vulnerabilities and require special consideration. The elderly leave 
their home areas and have few possibilities of adapting. Children are cut off 
from their ethnic and cultural environments and, in many cases, from 
everyday communication in their mother tongues, which is an important factor 
in their upbringing and their understanding of the world. The Assembly 
particularly observes that, due to traditional female roles and activities in 
many societies, women are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change 
than men. It underlines the importance of recognising gender specific impacts 
of climate change from the outset of policy setting. 
11.       The majority of migratory movements prompted by climate change 
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and environmental degradation are expected to occur within countries, 
although increased cross-border movement of people will also occur. The 
Assembly maintains that all the affected persons, whether or not they leave 
their country, need to be properly protected as regards their human, social 
and economic rights. Furthermore, this protection should include reliance on 
effective support from the international community if national support is 
lacking or insufficient. 
12.       The Assembly is concerned about the lack of consensus within the 
international community as regards the applicable international legal 
terminology concerning human mobility associated with environmental 
disasters and degradation. The variety of terms interchangeably used today 
hinders the much-needed progress on the recognition and legal protection of 
environmental migrants and displaced persons. 
13.       The difficulty arises from different approaches to the concept of 
migration, which itself lacks a universal definition. The humanitarian 
organisations advocate the need to maintain a distinction between cross-
border migration and internal displacement, voluntary and forced movements, 
in fear of undermining the existing categories they are mandated to protect. 
They argue that the definition of internally displaced persons as stipulated in 
the 1998 United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement already 
includes persons or groups who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave 
their homes or places of habitual residence as a result or in order to avoid 
natural or human-made disasters. 
14.       Various development agencies focusing on broader population and 
development issues, on the other hand, prefer to talk about environmental 
migration as an overarching concept, inclusive of all persons who have an 
environmental factor as the major driver for movement. They maintain that 
migration includes both international and internal, voluntary and forced 
categories of movement, and everything in between. 
15.       The Assembly welcomes the recent efforts undertaken by the informal 
United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee in aspiring to establish 
commonly accepted terminology and concepts. From its own perspective, it 
sees the need to cover the full range of human mobility caused by 
environmental factors implying any length of time and degree of possibility of 
return, while upholding the universally adopted protection standards 
prescribed in international law and normative frameworks. 
16.       The Assembly observes that whereas there exists a large body of well-
established international, regional and national legal instruments, conventions 
and norms to protect the rights of people forcibly displaced by conflict and 
persecution, and to some extent by natural disasters or conflicts over 
resources, many gaps remain in the existing protection frameworks. 
Particularly for those considered to have moved due to gradual environmental 
degradation, there may be normative and operational protection gaps, 
internally and internationally. In addition, when it comes to the small island 
states that risk becoming submerged, there may be a serious gap in the 
existing international treaties on statelessness. 
17.       Whereas these gaps need to be more thoroughly researched, and 
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while emphasising the need to recognise existing protection instruments (for 
example, for environmentally displaced persons under the Guiding Principles), 
the Assembly observes that no legal framework or defined policy exists that 
would cover the full scope of environmentally induced migration in the widest 
sense of the term. It therefore calls upon international organisations active in 
this field to consider the elaboration of a specific framework for the recognition 
and protection of environmental migrants, either in a separate convention or 
as parts of multilateral environmental treaties, or as both. 
18.        Alternatively, the Assembly encourages the respective United Nations 
agencies to consider extending the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
to include persons displaced by gradual environmental degradation, while in 
parallel creating a similar synthesis of existing international law on external 
displacement in the form of principles. 
19.       In this context, and in particular with reference to its Recommendation 
1631 (2003) on internal displacement in Europe, the Assembly expresses its 
continued support to the humanitarian action and normative frameworks 
developed over the last decade to protect the internally displaced persons 
through the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Ten years after the 
adoption of this unique source of guidance for providing assistance and 
protection to people forced to move within the borders of their countries, it is 
time to question whether time has come to enhance its impact not only by 
ensuring that its principles are enshrined in national legislation but also 
through working it into a binding instrument, as is presently being done by the 
African Union. 
20.       The Assembly remains concerned by the fact that there is not a single 
international organisation today that explicitly focuses on the problems and 
protection of people moving or having to move their places of habitual 
residence mainly or exclusively for environmental reasons. It recognises the 
leading role that the United Nations agencies, particularly the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (for example in the humanitarian protection 
cluster), have to play in providing protection and humanitarian assistance to 
those fleeing environmental disasters. 
21.       In addition to humanitarian action, the Assembly encourages an 
effective co-ordination structure to be established that would pull the various 
international agencies and stakeholders together. To this end, it invites a co-
ordinating commission for environmental migration to be created with a 
mission to co-ordinate the work of international organisations that focus on 
different aspects of the problem of environmentally induced migration, 
including through risk reduction, humanitarian response, adaptation and 
development. 
22.       The Assembly regrets that, when natural disasters occur, consequent 
environmental displacement and migration do not figure in disaster statistics. 
In the absence of an overarching organisation collecting or assembling 
statistics on non-conflict displacement, it urges the international humanitarian 
community and all countries falling victim of natural disasters to include - to 
the extent possible - the internally displaced and cross-border migrants in 
disaster statistics. 
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23.       The adaptation policies aimed at the protection of health and 
livelihoods of developing countries’ populations are essential in dealing with 
those impacts of climate change that became unavoidable. Such policies must 
be strengthened and supported through international development assistance. 
24.       In the light of the above, the Assembly calls upon its member states 
to: 
 24.1.       support the adoption of a clearly defined and inclusive working 
definition that covers all forms of movement from voluntary to forced 
and includes the full range of human mobility caused by environmental 
factors to be applied by state institutions and humanitarian 
organisations involved in the assistance to and effective protection of 
those concerned; such definition should be consistent with international 
and regional standards and recognise the different protection needs and 
rights of those affected; 24.2.       take adequate measures to reduce 
the vulnerability of developing countries to the impacts of 
environmental disasters and manage the evolution of environmental 
processes; 24.3.       undertake a comprehensive study, including 
primary data collection, and develop policies assessing the complex 
interaction of environmental change, migration, displacement and 
conflict; 24.4.       contribute, through active participation in the work of 
the international organisations dealing with this issue, to the 
investigation of existing gaps in law and protection mechanisms with a 
view to an eventual elaboration of a new international convention 
providing internationally assured protection to people displaced because 
of environmental degradation and natural and man-made disasters 
when return is impossible; 24.5.       pre-empt the work at international 
level by elaborating national legislation that would recognise 
environmentally induced migrants and their protection needs not only 
through the principle of non-refoulement under Articles 2 and 3 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights but also through subsidiary 
protection, e.g. granting them a status of temporary humanitarian 
residence or a permanent status in case of impossibility of 
return; 24.6.       promote multi-disciplinary research involving climate 
science, geography, migration, development and energy studies, 
disaster studies, environmental studies, social cohesion and health with 
a view to improved understanding and recognition of the links between 
the movement of people and environmental factors; 24.7.       promote 
policy coherence at national and international levels among migration, 
development, and humanitarian policies and adaptation policies to 
climate change, including by supporting the inclusion of migration and 
displacement consequences of climate change in the UNFCCC' 
successor-agreement to the Kyoto Protocol; 24.8.       take into account 
a gender perspective when elaborating national and international 
policies and protection frameworks on environmentally induced 
migration. 
25.       The Assembly further calls upon the European Union to take the above 
into consideration while elaborating their comprehensive immigration policy 
strategy. This strategy is needed at pan-European, regional, national and local 
levels. It should improve risk anticipation and management and disaster 
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response, offer adequate protection to the victims of climate and 
environmental disruptions and provide instruments for compensation and 
resettlement. It should also encourage awareness raising and sensitivity of the 
populations and authorities concerned. 
26.       In particular, the Assembly encourages the European Union to use the 
ongoing amendment process outlined in the Policy Plan on Asylum for better 
addressing the protection gap in cross-border environmental displacement. 
The Finnish and Swedish legislation and case-law should be more looked into 
to see whether it could serve as best-practice or even a model for a new sub-
paragraph, thereby explicitly recognising cross-border environmentally 
displaced persons in Europe. 
27.       The Assembly further calls upon the European Union to create an 
appropriate system of funding, at European level, supporting prevention and 
adaptation strategies, development and migration management projects as 
well as improved humanitarian response. 
28.       The Assembly is convinced that the time to address the dangerous 
environmental degradation including climate change is now. Action for this 
must be co-ordinated and swift: policy makers, the scientific community, civil 
society and other actors - at both national and international levels - must seek 
common solutions for those people who are currently or who may be induced 
to migrate in order to seek safe and sustainable existences. 
 
1 Assembly debate on 30 January 2009 (9th Sitting) (see Doc. 11785, report of 
the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population, rapporteur: Mrs 
Acketoft, and Doc. 11814, opinion of the Committee on the Environment, 
Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs, rapporteur: Mr Ivanov). Text 
adopted by the Assembly on 30 January 2009 (9th Sitting). 




11. Recommendation 1862 of the Council of Europe on environmental 
migration – 30 January 2009 
 
Provisional edition 
Environmentally induced migration and displacement: a 21st century 
challenge 
Recommendation 1862 (2009)1 
 
1.       Referring to its Resolution 1655 (2009) on “Environmentally induced 
migration and displacement: a 21st century challenge”, the Parliamentary 
Assembly draws attention to the numerous activities carried out by the Council 
of Europe in relation to the environment and migration. 
2.       It welcomes the work the Committee of Ministers has previously 
undertaken in elaborating the European Convention on the Legal Status of 
Migrant Workers (ETS No. 093) as well as in promoting the United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, leading to the adoption of 
Committee of Ministers Rec(2006)6 on Internally Displaced Persons. These 
recommendations are in line with the 1998 United Nations Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement, which include also “persons displaced from their 
homes or places of habitual residence due to natural or man-made disasters”. 
3.       The Assembly recalls the Council of Europe's duty to promote the 
universal protection of human rights of all vulnerable groups and to improve, 
whenever necessary, the legislation to this end. It encourages member states 
to assume a pioneering role in standard setting in the field of protection of 
people compelled to leave their homes mainly or exclusively for environmental 
reasons. 
4.       The Assembly is concerned about the various gaps in international 
human rights and refugee law, which leaves various categories of people 
fleeing environmental disasters internally or by crossing international borders, 
including European borders, without adequate legal protection. 
5.       It is equally concerned that people in Europe have no specific legal 
remedy against human-induced environmental degradation and climate 
change that affects their health and safety. 
6.       Consequently, the Assembly invites the Committee of Ministers to: 
 6.1.       launch a dialogue among its member states with a view to 
promoting understanding of the existence and scale of the problems 
related to environmentally induced migration and encouraging 
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concerted action. This action should aim at either improving the existing 
international protection framework or complementing the latter by 
elaboration of new binding instruments, and prioritise the challenges of 
prevention, adaptation and development as integral elements of the 
international response;  
 6.2.       set up a working group, in co-operation with other European 
institutions, to carry out a comprehensive legal study on the gaps in 
existing international law and normative regulations with a view to an 
eventual elaboration of a European framework convention for the 
recognition of status of environmental migrants, should this be deemed 
necessary;  
 6.3.       consider adding an additional protocol to the European Convention 
on Human Rights, concerning the right to a healthy and safe 
environment; such a protocol would introduce the precautionary 
principle in the Convention and would reflect the way the concept of 
“human rights” has evolved since the Convention was drafted;  
 6.4.       continue to urge member states to incorporate the United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the thirteen principles 
elaborated in Recommendation Rec(2006)6 of the Committee of 
Ministers in their national legislation;  
 6.5.       encourage its United Nations and other relevant partners to seek 
avenues for extending the Guiding Principles to include people displaced 
by gradual environmental degradation processes, and to consider 
developing similar Guiding Principles or Guidelines to cover the rights of 
those moving across international borders for compelling environmental 
reasons (“external displacement”);  
 6.6.       avail its expertise on legal, environment and migration issues to the 
United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee working group or any 
other international co-operation body set up for the purpose of setting 
standards for the protection of environmental migrants;   
 6.7.       adopt a recommendation calling on member states to develop in 
their spatial planning policies a common European approach to 
preventing and managing extreme climate events as the main cause of 
environmental migration;  
 6.8.       encourage dialogue between environmental, migration and 
demographic research centres in Council of Europe member states to 
widen and deepen the understanding of root causes of environmentally 
induced migration;  
 6.8.       prioritise the actions of the Council of Europe Development Bank 
that contribute to protecting and improving the environment. Projects 
that provide appropriate responses to urgent needs and to sustainable 
prevention action of environmental deterioration in a long-term 
perspective should be particularly supported; 
  6.9.       support, in co-operation with international and financial 
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institutions, the development of programmes for helping the public to 
adapt to the inevitable effects of climate change so as to reduce 
migration flows resulting from environmental factors. 
 
1 Assembly debate on 30 January 2009 (9th Sitting) (see Doc. 11785, report of the 
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population, rapporteur: Mrs Acketoft, and Doc. 
11814, opinion of the Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local and 
Regional Affairs, rapporteur: Mr Ivanov). Text adopted by the Assembly on 30 January 





12. Belgian Senate – Proposition of resolution aiming to promote the 
adoption of an environmental refugee status in international 
conventions (Doc. 3-1556/3, 21 March 2006) 
 
3-1556/3 3-1556/3 
Sénat de Belgique 
SESSION DE 2005-2006 
21 MARS 2006 
 
Proposition de résolution visant à la reconnaissance dans les 
conventions internationales du statut de réfugié environnemental 
TEXTE ADOPTÉ PAR LA COMMISSION DES RELATIONS 
EXTÉRIEURES ET DE LA DÉFENSE 
Proposition de résolution visant à promouvoir la reconnaissance 






A. Considérant que le Programme Environnemental des Nations unies (PNUE) définit les 
réfugiés environnementaux comme des personnes forcées de quitter leurs habitations 
traditionnelles d'une façon temporaire ou permanente, à cause d'une dégradation (naturelle ou 
humaine) nette de leur environnement qui bouleverse gravement leur cadre de vie et/ou qui 
déséquilibre sérieusement leur qualité de vie. 
B. Considérant que chaque changement physique, chimique et/ou biologique dans 
l'écosystème qui le rend temporairement ou en permanence inapte pour une habitation 
humaine est considéré comme une dégradation de l'environnement (PNUE, 1985). 
C. Considérant que, selon le constat établi par une étude de l'Institut pour la sécurité 
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environnementale et humaine (ISEH) de l'Université des Nations unies (UNU, Bonn) rendue 
publique le 11 octobre 2005, 50 millions de personnes pourraient devenir des « réfugiés 
environnementaux » au cours des prochaines années. 
D. Considérant que la montée du niveau des mers, le phénomène de désertification, les 
canicules ou les inondations obligeront prochainement des populations entières à quitter leurs 
lieux de résidence pour aller s'établir dans des régions où le climat est plus accueillant. 
E. Considérant qu'il y a des craintes bien fondées selon lesquelles les populations fuyant des 
conditions environnementales invivables pourraient croître de façon exponentielle au cours 
des prochaines années, alors que la planète subit des effets du changement climatique et 
d'autres phénomènes comme la désertification. 
F. Considérant que la dégradation de l'environnement peut avoir des origines naturelles 
(tornades, cyclones, éruptions volcaniques, tremblements de terre, etc.) ou directement causées 
par des activités humaines (déforestation des forêts tropicales, construction de grands 
barrages, catastrophes nucléaires, pollution, etc.). 
G. Considérant que la dégradation de l'environnement peut aussi être une association de 
causes humaines et naturelles (inondations, sécheresses provoquée par des changements 
climatiques). 
H. Considérant que selon l'ONU, la communauté internationale devra donc faire face à des 
mouvements de population importants au cours des prochaines années et qu'il est nécessaire 
que cette nouvelle catégorie de réfugiés environnementaux puisse trouver une place dans le 
cadre d'accords internationaux existant. 
I. Considérant qu'à l'heure actuelle, les réfugiés environnementaux ne sont pas encore 
reconnus dans les conventions internationales, comme c'est le cas pour les réfugiés politiques, 
et de ce fait ils n'ont donc pas accès aux mêmes ressources financières ou aux services de 
santé auxquels ont droit les réfugiés politiques. 
J. Considérant que 20 millions de personnes ont déjà été déplacées à cause de problèmes liés 
à des formes diverses de dégradation de l'environnement, de l'érosion des terres arables à la 
pollution des nappes phréatiques, précisent les experts de l'ONU. 
K. Considérant que le problème posé par les réfugiés environnementaux est lié à leur statut 
juridique car selon l'article 1er de la Convention de Genève, un réfugié est une personne qui 
craint, avec raison, d'être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son 
appartenance à un certain groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques et qui ne peut ou ne 
veut pas retourner dans son pays en raison de cette crainte. 
L. Considérant que l'avenir des réfugiés environnementaux passe donc par la reconnaissance 
juridique de leur existence pour permettre aux différentes organisations d'accomplir leur 
mission. 
 
DEMANDE AU GOUVERNEMENT: 
1. de promouvoir et de soutenir au sein des Nations unies la reconnaissance du statut de 
réfugié environnemental, afin qu'une solution juridique soit apportée au problème de ces 
réfugiés, et ce dans le cadre de la Convention de Genève sur les réfugiés; 
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2. de veiller à mettre cette question à l'ordre du jour d'un prochain Conseil des ministres de la 
Justice et des Affaires intérieures de l'Union européenne; 
3. de saisir le Conseil du développement durable de la question.  
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15. Belgian House of Representatives – Proposition of Resolution 
aiming for the recognition of a specific status for climate refugees 





























16. Belgian House of Representatives – Proposition of resolution 
related to the consideration and creation of a status of 
environmental refugee by the United Nations and the European 































17. Draft Convention on the International Status of Environmentally-























































20. Cover of the Times-Picayune, 2 September 2005 
 
 
